Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD)

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  • The Agni-II Trial Failure: Evaluation rather than Flagellation is needed

    The Agni family has had a successful series of user trials extending over several variants and a number of years which should give some confidence in the robustness of the design, development, testing and induction process.

    May 15, 2017

    Prasad M.V. asked: When both MTCR & Hague Code of Conduct aim to prevent the proliferation of ballistic missile, what is the difference between them?

    A. Vinod Kumar replies: The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is an export control grouping, on the lines of the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), which issues norms and guidelines on the export (or transfer) of missiles and/or related materials and technologies. The Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC), as the nomenclature indicates, is a code of conduct expected of states in handling their ballistic missile systems or inventories.

    Impressions on China’s Second Missile Interceptor Test

    The second Chinese BMD test has a message for India: propel the development of long-range (exo-atmospheric) interception capabilities to mitigate the possibility of further asymmetry on strategic forces.

    February 22, 2013

    Managing India’s Missile Aspirations

    The Agni-VI and Prahaar both signify unnecessary missile projects, which have been developed in the interests of DRDO technical and bureaucratic ambitions rather than the stated interests of India’s nuclear doctrine.

    February 10, 2013

    China’s ‘Anti-ship Ballistic Missile’ based Anti-access Concept: Implications of a Southward Re-orientation

    The Chinese efforts towards actualization of the ‘offshore defense’ concept which entails the conduct of campaigns in distant waters, strategic deterrence and counterattacks, has an inherent risk of bringing its naval forces on a confrontational course vis-à-vis other maritime forces, particularly the US. To defend itself against overarching US maritime superiority in such a scenario, China has developed its Anti-access and Area Denial (A2AD) concept, predicated mainly around the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile.

    January 2013

    Ballistic Missile Proliferation: Implications for India

    To counter the consequences flowing from growing ballistic missile proliferation in its neighbourhood, India must expand its BMD programme to include boost phase and mid-course phase intercept capability.

    December 19, 2012

    NASR: A Disadvantage for Pakistan

    It makes little sense whether a strategic or tactical nuclear weapon is used by Pakistan, since India’s general response would be to carry out a punitive attack on the adversary.

    August 19, 2011

    North Korea and Iran Partner in Ballistic Missiles Trade

    If peace is to prevail in East Asia, Pyongyang must abandon its uranium enrichment programme and all aspects of its nuclear programme should be placed under international monitoring.

    May 19, 2011

    Making Sense of ‘Nasr’

    In rethinking Cold Start as a default option and working towards proactive ‘contingency’ options, India is a step ahead in doctrinal shadow boxing.

    April 24, 2011

    Ankur asked: What is the most important objective that China wants to achieve through the development of ASBM?

    Ramesh V Phadke replies: If by ASBN you mean the Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile DF-21 modified to carry a conventional warhead to target a moving ship/carrier battle group on the high seas, then it is to deter any involvement of the US Navy in a possible future Taiwan conflict.

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