The US, UK and Australia agreement for cooperation in Naval Nuclear Propulsion (NNP) presents a viable legal framework under which NNP technology can be transferred to Australia.
Roby Thomas replies: The unmanned underwater systems (UUSs) are divided into two categories: remotely operated underwater vehicles (ROVs) and autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs). ROVs are linked and controlled by a person or crew on either land or neighbouring craft via a tether that houses energy and communication cables and a related tether management system, as well as built-in sensors for video (camera and lights), thrusters, a flotation pack, sonar and other instruments.
The Nigerian Navy is slowly clawing its way back to being a viable force capable of performing critical missions in respect of EEZ surveillance and patrol. It possesses an adequate fleet of inshore and riverine patrol craft and its growing refit and overhaul capabilities should prove adequate to the task of maintaining these vessels and augmenting them with new construction. However, the Nigerian Navy continues to face capability gaps in respect of the number of major surface combatants as well as the weapons systems available to the fleet.
The RSA may be forced to choose between significantly increasing the budgetary allocations for the SAN and adopting a rotational storage programme to preserve capability while reducing operational costs.
The article argues that India and the United States are poised to strengthen their bilateral strategic convergences, not only in the Indian Ocean but also in Pacific-Asia that lies eastwards of the Malacca Straits, and wherein India’s geo-strategic stakes as well as its military-strategic footprint are likely to increase in the coming years. This would progressively enhance the complementarities between their navies in the western Pacific and its contiguous seas, thereby enabling substantive naval cooperation towards ensuring security and stability in the broader Indo-Pacific region.
Abhay Kumar Singh replies: Joint naval exercises and joint naval patrols are maritime activities conducted within the wider ambit of naval diplomacy. Irrespective of their size and political persuasion of their governments, navies engage in bilateral and multilateral diplomacy for both competitive and collaborative purposes. These maritime engagements are aimed at strengthening international cooperation with friendly countries, on the one hand, and signalling capability and intent to deter potential adversaries, on the other.
The article assesses China’s Indian Ocean strategy against the backdrop of its naval base development in Djibouti. It argues that China’s naval force posturing stems from a doctrinal shift to ocean-centric strategic thinking and is indicative of the larger gameplan of having a permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean. China’s maritime strategy comprises four key components. First, to channel naval reinforcements for securing its maritime trade and economic interests in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)—even as it strengthens the Maritime Silk Road initiative.
At relatively little cost to either party, a mutually beneficial partnership has evolved over the decades, with the NCG and India being inextricably intertwined. It is to the credit of both countries that this relationship has lasted and thrived and continues to grow stronger without undue fanfare or hype and without, thus far, any tangible problems.
Considering the complementary interests and interdependencies at stake between China and Japan as also their individual aspirations of nation building through peace and stability, a clash over the Senkakus would only result in a ‘lose-lose’ outcome.
South Africa Boosts Naval Capabilities: But can it afford an expansion?
The RSA may be forced to choose between significantly increasing the budgetary allocations for the SAN and adopting a rotational storage programme to preserve capability while reducing operational costs.