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  • Competing Exceptionalisms: US-India Defence Relationship

    This article analyses US-India strategic relations and the potential role of defence trade. First, it argues that cooperative relations between the two countries are hindered by “competing exceptionalisms” and the lack of a pre-existing model for the relationship. At the same time, bilateral relations are being strengthened by a convergence of interests and increasing societal linkages. Even on issues that have historically divided New Delhi and Washington-such as relations with third countries-there is a more nuanced understanding of differing perspectives in both capitals.

    April 2012

    A Critique of MoD’s Joint Venture Guidelines

    The intention of the JV guidelines notwithstanding, the policy document suffers from certain weaknesses which may impact its objective of enhancing national defence industrial capability.

    March 05, 2012

    Private Sector Participation in Defence Production: Industrial Licensing and FDI Issues

    Notwithstanding positive developments over the last decade, certain grey areas in industrial licensing and FDI policy need further improvement to facilitate the private sector’s more meaningful participation in the Indian defence industry.

    January 27, 2012

    Time to Act on the Defence Industry Front

    International economic circumstances are propitious for India and Indian defence companies to strike deals that would help reduce dependence on foreign sources for defence needs.

    November 29, 2011

    A Case for Increasing FDI up to 100 per cent in India’s Defence Industry

    Given the sensitivity attached to defence-related FDI, each investment should be subject to wider review and impact analysis following which the FDI percentage could be determined varying between zero and 100 per cent.

    August 09, 2011

    An American Solution to India’s Defence Acquisition Problem?

    India’s increasing reliance on FMS route is indicative of its desperation to bridge the gaps in its defence preparedness and shows the weakness of the Defence Procurement Procedure.

    October 08, 2010

    Defining a New Conceptual Framework: Defence Economic Infrastructure

    If basic equipment shortfalls that the defence sectors face are to be addressed, then Indian defence planners need to use the DEI framework to create solution models.

    September 20, 2010

    Shakil Husain asked: May India develop a military industrial complex? What are the prospects?

    Ali Ahmed: The term 'military-industrial complex' acquired negative connotations since its use as such by Eisenhower in his farewell address. The apprehension is that such a complex would acquire its own interest and thereby fuel armaments and arms racing. This is what transpired in the US in its arming across breadth and depth in both the nuclear and conventional dimensions. Clearly, this is not how India views itself or envisages its future. Instead, it prefers the term 'defence industrial base'. Its history of conquest and as a once colonised state is attributed, among other reasons, to deficiencies in military technology. Consequently it is resolved to be better prepared in defending its freedoms. The template for this endeavour was set up early, in the Nehruvian period itself. Today, India has a technological edge conferred by the DRDO, as also a production system based on OFB and major PSUs. It has decided to reduce the external content in its armaments to 30 per cent. Given that its growing economy permits greater resources for allocation to defence (even though the percentage is maintained at 2-2.5 per cent of the GDP), it has evolved its Defence Procurement Procedure over the last half a decade so as to bring in private sector participation in defence production. The private sector is enabled to do so in partnership with foreign defence companies. Additionally, the companies from abroad are required to broaden the defence production base by transfer of technology through the programme of offsets. These measures would enlarge India's capacity. India would nevertheless require to be alert to the phenomenon observed elsewhere of armaments build up acquiring its own logic.

    Sumit Sinha asked: What are the characteristics of amphibious operations doctrine of Indian defence organizations?

    Ali Ahmed replies: The joint amphibious operations doctrine for the Indian Armed Forces has been laid down by HQ IDS. It is based on the existing excellent pamphlet on these operations. The issue is also covered in brief in India's Maritime Doctrine published last year. An amphibious operations capability is necessary in light of India's island territories, interests in the Indian Ocean and for an out of area capability if necessary. The formations and assets that are to be employed are earmarked and rehearsed in their roles. The Andaman & Nicobar Command has a major responsibility in this. ANC's Army brigade is readily available for the task. In addition, as in the eighties, it is possible that Army formations in the peninsula are also dual tasked accordingly. The air assets can be assembled with ease, given the flexibility inherent in the Air Force. The Navy has INS Jalashwa and other ships that can take part. Exercises have been held periodically beginning with Trishakti of the mid-eighties. The amphibious operations capability is also relevant in possible future conflicts and would be deployed for posturing, even if not actually employed. The major characteristics would be flexibility, speed of deployment, security both physical and of information, vulnerability both at sea and on landing, etc. The nuclear factor cannot be discounted as well.

    Food for Thought: Optimising Defence Spending

    While India’s latest defence budget has no doubt catered for a sizeable capital component, it may be prudent to reduce costs by switching to more affordable programmes.

    May 07, 2010

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