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Summary

First Person View (FPV) drones have been used by both the antagonists in the Russia–Ukraine conflict. Despite their limited payload capacity and reduced flight time due to their focus on speed and maneuverability, FPV drones are ideal for close quarter battle (CQB) situations. FPV drones combine personalised target selection, accuracy, autonomy, EW resistance and guidance into a single platform, at the fraction of the cost of bigger and more sophisticated platforms.

Introduction

The ongoing Russia–Ukraine conflict has featured use of a host of critical and emerging technologies (CETs).1 Artificial intelligence (AI), drones, unmanned underwater vessels (USVs), facial recognition technology (FRT) are some of the niche technologies that have been leveraged by both sides in an attempt to gain tactical advantages over the other. However, what remains under-appreciated in the strategic literature—at least outside of posts on social media platforms saturated with war footage of the conflict—is the innovative use of certain platforms and technologies.

Optimising the use of such technologies requires a combination of scale, training and innovation since the platform is generally a mix of collaboration, convergence and cost-savings. One such platform is the first person view (FPV) drone, whose initial usage by the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) led to a reciprocal response by the Russian forces,2 with a result that the conflict in the region has quite literally become a ‘game of drones’.3 This Brief analyses the FPV drone in detail, documents some of its uses in the ongoing Russia–Ukraine conflict and comments on the future of this technology and platform.

FPV Drones

FPV drones are aerial drones with an onboard camera whose live feed is streamed directly into the FPV user’s goggles, headset, smartphone device or any other device deemed compatible.4 FPV is a viewing angle where the pilot sees only what the drone sees. There are multiple types of FPV flying such as FPV freestyle (for beginners), cinematic and drone racing (going through a series of obstacles, flags and gates).5 The first amateur drone racing was held in 2011 in Karlsruhe, Germany,6 followed by Australia in 2013.7 The event is now handled by professional racing agencies Drone Racing League (DRL), Airspeeder and MultiGP, among others.

FPV racers also use certain exclusive terms within their clique such as bando (abandoned buildings) and orbit (flying in a circular path).8 These drones offer three major advantages: immersive experience for the user/pilot who can see in real-time what the drone is seeing, more precise flying and better accuracy due to low latency transmission. All three characteristics are a boon for the warfighter. Real-time communication, precision flying and accuracy are important attributes of modern warfare. This third dimension flying capability has been leveraged by soldiers in Russia and Ukraine to gain tactical advantages over each other.

FPV drones offer other advantages too. They may be assembled with disparate parts from other cannibalised platforms, 3D printed, fitted with bespoke explosives and made ready in a fraction of the time it takes to put together more sophisticated platforms like fighter jets and bigger unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on industrial assembly lines. An FPV drone, if handled properly, can be visualised as an extremely fast and manoeuvrable, pin-point explosive that can neutralise hard-to-reach targets such as soldiers hiding inside bunkers. It combines the accuracy of a precision-guided munition (PGM) with the mortar round’s ability to locate and hunt targets in defiladed positions (reverse slope of a hill or within a depression in level or rolling terrain). Some obvious limitations, such as limited endurance, payload capacity and range have adverse implications for the soldier, if these are viewed as solely flying platforms. But viewed as alternatives to expensive ammunition with added benefits of manoeuvrability, scalability and cost-effectiveness, these appear as lucrative acquisitions in modern warfighting.

FPV vs Regular Drones

There are five key attributes in which FPV drones differ from regular drones.

Control and Perspective

Regular drones operate on a line-of-sight principle when a pilot is in charge or through GPS/GNSS receivers, inertial navigation systems (INS), LiDAR scanners, ultrasonic sensors and visual cameras when in autonomous or semi-autonomous mode. The drone pilot can view the flying drone (for tactical drones) directly or look at its video feed on a console or screen. The camera of a regular drone is generally underslung and mounted on a gimbal which allows for rotation of the camera and in-flight stabilisation. FPV drones, on the other hand, provide the operator with a first person view, simulating the experience of flying from the drone’s cockpit. This is achieved by streaming the feed directly into the goggles or headset of the operator.

Manoeuvrability and Speed

Regular drones have the capability to hover and maintain a stable path, making them ideal for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions where steady footage and detailed environmental scan are required. FPV drones rely on speed, compactness and extreme maneuverability—ideal for close quarter battle (CQB) situations such as counterinsurgency/counter terrorism (CI/CT) scenarios.

Payload and Endurance

Regular drones, depending on their type, have a larger payload capacity and endurance which allows them to be used for complex missions involving multiple sensors and coordination with other entities and platforms. FPV drones have limited payload capacity and reduced flight time due to their focus on speed and maneuverability. Their payload is generally an onboard camera (or two) and bare minimum additional equipment. They are ideally suited for kamikaze or one-way missions.

Operational Use

There is partial overlap between regular and FPV drones in terms of operational use, in that both categories are used for ISR and kinetic missions. The difference is in the nature, complexity and size of the terrain or battleground. While the former is used over a wide geographical area for gathering intelligence or to monitor ongoing operations, the latter is used in complex, congested, or close quarter situations which may involve small-scale precise tactical strikes.

Technological Complexity and Cost

Regular drones can be more technologically sophisticated, incorporating advanced navigation systems, autonomous capabilities, and high-definition sensor suites. This complexity often results in a higher cost per unit. FPV drones place more emphasis on manual control and agility, relying less on autonomous navigation and complex sensor payloads.

Sub-systems of FPV Drone

FPV drones are made up of four major component groups which are frame, flight system, power system and the FPV system.

Frame

The frame is the base or foundation of the FPV drone and all modifications and attachments to the drone have to be done based on the design of the frame. The frame is made up of carbon fibre. There are three attributes that need to be kept in mind when designing a frame for an FPV: frame shape (True X, Wide X, Stretch X, Hybrid X, Dead Cat, H, HX, Z, Plus and Vertical Arms), wheelbase (varies between 65mm to 280mm) and mounting holes.9

Flight System

Flight system components include flight controllers (FCs), electronic speed controllers (ESCs), motors, propellers or props, radio and receiver. While the flight controller is generally considered the brain of the FPV drone and has sensors like gyroscopes, accelerometers, barometers, global positioning system (GPS) and magnetometers, ESC takes command from the FC, draws power from the battery and controls the speed of the motors. ESC comes in two varieties: individual ones for each motor or the 4-in-1 ESC which is a single circuit board with four speed controllers built into it. FPV drones usually employ brushless motors for powering their flight, while propellers provide the thrust needed to lift the drone off the ground. FPV drones can have three, four and six propellers too. Finally, the radio and receiver takes the command from the user’s radio controller and relays it to the FC through a specific set of transmission protocols.

Power System

This consists of the battery and the power distribution board (PDB). FPV drones mostly use lithium polymer batteries and these define the amount of time the drone can remain airborne. PDB is a traditional circuit board which powers the motors but these days many flight controls come equipped with an integrated PDB.

FPV System

The FPV system contains a camera (or two if the user also wants to record a video), VTX module and goggles. One of the most unique things about the FPV cameras is that the main camera being used to ‘sense’ the surroundings is kept still and mounted at an elevation so that the user can see ahead. Unlike regular drones, there is no gimbal for horizontally or vertically panning the camera. The VTX module converts the captured image/video by the camera into a compatible signal for transmission.

Russian Use of FPV Drones

Russian design and deployment of FPV drones has followed two near parallel paths: private entrepreneurship and state-supported initiatives. The Russian forces have used FPV drones in both manual and AI-enabled modes and have continuously tested these platforms directly on the battlefield. Drone development efforts are spearheaded by volunteer communities in the country that have a significant academic and hi-tech background.

Initially ceding territory to the Ukrainians at the start of the conflict in 2022, Russia has clawed back its advantage on the back of rapid prototyping and scaling in late 2023 and 2024, focusing on two platforms: AI-enabled and manual FPV drones10 and light weight quadcopters11 , the former for kinetic one-way missions and the latter for ISR. The former’s development is an outgrowth of the proliferation of commercially available off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment available in the open market. Another reason is the relative ease of bypassing sanctions on non-military commercial products.12 AI-enabled FPV drones are the next step in the evolution of these platforms. The additional advantage of having a human ‘on the loop’ always remains.

The success of these AI-enabled drones was witnessed in a racing competition held at the University of Zurich between 5 and 13 June 2022 when Swift, an AI-enabled FPV drone designed by researchers at the university, went head on against three drone racing world champions and beat all of them.13 The drone used reinforcement learning to train itself from real-time data collected by an onboard camera and an inertial measurement unit measuring acceleration and speed. This process had limitations of the drone not being able to replicate the same performance with changed ambience settings such as change in weather or light patterns.

A similar technique seems to have been used by Russian volunteers in August 2023 when they unveiled the Ovod (Gadfly) FPV drone whose onboard AI allowed for attacking static and dynamic targets with up to 90 per cent accuracy.14 Some Russian media outlets have hinted that these drones have already been deployed in battle, mostly by irregulars of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR), in addition to the Wagner group.15 A critical reason for the use of AI-enabled drones is to remove the drone pilot from harm’s way since use of FPV drones requires the pilot to be in close vicinity of the target. These drones rely on line of sight communication with either the ground station or the radio controller with the soldier. Use of AI-enabled drones aims to preserve the lives of the pilots.

FPV drones are being increasingly adopted by Russian forces. An unofficial norm is to use Lancet for long range, kamikaze drones for operational depth and FPV drones for tactical strikes. One of the major advantages (or disadvantages depending on perspective) is that a majority of FPV drones are being procured by and innovated by volunteers and private groups, enabling much better adoption and innovative material scrounging.16

A typical example is that of the Sudoplatov ‘Judgment Day’ group which has created an FPV drone worth US$ 440 and which can carry a payload of seven pounds over almost eight kilometres.17 Other groups include Archangel18 and models like Ghoul.19 Training for FPV pilots has been reduced from four to two weeks while drone racing may be included as an official Russian sport, part of the Games of the Future event this year.20 However, slow procurement efforts by the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD), as of date, may dampen these efforts in the medium to long term since production scaling will require capital investment in terms of machinery and money. 

Ukrainian Use of FPV Drones

Ukraine has been a pioneer of drone warfare in this conflict from the start. Ukraine initially relied on larger drones, but shifted to smaller technology to adapt to Russian advances. This was a progressive step based on Russia ’s increasing control of the airspace. In the initial days of the conflict, when Russia ’s air defense and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities were less pronounced, Ukraine relied on larger drones such as the Turkish TB2 Bayraktar to great effect.21 Ukrainians have also gained from US transfers of tactical micro drones and loitering munitions such as Switchblade, Puma and Phoenix Ghost.22

FPV drones were first introduced by the Ukrainians in end of July 2022 when a video uploaded on X (previously Twitter) by Ukraine’s 93rd Brigade showed an FPV drone taking out Russian soldiers by precisely striking through an open doorway.23 Today, companies like Escadrone have developed Pegasus FPV drones which take five minutes to be assembled and deployed.24 The drone has gone through multiple iterations in design optimisation (improvements in motors, radio antennas and control electronics) since the different variants can be sent to the same target in case of failure, being produced at the rate of 1,000 per month currently. Other groups include Vyriy Drone (Molfar FPV), Aerorozvidka and Drones for Ukraine.25

Ukraine has also attempted using AI-enabled FPV drones to target Russian trenches and troop positions.26 One of the main challenges for Ukrainian drone pilots has been the deployment of extensive electronic warfare (EW) suites and air defence (AD) systems by Russia, as a result of which they were losing close to 10,000 unmanned systems a month. In previous attempts, while a significant number of their FPV drones did get close enough to trenches and Russian armour to inflict damage, there have been ample sightings and reports that suggest that electronic interference has prevented the pilot from observing and therefore precisely homing in on their target as a consequence of the link between the drone and pilot rupturing.

Use of AI on board these drones may enable them to continue on an autonomous mode even after communication between the pilot and the drone breaks down. A Ukrainian company, Twist Robotics, is at the helm of creating these drones, which have been termed the ‘poor man’s Javelin’.27 Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has announced the creation of an Unmanned Systems Forces that will bring all drones operated by the country ’s armed forces under a single centralised command. Ukraine aims to produce one million First Person View (FPV) drones in 2024 and the BRAVE1 defence technology cluster is at the forefront of this effort.28 Pilot training has also been expedited at the Boryviter Military School whose primary goal is to enhance the qualifications of Ukrainian service members, focusing on intensive training in eight crucial areas, including UAVs and military communications.29

Quantity as Quality: A Shift in Warfighting Perspective                                  

Five attributes need to be kept in mind when analysing FPV drones from a quality versus quantity perspective.

Cost Benefit Analysis

One of the major aims within any conflict is to attain a desired military end state with minimal damage and expenditure of own platforms and ammunition. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine, American expenditure of Tomahawk missiles against the Houthis in the Red Sea30 and Israeli strikes in Gaza have renewed urgency across countries on the need for massive quantities of ammunition. The requirement of different calibres along with requirements of precision, combined with limited production capabilities of industrial complexes and exorbitant costs of the ammunition themselves mean that cheaper, faster and scalable alternatives need to be found.

FPV drones offer one such alternative. Capable of being produced in their thousands, these drones offer a cheaper and scalable alternative to precision weapons since they combine personalised target selection, accuracy, autonomy, EW resistance and guidance into a single platform, at the fraction of the cost of bigger and more sophisticated platforms. One of the major challenges faced by both countries’ forces has been the syncing between volunteer efforts innovating effective and new designs and the capital expenditure of the governments.

Once these are in place, these drones offer far better alternatives to their costlier counterparts and can be seen to offset certain shortfalls in various forms of ammunition including artillery shells, short range tactical missiles and PGMs. Even the US Department of Defense (DoD) has realised the advantages of having thousands of autonomous systems across multiple domains, and announced the Replicator Initiative in August 2023. The aim is to produce ‘attritable’ platforms which are unmanned and are built affordably by August 2025.31 However, though cost is a significant factor in this programme, the aim of the Pentagon is to reduce the cost per piece of an unmanned system from tens of millions of dollars to tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars per piece. Currently, the Switchblade 600 kamikaze drone is likely to be the first platform to be selected under the initiative.32

Collaboration

FPV drones are currently used in standalone modes for tactical level actions. But they may be required to act in coordination with other platforms such as other bigger UAVs, artillery batteries and as part of a combined arms assault. FPV drones may also be used in CI/CT areas as part of what this author terms a ‘disaggregated mothership mode’ (DMM) where a larger UAV/ quadcopter can hover over a particular area in a mountainous, forested or built up terrain, register the coordinates and then send them to an FPV operator who can then use the FPV drone for taking out hostile individuals without causing any collateral damage.

Another example can be that of AI-enabled FPV drones acting in tandem with drone swarms for taking out adversary counter drone, AD systems while the swarm targets the bigger installation. The requirement of collaboration will require compatible communication systems, all mapped to a certain plug and play command and control architecture, where decentralised teams can cause extensive damage.

Scaling and Government Support

The effectiveness of FPV drones as a major attack platform took a significant amount of time to register in the higher echelons of the Russian military hierarchy as compared to the Ukrainians, because for the latter, innovation exists as a complement to aid. Bigger conventional militaries consider attritable platforms as a sideshow as compared to armour, fighter jets or artillery. However, once the Russian soldiers realised the efficacy and, more importantly, the constant availability and readiness of FPV drones, the Russian MoD has slowly started providing financial support to selected drone makers and help them to scale.33

State support is absolutely essential in scaling up the production line of FPV drones. Platforms like FPV drones will have to demonstrate their effectiveness as kinetic platforms in the battlefield before being considered worthy of being supported through the national treasury. One of the biggest reasons behind this is that the entire concept of an FPV drone is anathema to a conventional warfighter. Most consider ‘rigged’ drones to be worthy of being used only by non-state actors due to their cheap costs and COTS components.

Pilot training and Push for Innovation

The cheap cost of FPV drones is offset by the amount of training and hand-eye coordination required to operate them. Even when used in drone racing, the constraint of a look-ahead camera with a narrow field of view requires constant practice to overcome. It is for this reason that the Ukraine Army trains their FPV pilots for a month with a pass rate of only 60–70 per cent, as compared to the Russians’ two weeks training.

A study conducted at the University of Zurich involving five drone racers each from the professional and novice categories respectively concluded that professional pilots consistently outperformed beginner pilots by achieving faster lap times, higher velocity and chose more optimal racing lines.34 The training standards can also be improved using virtual reality (VR) simulations.35 Also, the role of private funding and crowdsourcing also needs to be understood and put in context. In the case of Ukraine and Russia, the funding, innovation and push for deployment of these FPV drones has come from university students, academics and soldiers on the ground. Combining the experience of the soldier with the expertise of technical experts is one of the better ways to push a particularly effective, yet under-appreciated, technology on to the battlefield.

Iterative Deployment and Design

Deployment of FPV drones has preceded design in an iterative fashion. Stress testing of these platforms has not been done in a lab or firing range but directly on the battlefield which tests the equipment in the conditions it is meant to be used and not on idealised representations. In a number of cases, the design and structure of the FPV drones has undergone a major change based on inputs from users and battlefield footage.

Conclusion

FPV drones, combined with AI, are the next evolution in warfare. Cheap to design and develop, comparatively easy to scale, these drones have proven that quantity has a quality of its own, at least in future warfare where rates of ammunition expenditure, especially precision ones, may determine the outcome of a war.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Ulrike Frank and Jenny Soderstrom, “Star Tech Enterprise: Emerging Technologies in Russia ’s War on Ukraine”, European Council on Foreign Relations, 5 September 2023.
• 2.  “Ukraine to Produce a Million FPV Drones Next Year -Minister”, Reuters, 21 December  2023.
• 3. Can Kasapoğlu, “A Game of Drones in the Russia-Ukraine War”, Hudson Institute, 9 August 2023.
• 4. Grace Dean, “What are FPV Drones?”, Space.com, 20 October 2021.
• 5.  “The Best FPV Drones”, UAV Coach, 2024.
• 6.  Grace Dean, “Drone Racing: Everything You Need to Know”, Space.com, 7 December 2021.
• 7.  “What is Drone Racing ?”, Drone Racing Australia Inc, 2024.
• 8. “Glossary of Terms”, FPV Freedom Coalition, 9 November 2018.
• 9. Oscar Liang, “A Comprehensive Guide to FPV Drone Frames”, OscarLiang.com, 29 April 2023.
• 10. “How are 'Kamikaze' Drones Being Used by Russia and Ukraine?”, BBC News, 29 December 2023.
• 11.  Samuel Bendett and Jane Pinelis, “How the West Can Match Russia in Drone Innovation”, War on the Rocks, 25 January 2024.
• 12.  Nikolay Staykov, “Catching Spiders: Russia ’s Drone Companies and Sanctions Evasion”, The Insider, 19 February 2024.
• 13. “Challenge Accepted: High-Speed AI Drone Overtakes World-Champion Drone Racers”, University of Zurich Press Release, 30 August 2023.
• 14. David Hambling, “Russians Are Developing an Arsenal of Deadlier FPV Drones — But Bureaucracy is Holding Them Back”, Forbes, 1 September 2023.
• 15.  Ria Novosti, “It is Planned to Create Their Own UAVs for the Troops of the DPR and LPR, Rogozin Said”, Ria.ru, 12 November 2022.
• 16. David Hambling, “Russian Volunteer Group Claims to Make 1,000 FPV Kamikaze Drones A Day”, Forbes,  5 December  2023.
• 17.  Samuel Bendett, “From Russia's Sudoplatov ‘Judgment Day’ volunteer effort […]”, Twitter, 21 July 2023.
• 18. David Hambling, “Russia Prepares An ‘Avalanche ’ Of FPV Kamikaze Drones”,  Forbes, 26 July 2023.
• 19. “Meet 3D-printed Ghoul Drone Used by Russian Special Forces in Ukraine”, Armyrecognition.com, 9 October 2023.
• 20.   David Hambling, “Russia Prepares An ‘Avalanche ’ Of FPV Kamikaze Drones”,  no. 18.  
• 21. Agnes Halou, “With Turkish Drones in the Headlines, What Happened to Ukraine ’s Bayraktar TB2s?”, Breaking Defense, 6 October  2023.
• 22. Jon Harper, “US Commits to Procuring a Variety of  Additional Drones for Ukraine on Anniversary of Russian Invasion”, Defense Scoop, 24  February  2023.
• 23. “Angry Drones of Ukraine Armed Forces. What Types of Kamikaze Drones Are Most Publicly Mentioned: Statistics and Examples”, Molfar.
• 24.  David Hambling, “The Key is Pilots, Not Drones: Ukraine ’s Escadrone on the Skill of Flying FPV Kamikazes”, Forbes, 5 May 2023.
• 25. Ibid.
• 26. Alex Wickham, Ellen Milligan and Alberto Nardelli, “UK, Allies Look to Arm Ukraine With AI-Enabled Swarm Drones”, Bloomberg, 17 February 2024.  
• 27. Evgen Pilipenko, “Ukraine Creates FPV Drones with Artificial Intelligence: They Pursue a Target Without an Operator – WP”, Liga.net, 26  July 2023.
• 28. Natalia Drozdiak, Ellen Milligan and Aaron Eglitis, “Ukraine is Promised 1 Million Drones Within a Year by Allies”, Bloomberg, 16 February 2024.
• 29. Dominique Sogel, “War on a Budget: Ukraine Becomes Hotbed for Drone Tech”, The Christian Science Monitor, 20 December  2023.
• 30. Elbridge Colby, “The Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) […]”, Twitter, 13 February 2024.
• 31. Joseph Clark, “Defense Officials Report Progress on Replicator Initiative”, US Department of Defense, 1 December 2023.
• 32. Brandi Vincent, “Switchblade 600 Kamikaze Drones in the Running for Replicator Mass Production”, Defense Scoop, 2 February 2024.
• 33. David Hambling, “Russians Are Developing an Arsenal of Deadlier FPV Drones — But Bureaucracy is Holding Them Back”, Forbes, 1 September 2023.
• 34.  Christian Pfeiffer and Davide Scaramuzza, “Expertise Affects Drone Racing Performance”, Cornell University, 15 September 2021.
• 35. Matteo Macchini, Manana Lortkipanidze, Fabrizio Schiano and Dario Floreano, “The Impact of Virtual Reality and Viewpoints in Body Motion Based Drone Teleoperation”, Cornell University, 30 January 2021.

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Summary

Despite efforts by the country’s powerful army to weaken the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) led by former Prime Minister Imran Khan, independent candidates supported by the PTI secured the highest number of seats in the national assembly. The coalition government led by Shehbaz Sharif has its task cut out to deal with Pakistan’s economic and security challenges.

Pakistan’s 12th national and provincial elections were held on 8 February 2024, amid a tough political, economic and security situation. Many politicians, commentators and international observers remained skeptical till the last moment about whether the elections would be held as scheduled. The date itself was set only after the intervention from the top court of the country, asking the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) to come up with a date for elections to end the uncertainty surrounding it.1 The assemblies had completed their terms and were dissolved in August 2023. According to the constitution of Pakistan, the elections have to be held within three months after the dissolution of the assemblies. However, delimitation of constituencies according to latest census figure took some time.

Finally, amid tough security measures in which the army and civil armed forces were deployed to provide security to the polling stations and the voters,2 voting for the national and provincial assemblies was held on the same day across the country. Overall 47.6 per cent polling was recorded in the elections.3 Out of a total 128,585,760 voters in Pakistan, over 48 per cent of them cast their vote. The percentage of voting was marginally less than in 2018, which stood at  52.1 per cent. Compared to the last election, however, more people cast their votes as the number of total registered voters increased from 106 million in 2018 to 128.6 million in 2024. 

Almost all Pakistan observers and seasoned political pundits were proven wrong as soon as the final results started pouring in. Despite all the efforts by the country’s powerful army, known as the establishment, to weaken Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) led by the former Prime Minister Imran Khan, independent candidates supported by the party secured the highest number of seats in the national assembly. It also got overwhelming majority in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and came close second in the crucial province of Punjab (see Table I and Table II).

Prior to the election, it was speculated that Nawaz Sharif, and his party, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N), favoured by the establishment, might win most seats, if not the majority in the national assembly. Also, survey conducted by Gallup Pakistan one month before the elections showed that the gap between the PTI and PML-N was decreasing consistently since March 2023 as the election were inching closer.4 In Punjab, while 34 per cent said they would vote for the PTI, 32 per cent were going to vote for the PML-N. At the national level as well, though Imran Khan was leading, the gap between the PTI and PML-N was getting bridged as the elections were coming closer. On the Election Day, the voters gave a different mandate, proving all speculations wrong. It is also true that the National Assembly mandate was fractured with no party getting a clear majority.

Context of 2024 Elections

The elections were held in the background of the 9 May 2023 protests, against the arrest of the former Prime Minister Imran Khan and deteriorating economic and security situation. Khan’s government was removed from power through a no-confidence motion in April 2022, moved by the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), an alliance comprising over a dozen parties. After Khan’s fall, the PDM formed the government led by Shehbaz Sharif as the Prime Minister. However, the deteriorating economic situation and security conditions in the country took the wind out of the ruling alliance’s sails.

Since his ouster, Imran has been accusing the West for conspiring to remove him from power. He also alleged that he was a victim of the political conspiracy by the PDM with the support of the establishment. The fall-out with the establishment came when Khan differed on the appointment of next Army Chief Asif Munir whom he had removed as Director General of ISI in 2017 and replaced him with an officer seen as close to him, Lt Gen Faiz Hamid.

After his removal from power, the establishment filed several cases against him for revealing state secrets in the Cipher case, Toshakhana corruption, instigating violence, among others. Violent protest erupted after Khan was arrested by Pakistan Rangers from the Islamabad High Court premises. Military installation and the house of Lahore Corp Commander was attacked and vandalised by his supporters. Though Imran condemned these violent incidents, the damage was already done. Several senior party members left PTI in the aftermath of this violence. Moreover, these attacks were a severe blow to image of the invincible powerful Army who have stitched coalitions at their will and governed through a hybrid system.

Roadblocks to PTI’s Comeback

It is true that Imran Khan’s popularity was low when he was voted out of power. The economy was in shambles. His decision not to approach the IMF for funds was pinching the economy, inflation was peaking, fuel and prices of essential commodities were rising. Yet Khan was seen as anti-corruption crusader. He did not hesitate to put his political opponents behind the bars. Yet, once he was out of power, he skillfully changed the narrative of Western conspiracy against him, military interference and painted his opponents as ‘corrupt politicians’ in cahoots with the establishment. His narrative appealed to the new generation of young voters who resent Army’s interference in the politics.

Since his ouster, all efforts were made by the establishment to decimate Imran Khan, his party and weaken his support base by arrests, filing false cases, coercing his party members to change loyalty. Khan has not yielded so far and has been demanding a fair trial of the cases against him and his party members. He has also demanded a fair investigation of the 9 May incidents. While in Nawaz Sharif’s case, Pakistani court quashed corruption charges against him and freed him, in the cases against Imran Khan, judgements were rushed to convict him just before the elections. In two weeks, he was punished in three cases and sentenced to 10, 14 and seven years in prison.5 The ban on Nawaz Sharif to contest election was lifted as the court said a ban for life to contest is a violation of fundamental rights of a citizen.

Nawaz Sharif returned from self-imposed exile after almost four years. Within two months, all cases against him were cleared so that he could file nomination for the elections.6 His party was allowed to run an enthusiastic election campaign, unlike the PTI whose election symbol, bat, was taken away just few weeks ahead of the elections.7 Khan’s party was barred from fighting elections as a registered political party. Even its independent members were often stopped from campaigning and their rallies were raided by the police.8  

The economic and security situation in Pakistan has been deteriorating due to the persistent political instability and confrontational politics. The country’s economy has been growing at a rate of 2–3 per cent,9 much lower than the country needs to grow to effectively address its economic issues. Foreign investment has dwindled and foreign exchange reserve touched a little more than US$ 4 billion sending alarm bells. There was a stampede for food in Sindh.10

Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC) was established as a single window clearance and Pakistan Investment Policy (PIP) 2023 was adopted in July 2023. In 2022, Foreign Direct Investment stood at US$ 1.5 billion. The IMF preconditions to lift subsidy to enable Pakistan to receive the IMF tranche only contributed to economic hardship. Similarly, the country is facing increasing security challenges.11 The elections were held in this background, with the expectation that the new government would address these challenges. 

People’s Verdict

The electorate in Pakistan have given a fragmented mandate in the 2024 elections. No single party has won the majority in the national assembly as well as in the provincial assemblies of Punjab and Balochistan. In Sindh, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) has got a clear majority and in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP), the PTI supported independent candidates have won an overwhelming number of seats. Elections for one national assembly seat was postponed due to the killing of a candidate in KP.12 The result for another seat was withheld due to the reports of rigging.

Out of the 264 declared results for the national assembly seats, the PTI-backed candidates have won 93 seats, PML-N 75, PPP 54, and Mutahidda Quami Movement-Pakistan (MQM-P) has won 17 seats. No party, thus, has been able to get close to the halfway mark of 134 to form the government. New parties, formed by the former PTI members like the Istahkam-e-Pakistan Party (IPP) Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf Party-Parliamentarian (PTI-P) performed badly. Some parties have alleged rigging and distorting of the election results as the declaration of results were inordinately delayed.

The most explosive revelation was made by Rawalpindi Commissioner Liaquat Ali Chattha who accused the government of rigging the election by making independent candidate lose the election.13 This has added to the rising chorus of rigging. This is also not the first time Khan is accusing the government of rigging. He had done that in 2013 and an independent commission had rejected his accusation as baseless.

The low turnout may have helped the PTI win the highest number of seats in the national assembly. One factor may be that young voters who remain both tech-savvy and active on social media helped the PTI as the party remains popular among the young. The PTI, left with no option but to explore new ways to mobilise its voters due to the restriction imposed on its activities, used ‘guerilla campaign’, entailing the use of social media to hold meetings, rallies and convey the party’s messages to the voters.14 This could have helped to woo young voters particularly who see Khan’s conviction as politically motivated and his ouster in April 2022 as a bigger conspiracy. Khan who was a popular cricketer is also seen as an uncorrupt politician who had sold the dream of ‘Naya Pakistan’ which was cut short by the establishment.

Since the 2018 elections, 10.42 million new voters were added to the total number of voters in the country. More importantly, 56.86 million are young voters15 , aged between the age of 18 and 35. Though there is no survey to show how many and how these young voters voted, given the PTI’s outreach on social media, its young supporters may have come out to vote for the party-backed candidates. 

According to Dawn, in 2018, total 46.89 per cent female voter turned out to vote. In 2024, female voters share decreased to 41.3 per cent. The report further notes that 

“Men’s turnout increased from 56.01pc to 58.7pc. Approximately 2 million ballot papers were excluded from the count across all 264 National Assembly (NA) seats contested which surpasses victory margin.”16

Challenges Ahead

Pakistan faces the same challenges that it has been facing, particularly for the past over two years. These include political (in) stability, economic crisis, and emerging security threats from terror groups in the country. Elections 2024 have not settled the political confrontation among the political rivals in the country. If anything, the election results have intensified it. While the PTI and PML-N both claimed victory in the elections, parties like Jamaat Ulema Islam-Fazl (JUI-F), Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) along with the PTI have claimed that the elections were rigged. This has re-energised the claims questioning the credibility of the elections. There are slogans like ‘mandate thieves’ and demand for return of ‘85 seats’ that were snatched away from the PTI.17

The fractured mandate means that the political parties need to cobble together a coalition government in the spirit of give and take. The PTI, PML-N and PPP fought the elections less on issues related to common people, and campaigned against each other. The Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) that formed the government under Shehbaz Sharif was dismantled prior to the election given the divergent views among the partners. In many constituencies, these political parties fought closely. These differences were proven when the PPP initially decided to offer support to the PTI than PML-N. The PTI however refused to partner either with the PML-N, PPP or even MQM-P. Given the current circumstances, the fractured mandate has pushed the PML-N, PPP and MQM-P along with other smaller parties together to get engaged in intense discussion. The parties have to come together as 29 February will be the first day for the National Assembly to convene.

Once the coalition government is formed, it essentially will be weak for a few reasons. First, instead of Nawaz Sharif, who was expected to be the next Prime Minister, Shehbaz Sharif has been appointed as the leader of the new alliance. Given the performance of Shehbaz Sharif during the stint of 16 months as prime minister from April 2022 to August 2023, he may not have much to offer to address the economic crisis as the IMF’s tough conditionalities would be difficult to ignore. Additionally, he may remain hostage to the alliance partners and may not be able to take strong decisions.

The country is facing a serious economic crisis. There has been no sign of it recovering, despite all the bailouts from the IMF and aid from other countries.18 The imports are increasing and exports are decreasing. The Pakistan economy has contracted for the first time.19 Each party has made big promises and claims, like creating millions of jobs, controlling inflation, or rolling out welfare schemes.20 Managing the economy is going to be a tough challenge amidst the increasing pressure from the IMF to curb government expenditures, expand tax net and remove subsidies. The debt burden has also increased and debt servicing would paralyse the economy.  

Yet another challenge for the new government will be dealing with the emerging security challenges. In the last couple of years, not only have the terror attacks increased manifold, but Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan have deteriorated. One of reasons given by some observers about the possibility of the postponement of the elections was the increasing security concerns in Balochistan and KP particularly. Overall, terror attacks have increased by 70 per cent in 2023.21 The low voter turnout in these two provinces (39.5 per cent in KP and 42.9 per cent in Balochistan), was due to the security threats. The elections for the one national assembly seat in KP were cancelled due to the killing of one of the candidates. 

Implications

The fractured mandate will make the government unstable and would be easy for the establishment to manipulate as one had witnessed during the previous regimes in Pakistan. The government has to work closely with the military for its own political survival. The PML-N and PPP had once agreed to a charter of democracy with an agreement to keep the Army out of politics. Though this understanding was violated by Benazir Bhutto when she had a deal with General Musharraf, the two parties cannot be expected to revive this understanding. It is likely that the PTI and now JUI-F, who has rejected the election results,22 will try to create hurdles in the functioning of the government. Shehbaz Sharif will be busy keeping the alliance together, impacting the tough decision-making that the country needs on the economic and security front.

Many within Pakistan and outside countries expected a politically stable Pakistan as that would make it easy to deal with numerous challenges it faces. However, the fragmented mandate has created political uncertainty. Many predict that the new government may not complete the term. The weak government may not be able to come up with a united policy to deal with the threat of terrorism. Internal priorities of the new government will impact its foreign policy decision-making, whether with the United States, China, Afghanistan and India. In the worst of the cases, the country may return to severe political instability if the new government will not be able to not hold its allies together.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. Nasir Iqbal, “ECP Agrees to Hold Elections on Feb 8”, Dawn, 3 November 2024.
• 2. Rizwan Shehzad, “Govt Approves Troop Deployment for Poll Security”, The Express Tribune, 23 January 2024. 
• 3. “FAFEN Analysis of Voter Turnout”, Free and Fair Election Network, 14 February 2024. 
• 4. “Gallup Pakistan Political Weather Report: 1 month before the General Election 2024”, Gallup Pakistan, 11 January 2024.
• 5. Umer Burney, “In Yet Another Conviction, Imran and Bushra Bibi Handed 7-year Jail Sentences in Iddat Case”, Dawn, 3 February 2024.
• 6. Umer Burney, “In Major Relief, IHC Acquits Nawaz Sharif in Avenfield Reference”, Dawn, 29 November 2023.
• 7. Maryam Nawaz, “PTI Knocked Out of Electoral Arena as 'Bat' Symbol Withdrawn”, Geo News, 13 January 2024.
• 8. “Crackdown on PTI Rallies Amid Election Trail”, The Express Tribune, 28 January 2024.
• 9. “SBP Forecasts Real GDP Growth to Fall in 2-3pc Range in FY24”, Dawn, 23 October 2023.
• 10. Simonne Shah, “Why Pakistan is Facing a Growing Food Crisis”, Time, 13 January 2023.
• 11. “Annual Report 2023”, Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS), 1 January 2024.  
• 12. Ali Akbar and Abdullah Zehri, “Independent Candidate Shot Dead While Canvassing in Bajaur: Police”, Dawn, 31 January 2024.
• 13. Amir Yasin, “Official Shunted After Rigging Bombshell”, Dawn, 18 February 2024.
• 14. Abid Hussain, “‘Guerilla Campaign’: How Imran Khan is Fighting Pakistan Election from Jail”, Al-Jazeera, 7 February 2024.
• 15. Iftikhar A. Khan, “Number of Young Voters’ Surges to 56.86 million”, Dawn, 16 January 2024.
• 16. Wara Irfan, Aniqa Atiq Khan and Hawwa Fazal, “Pakistan’s Elections in Numbers — Low Turnout, Gender Inequality and Voting Mishaps”, Dawn, 19 February 2024.
• 17. “PTI Decries ‘Historic Electoral Heist’”, The Express Tribune, 16 February 2024.
• 18. Editorial, “Moody’s Report”, Business Recorder, 13 November 2023.
• 19. Atif Mian, “Pakistan’s economy has consistently fallen behind globally”, X (formerly Twitter), 12 February 2024.
• 20. Sajid Amin and Arooj Waheed, “The Manifesto Monitor”, Business Recorder, 7 February 2024.
• 21. “Annual Report 2023”, Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS), 1 January 2024. 
• 22. “Fazl Rejects ‘Rigged’ Election Results”, The Express Tribune, 14 February 2024.

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Summary

Japan views India as an indispensable partner in the region's security architecture, and contributes economic assistance and advanced technological capabilities to address critical infrastructure needs.

Introduction

The evolving balance of power in Asia, coupled with competing notions of order and stability, has paved the way for India and Japan to enhance their collaboration in the Indo-Pacific. For nearly seven decades, the 'Asia-Pacific' region operated within the framework of Pax Americana, where the United States played a dominant role in shaping the regional order.

However, the landscape began to transform in the second decade of the 21st century with China's ascendancy to become the world's largest economy, and its challenge to the established order. China's ambitious initiatives, notably the ‘Belt and Road’, signalled a departure from the previous status quo, as it sought to exert influence and reshape the regional order in alignment with its strategic interests.

This shift prompted the recognition among other Asian regional powers of the need for a comprehensive approach to regional security.  Against this backdrop, India and Japan identified common responses to the emerging challenges in the Indo-Pacific through strategies like Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) and Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), recognising the imperative for a strategic partnership that went beyond traditional security concerns.

As Japan reframes its security roles and India bolsters its defence and maritime capabilities, the complementary nature of their strengths becomes evident. Japan views India as an indispensable partner in the region's security architecture, and hence contributes to economic assistance and advanced technological capabilities to address critical infrastructure needs.

The declaration of a new plan for the FOIP by Japan's Prime Minister Fumio Kishida during his visit to New Delhi in 2023 and the importance placed on the Special Strategic and Global Partnership by India's External Affairs Minister, Dr S. Jaishankar, at the sixth India–Japan Indo-Pacific Forum held in November 2023, reinstate the geo-economic and the geostrategic interests behind India–Japan cooperation.

Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Architecture

Driven by challenges posed by China's revisionist policies, particularly its growing influence in the South China Sea and the perceived threats to Japan's investments and infrastructure projects in ASEAN nations through the Belt and Road Infrastructure initiative, Japan under former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reinforced the QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) by resuming talks in 2017 to uphold a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific and came up with concept of the FOIP.

Abe's FOIP strategy was rooted in his vision of ‘The Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ (2006)1 and ‘Confluence of the Two Seas’ (2007)2 . Abe’s policy rested on three key pillars: the advocacy and establishment of the rule of law, ensuring freedom of navigation and promoting free trade; the pursuit of economic prosperity, including efforts to enhance connectivity; and a commitment to peace and stability through active engagement in the region in collaboration with partner countries.

Further, in pursuit of Japan's FOIP Strategy, Abe initiated the Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (PQI) in May 2015 in collaboration with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). PQI aimed to enhance Japan's regional influence and strengthen its strategic network, while also creating new avenues for Japan's economic development by tapping into the international infrastructure market's growth opportunities.3 The PQI origin can be traced to the Japan Revitalization Strategy (JRS) known as ‘Japan is Back’, which received approval from the Japanese Cabinet in June 2013. The JRS represented the third ‘arrow’ of Abe's ‘Abenomics’ programme, serving as a new growth strategy to overcome economic deflation and rejuvenate the Japanese economy.4 This PQI initiative was later upgraded to the Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (EPQI) in May 2016.

Additionally, Japan extended Official Development Assistance (ODA) through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to support human resource and infrastructure development in partner countries. In 2022, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) outlined four key aspects in its fifth medium-term plan for the next five years.5 These included a commitment to the FOIP initiative, the cultivation of future leaders to foster enduring bilateral relationships, actions addressing climate and environmental concerns, and contributions to the socioeconomic revitalisation and internationalisation of Japan. The EPQI and ODA aim to promote ‘quality’ and ‘sustainable’ infrastructure across Asia, in comparison to the BRI funded by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which has led countries to fall prey to Debt Trap diplomacy.6

In March 2023, Japan's Prime Minister Fumio Kishida during a visit to New Delhi, building on the foundation laid by his predecessor Shinzo Abe, introduced new initiatives for the FOIP. Kishida's FOIP plan revolves around four main pillars: Principles for Peace and Rules for Prosperity; Addressing Challenges in an Indo-Pacific Way; Multi-layered Connectivity; and Expanding Efforts for Security and Safe Use from the ‘Sea’ to the ‘Air’.7  Kishida also announced Japan's intention to review its ODA guidelines for the next decade, with the aim of continuing ongoing ODA initiatives to strengthen collaboration on the FOIP with regional partners.

India–Japan Cooperation

Both Japan's FOIP and India's Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI)8 share common concerns regarding China's ongoing military and political interventions in the Indo-Pacific region. Consequently, both nations prioritise safeguarding maritime security and enhancing relationships with countries in the Indo-Pacific, particularly with ASEAN member states.

A crucial element of the Japan–India Vision 2025 involves the development of India's Northeast region, serving as a convergence point for India's Act East Policy and Japan's FOIP policy.9 Both the countries established the Act-East Forum in 2017 to enhance cooperation, focusing on various sectors, including connectivity, new and renewable energy, forest management and biodiversity conservation, among others. For India, Japan's increasing commitments in the North East, functioning as a connectivity pillar for IPOI and extending development cooperation to countries around the Bay of Bengal, present an opportunity to invigorate its diplomatic engagement with South and Southeast Asia, as part of the larger Indo-Pacific. 

For instance, JICA intends to connect India’s North East region with the Bay of Bengal through financing projects like Bangladesh’s Matarbari deep sea-port, to build robust supply chains. Similarly, other projects such as Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Project, the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway and the National Waterway-2 Brahmaputra Project aim for intra-regional connectivity. India and Japan are also collaborating in countries such as Myanmar and Sri Lanka. In Myanmar, Indian funding would be used to develop infrastructure in JICA supported schools.10 Sri Lanka, India and Japan in May 2019 came up with a plan to develop and operate the East Container Terminal (ECT) of Colombo Port under the trilateral Memorandum of Cooperation (MOC).

India and Japan’s Indo-Pacific strategies also found common platforms for collaboration in Africa through ‘Asia Africa Growth Corridor’ (AAGC), launched by India and Japan in 2017. Japan’s FOIP also understands the geostrategic location of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Indo-Pacific and hence provides aid for the improvement of power supply and cable connectivity. This will help India in developing surveillance around the Malacca Strait and in increasing connectivity with the Islands, thus countering Chinese activities in the sea.11

Indeed, in the realm of infrastructure development, India has been the largest beneficiary of Japanese ODA since 2005 in South Asia. The JICA actively backs a range of projects spanning education, transportation, health, water resources, energy and mining, private sector initiatives, agricultural development, and environmental conservation in India. As of 2022, Japan has extended JPY 161,530 million (approximately INR 10,421 crore) over Phase 1 to Phase 5 of the North East Road Connectivity Improvement Project, to help develop and improve national highways in the North East States.12

Japan-funded projects across India include the Mumbai–Ahmedabad High Speed Rail, the Western Dedicated Freight Corridor (DFC) and the Delhi–Mumbai and Chennai–Bengaluru Industrial Corridor (CBIC), among others. Completed infrastructure projects supported by JICA include metro projects in Chennai, Delhi, Bengaluru, Ahmedabad and Kolkata, as well as projects related to railway safety and the North East road network connectivity improvement.

In efforts to boost their economic partnership, in 2011, India and Japan signed the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), a free trade agreement. Despite facing challenges in CEPA, with India's Minister of Commerce and Industry calling for a review due to concerns about a trade deficit with Japan in 2022,13 it is important to note that CEPA has significantly accelerated bilateral economic and commercial exchanges between the two countries. Furthermore, in a bid to enhance digital trade and industrial competitiveness, both nations introduced the India–Japan Digital Partnership (IJDP) in 2018 and the India–Japan Industrial Competitiveness Partnership (IJICP) in 2019. At the fifth IJICP meeting held in Tokyo in 2023, a memorandum of cooperation between India and Japan on a Semiconductor Supply Chain Partnership was signed, emphasising their commitment to advancing collaboration in these crucial areas.

To accomplish the goal of achieving net-zero emissions, Japan's Asia Energy Transition Initiative (AETI) is actively seeking collaboration with India in the Clean Energy Initiative. Further, the two nations are currently engaged in discussions to establish a ‘joint credit mechanism’, facilitating Japan's purchase of renewable hydrogen and carbon credits from India, specifically derived from projects focused on renewable hydrogen.

To enhance collaboration in defence, the two countries in 2020 signed an Agreement Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Supplies and Services14 between the Self-Defence Forces of Japan and the Indian Armed Forces. Also, in 2018, India initiated its 2+2 dialogue with Japan at the ministerial level. Subsequently, in the second dialogue held in 2022, both nations expressed their intent to broaden cooperation into new and emerging domains such as space and cybersecurity. The agreement included an emphasis on increasing bilateral cooperation and conducting additional military exercises, particularly between the Japan Air Self-Defence Force and the Indian Air Force. India's economic and military potential, coupled with Japan's unique ability to undertake projects of enormous scope and scale, provides a compelling rationale for strategic collaboration against rising threats in Indo-Pacific.

Further, India and Japan share a vested interest in contributing to regional maritime security and stability in the Bay of Bengal, given the crucial Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) in the area. Consequently, the two countries engage in bilateral military exercises such as Shakti Exercise, Varuna Exercise, Garuda Exercise, Dharma Guardian and JIMEX. Additionally, they participate in multilateral exercises like MALABAR, RIMPAC and COBRA-GOLD. In 2022, Japan took part in the multilateral exercise MILAN hosted by the Indian Navy for the first time.16

Strengthening ties between India and Japan are underscored by their active participation in various multilateral platforms, including the QUAD, G-20, G-4, Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) and ASEAN, with a focus on fostering a reliable and resilient economy. Furthermore, in 2023, India and Japan played significant roles in reinforcing the rules-based order and championing multilateralism in the Indo-Pacific by leveraging their leadership positions in G-20 and G-7.15

The Global South has gained significant attention in recent years in the foreign policies of Japan and India. While India has highlighted issues of the Global South in its G20 presidency, Japan seeks to diminish the economic reliance of Global South countries on China by utilising its ODA for building a stable international order.16

Conclusion

The 'Special Strategic and Global Partnership' relation upgraded in 2014 from ‘Strategic and Global Partnership’ between India and Japan, two of the major democracies in the Indo-Pacific, has been strengthened due to the alignment of their geo-economic and geo-strategic interests. From infrastructure development to economic cooperation and defence collaboration, the multifaceted relationship between these two nations underscores their pivotal roles in the Indo-Pacific. India has witnessed the alignment of its Act-East Policy, SAGAR, under the larger IPOI with Japan’s FOIP in recent times.

India’s economic growth supported by Japan through its large-scale projects in different sectors has been the cornerstone of Japan’s foreign policy to enhance its diplomatic presence and protect economic interests along with other countries of the region thereby maintaining regional maritime security and economic order and developing connectivity. India's economic and military potential, coupled with Japan's unique ability to undertake projects of enormous scope and scale, provides a compelling rationale for strategic collaboration against rising threats in Indo-Pacific.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “A New Pillar for Japanese Diplomacy: Creating an Arc of Freedom and Prosperity”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2007.
• 2. “Confluence of the Two Seas”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2007.
• 3. Titli Basu, “What are India's Stakes in the 'Partnership for Quality Infrastructure' Initiated by Japan? Will it be More Beneficial than China's ‘One Belt, One Road’?”, Ask an Expert, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), 7 March 2018.
• 4. Richard Katz, "Voodoo Abenomics: Japan's Failed Comeback Plan", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 93, No. 4, pp. 133–14, 2014.
• 5. “Medium-term Plan of Japan International Cooperation Agency ” , Japan International Cooperation Agency.
• 6. Jakob Ranglin Grissler and Lars Vargö, “The BRI vs FOIP: Japan’s Countering of China’s Global Ambitions”, Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2021.
• 7. “New Plan for a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2 April 2023.
• 8. “Address by External Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar at the Chulalongkorn University on ‘India’s Vision of the Indo-Pacific’”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 18 August 2022.
• 9. “Joint Statement on India and Japan Vision 2025: Special Strategic and Global Partnership Working Together for Peace and Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region and the World”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 12 December 2015.
• 10. “Signing of Project Agreement for Provision of Library Materials and Creation of Soft Infrastructure for 15 Schools under Rakhine State Development Programme”, Press Release, Embassy of India in Yangon, 31 August 2020.
• 11. Ken Mriyasu, “Japan Sends First-ever Aid to Indian Islands at Mouth of Malacca”, Nikkei Asia, 7 April 2021.
• 12. “JICA extends ODA Loan of INR 1492 crores to India for the North-East Road Network Connectivity Improvement Project (Phase 6)”, Japan International Cooperation Agency, 31 March 2022.
• 13. "India to Seek Review of Trade Pact with Japan, Says Piyush Goyal", Economic Times, 8 September 2022.
• 14. “Exchange of Diplomatic Notes for the Entry into Force of the Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of India Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Supplies and Services Between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Indian Armed Forces”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 11 June 2021.
• 15. “Joint Statement from India and the U.S.”, The White House, 8 September 2023; “New Plan for a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’: Policy Speech by PM Kishida”, The Government of Japan, 19 June 2023.
• 16. Arnab Dasgupta, “Assessing Japan’s Diplomacy in 2023”, Commentary, MP-IDSA, 21 December 2023.

The outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011 led to the displacement of nearly 12 million people to neighbouring countries such as Turkiye, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt.1 Turkiye hosts approximately 3.6 million Syrian refugees, making it the country with the largest refugee population from Syria.2 Turkiye shares the longest land border with Syria amongst its neighbouring nations. Initially, Turkiye adopted an 'open door' policy to admit victims of the Syrian civil war into the country. However, as the situation in Syria continued to deteriorate, Turkiye gradually adopted measures to protect its borders.

During the Syrian civil war, the Kurds in Syria fought against the Assad regime as well as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The Kurds declared autonomy in Kurdish-majority north-eastern Syria and established the Rojava autonomous region. This emerged as a security challenge for Turkiye, which feared that the Turkish Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) would be further strengthened by their Syrian compatriots, the People's Protection Units (YPG).

Syrian refugees in Turkiye and the rising threat from Kurds in northern Syria pushed Ankara to take steps to enhance its border security. Ankara decided to create a buffer zone in northern Syria along its borders which it termed as ‘safe zones’.3 Its objectives were primarily to contain the flow of Syrian refugees and to ensure that the northern Syrian region is not used by the Kurds to launch attacks on Turkiye. As the Syrian crisis continued to linger, Ankara decided to settle Syrian refugees in the safe zone. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu stated in 2015 that once ISIS was eliminated from northern Syria, the safe zones would naturally emerge as havens for displaced Syrian refugees.4

Turkiye took a series of measures to protect its border with Syria. It built four-metre high concrete wall with barbed wire and employed various security measures, including aerial and land surveillance systems, active border patrol units, among other steps.5 Turkiye also launched military operations to eradicate ISIS presence. It launched Operation Euphrates Shield in August 2016 to eradicate ISIS presence from the Syrian border area and prevent the establishment of a ‘terror corridor’.6 More than 2,000 ISIS terrorists were neutralised in this operation. In January 2018, Turkiye launched Operation Olive Branch to counter the Kurdish and ISIS threats in Afrin. Turkiye claimed that it cleared an area of approximately 2,000 Sq kms by March 2018. Again, in October 2019, Turkiye launched Operation Peace Spring to liberate approximately 8,234 Sq kms of territory in northern Syria, extending up to 30 kilometres from the border, which was previously controlled by various terrorist factions.7 Similarly, Operation Winter Eagle was conducted in February 2022 and Operation Claw-Sword was carried out in November 2022 primarily against Kurdish militia groups.

Turkiye justified its military interventions in Syria on multiple grounds, including the prevention of potential waves of migration, counterterrorism, and protection of its borders. Turkiye has been able to keep the Kurdish militias away from the border and has created a buffer zone. This has allowed Turkiye to build the infrastructure required for settling the refugees in those areas. In 2023, Turkiye's Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu stated that over 550,000 Syrian refugees have returned to Syria since the creation of the safe zone.8 He also stated that Turkiye is talking with the Syrian government and urged the UN and the international community for support in this regard.

Syrian Response

Following Turkiye’s military interventions and creation of a safe zone in Northern Syria, the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates stated that Turkiye’s actions were blatant violations of international law and the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Syria. Syria alleged that the Turkish behaviour contradicted the understandings and outputs of the Astana process. Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal stated that as per international law, the Turkish Armed Forces must take all possible measures to avoid and minimise the loss of civilian life, injuries to civilians and damage to civilian objects during military operations. He also added that Turkiye should provide compensation for civilian deaths and injuries as well.9

As for the Astana process, it was initiated in 2017 by Russia, Iran and Turkiye to help resolve the Syrian conflict. It focused on de-escalation zones, ceasefire monitoring, and humanitarian aid delivery, with initial meetings held in the Kazakh capital, Astana. The Astana process aimed to create conditions for voluntary return of refugees by establishing stability and security, but challenges such as ongoing violence and destruction caused by the civil war hindered success.

The 21st round of Astana process was held in January 2024, where issues relating to the fight against terrorism, regional developments, political process, the return of Syrians as well as matters of humanitarian assistance were discussed. The Joint Statement released at the end of the meeting called for

‘continuation of efforts for the restoration of relations between Türkiye and Syria on the basis of mutual respect, goodwill and good-neighborly relations in order to combat terrorism, create proper conditions for the safe, voluntary and dignified return of Syrians with the involvement of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), revitalize the political process and ensure the unimpeded flow of humanitarian aid to all Syrians.’10

Conclusion

Turkiye's establishment of safe zones in Northern Syria served a dual purpose – to create a protective buffer area and facilitate the relocation of Syrian refugees from Turkiye, while preventing the spill over of terrorism into Turkish territory. However, the volatile nature of the region, characterised by the presence of various armed groups and conflicting interests of different states and non-state groups, have been the major challenges for Turkiye.

The conflict in Syria meanwhile has reached a stalemate, presenting limited prospects for a prompt political resolution. While violence has significantly decreased, sporadic skirmishes persist in both the northwest and northeast regions of Syria. The Assad government exerts control over approximately 70 per cent of Syrian territory. The Syrian government's efforts to reclaim territories lost during the civil war adds another layer of complexity to the situation.

Five foreign powers (Russia, Iran, Turkey, Israel, and the United States) have military presence in the region. Additionally, the remnants of ISIS periodically launch attacks, further complicating the situation. Consequently, the border region between Turkiye and Syria remains highly unstable, posing a potential risk of armed conflict.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “Syria Situation”, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
• 2. “Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Turkiye”, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
• 3. Lionel Beehner and Gustav Meibauer, “The-Futility-of-Buffer-Zones”, Orbis, Volume 60, Issue 2, 2016, pp. 248-265.
• 4. Karen DeYoung and Liz Sly, “U.S.-Turkey Deal Aims to Create De Facto ‘Safe Zone’ in Northwest Syria”, The Washington Post, 26 June 2015.
• 5. Ibid.
• 6. Murat Yesilak, Merve Seren, Necdet Ozcelik, “Operation Euphrates Shield Implementation and Lessons Learned”, Foundation for Political and Economic Research, 2017.
• 7. “Relations between Türkiye–Syria: Turkiye’s Approach towards the Conflict in Syria”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkiye.
• 8. “Turkiye: Cavusoglu Reveals Roadmap for Return of Syrian Refugees”, Middle East Monitor, 22 May 2023.
• 9. Chenar Chalak, “Syria Condemns Turkey’s ‘Hostile’ Action in North of Country”, Rudaw, 5 June 2022.
• 10. “Joint Statement by Representatives of Iran, Russia and Türkiye on Outcomes of the 21st International Meeting on Syria in the Astana Format, Astana, 24-25 January 2024”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkiye, 25 January 2024.