India’s decision to ally with America would be contingent upon the degree of convergence between their positions on core issues and the extent of military assistance needed in a two-front war scenario.

Given India’s evolving procurement system, efforts should be made to enhance compatibility of technology from various sources. This may require greater cooperation with the US since many of India’s suppliers other than Russia depend on US technologies for their products.

While 11 of the 12 prescribed sanctions will have little or no effect on India-Russia defence relations, the twelfth, unless waived, has the potential to completely derail the India-US Defence and Strategic Partnership.

India, on its way to become a global power, will likely have to follow a zigzag course, balancing between American demands, long-term friendship with Russia and its own strategic necessities in the neighbourhood and beyond.

An evaluation of the non-negotiable elements of the CISMOA Boilerplate agreement does not show any element that will have any unavoidable security risks for India.

India appears to be failing to consider the geopolitical and foreign policy fallouts from signing the so-called foundational military pacts with the United States.

Mutual and shared interests between India and the US must form the basis of an enduring solution to the quandary presented by the provisions of the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act.

The foreign policy establishment can justifiably feel upbeat with the results of the Modi-Trump meeting, which have been most gratifying especially given the uncertainties in the run-up to the visit.

No new initiative likely on strategic cooperation front, and complaints on H1B visa issue unlikely to fall on receptive ears since available data does not support the current Indian urban myth.

The main objective would be for Modi and Trump to come on the same page on key issues such as terrorism, UN reforms, South China Sea and the future of climate change.