New Delhi has long countenanced the idea of extra-regional operations. The Maritime Military Strategy published in 2007, for instance, lists the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean among ‘secondary areas’ of endeavour for the Indian sea services. ‘Areas of secondary interest will come in where there is a direct connection with areas of primary interest, or where they impinge on the deployment of future maritime forces.’ 1 The South China Sea abuts the Indian Ocean, the most compelling zone of primary interest for New Delhi, through the Malacca Strait.

In a nutshell the article posits that American naval power, and thus the United States' ability to police the seas, will continue to decline, and that Washington is attempting to compensate by fashioning a new paradigm of multinational maritime security. With no likely candidate for a global navy in the offing the challenge is to create one or more multinational guarantors of free navigation. I attempt to gaze into the future, discerning the likely dynamics of this coalition-building project.

As high-profile incidents of piracy become more common off Somalia, strategists have taken to urging the US government to send expeditionary forces ashore. The article uses history and Clausewitzian theory to estimate the nature of the threat and the likely efficacy of a land campaign. Even successful operations would entail costs exceeding the value of the political stakes. For this reason alone, going ashore is inadvisable.