At present Sri Lanka is witnessing the worst fighting since the signing of the ceasefire agreement (CFA) on February 22, 2002. The fighting was sparked by the LTTE's blockade of the Maavilaru reservoir on July 22, 2006 and the Sri Lankan government's attempts to reopen it by force. Since then the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government have indulged in heavy fighting in the north and east over issues like Sampur and the A9 highway. This has again put a question mark on the prospects for peace and is causing internal and international despair. On the other hand, the constitution of an All Party Committee on the ethnic issue, the "historic" agreement between the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the opposition United National Party (UNP), and the appointment of a Commission of Enquiry to probe human rights violations, all provide 'hope'.

The current standoff started with the crisis over the Maavilaru waterway in Trincomalee district, when the LTTE closed the sluice gate in protest against the reported insensitivity of the Sri Lankan government in addressing the drinking water problem of Tamils at Eachchilampattu. Colombo had earlier given the green signal for the Asian Development Bank (ADB) project on drinking water supply in the areas under its control in spite of protest from people living in the "uncleared" areas. As a result, without providing any room for negotiations, the local Tamils along with the LTTE closed the sluice gates of the water canal, thus blocking water to some 30,000 acres of ripe paddy fields and 60,000 people in nearby Sinhala settlements. The issue got aggravated when the Sri Lankan government began using military force to settle the issue.

After regaining control over the Maavilaru reservoir through military force, Colombo subsequently went ahead and gained control over the LTTE base at Sampur, which was perceived as a threat to the Navy's base and harbour at Trincomalee. This raises the question of why in both these instances the LTTE 'withdrew' and avoided an escalation in conflict? Why were the government forces going ahead with attacks on other targets in the north and east even at the time of peace talks with the LTTE?

The LTTE withdrew from the frontline in both instances after initial defensive attacks due to the reported lack of force to match the government's K-fir jets and ground forces. Besides, the Tigers were careful to keep casualties to the minimum possible at this stage when 'recruitment' and financial mobilisation are being constrained by the international community's strong pressure. The LTTE's efforts have been at both the military and diplomatic levels. Militarily, it is offering stiff resistance to the advancing Sri Lankan Army, the immediate aim being to gain respite from the present military operations and regroup rather than fighting a full-fledged war. Diplomatically, the LTTE is urging the international community to stop the Sri Lankan government's military offensive in the north and east, by warning that it would otherwise completely withdraw from the talks.

Conversely, the Sri Lankan government is determined to continue the military offensive, including aerial bombardment, and is aiming to push its Forward Defence Line (FDL) beyond the strategic Elephant Pass, which it lost to the LTTE in April 2000. With the present military advantage on the ground, the government hopes to gain leverage over the Tigers in any negotiation apart from maintaining the morale of its troops at a high level. In addition, it seems to believe that military success will help check the Janatha Vimukti Peramuna's anti-peace campaign.

Interestingly, however, both sides are claiming that the present hostilities are "defensive moves" while at the same time blaming the other for "aggression." Similarly, both are hailing the peace process and hoping that the international community will support their respective claims and efforts to boost the flow of money into their coffers. Nevertheless, international pressure has not prevented the LTTE from carrying out attacks and retaliation. Similarly, the government too is not in the mood to discontinue its military operation. For its part, Norway along with other co-chairs of the peace process is engaged in stopping the ongoing operations and bringing both parties back to the negotiation table. With the break down of peace talks on October 28-29, 2006 at Geneva over the issue of re-opening of the strategic A9 highway linking south Sri Lanka with Jaffna peninsula, fears of another war have deepened.

Despite intense fighting and failure of the Geneva II talks, the prospects for resolution of the conflict look bright at present, given the agreement between the ruling SLFP and the opposition UNP. In addition, the setting up of an All Party Committee and a Commission of Enquiry on Human Rights Violations are also significant in this regard. Particularly, the October 23, 2006 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the two major political parties on the ethnic question is a significant development in the five decades- long conflict and brings hope to the fatigued people. According to G. L. Peiris, former Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs and former Chief Negotiator of Peace, the agreement between the two main Sri Lankan parties "provides room for cautious optimism in the efforts to find a viable solution to the island's ethnic conflict." The MoU has provisions to ensure that the provinces have enough fiscal resources to make devolution of power meaningful. Besides, it also contains clauses to ensure that no particular ethnic or political group enjoys over-riding power or influence.

What is however required at this juncture is the sustaining of this 'hope' as a good confidence building measure with the Tamils on the basis of consensus between the SLFP and the UNP so as to trim down distrust between the two communities. Talks should be initiated on the basis of a 'southern consensus' for finding an amicable solution, and not misused for prolonging the conflict. The prospects for the upcoming talks depend entirely on the priority placed by the parties in using the opportunity to address the long-standing issues of the Tamils.

The arrest of three United National Liberation Front (UNLF) leaders at the Indira Gandhi International Airport in New Delhi on October 2, 2006 necessitates an evaluation of the external linkages of Meitei militant outfits. Apart from having close connections with their sister outfits in the north-eastern states, major Meitei outfits like the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the UNLF have been attempting to revamp themselves by tying up with foreign outfits and agencies directly or indirectly. In recent years, Manipur has recorded the highest militancy-related fatalities in the North East. For example, out of the 62 security forces' personnel killed in the North East region between January and September 27, 2006, 35 (56.45 per cent) were reported in Manipur alone.

The three UNLF leaders - Jayanta Kumar (Deputy Secretary of the group), Ghanshyan Kumar and Shyam Kumar - were arrested while trying to board a Kathmandu bound Indian Airlines flight. The operation was jointly carried out by the Delhi Police, Intelligence Bureau and the Immigration Department. Police sources speculate about the possibility of their attempt to set up a base in Delhi. However, the three UNLF leaders reportedly stated that they were only using Delhi as a transit point on their way to Kathmandu. The pen-drive and the compact disc confiscated from them contained detailed information on the deployment of army and paramilitary forces in the north-eastern states, information about the party's funding as well as its cadre strength. According to the information provided by the three arrested UNLF leaders, the total strength of the outfit was 2,000. They added that the strength of the second largest group in the state, PLA, was 1,500, including 100 to110 hard-core members.

The arrest of the three UNLF leaders who were going to attend a meeting with the outfit's chief R.K Meghen is an indication of the extent of their network, including attempts to establish linkages with the Maoist guerrillas in Nepal. Nepal's Maoists already have close connections with several Northeast outfits like ULFA and NSCN (IM). The forging of deep linkages between the Meitei outfits and Nepal's Maoists would be quite easy given sociological similarities and the latter's stance against Indian policies. Moreover, Maoists' domination of a significant portion of Nepal's territory means that the country could well emerge as a safe haven for the Meitei rebels. In addition, Nepal is the largest ISI hub in South Asia from where it operates to destabilise India.

It has been reported that the ISI and Bangladesh's Directorate General Field Intelligence (DGFI) have been playing an active role in fostering the militant activities of the UNLF. Like elsewhere in India, the Northeast also has a large number of ISI operatives. Though they are confined to the Tinsikia region of Assam, they have the capability to penetrate all militant-affected areas including Manipur. The bomb blast at a Hindu temple in Imphal on August 16, 2006, which claimed four lives and injured 66 others including two Americans and two French nationals, was an attack aimed at rousing ethnic/communal passions between Meiteis and Nagas who live in the hill districts of Manipur. Surprisingly, none of the outfits in the region claimed responsibility for the attack, with even the prime suspect, Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL), a Meitei militant outfit, denying its involvement.

Manipur has more than 30 militant groups, five of which are proscribed terrorist outfits; some are active, while a few are not. Most of the active groups use Bangladesh and Myanmar, while at the same time maintaining close ties with some foreign agencies in other Asian countries such as Pakistan, Singapore, Thailand and Nepal. For instance, the UNLF's connection with foreign agencies can be traced back to the 1960s when its then leader Arambamm Samarendra Singh established ties in erstwhile East Pakistan. Later, Nameirakpam Bisheswar Singh's (former PLA chief) visited Lhasa in 1975 to secure Beijing's support. Recently, the Thai connection of Meitei outfits was revealed when Bangkok repatriated four PLA cadres back to India, whom it had arrested in March 1997 with a cache of arms and charged with attempts to smuggle arms and explosives and travelling without proper documents.

Owing to similar anthropological aspects and geographical proximity, it is easy for armed rebels in the north-east to develop kinship with most of the South East Asian nations as well as to seek refuge to propagate their anti-Indian stance. As E Rammohan, former advisor to the governor of Manipur, emphasised at an IDSA seminar (October 11, 2006) the eastern border of India is much more under threat than the western border. Manipur shares a 398 kilometre-long porous border with Myanmar. In fact, the road between Tammu (Myanmar) and Moreh (Manipur) is the gateway to East Asian countries, where illicit arms and drugs smuggling are rampant and where militants are likely to reap benefits by expanding their networks. With the help of secessionist groups in Myanmar like Karen National Union (KNU) and Kachin Independent Army (KIA), Meitei outfits have established training camps along the Indo-Burmese border. They have also done so in Bangladesh under the aegis of the government. They have been covertly or overtly maintaining linkages with Pakistan and Bangladesh through active Muslim militant outfits like the People's United Liberation Front (PULF) and the Islamic National Front (INF). Interestingly, in an incident on November 10, 2006, two PULF hardcore members were arrested from Imphal airport while en route to Guwahati for an important meeting with the outfit's chief. The Assam-based ULFA has been the facilitator for buying arms from Cambodia and Bhutan for Meitei militant organizations.

Illicit arms uncovered in Manipur and other north-eastern states indicate that the weapons have originated from countries like China, US, Russia, Belgium, UK, Czechoslovakia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Thailand, Cambodia and Bangladesh, and that they are being smuggled through routes along the Indo-Burma border as well as via sea through Cox bazaar and Chittagong in Bangladesh. Most of the weapons being used by the outfits in the region are Chinese-made and they are comparatively more sophisticated than those wielded by the Indian army. Weapons such as Lathod M-76 (40mm grenade launcher), AGL, Chinese SAR rifles, AK series of Rifles, M-16 rifle, Machine guns, 60mm mortars, pistols, RPGs, sniper rifles are commonly used. Most of these weapons are bought in South-East Asian black markets. At the same time, Chinese arms manufacturing companies like Norinco are also clandestinely supplying arms to these outfits. Thus, easy availability of arms in the area fuels violence in the region.

Though Manipur is considered to be a tiny state in the large Indian landmass, the sizeable casualty figures for both civilians and security forces inflicted by militancy-related violence there is disproportionately large. Any further expansion in the capabilities of Meitei militants and their networks within and outside the country would pose an even more serious challenge. The Indian security establishment needs to take the threat posed by Meitei militants more seriously and make concerted efforts to staunch the spread of their networks within and outside the country.

The Bangladesh National Party (BNP), which came to power in 2001, completed its term on October 28, 2006 amidst violent protests that saw 24 people losing their lives. Rejecting the BNP's nominee for the post of Chief Adviser of the caretaker government, the 14 party opposition alliance led by the Awami League (AL) called for a strike to press for an alternate Chief Advisor as well as for electoral reforms. A political crisis has, however, been averted by the country's President, who assumed the additional responsibility of the Chief Advisor. As Dhaka limps back to normalcy, expectations of free and fair elections and transfer of power now rest entirely on President Iajuddin Ahmed.

The mechanism of Neutral Caretaker Government (NCG) is a constitutional innovation in Bangladesh. Its role is to conduct and supervise elections in a free and fair manner. In 1990 when the Ershad military regime was forced to hand over power due to popular resistance, an independent neutral body to conduct elections came to be considered necessary to ensure that the military's influence over the governmental machinery was nullified.

The agitating political parties led by the Awami League, the Bangladesh National party and the Jamaat-e-Islami issued a joint declaration, which stated that "the head of the interim caretaker government must be a non-partisan neutral person who will not be associated with any political party directly or indirectly, or he would not be contesting for the posts of President, Vice President or member of parliament. No minister of his caretaker government will participate in any elections." The caretaker government that was eventually formed was headed by Chief Justice Mr. Shabuddin, around whom a consensus had evolved. The neutral, efficient and free and fair manner in which the 1991 elections were conducted was a watershed in Bangladesh after years of military rule. This experience later formed the basis for institutionalising the mechanism of caretaker governments before elections.

The restoration of parliamentary democracy and the assumption of power by Begum Khaleda Zia in 1991 brought to the fore the conflicting dynamics of the Mujib and Zia political lineages. The bitter past came to dominate their relationship and polarised society to a large extent. Not only did personal animosity assumed political colour, but also frequent boycotts of Parliament and hartal came to mark the new democratic political order. The lack of democratic practices and non-co-operation between the two major political parties hampered the consolidation of democracy. The reported rigging and malpractices in the by-elections in Mirpur in 1993 and in Magura in 1994 undermined the credibility of the Election Commission as well as of the BNP government. Under these circumstances and given the prevailing mistrust and suspicion, the institutionalisation of caretaker government to conduct free and fair elections was demanded. When the ruling BNP rejected this demand, the Awami League, the Jatiyo Party and the Jamaat Islami resigned from the 147 parliamentary seats that they together held. Though the speaker refused to accept their resignation, the opposition parties ceremonially vacated their seats and continued with their boycott. In spite of the opposition's refusal to participate in the electoral process, the BNP went ahead with the conduct of elections in February 1996 and even formed a government. But it was soon brought to its knees when government officials including civil servants expressed their inability to carry out orders given by an illegitimate government. Thereupon the BNP stepped down and accepted the holding of fresh elections for the seventh parliament under a neutral caretaker government.

Before the elections were held, however, on March 21, 1996, the sixth parliament approved a bill granting constitutional status to the NCG under Chapter 2, A of the constitution, which stated that the non-party 'neutral' caretaker government shall be collectively responsible to the President. It would be headed by a Chief Advisor and would consist of ten advisors. Article 58C, clause 3 reads: "The President shall appoint as Chief Adviser the person who among the retired Chief Justices of Bangladesh retired last and who is qualified to be appointed as an advisor…" It also lays down that if the retired Chief justice is not available or is not willing to hold this office, the President should appoint as Chief Advisor the person who among the retired Chief Justices of Bangladesh retired immediately before the last Chief Justice. As an alternative, if no retired Chief Justice were to be available, the President could appoint as Chief Advisor a person who among the retired judges of the Appellate Division retired last, and in case even he is not available or not willing the President shall appoint the retired judge of the Appellate Division who retired immediately before the last such retired judge. The Awami League and the BNP won the elections in 1996 and 2001, respectively, and each time the losing party accused the NCG of facilitating the other party's victory.

The current constitutional crisis had its genesis when it became clear that retired Chief Justice K. M Hasan, who was earlier associated with the BNP in 1979, is going to take over as head of the caretaker government. His appointment was confirmed when the government brought in a constitutional amendment to increase the retirement age of judges, thereby making Hasan the last retired Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The Opposition's rejection of his candidacy and pressure from the civil society led him to decline the post of Chief Advisor. It was the resulting vacuum that forced President Iajuddin to take over as Chief Advisor to the caretaker government. The Bangladesh Constitution indeed provides for the President to assume such a responsibility, though Iajuddin's move generated controversy because he had not exhausted all other options available to him under the constitution.

The Awami League, which had earlier opposed the President taking over as head of the NCG, has decided to adopt a wait and watch policy. It submitted an 11-point demand to the President and has given a deadline for its fulfilment, which, it feels, would prove the President's neutrality. What made the AL accept Iajuddin as the chief of NCG was the fear that if it continues with its street demonstration strategy there was a possibility of the President employing the armed forces to restore law and order - a cause for apprehension given Bangladesh's history of military rule. There are reports that some Western donor countries also played an important role in persuading the political parties to be accommodative in this regard.

Three issues have assumed importance and have a direct bearing on the electoral process: (1) the Election Commissioner who is considered a BNP sympathizer, (2) the issue of the voters list, and (3) the administrative reshuffle carried out by the previous BNP government.

The Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) played an important role in preparing a fresh voters list, ignoring the High Court's direction to update it. There were allegations that the enumerators deliberately excluded the names of some members of the minority community and other AL supporters. The earlier list prepared by the CEC contained 9.13 crore voters. But this was struck down by the Supreme Court, which directed the EC to update the already existing list. The current list, after the court's direction, stands at 9.30 crore. The 2001 report of the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics states that if all the people above 18 are listed and no death has occurred, the current voters list should be 8.02 crore. There is hardly any time left to correct the voters list and an election held on the basis of this list is likely to be controversial.

Before relinquishing power, the BNP government undertook an administrative reshuffle. Newspapers have reported that most of the 700 posts to which the BNP appointed its own sympathizers are related to election activities. It often becomes a problem for the caretaker government to transfer and reappoint these officials. Appointments are made in such a fashion that if one officer were to be replaced there is a chance that the succeeding officer could be a BNP sympathiser. Though the caretaker Chief has made some changes in the administration, a lot more needs to be done. After taking over, the interim caretaker government has transferred some top officials. But it is alleged that this reshuffle would not have much of an impact since some of these controversial officers have been placed in better positions to influence the elections For example, two key secretary level positions in the administration - that of the home and establishment ministries - have been given to officials whose closeness to the immediately preceding government is well known and sources fear that these vital new appointments might influence the next election in favour of the parties from which they had obtained benefits. Moreover, the Establishment Secretary will be in charge of all transfers and appointment, which proves to be crucial for the forthcoming elections. It is important to mention here that the government appointed a total of 328 candidates as Upazilla Election Officers on September 21, 2006. Out of these, 150 are leaders or activists of the Jatiyatabadi Chhatra Dal (JCD), the student organisation of the BNP.

The most controversial issue is the reconstitution of the Election Commission, which is a prerequisite for free and fair elections. M. A. Aziz, the current Chief Election Commissioner, is a controversial figure and one of the Opposition's demands has been to remove him from the post. Efforts are being made to persuade him to resign so as to avoid a constitutional crisis. With the BNP and its allies openly supporting him, the Chief Election Commissioner has refused to resign.

Restructuring the Election Commission remains an important issue. Since the post of the EC is a constitutional position, the caretaker government does not have the authority to replace him. The NCG is trying to avert a political crisis by appointing four additional commissioners to neutralise the four politicised commissioners, including the Chief Election Commissioner, and thus make the functioning of the EC less arbitrary and more consensual. Similarly, there is hardly any time left for correcting the bloated voter's list and remove the names of fake voters. As Bangladesh gears for another political impasse and uncertainty over these issues, the two major political parties are preparing for yet another showdown in the streets, which is likely to be violent and bloody and probably would be just one of the many incidents that will characterize the political scene in the run up to the forthcoming elections.

The two-day China-Africa Summit on November 4 and 5, 2006 in Beijing, coinciding with the 50th anniversary of the establishment of China-Africa diplomatic ties, created a new milestone in China's relationship with the African continent. Hailed as a new type of strategic partnership, this gathering of forty-eight African countries - the biggest ever since the founding of the People's Republic of China - was concluded by a declaration and an action plan for 2007-2009. The main thrust of the Summit, as stated by the Chinese President Hu Jintao, was political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win co-operation and cultural exchange. In many ways the Summit has explicit implications for China's rise as an alternative power centre in the world.

China has incrementally cemented its traditional ties with the African countries. An article in Beijing Review mentions that in the fifty years of China-African diplomatic relations, the two sides have seen more than 800 high-level visits, including 160 visits from China to Africa and 676 visits from 51 African countries to China. Before the 1990s, China's support to the African countries was mainly in the form of free assistance in building railways, textile mills, hydropower plants, stadiums, schools and hospitals. With regard to trade, statistics from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce show that the two-way trade volume has rocketed from US $4 billion in 1995 to $39.74 billion in 2005. China exported goods worth $18.68 billion and imported goods worth $21.06 billion in 2005, with the trade surplus on the African side reaching $2.38 billion. By 2005, China's foreign direct investment in Africa totalled $1.18 billion with more than 800 Chinese enterprises operating in Africa. From January 2005, China had reduced tariffs on 190 African products to zero.

At the beginning of this year, Beijing unveiled an African Policy Paper on January 12, 2006 titled 'China's African Policy,' which states that "China will do its best to provide and gradually increase assistance to African nations with no political strings attached." This was followed by several high-level visits from China to African countries, first by President Hu Jintao to Morocco, Nigeria and Kenya between April 24 and 29, 2006, and then followed by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao to Egypt, Ghana, the Republic of Congo, Angola, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda between June 17 and 24, 2006. Earlier in 2000, China-Africa relations were institutionalised with the founding of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) to enhance bilateral exchanges and co-operation. The present FOCAC meeting was the third in succession and was raised to the Summit level indicating a deepening of Africa-China relations. On the economic front, Xinhua reports that China-Africa bilateral trade is expected to reach $50 billion in the current year and is projected to top $100 billion by 2010. At the opening ceremony of the summit on November 4, Hu Jintao pledged that China will double its aid to Africa by 2009 and cancel more debts owed by poor African countries. Hu also vowed that China would further open up its market to Africa by raising the number of tariff-free products from the current 190 to 440. All these indicate China's determined steps to deepen its relations with Africa and emerge as a major power to which the world could look up to.

China realises the important role of Africa in emerging global realignments in politics and trade. It also understands the critical needs of the African countries like increased trade, investments, debt-relief and development assistance programme. At the same time, China's common history of struggle against imperialism and colonialism has injected a kind of sensitivity in its policies towards the African countries. Both China and Africa give similar priority to notions of sovereignty and non-interference. Both realise the need for economic development based on mutual benefit. Africa has rich oil and mineral resources and a huge market, but suffers from economic backwardness and lacks funds and technology for development. China, on the other hand, has achieved remarkable economic growth and as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council wields a veto power. But with its rapid rise there is an ever-growing demand for steady supplies of oil and mineral resources. In this context, China has been able to converge its own needs with Africa's interests. Chinese State Counsellor, Tang Jiaxuan, observed that "economically, China and Africa should be partners of cooperation and should draw on each other's strength to work for mutual benefit." China has thus wisely formulated its foreign policy towards Africa on the principles of non-interference and mutual benefit, which is attractive and beneficial to the African countries.

China's African policy is based primarily on the motto of co-operation without intervention. This non-interventionist principle engenders a three-point approach: treating the African countries as equals, adhering to non-interference in their internal affairs, and respecting the African nations' road of development. Unlike the US, which links development with democracy, China does not dictate terms for political or economic reforms and only expects affirmation of the 'one China' policy. This non-interventionist and non-ideological foreign policy has made China an attractive country for African countries to engage with. In fact, African leaders find the 'Chinese model' more appropriate than the Western model of development, given similar concerns for poverty alleviation, rural development and economic growth. Further, unlike the West, China provides alternative technologies and fair trade and investment to Africa. On the issue of Sino-African energy co-operation, unlike their Western counterparts, Chinese companies have even ventured into risk-ridden regions of Africa to tap oil resources. Moreover, unlike Western companies, Chinese enterprises not only tap energy resources but also invest in building local infrastructure and launch projects in agriculture, power generation and telecommunications.

China's Africa policy is a part of its proactive foreign policy, which is aimed at not only protecting its security interests but also at shaping its security environment in a manner that is conducive to its national interests and growth. This strategy seeks to build up an alternative international order, which would distinctly pose a formidable challenge to US unilateralism and global hegemony. It also provides a new vision to developing countries, which wish to move away from the US-dominated world order to an alternative international order. China has entered in a big way in areas that have long been the domain of the United States. The recent high level visits by Chinese leaders to African countries testify China's expanding influence in the US's backyard. It is making inroads in a peaceful manner based on the strategy of a non-interventionist and non-ideological foreign policy. Some scholars are also talking about a 'great game' being enacted in Africa between China and the US for access to natural resources. China has already emerged as Africa's third largest trading partner, next only to the United States and France. The first Africa-China-US dialogue held in South Africa in August 2005 is a reminder of the possible security implications of growing Chinese and US influence in Africa. Though the dialogue does not foresee a direct conflict of interests between China and the United States, China's rising commercial interests in Africa heighten the prospects of conflict in future. Statistics show that China imported 28 per cent of its oil from Africa in 2005, compared to the US import of only 15 per cent in the same year.

Apart from competition for oil and resources, China is also blamed for pursuing neo-colonialism in the continent. For instance, cheap Chinese textile goods have flooded African markets creating fierce and unfair competition for African textiles. However, China has brushed aside such allegations and called it just another form of 'China threat' theory propounded by the West. China claims that its co-operation with Africa is based on a win-win formula. Africa too feels that China is a lesser evil than the West or the United States, since the latter tend to ostracize many of the autocratic governments on the continent by citing human rights violations, corruption and bad governance. Further, African countries feel that China is helping them in a big way with capital and technology. For instance, Chinese investments have helped Sudan to change its status from an oil importing to an oil exporting country. Further, a glance at the Action Plan (2007-2009) suggests that its focus is not only on energy resources but that a large part is dedicated to joint co-operation in education, environmental protection, promoting tourism, and fighting HIV/AIDS.

China's African policy, couched in altruistic notions, has thus become attractive to African countries. China has successfully projected itself as a responsible great power showing the path for development and growth to the lesser developed nations. It is fast emerging as a new power centre that provides an alternative to the US.