The India–China nuclear-strategic relationship has been surprisingly under studied, given the rising interest in the strategic interaction between the two countries. 1 Part of the reason is that India's nuclear capabilities have been relatively limited vis-à-vis China, though this is exaggerated by the tendency among Indian analysts to focus on the need to target Beijing. There is no evident reason why China should not be deterred by the targeting of other cities that are closer to India.
Dr. Quinlan and I are in fundamental agreement on the validity of nuclear deterrence as a national security strategy because the possibility of nuclear use cannot be ruled out. Where we disagree is on the conceptual basis for formulating such a strategy. Dr. Quinlan finds my minimalist approach to deterrence unsatisfactory because it rests on a very small number of historical cases in which states with large arsenals were deterred by states with far smaller ones.
India-Pakistan relations are best understood as an example of nuclear rivalry, in which nuclear weapons both exacerbate and limit hostility. In all such relationships, the minimal possession of nuclear weapons suffices to deter. Both India and Pakistan have adopted a minimalist posture, yet their strategic thinking tends to be inconsistent, which makes them vulnerable to needless expansion. This essay points to the conceptual basis for an optimal doctrine.
