Iskander Rehman is Visiting International Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. <a href="/profile/irehman">Click here for detailed profile</a>
This issue brief delves into the pragmatic motivations undergirding India and China’s “will to the sea”, before examining on a more conceptual level how New Delhi and Beijing have drawn on the old in order to buttress the new, most notably through the crafting of two maritime narratives.
Indian strategists may well find that many of the tactical quandaries faced today by the US carrier fleets cruising through the Asia Pacific are destined to become those of the Indian Navy in the not-too-distant future. Devising an AirSea Battle concept would enable it to parry blows and reassert sea control.
Not only would the presence of Chinese vessels present no real existential threat to Indian naval dominance in the region, it would also, paradoxically, provide the Indian Navy with a far greater degree of tactical flexibility in the event of a future conflict with China, be it on land or at sea.
India has long striven for a three carrier fleet comprised of one carrier battle group stationed on each seaboard, and a third carrier held in reserve.
China’s String of Pearls and India’s Enduring Tactical Advantage
Not only would the presence of Chinese vessels present no real existential threat to Indian naval dominance in the region, it would also, paradoxically, provide the Indian Navy with a far greater degree of tactical flexibility in the event of a future conflict with China, be it on land or at sea.