There is a need to evolve a protocol for contract administration and post-contract management of all capital and revenue contracts awarded by various departments of the defence ministry and the armed forces.

The government seems to have little fiscal space for accommodating the demand of the armed forces for additional funds, given its quantum on the one hand and the state of its revenues on the other which are already quite stressed.

The blueprint for the operationalisation of CDS would require intensive deliberation to make sure that no aspect of its implementation is left unaddressed.

Even if the Fifteenth Finance Commission manages to make a specific recommendation about the funds to be allocated for defence and internal security and the government accepts the recommendation, there can be no guarantee that the actual allocation will not fall short of the accepted level.

It would be nice to see the defence ministry setting up a task force and submitting actionable recommendations which could be considered by the finance minister while deciding the defence outlay next year.

There is a need to make it clear in the text of Paragraph 72 of DPP 2016 that no vendor other than the Development-cum-Production partner or the nominated Production Agency will be permitted to enter the tendering process at the post prototype development stage.

While the purpose of the Fall Clause, a price safety mechanism in rate contracts, is indubitable, some issues concerning its applicability and implications, both for the buyer and the seller, merit a review.

A dynamic offset policy has to include a mechanism for identifying the causes for likely delay or default on the part of vendors in discharging their obligation and removing the impediments faced by them

Shortage of funds even to service the committed liabilities raises questions about the financial affordability of the defence modernisation programme and viability of the push for ‘Make-in-India’ in defence.

It is important to pay greater attention to the system of costing followed by the MoD given that costing errors could result in the sanctioning of an unaffordable procurement programme, contract being awarded at a higher price, cost and time overruns, and default on contractual commitments.