The NPT placed two non-proliferation requirements on the NNWS. Article II expects the NNWS not to indulge in any activity related to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Article III(1) requires the NNWS to accept nuclear safeguards to be implemented by IAEA. Recently, the IAEA has proposed State-Level Concept (SLC) for verifying the presence or absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the state within the provisions of the CSA.

The safeguards verification measures of comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) of non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) with the international atomic energy agency (IAEA) for verifying presence or absence of undeclared nuclear material and undeclared facilities and activities using the provisions of Additional Protocol (AP) is well recognized. Recently, the IAEA has proposed State-Level Concept (SLC) for verifying the presence or absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the state within the provisions of the CSA.

India concluded a fresh safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/754) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2009. All aspects of safeguards measures including the items to be safeguarded were deliberated upon, to ensure that India’s safeguards agreement does not result in giving any flexibility to India to use safeguarded items for unsafeguarded activities. The safeguards agreement INFCIRC/754 came with many additional features. Some of them are a result of the IAEA’s efforts to bring uniformity to subsidiary arrangements and structure and format for reporting requirements.