Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

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  • India's Nuclear Limbo and the Fatalism of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime, 1974–1983

    India's relationship with the nuclear non-proliferation regime deteriorated sharply after its 1974 underground nuclear test which, according to India, was a peaceful nuclear explosion, but which was not accepted as such by the regime. That it did not follow up with immediate weaponisation challenged the core logic of the non-proliferation regime which operates on a Murphy's Law of ‘nuclear fatalism’, i.e. if a country has the know-how to produce nuclear weapons, it will certainly produce them.

    May 2013

    Comment on ‘The Global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Paradigm and India’

    Rajiv Nayan's article is both important and interesting. It is important because nuclear weapons pose a threat to humanity and the planet that in magnitude, severity and immediacy is the gravest of all known risks confronting us today.

    January 2012

    Uranium from Down Under: Can Madam Gillard Pull it off?

    Prime Minister Gillard's decision to reverse the uranium export policy not just indicates a dramatic shift in Australia’s strategic outlook, but also could endow a decisive fillip to its crisis-hit uranium industry.

    November 21, 2011

    The Non-Proliferation Paradigm and the Restive Outlier

    The nuclear non-proliferation paradigm 1 has rarely remained static. Its logic or the underlying principle has however been singular – non-proliferation should lead to nuclear disarmament, and eventually total elimination. It is the approach to the paradigm that has evolved over the years, often accentuated by, and many a time succumbing to, the transformations in the global security environment. Milestones in this evolution have often been construed as shifts in the paradigm, as newer security imperatives necessitated augmentations in existing approaches to proliferation challenges.

    July 2011

    The Global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Paradigm and India

    Non-proliferation is now an accepted norm in international security and international relations. Most countries perceive global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation as being inseparable in principle, although there is disagreement among countries on the ultimate objective of non-proliferation. Most countries generally want non-proliferation to be a transitional arrangement before total nuclear disarmament, which at present is a desirable though distant goal. The classical bargain for balancing the two has tilted in favour of non-proliferation.

    July 2011

    Non-Proliferation Lobby Analysts Seek to Corner India on CTBT

    To resolve the challenge posed by the NPT criteria, the best solution would be to amend the NPT and accommodate India as a nuclear weapon state.

    June 03, 2011

    Disarmament’s ‘Lost Decade’

    The paralysis at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) captures the state of affairs that has bedevilled the field of arms control/disarmament during the last 10 years.

    February 02, 2011

    IAEA and the Nuclear Fuel Bank: Signs of Spring in a Nuclear Winter

    The proposed Nuclear Fuel Bank would provide fuel to only those states that are in compliance with their international commitments, especially obligations under the NPT.

    December 07, 2010

    Change in India-US Diplomatic Practices – An Interim Report

    Change in India-US Diplomatic Practices – An Interim Report

    During the last dozen years or so, the Indian and American governments have instituted broad policy changes aimed at turning their bilateral relationship into some form of strategic partnership.

    Judging Myanmar’s Nuclear Ambitions and Likely Implications

    There is no denying that Myanmar has an ongoing nuclear research programme but whether it has the intention of developing nuclear weapons remains unclear.

    July 22, 2010

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