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Summary

Japan’s data protection framework faces significant challenges emerging from corporate structures as well as inadequate defences against human actors within the chain of data custody. Indian regulators can study and learn from the Japanese experience on the creation of a legal framework that takes due consideration of the norms of free enterprise while ensuring the safety and sanctity of personal data.

Introduction

Personal data is the next great key resource shaping the future of human evolution, as epitomised by the phrase ‘data is the new oil’.1 This understanding has driven countries and societies to begin thinking deeply about the implications of handing over private data to a corporation, government or other entity. Japan’s status as a key United States ally as well as a developed economy makes it a strong player in the digital economy.

Recent string of incidents in the corporate domain have highlighted that Japan does not necessarily possess the strong safeguards seen elsewhere in the world to prevent data leakage from taking place. The Brief examines Japan’s existing legal and policy frameworks and assesses the implications for the future of data security and private data protection in the country. It will be argued that Japan’s data protection framework faces significant challenges emerging from corporate structures as well as inadequate defences against human actors within the chain of data custody. 

The LINE-NAVER Data Breach

On 5 March 2024, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Telecommunications issued administrative guidance (gyōsei shidō) to social media entity LINE Yahoo! Corporation after it discovered a breach in the cloud services it had been subcontracting from Korean social media entity NAVER Korea.2 NAVER’s servers, containing LINE’s data on Japanese consumers, were found to be inadequately protected against unauthorised access, and a malware infection in one of NAVER’s subcontractors’ servers allowed external actors to access Japanese consumers’ data. The investigation found that ‘external actors’ had been able to access NAVER Cloud’s servers, which in turn gave them access to LINE’s data.

It is pertinent to observe here that LINE Yahoo! has been involved in a string of unauthorised data leakages in the past as well. In 2021, a Chinese subcontractor of the company was able to access user data in Japan and in August 2023, the company was found to be sharing user location information to NAVER, which in turn was giving its subcontractors access to its data. As a result, the Minister for Internal Affairs in a press conference reported that the ministry has placed LINE! Yahoo under a year-long watch list, after which further actions would be considered if no improvements were observed.3

NTT West Data Leakage

Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT) Corporation West, the branch of the semi-private national carrier handling operations in Western Japan, also came under the scanner after a former temporary worker at the company was arrested in January 2024. The staffer had reportedly copied over 9 million pieces of customer data onto a USB stick from another subsidiary using his access to NTT West’s internal network. The subsidiary targeted by the former employee handled call centre operations for NTT Corporation, and the data allegedly taken covered over 10 years of names, telephone numbers and addresses.

Once again, this was not the first time NTT West has been hit by cases linked to unauthorised access of data. In April 2022, a client of the telecom giant reportedly warned of a suspected leak of information at NTT’s end. However, NTT West apparently conducted a shoddy investigation after which it declared the matter settled, only to be outed in October 2023 after the client company approached the police to request an investigation. As the January incident came to light, NTT West’s president Masaaki Moribayashi announced that he would step down from his post to take moral responsibility. The company has committed to spend over 10 billion Japanese yen in the following three years in order to boost its network security and detect irregularities.4

Legal Frameworks for Data Protection

In both instances, the unauthorised access to user’s personal data is under scrutiny, leading to questions being raised about whether the affected parties have any legal recourse under current Japanese law. Also, what obligations do businesses have under the law to safeguard such data?

In Japan, the Act on the Protection of Personal Information (APPI), 2003 is the principal data protection law. After its adoption, it has undergone periodic amendments, the latest one being in 2020. One of the key steps under the APPI was the establishment of the Personal Information Protection Commission (PPC) as the primary regulator responsible for the implementation of the legislation. Under the law, the PPC is entrusted with the following responsibilities:5

• Promotion of basic policy
• Supervision
• Mediation of complaints
• Public relations
• International cooperation
• Reporting to Diet

Given the wide range of responsibilities, the PPC plays a vital role in ensuring robust privacy security frameworks across businesses along with sectoral regulators, if any. For the purpose of the law, businesses dealing with personal data are called personal information controllers (PIC), while the individuals or the customers are referred to as data subject. The act also outlines the broader duties and obligations of PICs and the rights of data subjects.

LINE/NAVER Korea Data Leakage

To examine the applicability of the APPI in this case, it is important to determine the nature of cooperation between the LINE and NAVER. According to the administrative guidance, factors that contributed to the incident included strong dependence of the LINE on NAVER regarding system and network configuration, as well as inefficient safety control measures. The ministry also advised the Japanese entity to improve its operations by reviewing its capital partnership with NAVER as it is under “considerable influence” from the South Korea-based entity.6 As reported, NAVER’s cloud has “extensive access” to LINE’s environment, making it easy to access data stored using NAVER’s network.7 On this, the ministry underlined the need for both services to implement their own authentication tool instead of relying on the shared directory.

These operational arrangements position NAVER as a data processor in the case, entrusting the entities with certain obligations under the law. According to the law, LINE has a legal obligation to conduct appropriate and necessary supervision over NAVER, which is a data processor.8 In fact, the PPC guidelines also emphasise the importance of measures that involve visibility and supervising the processing of personal data by the outsourcing provider.9 However, neither the APPI nor any related regulations impose direct obligations on data processors.

There is also a need to evaluate whether such operational arrangements were serving any of the key principles of any data protection regime, such as purpose limitation and data minimisation. These principles are at the heart of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which has partially, if not completely, inspired the data protection regime in Japan. Purpose limitation entails the collection of personal data for ‘specified, explicit, and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes’.10 Similarly, data minimisation means the collection of personal data that is ‘adequate, relevant, and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed’.11 Clearly, these principles were not adhered to in the present case, as LINE user credentials serve no purpose to NAVER’s infrastructure. Furthermore, administrative guidelines also noted that LINE entrusted security management to NAVER, amounting to the breach of duty under the law.

NTT West Data Leakage

In this case, the leak is believed to have taken place over a decade, and the management ignored warnings on multiple occasions.12 The threat actor in the case, a former employee of the company, sold the leaked data to a third party, which included information such as addresses, names and phone numbers of customers. Furthermore, the leaked data also contained credit card information in some cases. The fact that a temporary employee had access to such data raises concerns about the company’s data security framework, which clearly failed to prevent data breaches. It also prompts questions about data security practices, such as implementing stringent controls over user credentials and access privileges to prevent unauthorised access and safeguard sensitive information. Following the widespread publicity of the breach, the communications ministry has also ordered NTT West to revise its contracts with employment agencies.

As far as legal remedies for victims are concerned, despite no evidence of secondary harm to users resulting from the leak, courts in Japan now recognise the private right of action for a data breach involving personal information.13 In fact, the Supreme Court of Japan acknowledges that the plaintiff’s mental distress stemming from the data breach constitutes compensable harm. On multiple occasions, it has been observed that PICs have often voluntarily offered compensation to affected parties to forestall any proceedings. Though no claimants have come forward thus far in the current case, it is not a sign of mature business practice to prefer paying compensation over strengthening data protection rules.

Many sector-specific regulations authorise relevant regulators to enforce rules by notifying business improvement orders following a cyber incident or, in the worst case, render business suspension orders. Following a breach, the PPC is also authorised to issue advice for improvement. If the PIC fails to comply with such advice, the PPC may escalate by issuing an order of improvement. Failure to comply with an order for improvement could also be grounds for criminal imprisonment.14 As NTT West has been served with an order for improvement, it is too early to say how conditions will improve in the future.

To ensure that appropriate data protection measures are in place, the PICs are also required to remain vigilant of malicious insider threats, as exemplified in the case of NTT West. User behaviour monitoring is critical to look for an anomaly to pre-emptively identify an insider threat. However, it is equally important to strike a balance between these practices and privacy concerns. To enable a better understanding of data management, the PPC released a data mapping toolkit for private entities.15 The toolkit can also help the PICs with regulatory compliance, data governance and security initiatives within the organisation, though it is unknown whether NTT West applies the toolkit in its internal systems.

Conclusion

In an age where the free flow of data is at the root of global commerce, even a state with high capacity like Japan needs to wrestle with the creation of a legal framework that takes due consideration of norms of free enterprise while ensuring the safety and sanctity of the data shared by its 127 million citizens.  The cases discussed above throw up interesting—and complicated—questions about Japan’s struggle to implement the same.

As the Diet enters into discussions on the amendment to the Designated Secrets Protection Law 2014 which will seek to protect economic secrets behind a firewall of security clearances,16 it is an opportune moment for it to also consider how it can best protect the private data of Japanese citizens from a range of threats emerging from within and outside its economic actors. It is also a good opportunity for India, currently in the throes of devising its own legislation on data protection, to learn from Japan’s struggle, particularly concerning delineation of wider obligations for data processors and enactment of stringent penalties in the event of a data breach involving sensitive personal data.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “The World’s Most Valuable Resource is No Longer Oil, But Data”, The Economist, 6 May 2017.
• 2. “LINEヤフー株式会社に対する通信の秘密の保護及びサイバーセキュリティの確保に係る措置（指導）” [Measures (Guidance) for Protecting the Confidentiality of Communications and Ensuring Cybersecurity for LINE Yahoo! Corporation], 総務省 (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Telecommunications), 5 March 2024. Also see “Japan Ministry Urges Line App Operator to Bolster Data Protection”, Kyodo News, 5 March 2024.
• 3. “松本総務大臣閣議後記者会見の概要” (Summary of Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications Matsumoto’s Post-Cabinet Press Conference), 総務省 (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications), 5 March 2024.
• 4. “NTT West: Be Aware of Responsibility for Handling Personal Information”, Editorial, The Japan News by the Yomiuri Shimbun, 6 March 2024.
• 5. “Roles and Responsibilities”, Personal Information Protection Commission, Japan.
• 6. “Japan Ministry Urges Line App Operator to Bolster Data Protection”, no. 2.
• 7. Simon Sharwood, “Japan Orders Local Giants LINE and NAVER to Disentangle their Tech Stacks”, The Register, 6 March 2024.
• 8. “A Guide to Data Protection in Japan”, Atsumi & Sakai, September 2020.
• 9. Hiroyuki Tanaka, Noboru Kitayama and Ryoko Matsumoto, “Japan: Data Privacy Comparative Guide”, mondaq, 14 March 2023.
• 10. “Article 5- Principles Relating to Processing of Personal Data”, GDPR.
• 11. Ibid.
• 12. Laura Dobberstein, “NTT Boss Takes Early Retirement to Atone for Data Leak”, The Register, 1 March 2024.
• 13. Andrew M. Pardieck, “Privacy Matters: Data Breach Litigation in Japan”, Washington International Law Journal, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 1–43.
• 14. “A Guide to Data Protection in Japan”, no. 8, p.15.
• 15. “Japan’s PIPC Introduces Data Mapping Tool”, International Association of Privacy Professional (IAPP), 18 October 2022.
• 16. “2nd Half of Diet Session: It Is Time to Deliver Results to Dispel Distrust in Politics”, Editorial, The Japan News by the Yomiuri Shimbun, 30 March 2024.

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Summary

Haiti’s plight underscores the urgent need for a unified international response, with the need for the United States to play a pivotal role in fostering collaboration and implementing sustainable solutions.

Introduction

In the wake of the profound political upheaval and rampant gang violence, the resignation of Haitian Prime Minister Ariel Henry on 11 March 2024 underscored the daunting challenges facing governance in Haiti.1 President Jovenel Moïse was also assassinated in July 2021. With Haiti's political landscape devoid of elected representatives and a functioning legislature, the formation of a transitional council aims to address the country's electoral challenges. The dire situation in Haiti has prompted the United States2 , Canada3 , EU, France4 , and India5 to launch evacuation missions.

Haiti’s Many Challenges

Haiti, the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere, has endured decades of hardship. Natural disasters such as earthquakes and hurricanes, inflict repeated devastation.  While international interventions aim to foster stability, their efficacy remains a subject of debate. The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), operational from 2004 to 2017, serves as a prime example. Established with the intention of promoting security, the mission was ultimately tarnished by allegations of misconduct and the inadvertent introduction of cholera.6  Similarly, the aftermath of the devastating 2010 earthquake was further complicated by difficulties in distributing international aid, hindering recovery efforts. These factors contribute to a persistent cycle of instability, where political unrest and poverty remain constant battles for the Haitian people.

Pervasive Influence of Armed Groups

Haiti faces a significant challenge in the form of proliferating armed groups.  Estimates suggest that roughly 200 such groups operate nationwide, with a concentration of around 20 in the capital city, Port-au-Prince. These groups act as a major impediment to stability and progress. Within this landscape, two main coalitions, the G-Pèp and the G-9 Family, wield considerable influence, particularly in impoverished neighbourhoods of the capital. These groups often forge opportunistic alliances with political parties, oscillating between conflict and collaboration.

Notably, figures such as Jimmy Chérizier, alias ‘Barbecue’, have risen to prominence within these gangs, with Chérizier leading the Living Together alliance which has increasingly advocated for political reform. However, his calls for change are tarnished by allegations of past brutality associated with himself and his organisation.7

Despite this violent history, a potential shift in tactics might be underway. Recent pronouncements by Chérizier suggest aspirations to dismantle the current government and establish a more robust justice system.  Furthermore, his openness to disarmament contingent upon the armed groups' participation in negotiations to form a new government, hint at a possible willingness to pursue political solutions. Chérizier's insistence on gang inclusion in these discussions underscores his belief that such involvement is necessary to curtail gang violence.8 He further emphasises opposition to foreign intervention as a means of restoring stability.

Whether Chérizier's rhetoric translates into a genuine pursuit of peaceful solutions or represents a strategic manoeuvre remains to be seen.  However, his influence within the gang landscape necessitates a nuanced approach. A deeper understanding of his motivations and potential role in Haiti's future is crucial for navigating this complex situation.

The UN describes the situation in Haiti as 'cataclysmic' due to a surge in gang violence.  Since the start of 2024, over 1,500 people have been killed and 826 injured.9 Corruption, impunity and ineffective governance have pushed the country's institutions to the verge of collapse. Gang-related sexual violence has surged, including assaults on women who have witnessed their spouses being killed. There is ongoing lethal vigilantism, with community groups targeting those suspected of minor crimes or ties to gangs.

Armed gangs have seized control of much of Port-au-Prince, destroying police stations, government buildings, financial institutions and medical facilities, while also engaging in numerous killings and abductions. There are concerns that the Haitian police force, already outnumbered and outgunned by the gangs, may soon be overwhelmed. Despite international efforts to address the crisis, such as the provision of US$ 10 million in equipment to Haitian security forces by the US State Department, illegal weapons continue to flow into the country, undermining existing arms embargoes.

Deteriorating Humanitarian Conditions

The issue of food insecurity has reached unparalleled heights due to gangs impeding agricultural operations and obstructing crucial transportation paths, further worsening the humanitarian predicament. Food insecurity persists at alarming rates, affecting 44 per cent of the Haitian population with acute shortages. The surge in violence has led to the internal displacement of 313,901 individuals, with 60 per cent of this displacement occurring in 2023.10

Children are particularly at risk, with 3 million in urgent need of assistance. Rampant violence makes it difficult for parents to provide proper care and nutrition for their kids, and fear of getting caught in the crossfire prevents them from seeking medical attention at health centers. The healthcare system is crumbling, with at least half of facilities malfunctioning due to a lack of medicine, staff and beds to treat people injured by the violence. The situation is further compounded by lack of international support. With nearly half of the population (5.5 million) in need of aid for survival, the UN's response plan is drastically underfunded (only 6.6 per cent of the US$ 674 million goal has been met).11

Haiti faces the terrifying prospect of a large-scale hunger crisis. Nearly half the population, a staggering 4.97 million people, are struggling to put food on the table. This situation is especially dire for children, with a shocking 19 per cent increase in severe acute malnutrition cases in 2024.  The roots of this crisis run deep. Gang violence has become a central driver. Gangs extort farmers, disrupt food distribution with roadblocks, and threaten agricultural production in vital areas like Artibonite, the country's main rice-growing region. This violence has triggered an economic collapse, driving up food prices and pushing more people into poverty.12

Haiti's vulnerability to hunger goes beyond the recent surge in violence. Decades of political and economic instability have weakened the country's food security system. Deforestation, fuelled by poverty and natural disasters like floods and earthquakes, has further eroded its ability to feed itself. In addition, unsustainable trade policies that undercut local agriculture have also played a role.13

Regional and International Responses

The far-reaching repercussions of Haiti's gang violence, political deadlock and humanitarian catastrophe pose a significant threat to the stability of not just Haiti itself, but to the entire Caribbean region. With no apparent resolution in sight for the political crisis, it primarily falls upon the regional countries to mitigate human suffering and prevent the country from descending into chaos.

First, although the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has not traditionally played a major role in resolving Haitian crises, some scepticism remains regarding its current involvement, particularly acting as US proxy.14 CARICOM is uniquely positioned to contribute meaningfully due to its geographic proximity to Haiti, and commitment to democratic principles. CARICOM's advantages include a deeper understanding of Haitian realities due to its physical closeness. This, combined with historical ties, fosters cultural empathy, and facilitates communication between Haitian stakeholders and international actors.

Additionally, CARICOM's unified stance on democratic governance has already exerted pressure on Haitian officials to prioritise free and fair elections. The CARICOM meeting in Jamaica on 11 March 2024 represents a positive step forward. By facilitating dialogue and consensus-building, it could pave the way for a Transitional Council and a more stable political environment.15 However, the success of this initiative hinges on sustained engagement from both CARICOM and the international community as a whole. CARICOM's continued leadership, informed by its regional perspective, is essential for fostering long-term stability in Haiti, which benefits the entire Caribbean.

Second, the United States plays a significant role in Haiti due to its geographic proximity.  Its policy towards Haiti is multifaceted, aiming to address the nation's pressing challenges and promote stability. This strategy prioritises supporting Haitian-led initiatives to combat gang violence, navigate political and constitutional crises, stimulate economic growth and address the root causes of emigration.  Legislative measures like the Global Fragility Act and the HAITI Act reinforce these efforts. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) serves as the leading humanitarian donor, deploying Disaster Assistance Response Teams and investing in disaster preparedness programmes.  Despite these efforts, challenges remain, such as Haiti's low COVID-19 vaccination rate.16

In October 2022, Haiti found itself in a desperate situation. Gang violence and a blockade of the country's main fuel port led to crippling shortages, bringing the nation to a standstill. Prime Minister Ariel Henry, recognising the severity of the crisis, made a plea to the international community for a ‘specialized armed force’ to help restore order and address the growing humanitarian concerns.17 However, Haiti's request for assistance wasn't met with an immediate response. The international community faced challenges in mobilising a solution. Finding a country willing to lead a security mission in a volatile situation proved to be a hurdle.

It wasn't until July 2023 that progress was made. Kenya stepped forward, offering a significant contribution of 1,000 police officers to support a potential security mission. This offer represented a turning point, but it still took several months for the international community to solidify its response. Finally, in October 2023, after a three-month delay, the UN Security Council authorised the creation of a full-fledged Multinational Security Support Mission for Haiti.18 This delay highlights the complexities of coordinating an international response, particularly in a situation as critical as the one Haiti faced.

The US approach to security in Haiti also reflects a reluctance for a direct intervention due to its past experience. Following the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, the US hesitated to lead a multinational peacekeeping force. Despite initial US requests, Canada declined leadership while offering financial aid.19 Haiti, with US backing, then reached out to Africa. Stepping forward, Kenya agreed to lead the mission, sending 1,000 police officers to Haiti, with the US providing most of the financial resources.

Third, Kenya's plan to lead a security mission in Haiti has sparked heated debate at home. Sending paramilitary police to quell gang violence raises concerns. Critics fear Kenyan casualties and question the mission's justification. Prime Minister Henry's resignation further complicates matters. Reports of some Kenyan officers opting out add to worries about safety and effectiveness.20 Haiti's worsening security has reportedly forced Nairobi to delay the deployment until political stability returns. Despite accusations of secrecy and neglecting domestic needs, Kenya sees the mission as a way to boost its international profile and ties with the US. Yet, doubts persist about the mission's viability and whether it can address Haiti's systemic problems.

Despite ongoing discussions, the future of the Haiti mission is unclear, clouded by worries about its impact on both Kenya and Haiti. Some argue for alternative approaches, focusing on empowering local institutions and fostering long-term stability, rather than solely relying on external forces. This perspective advocates for supporting Haitian-led efforts, emphasising strengthening national institutions for lasting peace and security. As talks continue, the mission's fate remains uncertain, highlighting the complexities of international intervention and the need to prioritise the long-term interests and sovereignty of the nations involved.

Finally, the recent call by the United Nations Secretary-General for renewed efforts towards reparatory justice frameworks,21 resonates deeply in the Haitian context.  Haiti, the first nation in the world to declare independence based on the ideals of liberty and equality (1804), was forced to pay a crippling indemnity to France for its liberation.22 This financial strain, amounting to billions in today's terms, stifled Haiti's economic development for generations and continues to contribute to the country's current struggles.  In 2003, President Jean-Bertrand Aristide's demand for France to repay this debt, then estimated at almost US$ 22 billion, was met with his overthrow in a coup reportedly involving both France and the United States.23   This incident underscores the enduring impact of external meddling in Haiti's path to development.

Conclusion

Haiti's challenges serve as a stark reminder of the interconnectedness of global issues and the imperative for collective action. Beyond its borders, the nation's plight underscores the urgent need for a unified international response, with the need for the United States to play a pivotal role in fostering collaboration and implementing sustainable solutions. By reimagining frameworks such as the Monroe Doctrine to encompass not only security but also economic emancipation, there lies an opportunity to pave a path towards prosperity and stability for Haiti and the wider region. Now more than ever, concerted efforts and innovative approaches are essential in addressing the multifaceted challenges facing Haiti and in shaping a future for its people.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Sarah Morland, “Haiti's Prime Minister Ariel Henry Resigned. Who Will Replace Him?”, Reuters, 12 March 2024.
• 2. Widlore Mérancourt and Amanda Coletta, “U.S. Evacuating Americans from Haiti as Humanitarian Crisis Worsens”, The Washington Post,  21 March 2024.
• 3. “Canada Begins Evacuating Vulnerable Citizens from Haiti”, Reuters, 26 March 2024.
• 4. “France Evacuates French and EU Citizens”, DW, 27 March 2024.
• 5. “What is ‘Operation Indravati’, Launched to Rescue Indians in Haiti”, Indian Express, 22 March 2024.
• 6. Rosa Freedman, Nicolas Lemay-Hébert and Siobhán Wills, The Law and Practice of Peacekeeping Foregrounding Human Rights, Cambridge University Press, 2021, pp. 13 – 33.
• 7. Maria Abi-Habib, Natalie Kitroeff and Frances Robles, “Why Everything Changed in Haiti: The Gangs United”, The New York Times, 14 March 2024.
• 8. Morgan Gisholt Minard, “Gang Leader Jimmy 'Barbecue' Chérizier Demands Talks Role”, BBC, 31 March 2024.
• 9. David C. Adams, “‘Cataclysmic Situation’ in Haiti Leaves 1,500 Dead in Gang Violence”, The New York Times, 28 March 2024.
• 10. “Annual Report 2023”, World Food Programme.
• 11. “Breaking Point in Haiti: The Struggle for Survival”, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 1 April 2024.
• 12. “Explainer: Feeding Haiti in Times of Crisis”, UN News Global Perspective Human Stories, 1 April 2024.
• 13. Ibid.
• 14. Jacky Lumarque, “Haiti Has Good Reason Not to Trust the International Community”, Financial Times, 28 March 2024.
• 15. “Outcome Declaration of CARICOM, International Partners and Haitian Stakeholders”, CARICOM, 11 March 2024.
• 16. Karla I. Rios and Clare Ribando Seelke, “Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy”, Congressional Research Service, 1 February 2024.
• 17. Brian Ellsworth and Harold Isaac, “Haiti to Seek a Foreign Armed Force to Combat Gangs, Decree Says”, Reuters, 8 October 2022.
• 18. “Explainer: Why did the UN Vote to Send an International Force to Haiti?”, Reuters, 3 October 2023.
• 19. Peter Zimonjic, “Liberal Government Announces $100M in Aid to Shore Up Police Forces in Haiti”, CBC News, 24 March 2023.
• 20. Caroline Kimeu and Tom Phillips, “‘It’s Mission Impossible’: Fear Grows in Kenya Over Plan to Deploy Police to Haiti”, The Guardian, 28 March 2024.
• 21. Catarina Demony, “UN Chief Calls for Slavery Reparations to Overcome 'Generations of Discrimination'”, Reuters, 25 March 2024.
• 22. Catherine Porter, Constant Méheut, Matt Apuzzo and Selam Gebrekidan, “THE RANSOM: The Root of Haiti’s Misery: Reparations to Enslavers”, The New York Times, 16 November 2022.
• 23. Lisa Louis, “France's Historical Responsibility for Haiti”, DW, 21 March 2024.

The first-ever electoral win of Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands late last year, which saw it win 37 out of the 150 House of Representatives seats, highlights the growth of far-right extremism across Europe. PVV is considered a far-right political party due to its extremist positions on issues such as border control, immigration, asylum and Islam. Wilders’ electoral success aligns with the region-wide ethno-nationalist and anti-globalist tilt and a retreating embrace of multi-culturalism, the rule of law, and liberalism, which formed the bedrock of the European political system since 1945. Similar scenarios have unfolded in other European countries like Sweden, Finland, Poland, France and Italy, where the far-right has established a prominent presence.

Key Drivers

Far-right extremist beliefs and conspiracy theories promote a hierarchical narrative wherein non-Whites are deemed inferior to the White race and disseminate a warning of the Islamisation of Europe. Europe’s restive immigrant population has contributed to exacerbating the far-right extremist threat across the continent. The influx of migrants over the decades has festered resentment within the local European population, who fear the undermining of ethno-national identities and access to adequate social and economic opportunities.

This has resulted in swelling support for exclusionary nationalist rhetoric,1 rising instances of Islamophobia, and dissemination of conspiracy theories such as eco-fascism and the Great Replacement, worsening the crisis. The Great Replacement Theory, endorsed by far-right political leaders such as Marine Le Pen, Viktor Orbán and Matteo Salvini, asserts that ‘replacist elites’ are purposely replacing White Christian communities with multi-ethnic and multi-religious groups through illegal immigration.2

Furthermore, conservative intellectuals and organisations have openly expressed xenophobic views. Douglas Murray, in his book The Strange Death of Europe, argued that rising immigration levels have resulted in the ‘streets in cold and rainy northern towns of Europe filled with people dressed with the foothills of Pakistan or the sandstorms of Arabia.’3 Many White supremacists and conspiracy theorists frequently highlight census data and express concerns that White European citizens will become a minority by 2044.4   

Eco-fascists attribute environmental degradation to a surging immigration population. They advocate creating homogenous White Christian communities.5 This ideology has inspired incidents of far-right extremism, including the Christchurch shooting in March 2019. The Euro crisis, resulting in large-scale unemployment and the COVID-19 outbreak, which devastated economies and various industries, further deepened anxieties and the impact of continued immigration into their countries.

Additionally, self-radicalisation through technological advancements and social media has heightened the risks of lone-wolf extremist acts carried out by the far-right. Technological advancements have also facilitated the cultivation of online communities among the far-right on 8chan and Facebook, among other forums.

Right-Wing Extremist Incidents

One of the earliest physical manifestations of far-right extremism in Europe occurred when Anders Breivik, a neo-Nazi, killed 77 people in Norway in July 2011. His manifesto and actions, driven by his apprehension about the Islamisation of the predominantly Christian West, have been emulated by others years after his arrest.6 In June 2019, Walter Lübcke, a Christian Democratic Union leader, was fatally shot near the city of Kessel by Stephan Ernst, a neo-Nazi for his pro-immigration views.7  

A few months leading up to this attack in Germany, Christchurch in New Zealand was devastated by mass shootings in March 2019, in which over 50 people were killed. These attacks were carried out on two mosques by another neo-Nazi, Brenton Tarrant, who was inspired by Breivik. Additionally, a boy based in Darlington was arrested in the United Kingdom as part of an investigation into far-right extremism. It was found that he was an active participant in racist online forums and possessed information useful for committing terrorist acts, such as manuals for making explosives.8

In December 2022, adherents of the far-right Reichsbürger movement attempted to violently seize power in Germany by overthrowing the democratically-elected government.9 However, their plan was thwarted by German officials following which mass arrests occurred. One of the detainees was Birgit Malsack-Winkemann, a former lawmaker associated with the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party. Raids and seizures were also carried out throughout the country across multiple properties.

More recently, following a stabbing incident near a school in Dublin in December 2023, far-right extremists damaged public infrastructure and targeted police forces. Following the attack, police concluded that unrest was driven by a ‘lunatic, hooligan faction driven by a far-right ideology’ and warned against ‘misinformation’.10 About 34 people were arrested as part of the investigations into the rioting carried out by the far-right.11

Counter-Measures

Various European countries have been taking countermeasures to tackle the scourge of violent extremism. Finland, for instance, since 2012 has put forward National Action Plans after extensive collaboration between governmental and non-governmental organisations, along with researchers and religious communities. These plans contain measures to identify recruitment methods of different radical extremist groups, steps to prevent participation of young people in radical activity, help promote safety and security of premises of religious communities, among other provisions.12  

The Swedish Center for Preventing Violent Extremism, established in 2018, is primarily tasked with developing knowledge-based and cross-sector work involved in preventing violent extremism at national, regional and local levels. The Center works to promote the development of preventive work at the national, regional and local levels; strive to attain a high degree of coordination and effectiveness concerning preventive measures; provide support to agencies in addressing issues relating to VE and collect and disseminate information about preventing violent extremism.13 Sweden also appointed a National Coordinator to safeguard democracy against violent extremism in 2015.14

The Netherlands’ National Counter-terrorism Strategy for 2022–26 calls for ‘extra attention’ towards the threat posed by potentially violent, extremist lone actors, flags the need to privilege innovative (technological) solutions to facilitate the detection and combating of the dissemination of violent extremist and terrorist content and calls for measures designed to ensure the safe re-integration of individuals after detention.15 The United Kingdom’s ‘Prevent’ strategy supports police and security agencies in identifying individuals and groups at risk of radicalisation.16

Germany passed the Federal Government’s Strategy to Prevent Extremism and Promote Democracy in 2016 which calls for coordinated efforts by federal, regional and local authorities in association with civil society. More than 700 civil society organisations are funded by the federal government on measures to prevent extremism. Germany has established federal agencies for civic education and anti-discrimination.17 Germany also has initiatives such as Exit Germany which counsels families impacted by right-wing extremism.18

Despite these significant measures, far-right extremism continues to be a sociological challenge that has significantly undermined multi-culturalism, liberal democracy and rules-based order in Europe. Continuing and enhanced cooperation between intelligence agencies, NGOs and community activists is necessary for addressing this critical threat.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Prerna Singh, “How Exclusionary Nationalism Has Made the World Socially Sicker from COVID-19”, Nationalities Papers, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2022, pp. 104–117.
• 2. “How France’s Great Replacement Theory Conquered the Global Far Right”, France 24, 8 November 2021.
• 3. Doughlas Murray, The Strange Death of Europe: Immigration, Identity, Islam, Bloomsbury, May 2017.
• 4. Cassie Miller, “There is No Political Solution: Accelerationism in the White Power Movement”, Southern Poverty Law Centre, 23 June 2020.
• 5. Alistair Walsh, “Eco-fascism: The Greenwashing of the Far Right”, DW, 19 May 2022.
• 6. “Norway Mass Killer Anders Breivik Ordered to Stay in Jail”, BBC, 1 February 2022.
• 7. “German Far Right Gunmen Gets Life for Murder of Politician Lübcke”, BBC, 28 January 2021.
• 8. Daniel De Simone, “Darlington Boy Youngest to be Convicted of Terror Offence”, BBC, 19 January 2022.
• 9. Ido Vock, “Reichsbürger: German Far-Right Extremists Charged with Planning Violent Coup”, BBC, 12 December 2023.
• 10. “Far-Right Riots Erupt in Dublin Following School Stabbing Attack”, Al-Jazeera, 24 November 2023.
• 11. “Calm Restored to Dublin Streets After 34 Arrested for Riots”, Reuters, 25 November 2023.
• 12. “National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism is Progressing”, Ministry of the Interior, Finland, 21 July 2022.
• 13. The Swedish Center for Preventing Violent Extremism.
• 14. “Actions to Make Society More Resilient to Violent Extremism”, Stockholm, 13 August 2015.
• 15. “The National Counterterrorism Strategy for 2022-2026: Summary”, National Coordinator for Counter-terrorism and Security, Ministry of Justice and Security, The Netherlands, May 2022.
• 16. “Prevent Strategy”, HM Government, June 2011.
• 17. “Federal Government’s Strategy to Prevent Extremism and Promote Democracy”, July 2016.
• 18. Exit: Germany — We Provide Ways out of Extremism.

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Summary

The Project 75(I) will provide an opportunity for local manufacture of the state-of-the-art submarines which will enable the Indian Navy to dominate the undersea domain in our area of interest whilst providing the Indian industry an opportunity for long-term partnership in not only submarine construction but also maintenance, logistics and maintenance support.

Introduction

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) issued an Expression of Interest (EoI) in June 2019 for shortlisting of Indian Strategic Partners (SP) in collaboration with foreign original equipment manufacturers (FOEMs) for construction of six conventional submarines under Project-75(I) of the Indian Navy. The Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) had earlier approved progressing the project under the Strategic Partnership Model (SPM) in January 2019. The Brief places in perspective developments relating to the procurement of the P-75(I) submarines, specifically in the context of the defence procurement/acquisition procedure that sought to build indigenous capacity in the domestic private defence industry through the SPM.

The P-75(I) Saga

While the most recent DAC approval for the Project 75(I) was in January 2019,1 the project was envisaged in the year 1999 when the Government of India contemplated indigenous construction of conventional submarines at two Indian shipyards. The project was formally initiated in November 2007 with the granting of the Acceptance of Necessity (AoN). The plan was to induct 12 conventional submarines by 2012 and another 12 by 2030.

To bridge capability gaps in India’s submarine force comprising of just four German HDW and 10 Russian Kilo-class submarines, the contract for six Scorpene submarines (Kalvari-class) worth Rs 18,706 crores was signed in 2005, which later escalated to about Rs 23,000 crore. The first of the Scorpene submarines built at Mazagaon Docks Limited (MDL) was inducted in 2017 and the sixth submarine is set to be inducted this year. The DAC gave approval for three additional Scorpenes in July 2023.

The EoI issued by the MoD for the P-75 (I) in June 2019 noted that while Indian companies would be shortlisted ‘based on their capability for integration of system of systems, expertise in shipbuilding domain and the financial strength’, FOEMs would be shortlisted based on their ‘submarine design meeting the Indian Navy’s Qualitative Requirements and qualifying the Transfer of Technology and Indigenous Content (IC) criteria’.2

The DAC in January 2020 shortlisted MDL and private sector ship builder Larsen and Toubro (L&T) to tie up with any of the five foreign submarine builders as strategic partners. These five included Rubin Design Bureau (Russia), Naval Group-DCNS (France), Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) (Germany), Navantia (Spain) and Daewoo (South Korea).3 The Request for Proposal (RfP) for the nearly Rs 43,000 crore project was issued in July 2021 to the shortlisted two Indian strategic partners, MDL and L&T. The MoD noted that the Project 75(I) envisaged ‘indigenous construction of six modern conventional submarines (including associated shore support, Engineering Support Package, training and spares package) with contemporary equipment, weapons & sensors including sea proven Fuel-Cell based AIP (Air Independent Propulsion Plant), advanced torpedoes, modern missiles (indigenous) and state of the art countermeasure systems’.4  

The French Naval Group in May 2022 announced that it will not be able to participate in the project, given that the RfP includes a sea proven operational AIP system, which it did not possess.5 Russian officials in August 2022 also noted that the terms of the project were “unrealistic” and that they preferred a government-to-government agreement for the project.6 Reports noted that the timeline for submitting bids was extended as a result of the apprehensions expressed by the FOEMs, mainly relating to liability clauses.7 Hanwha Ocean (which took over Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering in May 2023) initially maintained interest in Project 75(I) in collaboration with L&T. It also held talks with MDL. CMD, MDL was however cited as stating in August 2023 that the South Korean company had withdrawn from the tender process.8

TKMS and Navantia remain in the race to bag the prestigious contract along with the Indian partner. Despite initial apprehensions, TKMS signed a teaming agreement with MDL in June 2023 during the visit of German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius to India comprising non-binding and non-financial Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). TKMS agreed to contribute to submarine engineering and design as well as provide consultancy support while MDL would be responsible for constructing and delivering the respective submarines.9 TKMS was offering the HDW Class 214 submarines to meet the Indian Navy’s requirements.10

On the occasion of the signing of the MoU with MDL, TKMS noted that the four HDW Class 209 submarines built in the 1980s were a successful example of Indo-German cooperation which continue to be frontline assets of the Indian Navy. Two were built in Kiel while the last two were built at MDL. TKMS and MDL also signed an agreement for the repair and overhaul of the second of the HDW submarines, INS Shankush in July 2023, worth over US$ 300 million, to be completed by 2026. The Medium Refit Cum Life Certification (MRLC) of the first submarine INS Shishumar was signed in 2018, which extended the service life of sub by another ten years.11

German Ambassador to India Philip Ackermann in March 2024 stated that there was clear political will on the part of the German leadership for enhanced defence cooperation with India. He flagged the “huge paradigm shift” in German strategic thinking to “boost cooperation with our strategic partners outside the NATO area” in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and China’s expansionist behavior in the Indo-Pacific in violation of the rules-based international order.12 Ackermann noted that while the selection process for Project 75(I) was ongoing, there is a “clear willingness and preparedness from the German side to support this Indian project”.13 He further added that a group of Indian naval officers will be visiting Germany in March 2024 to evaluate the submarines.

Spain’s Navantia, meanwhile, signed a teaming agreement with L&T in July 2023 for submission of techno-commercial bids for the submarine project, a month after the TKMS, MDL MoU. Navantia and L&T had signed a MoU in April 2023. Reports note that the company will be offering its S80 class of submarines.14 Spanish Secretary of State for Defence Maria-Amparo Valcarce Garcia visited New Delhi on 8 March 2024. During her meeting with Defence Secretary Giridhar Aramane, a number of bilateral defence cooperation issues were discussed, with focus on industrial collaboration.15 Earlier in February 2024, Spanish Deputy Prime Minister Teresa Ribera visited India. She asserted that Navantia was developing the most modern submarines though she added that “we need to be quite respectful about decisions being made by each country on how to [meet] defence requirements”.16  

The SPM Policy at Crossroads

The Strategic Partnership Model (SPM) as a capital acquisition policy is, therefore, at a significant crossroads. The procedure was first promulgated in May 2017, following its inclusion as Chapter VII of the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) 2016. This followed the December 2015 report of a task force headed by V.K. Aatre, former scientific adviser to the defence minister, which laid down criteria for selecting Strategic Partners (SPs) from the private defence industry for executing high-value, defence projects.17

The SPM eventually envisaged developing domestic capabilities in the four segments of fighter aircraft, submarines, helicopters and armoured fighting vehicles/main battle tanks. The SPM is part of the MoD’s efforts relating to defence procurement to develop long-term indigenous defence industrial capabilities. Other categories of capital acquisition as listed in the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2020 include ‘Buy’, ‘Buy and Make’, ‘Leasing’, ‘Design and Development’. Under the ‘Buy’ scheme, procurements are categorised in order of priority based on their relative importance towards indigenisation as ‘Buy (Indian – Indigenously Designed, Developed and Manufactured)’, ‘Buy (Indian)’, and ‘Buy (Global)’. Under the ‘Buy and Make’ scheme, the procurements are categorised in order of priority as ‘Buy and Make (Indian)’ and Buy (Global - Manufacture in India).

It is pertinent to note that the Indigenous Content (IC) requirements for most ‘Buy’ categories of capital procurement are more than 50 per cent. The IC requirements for SPM projects are lower than for those under the ‘Buy’ category of capital procurement. The Project 75(I) EoI stipulates IC as a minimum of 45 per cent on cost as per commercial bid basis with 60 per cent to be achieved for the last submarine with incentives for achieving higher IC content. Such provisions were included to ensure greater willingness on the part of the FOEM to partner with Indian SPs to execute high-value defence projects. It is pertinent to highlight that a higher IC content is envisaged for Project-75 (I) given that majority of weapons on the submarine are likely to be indigenous.

Despite such provisions, however, the policy has not seen success so far. Some of the issues highlighted by analysts as regards the SPM policy included the restrictions on FDI limits. This was especially so in the aftermath of the government allowing FDI limit in defence to 74 per cent in May 2020, from the earlier limit of 49 per cent.18 The DAP 2020 notes that the strategic partner of the FOEM has to be an Indian company ‘owned and controlled by resident Indian citizens’ and the maximum permitted foreign direct investment (FDI) shall be 49 per cent.19 Officials of the Swedish defence company SAAB were cited as seeking clarification if the SPM policy also allowed for 74 per cent FDI, after the government raised the limit.20 As regards the Project 75(I) specifically, previous sections highlighted apprehensions of Russian and French defence majors as regards ToT and liability clauses, among others.

The Project-75(I) was the second project to be pursued under the SPM policy of defence procurement. The first project under the SPM policy related to the procurement of naval utility helicopters (NUH) worth more than Rs 21,000 crore, an EoI for which was issued in February 2019 after the DAC approved the project in August 2018. Sixteen NUH were planned to be bought in a flyaway condition from a foreign military contractor, while the remaining 95 were to be built in the country in partnership with an Indian firm. Three foreign firms, Airbus, Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (part of Lockheed Martin) and Kamov (Russian firm) submitted technical bids while Indian firms that were in the reckoning as SPs were Tata Aerospace and Defence, Mahindra Defence, Reliance Defence, Adani Defence, HAL, Bharat Forge and Lakshmi Machine Works.

This project, however, did not fructify as planned due to a plethora of reasons, including interest shown by the state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) in the project, which was opposed by the domestic private defence industry on the grounds that the SPM policy was specifically promulgated to build capacities in the private defence industry.21 There were also changes in specifications relating to maximum take-off weight. The NUH was eventually placed on the positive indigenisation list (PIL) which was issued in April 2022, barring the import of such platforms.22

Way Ahead

On the occasion of the DAC granting approval for the Project 75(I) in January 2019, the Ministry of Defence noted that it will ‘provide a major boost to the existing submarine design and manufacturing ecosystem in India through transfer of design and equipment technology as well as necessary skill sets’.23 The delivery of the first sub is expected not later than eight years after the signing of the contract. Given the reality of extant Indian submarine strength, the acquisition by Pakistan of eight 039 Yuan class submarines from China with AIP capability by 2028 and the increasing forays of Chines submarines in the waters of the Indian Ocean, it is essential that there is faster forward movement on the Project 75(I) with early contract conclusion for a submarine with proven combat capabilities which will provide the Indian Navy a true combat edge.

The success of the strategic partnership model policy therefore is essential to convince FOEMs to be partners with the Indian domestic defence industry in taking forward the vision of building capacities in niche technological platforms like submarines. Moreover, given that the SP will not only need to commit to a plan for indigenisation in terms of value of production but also formulate a research and development roadmap to achieve self-reliance, the SPM policy will only aid in enhancing domestic capacities in the Indian defence industry.

The Project 75(I) will provide an opportunity for local manufacture of the state-of-the-art submarines which will enable the Indian Navy to dominate the undersea domain in our area of interest whilst parallelly providing the Indian industry an opportunity for long-term partnership in not only submarine construction but also maintenance, logistics and maintenance support. This project will form the basis for development of fully indigenous next generation submarine design and technology for use by the Indian Navy with potential for export to interested partner nations. The Project 75(I) will be the acid test for atmanirbharta in India in the true sense through the SPM Model which will help realise the vision of the Government of India in the defence manufacturing space and should, therefore, be taken to its natural conclusion.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “DAC Approval for Indigenous Construction of Six Project 75(I) Submarines Under Strategic Partnership Model”, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 31 January 2019.
• 2. “Expression of Interest For Six P 75(i) Submarines for Indian Navy”, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 20 June 2019.
• 3. “Defence Acquisition Council, Chaired by Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh, Approves Several Procurement Proposals to Boost ‘Make in India’”, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 21 January 2020; See also Rajat Pandit, “Centre Shortlists Two Firms for Rs 50,000 crore Stealth Sub Contract”, The Times of India, 22 January 2020.
• 4. “MoD Issues RFP for Construction of Six P-75(I) Submarines for Indian Navy”, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 20 July 2021.
• 5. “France’s Naval Group Pulls Out of India’s P-75I Submarine Project Ahead of PM Modi’s Visit”, The Hindu, 4 May 2022.
• 6. Dinakar Peri, “Terms of Indian Navy’s Mega Submarine Deal Unrealistic: Russian Official”, The Hindu, 15 August 2022.
• 7. Mayank Singh, “Delays Dog Indian Navy’s High-tech Submarine Plan”, The New Indian Express, 18 December 2022; Manu Pubby, “Indian Navy's P75I Submarine Programme in Troubled Waters”, The Times of India, 2 December 2022.
• 8. Raunak Kunde, “South Korea’s Hanwha Ocean Withdraws from India’s Project 75(I) Submarine Tender”, Indian Defence Research Wing (IDRW), 14 August 2023; Manish Kumar Jha, “After Hanwha’s K-9 Vajra, Submarines are the Potential Area to Collaborate with India, Says Kim Dae-Young, EVP”, Financial Express, 28 June 2023.
• 9. “thyssenkrupp Marine Systems and Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited Express their Intention to Build Submarines for and in India”, thyssenkrupp Marine Systems, 7 June 2023.
• 10. Ritu Sharma, “Germany Offers ‘Bigger’ 214 Version of HDW-Class Submarines to Indian Navy to Counter Pakistan, China”, The Eurasian Times, 19 November 2023.
• 11. “thyssenkrupp Marine Systems and Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited Sign Contract for Overhaul and Modernization of Indian Submarine INS Shankush”, thyssenkrupp Marine Systems, 27 July 2023.
• 12. Rajat Pandit, “Clear Political Will in Berlin Now to Boost Defence Ties with India: German Envoy”, The Times of India, 4 March 2024.
• 13. Ibid.
• 14. Ajai Shukla, “L&T, Navantia Sign Teaming Deal for Project 75(I) Submarines at Rs 43K cr”, Business Standard, 10 July 2023.
• 15. “Defence Secretary & Spanish Secretary of State for Defence Meet in New Delhi; Focus on Defence Industrial Cooperation”, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 8 March 2024.
• 16. Rezaul H. Laskar, “India a Very Relevant Player for Indo-Pacific Security: Spain’s Teresa Ribera”, Hindustan Times, 8 February 2024.
• 17. “Report of the Task Force on Selecting Strategic Partners”, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, December 2015.
• 18. Prasanna Karthik, “India’s Strategic Partnership Policy is Counter-productive in its Current Form”, Observer Research Foundation, 8 June 2020.
• 19. “Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020”, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, p. 481.
• 20. Dinakar Peri, “SAAB Seeks Clarity on Strategic Partnership Model”, The Hindu, 23 September 2020.
• 21. Manu Pubby, “Keep Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd Out of Naval Helicopter Plan, Private Companies Tell Govt”, The Economic Times, 14 July 2020.
• 22. Snehesh Alex Philip, “Naval Utility Chopper, Light Tanks on 3rd List of Items India Will Stop Importing”, The Print, 7 April 2022.
• 23. “DAC Approval for Indigenous Construction of Six Project 75(I) Submarines Under Strategic Partnership model”, no. 1.