Over the last decade we have seen a race to build ports in the Indian Ocean as the two Asian powerhouses, China and India, compete to assert their regional influence. The newest addition to this power struggle is the Chabahar Port, located in Chabahar, a coastal town in the Sistan–Baluchistan region in south-eastern Iran, next to the Gulf of Oman, and at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz (Figure 1). Its strategic importance and economic value have drawn attention from many countries; however, India was the quickest to secure a deal to develop the port.

The results of the most recent Parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections in Iran indicate that Iranians are increasingly unhappy with the conservative establishment in the country. The Reformists or moderates and pro-Rouhani group of ‘Hope’ secured a majority in the Assembly of Experts and also won more seats than their rival conservatives or Principlists in the Majlis or parliament. The elections for the two bodies were held on February 26, 2016.

The post-2003 Persian Gulf sub-region has witnessed intensified geopolitical conflicts and competition between Iran and the Gulf Arab states, particularly between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Scholars and experts have mostly analysed the conflicts through political and strategic prisms while neglecting their economic dimensions. This article analyses the various post-2003 conflicts between Iran and the Gulf Arab states with a focus on how economic integration or the lack thereof creates the incentives to resolve or sustain the conflicts.

This article examines Iranian contentions on three issue areas that exemplify the politicised nature of its interactions with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These include access to military facilities, information credibility and the ‘nuclear activism’ of US-based non-governmental organisations (NGOs).