Putin seems to have concluded that Russia must draw the line at Ukraine. The EU bid to sign trade agreement with Ukraine in December drew Russia’s ire and now Russia has moved to make Crimea its part thus changing the borders in Europe once again and deepening the distrust between Russia and the West at a time when serious issues like Syria, Iran and Afghanistan are yet to be resolved.
The West will be compelled by their own threats to impose economic sanctions against Russia. But Russia is no Iraq or Iran and may very well retaliate against Western companies, for example, Exxon Mobile is active in Russia and there are 6,000 German companies in Russia.
While President Putin has conveyed the message of tough military action, it is highly unlikely that he will order his troops to invade the majority ethnic Russian region of Crimea. Military brinkmanship can be seen as an attempt to force the West to include Russia as a partner in settlement of the crisis.
Russia has signalled its intentions in Crimea. With neither the US nor Europe willing to be engaged in another crisis in Eastern Europe, the Russian strategy would be to re-enter the scenario not as a junior partner of the West but as a recognized primary power in the region, without whom Ukraine cannot be stabilised.
Central Asia remains both stable and unpredictable after 20 years of its reemergence. The states here continue to undergo complex nation-building process, which is far from complete. The book is an attempt to provide an overview of political and strategic processes at work in the region by taking the case of Kyrgyzstan – tracing the events erupted since 2005 and more after 2010.
The India-China relations in 2013, in spite Depsang incident, had a more positive than negative tone. Premier Li chose India as his first overseas stop and the pronouncement to deepen ties with India as “strategic choice” along with promise to make “greater efforts” to resolve boundary issue. Equally positive voice came from the Indian leadership for rejecting the relevance of “containment” in favour of “cooperation” that could bring more gains instead.
In this final part of the Policy Paper series, P Stobdan deliberates that if India and China make a calibrated move for working together in Afghanistan, the outcome could be more harmonizing than conflicting. So when India reviews its post-2014 Afghan policy, the China factor should not be seen in a zero-sum perception for many in the West may press India playing a countervailing role to China.
In this third part of the Policy Paper series, P Stobdan argues that India should continue to remain engaged in Asia-Pacific for reasons not only confined to mercantile interest but also because it is an arena shaping the major powers behaviour. At the same, a regional rebalancing and attention to equally critical Central and West Asia will broaden India’s prospects for shaping the global order.
In this second-part of the Policy Paper series, P Stobdan suggests that in the recent Indian strategic discourse, commentators have been exulting the US ‘Asia Pivot’ and seriously hoped that the idea will offset China’s regional outreach, for it also appeared similar to India’s own ‘Look East’ policy, which to an extent enabled New Delhi to ruffle a few feathers in the East Asian region.
In a 4-part series of Policy Papers, P Stobdan analyses India's response to the global shifts and how India’s strategic perception seems to have altered dramatically in the recent years. What it essentially means is that embracing the cold-war perception or adopting any containment strategy is unlikely to be enduring in the longer run.
Crimean crisis: A New Phase of Cold War?
Putin seems to have concluded that Russia must draw the line at Ukraine. The EU bid to sign trade agreement with Ukraine in December drew Russia’s ire and now Russia has moved to make Crimea its part thus changing the borders in Europe once again and deepening the distrust between Russia and the West at a time when serious issues like Syria, Iran and Afghanistan are yet to be resolved.