The BRICS group has gone a long way from being the simple acronym to becoming global political player. While it remains undecided whether the BRICS will evolve into a comprehensive, consolidated alliance in global politics, the trend towards increased collaboration and institutionalization now indicates that this may well be feasible. The article examines the relationship between the European Union and BRICS and seeks to understand whether the EU and BRICS are more likely partners or rivals.

The article explores America’s evolving policy towards BRICS in the context of the Trump administration’s new ‘America First’ global strategy. Even though the BRICS grouping has not become an anti-systemic or anti-liberal force, its attempts to form an alternative centre of global power has prompted the US to manage multipolarity. The Trump administration has continued America’s previous policies of hedging potential BRICS consolidation and enhancing its regional engagement in the era of sovereignty revivalism and deglobalisation.

Given complexities currently underpinning multipolar realities of the international system, it seems that a pluralist internationalism is becoming a strategic consideration for a post-Western world order. This warrants new agendas for cooperation. Based on the latter this analysis examines to what extent the BRICS can articulate such a new agenda based on a South African-informed perspective. This involves exploring the basis of a BRICS-African agenda competing with the geo-political interests of sub-groupings such as the SCO, RIC, and the EAEU.

This article studies China’s approach to BRICS. It argues that China sees BRICS as a major asset in its effort to become a major world power and to reform the international system so that it becomes fairer and better serve its interests. However, in China’s view, these interests coincide with the interests of other major non-Western states which also suffer from this sense of unfairness, therefore this position is not self-seeking. This is a major problem which should be overcome with the help of other developing countries.

Russia India and China are paying more and more attention to international security issues. They have developed a broad common security agenda via cooperation through two international institutions created by them. BRICS serve as a mechanism for promoting their economic security interests, SCO is focused on traditional security issues. Along with forming a common position on main international security problems, Russia, India and China act as great powers and disagree on certain security matters mostly of regional and bilateral nature.

This article examines the evolution of Russia’s policy towards BRICS from the time of its formation as a group of four countries in 2006 to the present. The authors analyse the main political objectives that guided Moscow in initiating the creation of this format and in developing it in subsequent years. The article argues that, with Russia as a participant, the character of the organization has undergone major changes, due both to the changing international situation and fundamental changes that the foreign policy of Russia itself has undergone since 2014.

Having overcome its ‘middle-power’ complex during the centre-left governments, Brazil obtained a relatively robust position in international politics as global power, siding with G-20, BRICS and other multilateral bodies. However, since the 2018 presidential elections Brazil has been undergoing a visible shift in its foreign policy towards more alignment with the US and the West that questions its traditional international autonomy, multilateralism, South-South engagement and environmental activism.