Nuclear Doctrine

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    • India’s ‘No First Use’ Nuclear Doctrine

    The Defence Minister’s recent statement on ‘no first use’ basically underlines the fact that India’s current nuclear doctrine is working well.

    Rajiv Nayan
    September 16, 2019

    ‘No First Use’ is Not Sacrosanct: Need a Theatre-Specific Posture for Flexible Options

    Nuclear doctrines and postures are dynamic processes that evolve with the security environment. Twenty years after India’s nuclear doctrine was first drafted, the time is ripe for a comprehensive review and suitable revisions.

    A. Vinod Kumar
    August 27, 2019

    Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons and the Indian Nuclear Doctrine

    The nuclear escalation risk cannot be contained by the revision of India’s minimum deterrence policy but with a change in Pakistan’s behaviour.

    Sanjana Gogna
    September 11, 2017

    Revisiting India’s Nuclear Doctrine

    India’s current nuclear doctrine does not call for an automatic massive retaliation for Pakistan’s use of TNWs against Indian troops on Pakistan soil. However, this does not mean that such an attack will go unanswered.

    G. Balachandran and Kapil Patil
    March 27, 2017

    Is India’s Nuclear Doctrine Credible?

    Recent debates by former officials and analysts on India’s nuclear doctrine highlight certain credibility problems. Two inter-related pillars of the doctrine—the pledge of ‘No-First Use’ (NFU) and the assurance of a ‘massive retaliation’ response to a nuclear strike—have been scrutinised.1 The backdrop shaping the debate is the pressing need to discover options to produce a de-escalation or deter an escalation in Pakistan’s sub-conventional war. This is the context for the ongoing contestations around India’s nuclear doctrine.

    Zorawar Daulet Singh
    January 2017

    Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Deconstructing India’s Doctrinal Response

    The military and scientific leadership of Pakistan has given clear signals that tactical nuclear weapons have a vital role in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons policy. Developed to lower Pakistan’s nuclear threshold, these weapons may further deter India from launching a conventional strike to punish Pakistan for its sub-conventional war against India. This has led to a debate on the possible doctrinal responses that India could adopt to counter Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons.

    Arka Biswas
    November 2015

    Revisiting India’s Nuclear Doctrine

    In principle there is nothing wrong in revisiting the doctrine but such revisions/reviews must be based on sound and valid reasons. The proponents of the doctrinal review argue that India’s existing doctrine is ill-suited to deter Pakistan from using tactical nuclear weapons against India.

    G. Balachandran and Kapil Patil
    June 20, 2014

    Foreign policy agenda for the new government

    Foreign policy agenda for the new government

    India has unprecedented opportunity to follow a foreign policy to meet its developmental aspirations and security needs, both of which are complementary. Sustained economic growth is essential for India to follow a proactive foreign policy.

    May 27, 2014

    Revisiting India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Is it necessary?

    “Credible minimum deterrence” is the cornerstone of India’s nuclear doctrine. It, used in conjunction with the concepts of “No First Use” (NFU) and “Non Use” against non nuclear weapon states, clearly indicates that India envisages its nuclear weapons as only a deterrent and not as a means to threaten others.

    Satish Chandra
    April 30, 2014

    Managing India’s Missile Aspirations

    The Agni-VI and Prahaar both signify unnecessary missile projects, which have been developed in the interests of DRDO technical and bureaucratic ambitions rather than the stated interests of India’s nuclear doctrine.

    Frank O'Donnell
    February 10, 2013

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