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| Title | Date | Date Unique | Author | Body | Research Area | Topics | Thumb |
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| The Dissolution of Factions within Japan’s LDP: An Unfinished Revolution | March 06, 2024 | Arnab Dasgupta |
SummaryJapan is on the cusp of a political revolution following the revelations of a deep, systematic scandal encompassing the entire Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) which threatens its nearly-uninterrupted grip on power. While Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has attempted to tamp down on the internal factions responsible for the scandal, it is difficult to say with any certainty whether the formal termination of political factions will endure into the future. IntroductionJapan’s post-Second World War political system has been defined to a great extent by the longevity of the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) nearly-uninterrupted grip on power. To a large extent, this continuous rule has been held in place by the existence within the LDP of substantial factional groups. As a big-tent party meant to bind together the conservative spectrum in the wake of a disastrous war and nearly 10 years of American-led occupation, the LDP from the very start relied on internal factions to provide the kind of oppositional politics that could not be counted on from the traditional opposition benches in the Diet. Even the overhaul of the electoral system undertaken in 1995 with the amendment of the Public Offices Election Law (kōshoku senkyo hō, 1950) did not fundamentally alter the necessary conditions for the continuing relevance of factions. It is thus a surprising (and possibly ground-breaking) development that Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on 16 January 2024 essentially presided over the end of factions in their current avatar, by announcing the dissolution of his own faction and accepting the interim findings of an intra-party reform committee report recommending dissociating party factions from any administrative functions, relegating them to ‘policy organisations’ only.1 Kishida’s actions have since triggered the dissolution of nearly all other factions within the LDP, with the holdouts being met by a wave of mass defections. As new political formations emerge, Japan appears to be on the cusp of a political revolution, and it would be interesting to observe how politicians within the LDP negotiate the brave new world set in motion by Kishida. Factions in Japanese PoliticsKishida’s January decision has a backdrop in the wildfire that is the party funds scandal. The scandal first emerged into public consciousness in December 2023, when investigators from the Tokyo Prosecutor’s Office raided the offices of two prominent factions within the LDP2 —the Abe and Nikai factions, led by the late Shinzō Abe (until 2022, collective leadership afterwards) and former LDP Secretary-General Toshihiro Nikai respectively—while members from the prime minister’s own faction were called in for interviews. Behind the raids was a scandal of deep complexity, which proceeded in the following fashion. As Japan’s electoral laws, most prominently the Public Offices Election Law 19503 , were amended in 1995 to provide for a mix of single-member districts (SMD) with first-past-the-post (FPTP) systems and multi-member districts (MMD) with proportional representation (PR) systems, campaign funding became an issue.4 Pre-reform, prospective candidates sought funding from interested citizens and corporations in order to stand for elections, which raised well-deserved questions about legislative capture by vested interests. Simultaneously, amendments made in the same year to the Political Funds Control Law 19485 placed ceilings on contributions to lawmakers’ election campaigns by corporations and lobbying groups. Electoral activities became publicly funded, with a sum of 250 Japanese yen being allocated to each party for every vote it obtained in the previous elections. The law, however, turns out to have a major loophole which has led it to be called a ‘dead law’ (zaru hō)6 in Japanese—there are no restrictions for party factions in the amendments. Under the pre-1995 system, party factions played important roles within the party. As mentioned above, at the macro level, they played the role of internal opposition parties, which meant that bad policies would often not even see the light of day due to their opposition. Additionally, they served as alternative power centres for intraparty competition—the number of members in one’s own faction, and the contacts they had with other factions, could often make an outsized difference in the race to be elected the Secretary-General of the party, which often (though not always) led to the post of Prime Minister. Factions also served to sort policymakers in easy-to-predict policy groupings, as the faction leader’s role as whip led to policy uniformity among the members. A prominent example of this latter role is the Abe faction, which when led by the former prime minister grouped together nearly all the far-right Diet members in a single bloc. This bloc then used its numerical strength as the largest faction during Abe’s second premiership (2012–2020) to push policy in directions it favoured. These steps included the formation of the National Security Council, institution of security clearances and curbs on freedom of information, while tamping down on less-favoured policies such as separate surnames for married couples, LGBTQ+ issues and a soft line of China. The Kickback Scandal and FactionsIt was expected that as the electoral system changed, party factions would cease to be relevant. However, even after nearly 20 years, factions continued to operate at more-or-less the same levels of activity. Many scholars have attempted to explain their survival in various ways, but the events of December 2023 and January 2024 point to a hidden factor. The factions, being in charge of funding and expenses for its members, had become the ideal vehicle for a long-running, persistent and widespread scheme of kickbacks. Utilising the loopholes in the law, party factions held large parties the tickets to which individual lawmakers would have the responsibility to ‘sell’ to corporate and individual donors. Quotas were set by the faction leadership in line with the lawmaker’s track record and personal charisma. If the lawmaker failed to meet the quota, the debt would be transferred to their balance sheet. If they overshot the quota, however, the difference in amount would be transferred over to them in kickbacks which they could then use as ‘alternative’ campaign funds in addition to taxpayer-funded expenses. Alternatively, they could use the faction’s services to pool the funds into one large slush fund for all the faction members to dip into according to need.7 This loophole obviated the need for reporting such slush funds or kickbacks, as factions remained beyond the purview of the law. The resulting pool of funds, according to prosecutors, reached approximately 675 million Japanese yen (US$ 4.5 million) for the numerically-strongest Abe faction alone, with the Nikai faction a close second with 264 million Japanese yen (US$ 1.7 million).8 The fallout of the prosecution, and the subsequent series of indictments and arrests of junior lawmakers, initially followed a predictable script. Kishida sought, and was granted, the resignation of several leading members of his Cabinet belonging to the stricken factions. Most notably, this list included Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirokazu Matsuno, Minister for Economy, Trade and Industry Yasutoshi Nishimura, Internal Affairs Minister Junji Suzuki and Agriculture Minister Ichiro Miyashita.9 The prime minister also promised reform of the electoral funds law to completely ban or raise to prohibitively high levels any kind of private funding of elected officials, and continued to call for ‘restoring the trust’ in politicians in press conferences. However, and uncharacteristically for a public often apathetic to previous revelations of political misdeeds, the Japanese people do not seem to have forgiven and forgotten this current trespass. Surveys of public attitudes are continuously revealing the lowest levels of trust in elected officials, persistent negativity about Kishida’s premiership and calls for his immediate resignation.10 ‘End’ of Factions in the Wake of the ScandalFaced by unprecedented public anger, Kishida was led to embark on an internal process of house-cleaning by initiating a reform committee within the party, whose membership immediately came under fire for including members of the factions involved in the scandal, despite also including non-faction-affiliated members such as former Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga. As media reports noted Kishida’s taking an active role in the proceedings, the committee came up with a set of interim recommendations which the prime minister immediately declared he would adopt. Illegal actions by any member of a legislator’s staff would be considered the legislator’s responsibility as actions taken on his behalf. More importantly, the factions are to be replaced by ‘policy organisations’ devoted to ‘educating and training’ freshmen lawmakers, with no financial powers.11 Putting words into practice, Kishida dissolved his own faction, angering many within the party who supported the old system. This in turn triggered a wave of dissolutions, with the Abe, Nikai and Moriyama factions going out of existence. The factions headed by Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso and Toshimitsu Motegi have sought to hold out, but have been met with an exodus en masse as members willingly give up their faction affiliation. Public anger remains unabated though, as recent surveys point to disillusionment regarding Kishida’s follow-through of his promises to eliminate factions and to reform the political funding law. The opposition parties have sought to make hay of these emotions, though their distraction and division have not translated into electoral fortunes. ConclusionIt is difficult to say with certainty whether the formal termination of political factions will endure into the future. Japan’s political system has tried to purge itself of factions before, only to see them reinvent themselves and re-emerge onto the scene. Indeed, it may be better for factions to continue to exist in different forms. Given the absence of external opposition, internal policy factions provide the only checks-and-balances (albeit from within the same party) to the actions of the executive, as they constrain the prime minister from taking any action that might affect him in the next party polls. This is doubly important as other national political parties in the Diet have historically been unable to mount any concerted opposition to the LDP’s policies, and are therefore not trusted by the public at large. Regional parties such as Nippon Ishin no Kai12 (Japan Restoration Party, Osaka and Kyoto regions) and Tomin First no Kai13 (Tokyo Residents First Party, Tokyo and surrounding areas) have made their mark in recent elections, but have a long way to go before they can plausibly challenge LDP dominance. At the same time, it is certain that the factions as currently constituted present a serious issue, as they concentrate financial power out of proportion to their role within the political system. The party funds scandal reveals not only the creation of alternative power centres within a ruling party, but also a worrying disregard for public accountability, features which the LDP would do well to distance itself from in future in order not to attract international concern over its level of democratic functioning. The political reform committee’s recommendations are the right way forward on the surface. Collective responsibility would create a ‘stick’ to counter the ‘carrot’ of political office. The reconstitution of factions as political research and study organisations devoted to the cultivation of young lawmakers can create a balance between Japanese lawmakers’ need to coalesce around particular viewpoints and ideologies and the public accountability that comes from not having secretive alternative funds available to influence elections. The latter measure would also clarify for outside observers the appropriate group of lawmakers to approach to influence policy. A good instance of the way this could work is the non-faction-affiliated Ganesha no Kai (Ganesha Group) headed by the pro-India former Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, which focuses on improving ties with India. However, given the difficulties of political reform in Japan historically, one cannot be too optimistic on this score. Nevertheless, Japanese politics is heading towards a brave new world for sure. Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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East Asia | Japan | system/files/thumb_image/2015/japan-ldp-t.jpg | |
| Myanmar: Three Years of Coup and Civil War | March 05, 2024 | Om Prakash Das |
SummaryThe Myanmar military, disputing the results of the 2020 election, seized power on 1 February 2021, triggering widespread civil unrest and armed resistance. Despite international condemnation, Myanmar remains mired in violence, with uncertain prospects for resolution and questions about its future trajectory. IntroductionOn 1 February 2021, Myanmar's armed forces (Tatmadaw) rebuffed the landslide electoral triumph of the National League for Democracy (NLD) in 2020 and assumed control of the government. The allegation of widespread fraud in the 2020 elections precipitated a crisis wherein the military, wielding substantial control over the government as a result of a constitution it authored, declined to acknowledge the election outcomes. The coup incited widespread civil disobedience, protests and armed resistance. The Civil WarAfter the 2021 coup, opposition activists and former lawmakers formed a shadow government, known as the National Unity Government (NUG). The NUG has been working to mobilise resistance and coordinate the actions of local militias, known as People's Defense Forces (PDFs). PDF is a collective term for three types of armed groups that have emerged since the coup—PDFs; Local Defense Forces (LDFs), and People's Defense Teams (PDTs). PDFs are larger armed units formed or recognised by the NUG, operating under joint command systems with several ethnic armed organisations.1 In June 2019, three armed groups—the Arakan Army (AA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), formed an alliance called ‘The Three Brotherhood Alliance’.2 The alliance rose to prominence in 2023 in resisting the Burmese junta. On 27 October 2023, the alliance launched Operation 1027, an offensive against the junta in northern Shan state. The alliance and other ‘resistance forces’ control a substantial part of the country as of now.3 Amidst internal discord, diverse opposition factions have coalesced, attaining an unprecedented degree of cooperation regarding military strategy. This collaborative endeavour extends across two-thirds of the nation's territory and has culminated in significant triumphs against their adversaries.4 The civil war has precipitated a grave humanitarian crisis. The UN reports that over 2.6 million people are now displaced within Myanmar, with nearly 800,000 of these displacements occurring since late-October 2023.5 In India, approximately 59,200 individuals from Myanmar's North-West region have sought protection since February 2021. Of these, around 5,500 are in New Delhi and have registered with the UNHCR. 6 The United Nations reported that ‘security forces in Myanmar have caused the deaths of at least 1,600 individuals and have detained more than 12,500’7 within one year of the coup. A report by the Peace Research Institute Oslo notes that at least 6,000 civilians perished during the initial 20-month period subsequent to military coup.8 According to The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), since the military coup in 2021, the country has witnessed an estimated death toll of no fewer than 50,000 individuals, encompassing at least 8,000 civilians.9 According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), as of 19 February 2024, a total of 26,147 political prisoners were in detention.10 This includes nearly 4,000 women and at least 300 children. The Global Investigative Journalism Network states that approximately four journalists have been killed, as of February 2023, with 145 journalists having been arrested and approximately 68 remaining in detention.11 The Junta’s Tenuous PositionOperation 1027 has seen an increase in junta’s airstrikes, causing significant civilian casualties with over 554 deaths documented by the UN since October 2023. The total number of civilians killed by military actions exceeded 1,600, marking a sharp rise from around 300 in the previous year.12 In November 2023, a coalition comprising Karenni ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) initiated an independent offensive termed ‘Operation 1111’ in Kayah (Karenni) State. Simultaneously, the Arakan Army (AA), ostensibly in solidarity with the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Karenni forces, launched assaults on numerous military outposts in Rakhine State, achieving comparable success.13 Furthermore, the Tatmadaw contends with ongoing offensives in Chin, Kachin and Mon states, as diverse PDFs, representing the armed factions of the NUG established by the deposed government, operate in Tanintharyi Region, having established the Southern Brothers Army.14 The State Administration Council (SAC)15 has lost control of most of the country except for a central corridor connecting major cities. Rebel groups now hold the majority of territory, including seven entire states and parts of five others.16 They even control some key roads leading to neighbouring countries. This signifies a significant shift in power dynamics within Myanmar. Nonetheless, Myanmar's military has shown resilience and adaptability across generations despite international and domestic challenges. It maintains unity through an institutional system distributing benefits and managing officer ambitions towards collective goals.17 The incidence of battlefield losses has the potential to precipitate regime instability and elevate the probability of regime breakdown. Such defeats not only unveil vulnerabilities within the Tatmadaw but also have the potential to instigate subsequent rebel incursions that exploit the military's perceived limitations, thereby exacerbating losses.18 Reports note that military setbacks have led to low morale, weakened unit cohesion, and increased desertions. Over 4,000 soldiers have defected or surrendered since Operation 1027 began, adding to the 14,000 who defected after the 2021 coup.19 The October 2023 military operation has significantly challenged the junta's grip on power. Over 5,500 soldiers and 10 generals have been killed, and 30 towns captured.20 Failing to retake lost territory and increasingly resorting to brutal tactics like airstrikes and arson, the weakened junta shows signs of losing public support and control. The junta government is currently contending with escalating casualties and defections amidst an unpopular war, compelling it to contemplate contentious measures such as mandatory military service to address manpower shortages.21 However, this initiative entails significant political risks, as evidenced by incidents of backlash among young adults in response to enforced mandatory military service.22 The military employs both ideological loyalty and financial incentives to maintain the dedication of its officers. There has been no significant internal dissent that threatens the stability of Myanmar military, till the 2021 coup. But since the coup, ‘an estimated 10,000 soldiers and police officers have defected by joining the “people's side” in opposing military rule’.23 Anti-Junta Forces and Conflicts WithinEthnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) and PDFs have different visions for the future of Myanmar and could face challenges in power-sharing and moderating their respective ideological positions. Myanmar’s armed rebel groups operate independently even as they agree on the core need relating to the removal of the Tatmadaw. However, their end goals differ significantly. The EAOs aim for liberation and self-governance, while the PDFs aspire to restore democratic order under Aung San Suu Kyi.24 Despite these issues, pro-democratic forces like NLD and few ethnic groups led a transformation known as the 'Spring Revolution'.25 In response to this, the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), the broadest front of resistance, endorsed and published a new Federal Democracy Charter in April 2021. The promulgation of the Charter marked a new phase in popular resistance to military rule and efforts to rebuild politics of Myanmar.26 This charter deals with the questions about how certain issues need to be approached and highlights legal and political considerations to support interim institutions' constitution-building efforts.27 Where is Myanmar Heading?The protracted armed conflict between the junta and anti-junta groups shows no sign of imminent resolution. In January 2024, Myanmar army chief, Min Aung Hlaing, extended the 'state of emergency' and affirmed that the military would take “whatever measures necessary to restore stability to the state”.28 In December 2023, Myanmar's junta leader Min Aung Hlaing called on armed ethnic groups that “it is necessary to consider the lives of the people, and those organisations (EAOs) need to solve their problems politically”.29 The NUG perceives the junta's position as indicative of its apprehension regarding the imminent collapse of the military regime. The NUG asserts that the junta are “losing badly on the ground, they are trying to find an exit route. There would be genuine dialogue if the military guarantees that it no longer has a role in politics; they must be under an elected government.”30 A pro-junta publication in November 2023 had noted that at a meeting of the National Defence and Security Council, apprehensions were raised that the country can split into various parts if the government did not effectively manage the incidents in the border region.31 As the anti-junta forces advance, the cohesion of the diverse EAOs in pursuit of the overarching objectives of democratic and federal reform in Myanmar will be open to question. Will the EAOs sustain their unity for the collective vision, or will they vie for privileges, increased resources, and authority relative to other factions? Intra-group competition could exacerbate the risks of balkanisation.32 The NUG and significant ethnic armed organisations have advocated for the establishment of a genuinely democratic federal state, explicitly opposing the constrained democracy outlined in the 2008 constitution. However, concerns persist regarding potential post-conflict scenarios regarding the equitable distribution of power and resources among the diverse factions that are opposing the junta. These factions are keen to assert their own governance, explore self-determination, and secure a portion of the nation's considerable resources.33 EAOs are poised to exploit the current vulnerabilities of the Tatmadaw while also seeking to expand their control over territories, which presently encompass more than 50 per cent of Myanmar's landmass.34 The resistance movements in major urban centres such as Yangon, Mandalay and Naypyidaw have yet to achieve the same level of success as the insurgents operating in the country's peripheral regions. There is no doubt though that armed resistance groups have inflicted notable defeats on the junta, which can potentially destabilise power balances among its elite factions.35 ConclusionRecent developments in Myanmar indicate a low probability of the junta reclaiming lost territory. They are presently entrenched in a defensive posture focused on maintaining control of towns and defending logistical routes. There is a possibility that the civil war may escalate further into the major urban centres of Myanmar. Despite ongoing international pressure for a negotiated resolution, the prospects for the acceptance of negotiations within anti-junta forces are slim, and international support is limited. Importantly, resistance groups have indicated a readiness for political integration and a federal structure of democracy, a factor that could potentially reshape Myanmar's political trajectory. Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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South East Asia and Oceania | Myanmar | system/files/thumb_image/2015/myanmar-coup-t.jpg | |
| Neo-Nazi Music Concerts: Incubators of Far-Right Extremism | February 28, 2024 | Saman Ayesha Kidwai |
Far-right extremist music concerts Call of Terror and Hot Shower in France and Italy respectively in February–March 2024 are expected to intensify the far-right movement moving forward. This is the first time such concerts are being organised since the COVID-19 outbreak. These concerts, like Ukraine’s Asgardsrei festival—a famous black metal Neo-Nazi musical event that was held annually until the pandemic—are pivotal to the mobilisation and recruitment of hardened extremists. Such concerts feature bands who promote a bigoted and racist ideology, including one of the most notorious sub-genres within the black metal musical arena, i.e., National Socialist Black Metal or NSBM. Racist neo-Nazis have used this genre of music to disseminate a violent and xenophobic ideology which espouses White supremacy, anti-establishment narratives, Holocaust denial and anti-Jewish sentiments. At the same time, they have popularised music as a key avenue for transnational networking of like-minded individuals who ardently support a virulent ideological belief, raising millions of Euros in revenue.1 The network established among such ideologically inclined individuals (neo-Nazi black metal followers) spans the European continent and encompasses Russia as well as the United States. It brings together those driven by White supremacist narratives, glorification of violence, and call for violent actions aimed at realisation of ethno-national racial and cultural superiority. The resurgence of Call of Terror and Hot Shower needs to be contextualised in the backdrop of legalisation of the fascist salute in Italy, the remigration debate in Germany, and the far-right in Europe gaining increasing popularity as the only viable alternative to address the electorate’s socio-economic concerns while pushing for the adoption of a more hardliner approach on immigration. It also needs to be understood within the ambit of the ongoing Israel–Hamas conflict and the Ukrainian crisis, which have resulted in widespread anti-Semitism, racist ethno-nationalism, and vilifying rhetoric against Jews propounded by Neo-Nazis across Europe and the United States. Ukrainian neo-Nazi groups like Azov Batallion have showcased Nazi insignia on their uniforms. This group has been integrated into the Ukrainian armed forces to fight against Russia’s military actions. Music’s role within the far-right extremist culture is critical to understanding why concerts and musical gatherings have retained their prominence and have attracted an increasing number of recruits to the racially divisive ideological belief and value system. Robert Futrell and Pete Simi have explained that
Neo-Nazi music has provided some youth with the opportunity to freely advocate and glamourise their extremist propaganda and violence, and indulge in proscribed symbolic gestures. Moreover, it has forged ethno-nationalist, emotive and community ties that surpass territorial boundaries. While neo-Nazi black metal initially appeared to have burst onto the musical scene in the 1990s, music’s role in promoting a racist worldview has its roots in the anti-Semitic compositions created by Richard Wagner, who was celebrated by Adolf Hitler and in the Third Reich’s efforts to ban music considered to be ‘degenerate’, i.e., associated with Jews.3 Violence is encouraged, aided and abetted among neo-Nazis in this industry and against those considered as the ‘other’, including police officials and members of the LGBTQ+ community.4 As part of its investigative report, VICE News has pointed out a critical fact that must be considered while strengthening efforts to clamp down on the occurrence of such activities and framing counter-extremism strategies. It notes that
The sale of tickets, merchandise, memorabilia and catering leading up to and during such events is expected to facilitate the financing of extremist agendas and dissemination of a divisive ideology riddled with hate and linkages to the Nazi era. Additionally, Identitarianism is a movement which has denounced Islam, immigration, pluralism, globalism and refugees, has been associated with anti-Semitic figures like Martin and Brittany Sellner. It is believed to play a central role in facilitating the establishment of bridges between trans-national far-right extremists who are in attendance for such concerts.6 This specific brand of black metal musical sub-culture features Nazi symbols and demonises liberals, left-leaning politicians and minorities. For example, in the past, Erschiessungskommando, a neo-Nazi band, released a song the lyrics of which explicitly targeted a left-leaning member of Thuringia’s State Parliament, Katharina König-Press—‘You will die cruelly, that is not the question’—and her father, a vocal opponent of far-right extremism.7 Notably, Thuringia is one of the key bastions of Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, a far-right party in Germany), which has been declared as extremist along with its youth wing in several states across the country by the domestic intelligence agency. At the same time, relatively small-scale gatherings such as those held in Hungary in November 2023 organised by Nordic Sun Records mentioned on its website the relevant details—the date of the musical events, the entrance fee, bands performing on said dates, and the area in which the events would be held.8 The brazen attitude displayed by the promoters signals widespread complicity of authorities and political elites, perhaps even Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who has been known to attend several far-right events. Orban’s policies have led to the ascendance of far-right values which has nurtured a fertile environment for neo-Nazi extremist groups to prosper. Notably, France, Hungary, Ukraine, Germany and Italy are some of the countries which (whether due to the backing of far-right elements who might have infiltrated various state institutions covertly or overtly) now play host and incubator even perhaps, to well-known far-right elements and a neo-Nazi black metal scene. In fact, former Ukrainian Prime Minister Oleksiy Honcharuk and former Minister of Temporarily Occupied Territories, IDPs and Veterans Oksana Koliada attended a neo-Nazi concert held in Kyiv in October 2019, where the main attraction was a holocaust denier neo-Nazi band, Sokyra Peruna.9 After the pandemic abruptly disrupted Asgardsrei, a festival considered to have been critical in constructing ‘a pan-European community of right-wing extremists’,10 Call of Terror and Hot Shower could generate greater traction and unprecedented revenue, and could even replace Asgardsrei as the epicentre of the neo-Nazi black metal congregation. ConclusionNeo-Nazis have exploited music’s potency to generate a cult-based following among radicalised individuals. This has resulted in strengthening the far-right scene across the Atlantic and networks forged by individuals with shared interests. While there is a dearth of information about the precise attendees of these concerts, a rough estimate stands at a few hundred. It must be understood that those who fall into this category are hardened extremists who can carry out significant damage and promote far-right propaganda, especially with social media and encrypted forums at their disposal. Despite the abovementioned warning signs and seriousness of these threats visible to policymakers and intelligence agencies, the announcement of Call of Terror and Hot Shower and other simultaneous small-scale gatherings indicate that they have been largely disregarded. As a result, given the swelling support for far-right populist politicians and agendas internationally, it is unlikely that serious efforts will be undertaken to clamp down on them in the foreseeable future. These developments can be expected to have a long-term and damaging effect on efforts by moderate politicians and allied agencies to conserve globalist and pluralist societies across communities, resulting in growing fissures and socio-economic polarisation. Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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Counter Terrorism | Far-Right Extremism | system/files/thumb_image/2015/neo-nazi-music-concert-t.jpg | |
| Turkiye Leverages Sweden’s NATO Accession Bid | February 28, 2024 | Abhishek Yadav |
IntroductionTurkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan signed a presidential decree on 25 January 2024 approving the ratification law passed by the Turkish Grand National Assembly to allow Sweden to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).1 This decree formally promulgated Turkiye’s ratification of Sweden’s NATO accession agreement that the Turkish Parliament adopted on 23 January 2024. Turkiye though extracted substantial concessions from Sweden and other nations in exchange for approving Sweden’s bid to join NATO. While Turkiye supports NATO expansion to counter Russian aggression, it leveraged its position as an existing member with veto power to negotiate benefits aligned with its national interests. Arms EmbargoTurkiye initially opposed Sweden’s bid when Sweden formally decided to pursue NATO membership in May 2022 in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. To secure Ankara’s support, Sweden authorised military equipment deliveries to Turkiye in September 2022, reversing restrictions imposed in October 2019.2 These included electronic systems, software and technical assistance from Swedish defence companies. The licensing decision by Sweden was taken in consultations with the cross-party Export Control Council to ensure broad political support. This decision reflected the changed defence and security circumstances based on Sweden’s NATO membership bid and the importance of cooperation with NATO allies like Turkiye. Sweden assessed cooperation with Turkiye through NATO as essential for national and mutual security interests. PKK ConcernsOne specific condition Turkiye set for approving Sweden’s NATO membership bid was that Sweden stop providing support to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). As per Turkiye’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, over its more than 35 years of insurgency against the Turkish State, PKK, designated as a terrorist organisation by Turkiye, the US, the UK and the European Union, has been responsible for over 40,000 fatalities through its violent tactics to advance the Kurdish nationalist cause.3 Turkiye had accused Sweden of harbouring PKK members and allowing PKK fundraising and recruiting on its soil. To address Turkiye’s concerns, Sweden amended its constitution, changed counter-terrorism laws, and expanded counter-terrorism cooperation against the PKK as per the 2022 Trilateral Memorandum between Sweden, Finland and Turkiye.4 The Swedish Government adopted a new comprehensive national strategy to address the evolving threat from violent extremism and terrorism.5 This updated comprehensive strategy will mobilise various security agencies, including the Swedish Security Service, Police, Contingencies Agency and the Swedish Centre for Preventing Violent Extremism. Sweden’s Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson justified the shift due to the insufficient nature of the previous framework given the heightened risks, signifying a strategic priority to reinforce counter-terrorism policies and institutions against violent groups.6 In July 2023, Sweden and Turkiye agreed to continue cooperation through the Permanent Joint Mechanism established at the 2022 Madrid NATO Summit, as well as a new bilateral Security Compact that will meet annually at the ministerial level and create working groups as needed.7 After a series of negotiations and commitments from Sweden to crack down on PKK activities, Turkiye declared that Sweden had adequately satisfied this membership criterion related to the militant Kurdish group. With this PKK-related stipulation met to Turkiye’s satisfaction alongside security assurances, Turkiye formally ratified Sweden’s accession to the NATO alliance.8 However, as per media reports, there is a prevailing sense of discontent within the Swedish Kurdish community. Members of the sizeable Kurdish population, comprising an estimated 50,000–100,000 individuals, hailing from Turkiye, Iran, Iraq and Syria, feel targeted by the Swedish authorities amid efforts to appease Erdogan’s demands.9 US Approves F-16 AircraftOn 26 January 2024, the US State Department authorised a potential Foreign Military Sale to Turkiye involving the purchase of 40 new F-16 aircraft and the modernisation of 79 existing F-16s to V-Configuration at an approximate cost of US$ 23 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) officially informed Congress of this prospective sale.10 The proposed sale aims to assist Turkiye, a NATO ally, in expanding and modernising its F-16 fleet, addressing the impending retirement of older aircraft. By acquiring these new and upgraded aircraft, Turkiye seeks to bolster its defence capabilities, contribute to NATO missions for regional security, defend NATO allies, and uphold interoperability with US and NATO forces. Notably, in December 2020, the US imposed sanctions on Turkiye’s Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB) under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017 (CAATSA) legislation for procuring the Russian S-400 surface-to-air missile system.11 Despite repeated warnings from the US about security risks and boosting Russia’s defence sector, Turkiye decided to acquire the S-400. Consequently, Turkiye was suspended from the F-35 programme, given the S-400’s incompatibility with NATO systems. On 26 January 2024, US Senator Ben Cardin, Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, highlighted that he had predicated approval of the F-16 sale to Turkiye on the condition that Ankara support Stockholm’s NATO accession bid. While acknowledging Turkiye’s strategic value as a regional NATO ally, Cardin specifically conveyed that ongoing discussions aimed to compel improvements in Turkiye’s human rights record on issues like the imprisonment of journalists and civil society leaders, cooperation on holding Russia accountable for aggression against Ukraine, and inflammatory rhetoric regarding the Middle East.12 On 14 February 2024, US Ambassador to Turkiye Jeff Flake emphasised the importance of selling F-16 fighter jets to Turkiye, arguing it would strengthen NATO, ensure future interoperability between allies, and enhance Turkiye’s capacity to contribute to collective security, having the Alliance’s second-largest military.13 He contended that improved US–Turkiye relations would advance American security, power and prosperity interests across multiple fronts. Flake also highlighted Turkiye’s expanding domestic defence industry production of drones, components, engines and artillery as integral to the US defence supply chain and NATO strength. He cited a partnership with Turkish defence firms to increase diminished US munition stockpiles that have been heavily tapped to assist Ukraine against Russia’s invasion. Flake noted that new Texas production lines purchased from a Turkish defence company by 2025 are expected to supply 30 per cent of all American-made 155 mm artillery rounds, further exemplifying the benefits of US–Turkiye defence industry collaboration. Canada and Arms ExportsThe Canadian Government found credible evidence that some Canadian military goods and technologies exported to Turkiye, specifically sensors integrated into Turkish Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), have been utilised in the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Libya and Syria, contrary to Canada’s export permit requirements and end-use assurances.14 Therefore, on 16 April 2020, Canada implemented a presumptive denial policy for applications to export or broker munitions to Turkiye.15 Notably, Canada is bound under the international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), as its Article 11 covering diversion specifies that State Parties take measures to prevent the diversion of conventional arms.16 After Turkiye’s ratification of Sweden’s application to NATO membership, Canada lifted the presumptive denial policy for applications to export or broker munitions and related items to Turkiye on 29 January 2024. Applications will now be assessed on a case-by-case basis as per Canada’s risk assessment framework and ATT commitments. For items where Turkish government entities are the end user, exporters must obtain end-use assurances from the importer stating whether items will be re-exported outside NATO and outlining the permitted end use.17 An established notification procedure covers certain components, like the Wescam sensors used in Turkiye’s Bayraktar TB2 drones and specified dual-use goods and arms, as part of the lawful international arms trade18 to ensure accountability and transparency. Turkiye has expressed that it will soon achieve self-sufficiency in manufacturing key drone components currently imported from abroad.19 This includes achieving domestic production capabilities for specialised optical sensors and other technologies utilised in unmanned aerial systems like the Bayraktar TB2. By localising production, Turkiye aims to establish its own reliable and sovereign supply chain for strategic aerospace and defence equipment needs. ConclusionThrough a transactional approach tied to Sweden’s NATO accession process, Turkiye effectively leveraged concessions from Sweden and other NATO allies, including lifting of restrictions on arms exports and expanding security cooperation. Going forward, Turkiye will have to demonstrate greater accountability and transparency on issues like human rights, regional conflicts and end-user usage of arms to address concerns from the US, Canada and other NATO allies. Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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Turkey, Sweden, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) | system/files/thumb_image/2015/turkey-nato-t.jpg | ||
| Thorough Analysis of Predictive Maintenance for the Operation and Maintenance of Military Aircraft | October-December 2023 | Om Ranjan |
The increasing digitisation of aircraft operations and support in recent years have made it possible to monitor, assess, and predict the health of aircraft structures, systems, and components more often. Different activities fed into what is called condition-based maintenance (CBM) strategy, is believed to offer significant benefits in terms of both cost and time. These activities are typically summarised using terms like predictive maintenance, prognostics and health management (PHM), integrated vehicle health management (IVHM), or aircraft health management (AHM). |
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| Rethinking ‘Air Power’ for the Governance of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in India | October-December 2023 | Dnyanada Palkar, Devyani Pande |
The exponential progress in technological innovation and its consequent applications over the last two decades has hastened the ‘fourth industrial revolution’. The extraordinary pace of technological advances is leading to the merging of ‘the physical, digital, and biological worlds in ways that create both huge promise and potential peril’.1 The promise and peril identified here manifest in several systems such as advanced robotics, automation, and machine-to-machine communication. One such system is unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with drones being a significant type. A UAV is an aircraft that operates either remotely or on another aircraft without a human operator on-board, comprising of an operating system to allow for communication between components, control of sensors, navigation, avionics and communication. |
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| Operation Cactus: India’s First Rapid Reaction Strategic Mission in the Neighbourhood | October-December 2023 | Gulbin Sultana |
Operation Cactus was one of the most important strategic airlifts by the Indian Air Force (IAF) in the neighbourhood, which was accomplished despite several issues and challenges. Various lessons were learnt from the experience of Operation Cactus. Some of the issues and challenges were subsequently addressed to improve the capability of India to undertake a joint strategic mission within a short period. However, with India’s everincreasing strategic interests and sphere of influence, the IAF needs to further bolster its strategic airlift capability. |
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| Air Power and HADR: Defining the Role of the Indian Air Force in Disaster Management in India | October-December 2023 | Pintu Kumar Mahla |
The versatility, speed and strategic reach of air power makes it an indispensable component of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) efforts, contributing significantly to the effectiveness and efficiency of disaster response operations. This article provides an in-depth exploration of the intricate dynamics between air power and HADR, offering valuable insights into the evolving and indispensable role of the Indian Air Force (IAF) in disaster management within the Indian context. The article will also provide insights into how several Indian civil agencies collaborating with the IAF makes for a robust disaster management system in India. Furthermore, the article conducts a comprehensive analysis of the transformation in the IAF’s role within HADR over the past two decades. Finally, the article offers policy recommendations pertaining to the interplay of air power, the armed forces and civil administration. |
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| Maximising Civil–Military Fusion for Indian Airlift: Requisition and Beyond | October-December 2023 | Armaan Jena |
As many pieces of the jigsaw puzzle, which is India’s aerospace policy, come together, there are still pieces that merit spotlight to ensure the picture is complete. India’s requisition policy is one such missing piece which the Indian state needs to rectify quickly. Though in terms of legislation, India has the Aircraft Act, 1934 and Defence of India Act, 1962 that allows for requisitioning aircraft and airports, there is a policy void that the Union government must redress. As of today, the government can requisition aircraft during an emergency/wartime to augment airlift capabilities, but it can completely deflate the civil aviation industry in the process post airlift requirements, if not properly managed and in the absence of a dual-use policy. During the seminar ‘Samanjasya Se Shakti’, the Indian Army’s first such seminar on military logistics held in 2022, former Secretary, Ministry of Civil Aviation, Rajiv Bansal, delved into the requisition of aircraft where he stated that there needs to be clarity on how to proceed further and initiatives to be taken in enlisting an objective. However, requisition by itself is a means to an end with the ultimate objective being strategic airlift for the armed forces. This article explores a dual-use policy to augment Indian airlift capabilities leveraging the civil aviation ecosystem and lays out inputs for consideration and scrutiny. |
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| Dynamic Maritime Airspace Management: The Philosophy for an AI Environment | October-December 2023 | Johnson Odakkal, Neeraj Singh Manhas |
Indian territorial space is commonly perceived to be extending over 3,287,263 sq. km. This statistic often overlooks the maritime jurisdiction over 2,013,410 sq. km. of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and approximately 1.2 million sq. km. of Extended Continental Shelf filed on 11 May 2009. This maritime space of 3.2 million sq. km. nearly doubles the associated air space management expanse. Classical airspace management in military operations enhances combat effectiveness by encouraging the safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace with minimal restrictions on friendly airspace users. It also entails coordinating, integrating, and managing airspace to maximise efficacy at all levels of conflict. Maritime airspace management, further looks at preventive approaches to ensure all users of the airspace refrain from interfering with one another. Additionally, it needs to simplify air defence identification, and accommodate the safe passage of all air traffic. Roles and duties affecting this system are approaching increasing complexity and require a judicious mix of technology and computational options. The use of 4D maritime space in surface, sub-surface, aerospace and cyber-domain, increases the applicability of AI to naval operations. The Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) is also conceived to answer this requirement to foster maritime safety and security collaboration, given the region’s significance in international trade and security. This article will look into the evolution of conventional airspace management at sea and the usage of AI in maritime airspace management from the manmachine interface of detection, identification, designation and action. |
