The strategy articulated by Deng Xiaoping in 1990 as a guiding tenet of China's foreign policy was: “Observe calmly, secure our position, cope with affairs calmly, hide our capacities and bide our time, be good at maintaining a low profile, and never claim leadership 1”.
The article argues that India and the United States are poised to strengthen their bilateral strategic convergences, not only in the Indian Ocean but also in Pacific-Asia that lies eastwards of the Malacca Straits, and wherein India’s geo-strategic stakes as well as its military-strategic footprint are likely to increase in the coming years. This would progressively enhance the complementarities between their navies in the western Pacific and its contiguous seas, thereby enabling substantive naval cooperation towards ensuring security and stability in the broader Indo-Pacific region.
This paper is an endeavour to appraise the importance and 'value' of India-US defence exercises for Indian policy makers. It examines their dividends, costs, and pitfalls. The paper argues that such combined exercises are not only useful in functional terms but are also necessary. While such exercises are invariably embedded in inter-state relations and grand-strategic issues, in this case the paper confines itself to operational and military-strategic issues.
Since 2005, the ‘centre of gravity’ of Asian piracy has clearly shifted westwards from Southeast Asia to the western Indian Ocean. The Somalia-based pirates are on the rampage, capturing vessels of all sizes ranging from yachts to super-tankers and their crew for ransom. This is hardly surprising, considering that the writ of Somalia’s Transitional Government (TFG) does not even run on the entire Somali land territory, and much less on its adjoining seas.
Epic sea battles between aircraft carriers have not recurred after World War II; in the post-war period, most carriers began to retire without even having participated in a battle. Many countries that possessed carriers or were aspiring to get them thus began to re-assess the military-strategic utility of such platforms in the radically altered global geo-strategic environment.
The first half of May 2008 (2-16) witnessed an epochal multilateral event that passed off virtually unnoticed in the countries involved. It saw the first ever combined maritime exercise among the navies of India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSAMAR). The lack of attention to it was hardly surprising given that the venue was the wide blue yonder, and the fact that the peoples of these countries are only beginning to realise the import of events that occur beyond terra firma.
The 2-day Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) in New Delhi (February 14-15, 2008) may well turn out to be a historic event for the countries of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). As an arrangement for multilateral naval and maritime security cooperation among regional countries, IONS not only offered a forum for exchange of views but also showcased its importance and reach.
The growing interest of nations in the ocean-realm has become discernable in recent years, leading to an increased significance of maritime security. This is particularly relevant to India, whose vital stakes are expanding beyond its terrestrial confines. How has this increased the responsibility of Indian maritime forces? Can we expect these forces to satiate national-security interests beyond maritime affairs? What approach and capabilities are needed for this? As an attempt to answer these questions, this book is intended for a 'wide-spectrum' readership; ranging from a layman but a keen observer of national/ global events that affect him, and who seeks an association with India's growing eminence; to the academics and Indian policy makers.
Piracy off Somalia: Can Naval Patrolling be the ‘Antidote’?
Since 2005, the ‘centre of gravity’ of Asian piracy has clearly shifted westwards from Southeast Asia to the western Indian Ocean. The Somalia-based pirates are on the rampage, capturing vessels of all sizes ranging from yachts to super-tankers and their crew for ransom. This is hardly surprising, considering that the writ of Somalia’s Transitional Government (TFG) does not even run on the entire Somali land territory, and much less on its adjoining seas.