Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

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  • Prateek asked: Why did India ratify the Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC) which seems to go against certain clauses of the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLNDA)?

    G. Balachandran replies: No party to CSC has raised any objection to India’s accession on the ground that CLNDA is inconsistent with the provisions of CSC. The CSC too does not impose any obligation to which India may have an objection. Finally, in case of a nuclear incident in India, CSC may provide additional resources for compensation.

    Two standoffs and some nuclear lessons

    standoffs in Doklam and North Korea

    The standoffs in Doklam and North Korea offer insights on how crisis stability remains subject to the complexities of deterrence, especially in theatres with multiple nuclear-armed states, and what this entails for disarmament.

    December 29, 2017

    The Clarion Call from the Atolls: Marshall Islands Puts the Nuclear Powers on Notice

    The Clarion Call from the Atolls: Marshall Islands Puts the Nuclear Powers on Notice

    The pivotal question is whether a judicial intervention, in the absence of any political stimulus, can make a meaningful difference to the disarmament movement.

    April 06, 2016

    The discreet silence on the NPT

    The discreet silence on the NPT

    The collective silence of the guardians and the state-parties by no means signifies the NPT’s good health, especially when they continue to emphasise upon the slow pace of disarmament and enduring pressures on the non-proliferation regime.

    March 02, 2015

    India and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime - The Perennial Outlier

    India and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime - The Perennial Outlier

    Publisher: Cambridge University Press
    ISBN 978-11-0705-662-6
    Price: Rs.895/-
    The book describes India as a unique case of an outlier surviving outside the regime’s overarching system, as a nuclear-capable state with prolonged record of resistance (and selective adherence), but ending up seeking opportunities to engage with its normative structures. The ideological and policy shifts that had shaped India’s transformative journey from a perennial outlier to one seeking greater integration with the regime, though, also exemplifies the underlying strategic paradoxes and dogmatic incongruities. The book assesses how these dynamics will determine India’s role in global anti-proliferation and its status in the emerging global nuclear order.

    2014

    Politics, Security and Nuclear Abolition: Beyond the Idealist Rhetoric

    Disarmament and non-proliferation are rightfully viewed as two sides of the same coin: the two imperatives that need to be met if the prospect of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is to be realised. Although the existence of a link between the two concepts is obvious, the exact nature of this connection is perhaps not as clear. The central question here is whether it is politics or strategic realities that shape states’ nuclear options and by implication, the two-fold road to global zero.

    January 2014

    Anand Ratkal asked: What is the Indian viewpoint on the global nuclear disarmament issue and the NPT and CTBT in particular?

    Reshmi Kazi replies: India has been a consistent advocate of global nuclear disarmament since the inception of the concept in the United Nations. India, faced with two nuclear neighbours with one of them declaring its nuclear arsenal as India-specific, had to reluctantly become a nuclear weapon state. However, India remains committed to the idea of negotiating a universal, non-discriminatory and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, one that takes into account India’s national security interests.

    India and the NPT

    The UN Security Council adopted unanimously resolution 1887 on nuclear non-proliferation which among other actions called on states not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to join it. However, India responded to the resolution by declaring categorically that it will not join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state since nuclear weapons constitute an integral part of India’s security. Till date, the NPT recognises only the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (US, Russia, UK, France and China) as nuclear weapon powers and mandates that other countries can be a party to the NPT only as a non-nuclear weapon state. This is not acceptable to India and hence the issue of India joining the NPT does not arise. India’s stated position on the NPT is that it “cannot accept externally prescribed norms or standards on matters within the jurisdiction of its Parliament or which are not consistent with India's constitutional provisions and procedures, or are contrary to India's national interests or infringe on its sovereignty.”

    India and the CTBT

    India’s stand on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) too is a principled one. India has declared that it would be unable to sign and ratify the CTBT in its present discriminatory form. However, India has pledged to continue with its voluntary and unilateral moratorium on further nuclear testing. India is the only nuclear weapon state to declare that it believes its security would be enhanced, not diminished, in a world free of nuclear weapons.

    Iranian Nuclear Imbroglio: The Way Forward

    After wining the elections, Hassan Rouhani has insisted that Iran is ‘ready to show more transparency’ over its nuclear programme, but has also affirmed that it has ‘inalienable rights’ to enrich uranium as a member of the NPT.

    August 06, 2013

    India's Nuclear Limbo and the Fatalism of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime, 1974–1983

    India's relationship with the nuclear non-proliferation regime deteriorated sharply after its 1974 underground nuclear test which, according to India, was a peaceful nuclear explosion, but which was not accepted as such by the regime. That it did not follow up with immediate weaponisation challenged the core logic of the non-proliferation regime which operates on a Murphy's Law of ‘nuclear fatalism’, i.e. if a country has the know-how to produce nuclear weapons, it will certainly produce them.

    May 2013

    Comment on ‘The Global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Paradigm and India’

    Rajiv Nayan's article is both important and interesting. It is important because nuclear weapons pose a threat to humanity and the planet that in magnitude, severity and immediacy is the gravest of all known risks confronting us today.

    January 2012

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