The Curious Case of Jama’at-e-Islami Jammu and Kashmir
Manzoor Ahmad
October 14, 2021
The recent statement by the former Amirs (chiefs) of Jama’at-e-Islami Jammu and Kashmir, which was banned in 2019, seems to be a tactical move by the leadership to save the organisational structure from any kind of damage and to continue Islamisation of the society at the grassroots level.
On 11 August 2021, just three days after the National Investigation Agency (NIA) raided around 56 locations linked to the banned Jama’at-e-Islami in Jammu and Kashmir, three former Amirs (chiefs) of the organisation issued a longish and a very important statement to the press.1 The three-part statement challenges the charges levelled against the organisation and explains in detail the evolution of the Jama’at-e-Islami in Jammu and Kashmir, its core ideology and relations with Hurriyat Conference and armed groups like Hizbul Mujahideen. It was the first statement issued by the organisation since it was banned in 2019.
The Jama’at-e-Islami Jammu and Kashmir was banned by the Ministry of Home Affairs for five years on 28 February 20192 under section 3 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. The Union Home Ministry, in a Notification, declared that Jama’at “has been indulging in activities which are prejudicial to internal security and public order and have the potential of disrupting the unity and integrity of the country”.3 The decision of banning the Jama’at as an “unlawful association” was confirmed by the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Tribunal in August 2019, after it perused various evidences including the background note and affidavits submitted respectively by the Union government and the Jammu and Kashmir Police about the “secessionist tendencies” of Jama’at.4
After the Tribunal upheld the decision of the Union government, the Jama’at moved the Delhi High Court challenging the ban and the Tribunal Order of 27 August 2019 and filed a petition under Articles 226 and 2275. It is pertinent to mention that this was the third time Jama’at was banned. The first time it was banned was in 1975 when it protested against the Indira–Abdullah Accord. The second ban on the organisation was imposed in 1990 which lasted till 1995.
Interestingly, the petition that Jama’at submitted to the Delhi High Court and the statement issued by the three Jama’at leaders have the same tone and content. Both documents seek to clarify that the sole purpose of the organisation is to “spread the word of Islam”.6 Both documents emphasise that its constitution does not support “agitational politics” and that it was formed purely as a “socio-religious” group committed to democratic and constitutional methods. The idea that the organisation supports militancy is a “misconception” and is the creation of those with “vested interests” against the Jama’at.7
It is true that Jama’at is a socio-religious and political organisation and is committed to social reformation of the society, but that is not the whole truth. From the very beginning, Jama’at had a clear political position. It always advocated the “Right to Self-determination” for Jammu and Kashmir. This is purposely not touched either in the petition or in the statement issued later. This is a timely tactical move by the leadership to save the cadre and the organisational structure from any kind of damage so that they are able to focus on Islamisation of the society at the grassroots level till they find a favourable time for operating at a much larger platform. The fact is that Jama’at is explicitly an Islamist organisation free of secular pretentions. This will remain unchanged though there could be changes in its strategies with changes in the overall political situation.
Formation and Changing Strategies
The Jama’at-e-Islami as a separate organisation in Jammu and Kashmir was officially established in 1952.8 Till that time it operated under the Constitution of Jama’at-e-Islami India.
In the 1950s, the Jama’at in Jammu and Kashmir reached out to people in different regions of the state and started mobilising them for the establishment of a system based on Islamic principles. Starting with just four members, the organisation now has 5000 basic and committed members across the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir. It is important to mention here that one becomes a basic member only after years of training and scrutiny. The mobilisation drive was successful because it happened through Jama’at’s own schools, madrassas, libraries and most importantly and paradoxically, through participation in elections. It seems that Jama’at violated its own constitution by contesting elections in a secular country. The fact is that it was done for the fulfillment of the larger Islamisation project. Elections were used as a tool to expand the base to reach out to more and more sections of people.
The Jama’at succeeded in achieving its preliminary objective. The message and the ideology of political Islam reached every corner of Jammu and Kashmir, which appealed to the educated younger generation belonging to the lower middle-class families. At the same time, the emphasis on political Islam was not just a tacit challenge to the Indian rule but it also challenged the conventional Sufi traditions which encouraged coexistence of different cultures and had existed in the state for centuries.9 The Sufis had failed to address the issues affecting the educated youths who were witnessing transformation in every sphere of their lives. The Jama’at, which had heavily invested in schools and in the distribution of Islamic literature, especially books and pamphlets written by Maududi, easily filled this gap by introducing people to a more activist version of Islam and integrating them with the modern world.
By the 1980s, the organisation was comparatively stronger and in a better position to influence the public opinion. It actively participated in electoral process from 1969 to 1987. The Jama’at was an important constituent of Muslim United Front (MUF) in the late 1980s10, which contested election against the National Conference–Congress alliance. Without Jama’at, the idea of MUF would have never materialised because Jama’at was the only religio-political party, which had resources and manpower with experience in electoral politics. The alleged rigging of the election and the consequent failure of MUF triggered armed insurgency in the valley of Kashmir. Many Jama’at leaders including Muhammad Yusuf Shah, who later came to be known as Sayeed Salahuddin now heading the United Jehad Council (UJC), crossed the Line of Control (LoC) for arms training. Although Jama’at consistently denied having any direct role in insurgency, a founding member of the Pakistan-sponsored Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) called HM as the “sword arm of Jama’at”.11 Later, it was associated with the Hurriyat Conference from the early 1990s till 2008 when it formally distanced itself from the conglomerate. The decision was the result of a decade-long debate within the organisation.12
The Jama’at has consistently changed its strategy in response to the changing political reality in the state. It does this without deviating from its core ideology. Scholars who have extensively written about Jama’at believe that the organisation’s own framework allows it to take “multifarious positions” in order to achieve its desired objectives.13 The fact is that all Islamist movements including Jama’at abhor the doctrine of secularism and have an antagonistic relationship with secular states. If this is not expressed explicitly, it does not imply acceptance of a secular doctrine. Islamists conveniently shift to a strategy of “war of position” or in other words an “intellectual moral reform” of a society if they find it difficult to confront a secular state at any particular time.
Jama’at is the only religious organisation in Jammu and Kashmir that has remained politically active since its formation in 1952. Its politics is a bit complex. They have been a part of the mainstream politics and at the same time vociferously represent political Islam. The founders and various other leaders have from the very beginning employed a much nuanced and ambiguous strategy to achieve their objectives. With this, they have been able to Islamise and politically mobilise people across the state. However, these strategic maneuvers have not gone unnoticed. The repeated ban on the organisation by the Union government reaffirms this fact.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
8. The Jama’at-e-Islami was first established in India by Sayyed Abul A’la Maududi in 1941. Four years later, in 1945, a meeting was convened in Pathankot which was attended by four Kashmiris including Sa’aduddin Tarabali, who later became the first Amir (Chief) of Jama’at. So impressed were the four Kashmiris with Maududi that they committed themselves to the expansion of Jama’at-e-Islami in Jammu and Kashmir. Owing to the disputed status of the state and involvement of Kashmiri leaders with the Self-determination movement, Jama’at-e-Islami India decided that the organisation in Jammu and Kashmir should operate separately. See Yoginder Sikand, “The Emergence and Development of the Jama’at-i-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir (1940-1990)”, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2002, p. 723.
12. In 1998, when insurgency in Valley was at peak, a bitter struggle ensued between the then Chief of Jama’at and Syed Ali Shah Geelani, who was head of the political division of the organisation with former opposing the armed struggle and latter in favour of owning and supporting the armed insurgency. This schism within the organisation eventually led to the formation of factions like Tahafuz-i-Dastur Forum which supported Geelani’s call for resistance against the state. However this acrimony subsided when Jama’at allowed Geelani to form Tehreek-i-Hurriyat (TeH) in 2004. With the formation of the TeH, the Jama’at leaders could easily deny involvement in the resistance movement in Kashmir.
Given its geo-strategic importance, Indonesia’s cooperation is crucial for success of any regional security framework in the Indo-Pacific. It is therefore important that regional powers pay attention to Indonesia’s concern over Australia’s decision to acquire nuclear-powered submarines under the newly constituted AUKUS, especially in view of the increasing US–China rivalry in the region.
The Indonesian foreign ministry in a statement has expressed concern over Australia’s decision to acquire nuclear-powered submarines under the newly constituted AUKUS pact between Australia, the US and the UK. The statement further reads into Jakarta’s anxiety over “continuing arms race and power projection” in the region.1 Indonesia–Australia strategic relationship has been driven by their close geography, however apparent lack of dialogue between the two countries has recently exposed its vulnerabilities.
Indonesia has been a strong advocate of rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific and has played a crucial role in drafting the “ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific”.2 Security arrangements like AUKUS may have similar goals of freedom and peace, and therefore it is desirable that regional powers take Jakarta into confidence, especially amidst increasing uncertainty due to US–China rivalry in the region. Given its geo-strategic importance, Indonesia’s cooperation will be essential for success of any regional security framework in the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, Indonesia may find it more pragmatic to participate in frameworks outside of ASEAN, such as engagement with supply chain resilience cooperation or the Quad plus, to avoid sitting on the sidelines during vital restructuring in the Indo-Pacific balance of power.
Indonesia–Australia Relations
The bilateral relationship has a strong element of defence. However, the rhetoric of “most important security partner” coming out of Canberra repeatedly for Indonesia falls short in the face of their defence engagement over the years.3 A Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement was signed in 2018, building on the first bilateral defence agreement signed in 1995. But Australia’s Defence Cooperation Program (DCP) has never allocated largest share of its funding to Indonesia, nor has Indonesia been Australia’s most frequent defence training partner. Indonesia’s defence exercises with the Australian Defence Force (ADF) between 1997 and 2015 represent only 8 per cent of ADF’s total defence exercises, compared to 25 per cent (highest number) in case of the United States and ADF.4 Even other ASEAN nations like Thailand and Malaysia have trained more with Australia than Indonesia.
That is not to discount the strategic importance Indonesia holds in Australian policy and academic circles. The defence white paper in 2009 and in 2016 both acknowledge Indonesia’s significance to Australian national security. The incongruity has arisen due to insufficient follow-up on the narrative. Given their positioning in the Pacific Ocean, any threat to Australia will come from or through Indonesia. Richard Tanter from Nautilus Institute calls the bilateral relationship asymmetric because Indonesia is more important to Australia from a security perspective than Australia is to Indonesia.5 But as he also mentions in his paper, the two countries have very different histories and political evolution, which has likely led to ambiguity in their bilateral relations.
Australia’s role in separation of East Timor in 1999 badly affected its relationship with Indonesia, and has sustained Jakarta’s suspicion of Australia to this day. The defence cooperation at that time was suspended only to be normalised many years later in 2006 through the Lombok Treaty.6 In 2013, Indonesia uncovered that Australia was spying on the-then president Yudhoyono and people close to him. As a consequence, it had suspended mutual intelligence cooperation.7 Hence, in matters of strategic conduct, Indonesia has preferred a cautious and calibrated approach in its relationship with Australia. The unsteady course of their bilateral relationship makes Indonesia’s current reactions unsurprising. The secretive manner in which AUKUS was conceived has irked many of Australia’s security partners. But Canberra’s clear preference for closer defence relationship with allies in Anglosphere has alienated Indonesia.8 In recent years, there has been greater realisation within Jakarta of the country’s maritime vulnerabilities. President Joko Widodo’s “Global Maritime Fulcrum” policy revolves around propelling Indonesia as a strong maritime power, given substantial economic and logistical dependencies on the sea.9 In that scenario, a development like AUKUS, which further complicates the regional security environment where Indonesia could be victimised in a great power conflict, has naturally pronounced Jakarta’s insecurities.
ASEAN Dynamics
As over most geo-political issues, ASEAN members have a differing stance on the AUKUS deal. While Indonesia and Malaysia openly expressed their concerns, the Philippines welcomed it and Singapore chose to take a moderate position. While Australia has tried to allay concerns over an emerging arms race in the region, it cannot be denied that Southeast Asia will effectively be the theatre for any conflict that breaks among larger powers like China, Australia and the US. Indonesia has advocated “ASEAN Centrality” of the Indo-Pacific on multiple forums and also in the ASEAN outlook on Indo-Pacific. And even though newer security arrangements like the Quad or AUKUS may declare commitment to ASEAN centrality, their emergence itself can be seen in relation to ASEAN’s performance as a regional organisation.10 ASEAN’s consensus-based decision-making process has prevented any conclusive step on contentious issues like the South China Sea conflict, and more recently the Myanmar crisis.
The ASEAN may choose either to continue avoiding confrontation with regional security issues and focus on economic integration instead, or it may transform its internal workings to foster more concrete decisions on regional security. In both ways it will remain the most formidable grouping of the Indo-Pacific around which other frameworks may revolve, but the latter will allow it to engage large powers without the absolute need for newer security arrangements. It will also help ASEAN retain the upper hand in setting the tone for security discourse on Indo-Pacific. Consequentially, any anxieties regarding new groupings among larger powers will not be acute. But given ASEAN’s track record of handling conflicts in the region, a radical change in its outlook is unlikely.
Indonesia’s Role in the Region
Indonesia, as the largest economy and most populous ASEAN nation, has assumed a leadership role within the organisation. Maintaining an independent foreign policy has compelled Jakarta to prevent taking sides between the US, its closest security partner, and China, its closest economic partner. So it has promoted ASEAN as the primary regional organisation in Indo-Pacific. But exclusive association with ASEAN and ASEAN-led organisations may limit Indonesia’s strategic engagements as larger powers do not look to ASEAN for resolution of crisis situations anymore.
Senior researcher at CSIS Evan Laksmana opines that it may be useful for Indonesia to consider “flexible coalitions” with “like-minded powers such as Australia, India, Japan and South Korea”.11 India has reaffirmed its policy of multi-alignment,12 and is already a member of Quad with Australia and Japan. Jakarta’s unease with newer security arrangements in the region, even though not unfounded, may be more due to lack of its own participation. Indonesia is a vibrant democracy and straddles the most significant oceanic trade routes of the world. It has shown commitment to international peace and has consistently been one of the largest contributors of troops to UN peacekeeping operations across the globe.13 If it views itself as a regional leader, it is incumbent upon large powers to acclimatise their foreign policies accordingly.
Conclusion
Some analysts have lauded Australia with its AUKUS deal as an example of standing up to China14, notwithstanding that it may make Australia a bigger and clearer target for Beijing’s punitive methods like economic sanctions.15 It is also possible that escalations of a military nature could be intensified in the region. For Southeast Asian nations to join or constitute among themselves any military-centric grouping like AUKUS or Quad will certainly provoke China. Beijing’s grey-zone operations on adversaries is a testimony of its assertive actions against countries with perceived anti-China stance. In that case, it becomes important what the smaller power in such an arrangement is getting out of that deal. For instance, Australia is getting the prized nuclear technology from the US, which was only shared with the UK up until founding of AUKUS.
Indonesia is the largest archipelagic country with long coastlines to defend. Coastal surveillance and maritime intelligence sharing could be of great benefit to Indonesia considering the Chinese incursions into its northern maritime territory of Natuna Regency in 2020. Indonesian defence acquisitions in the past have been focussed on aircrafts, and there are long-term future plans to acquire 230 combat aircraft of different varieties as well.16 More importantly, if Indonesia would consider the idea of participating in a multilateral security framework, it could command cooperation in all areas of traditional security, including cyber technologies. It remains to be seen if Jakarta may be willing to assume a multi-faceted leadership role in the region and upscale its engagements with the countries involved in the Indo-Pacific. A reinvigorated and nuanced security policy will allow it to respond accordingly to fast-changing security environment in the region.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Baghdad Conference is significant for a variety of reasons including Iraq’s attempt to emerge as a regional mediator and reduce tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia on the one hand, and Turkey and Egypt–UAE, on the other. However, at the core of it, the event was aimed at reviving Iraq’s economic and political fortunes.
On 28 August 2021, Iraq hosted the first “Baghdad Conference for Cooperation and Partnership” with participation of eight regional countries, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait and Jordan, besides France as a co-sponsor. While Egypt, Jordan, Qatar and France were represented by the heads of state, Kuwait and UAE sent their prime ministers. From Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran, their foreign ministers attended the event. The heads of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Arab League and Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) were also present at the Conference. The Baghdad Conference is significant for a variety of reasons including Iraq’s attempt to emerge as a regional mediator and reduce tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia on the one hand, and Turkey and Egypt–UAE, on the other. But at the core of it, the event was aimed at reviving Iraq’s economic and political fortunes.
The Conference is the brainchild of Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi who took charge of Iraqi government in May 2020 after months of uncertainty over finding the successor to Adel Abdul-Mahdi who had resigned in November 2019 after a series of protests across Iraq against his government’s failure in checking corruption and in providing basic amenities like water and electricity. Kadhimi emerged as a consensus choice because of his reputation as a successful chief of Iraqi intelligence service, especially in the fight against the Islamic State (ISIS), and his good working relations with the three major external stakeholders—the United States (US), Iran and Saudi Arabia. After assuming power, Kadhimi’s priority has been to revive the Iraqi economy and to undertake a more prominent regional role to reduce tensions among regional countries.
As part of effort to reduce tensions and promote regional cooperation, Iraq has reportedly organised several rounds of talks between Iranian and Saudi officials, besides hosting a tripartite summit attended by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, Jordanian King Abdullah-II and Iraqi President Barham Saleh in June 2021. The Baghdad Conference is a continuation of the same attempt as noted in the final communiqué issued after the meeting.1 Among the key issues discussed in the Conference were the conflict in Yemen, the situation in Lebanon and overcoming the economic disruptions caused by the COVID-19. The communiqué noted that the regional countries face “common challenges” and they need “to deal with them on the basis of joint cooperation and mutual interests”. It further highlighted the importance of economic reforms being undertaken by the Government of Iraq and emphasised the need for regional support for Iraq’s economic revival.
While the challenges facing Iraq and the causes of regional tensions are much deeper to expect any breakthrough, the fact that Iraq was able to bring together representatives from Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Turkey and UAE on the same table is no mean achievement. Significantly, the organisers were not really aiming for any diplomatic breakthrough and were realistic in their objective as noted by Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein who underlined the need for initiating a dialogue rather than expecting any serious outcome.2 Notably, the Conference decided to form a follow-up committee comprising foreign ministers of participating countries who will explore the possibilities for further cooperation and “prepare for periodic future sessions, and discuss strategic economic and investment projects proposed by Iraq.”3
Several factors contributed to Iraq’s success in organising the Conference and bringing the rival regional powers on the same platform. Firstly, the transition in Washington earlier this year has had a striking impact on the regional geopolitics. The Biden administration not only extended its support for the Conference but has been encouraging the Kadhimi government to bring reforms and end the endemic corruption in Iraq. Secondly, the ongoing reorientation in US foreign policy has created a regional environment for the regional countries to amend their foreign policy behaviour to avoid security threats emanating from regional rivalries and tensions. One of the first instances of the change in the behaviour of regional countries came with the signing of the Al-Ula Declaration to end the boycott of Qatar by Saudi Arabia and its regional allies—Bahrain, Egypt and UAE ending the nearly four-year GCC crisis. The kingdom also attempted to end the Yemen conflict by declaring a unilateral ceasefire in March. Similarly, there have been attempts by the UAE, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran to engage each other given that the Biden administration, unlike its predecessor, is not keen to get involved in the cantankerous regional politics.
Thirdly, and most importantly, the Baghdad Conference is a result of Kadhimi government’s three-pronged strategy to revive Iraq’s fortune. Prime Minister Kadhimi knows that without the support of the neighbouring countries, Iraq cannot overcome the economic, political and security challenges it is facing. He also understands that playing a mediatory role serves the purpose of striking a balance in relations with rival regional powers, and at the same time, generate the goodwill and confidence among international investors and major global powers. In terms of domestic politics, the successful conduct of the Conference can be showcased as an achievement for the government approaching an election, and at the same time, it can pave the ground for reviving regional trade and investments in Iraq, significant for the much-needed economic recovery.
From an Indian perspective, it is important to keep an eye on the developments in Iraq, not only because of Baghdad’s attempts to emerge as a regional mediator but also because of the significance of Iraq as India’s energy partner and the economic opportunities that it offers in terms of bilateral trade and investments. Besides, the Baghdad Conference was noteworthy from the regional diplomacy viewpoint and the fact that France was a co-organiser of the Conference underlines the scope for international diplomacy. Given India’s interests and diplomatic capital in West Asia, it posits an opportunity for New Delhi to partner with the like-minded international powers to engage the regional countries.
The Baghdad Conference is a significant development so far as Iraq’s future is concerned. The country debilitated by war, insurgency and terrorism during the past two decades needs extraordinary initiatives to revive its fortunes. It is still early days to predict if the Conference will lead to a tangible outcome but the initial response it has garnered within Iraq and from the regional and international community confirms that an opportunity lies therein.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Is the Threat of Islamic State Khorasan a Red Herring?
Pradeep Singh Gautam
October 01, 2021
The rising threat of Islamic State Khorasan (ISK) since the Taliban’s capture of Afghanistan could be a red herring as it seems to be overplayed by Pakistan to mainstream and help the Taliban regime.
A new wave of violence has emerged since the US troops’ withdrawal from Afghanistan and the takeover by Taliban. After the Kabul airport attack on 26 August 2021, in which nearly 170 people died including 13 US soldiers, Jalalabad was rocked by bomb blasts on 18–19 September 2021. Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK) has claimed responsibility for these attacks. This existing threat of ISK is being harped upon by various commentators as having potential to destabilise the wider region. How serious and credible is this threat? Pakistan is asking the wider world to cooperate with the Taliban to defeat it. Should we encourage that? If yes, what may be the long-term implications of this cooperation?
For this analysis, let’s first consider the strengths and weaknesses of the threat posed by the ISK.
Who are the ISK?
ISK was formed as a Wilayah (province) of the earlier Islamic State of Syria and Levant (ISIL) in the year 2015. It was initially said to be formed by the disgruntled elements of the Tahreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Orakzai agency of Pakistan, which then shifted across the border to Nangarhar and Kunar in Afghanistan. Subsequently, the disgruntled elements of Taliban, Al Qaida and Haqqani Network joined the ISK.1 Their numbers are estimated to be between 1,500 and 2,2002.
Figure 1 shows the intensity of their attacks since its formation.
Figure 1: Total Fatalities Note: The data only includes fatalities exclusively attributed to the ISK in Afghanistan.
Source: “Data Export Tool” [Database], The Armed Conflict & Location Event Data Project (ACLED).3
Their activity was the highest in year 2017–2018 and then it tapered down. The ostensible reason for this fall post-2018 was due to the concerted action against them by the Afghan and the NATO forces. Figure 1 shows a sudden jump in August 2021 due to the Kabul airport blast. In all this recent buzz around ISK, it is pertinent to analyse how serious this threat is.
In theory, as the Islamic State operates on the ideology of a global caliphate, ISK also, by definition, has a potential global ideological reach. It is known to recruit from across the world. It is noteworthy that as per the reports, a terrorist from Kerala was involved in the Kabul Gurudwara attack.4 Again, Islamic State is known to use extreme and graphic violence to instill terror. Its ideology may also inspire lone wolf attacks. A caveat may be necessary here as many a times lone wolves find ISIL ideology convenient to justify their attacks. It is also seen that many a times ISIL claims random terror attacks for propaganda purposes.
Inherent Limitations
Notwithstanding the aforementioned strengths, there are some distinct weaknesses as well.
First, an Islamic State of this kind requires territory which it controls, a caliph and Dawla (state). As of now, ISIL does not control any territory and their caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is dead. As the state exists no more, this puts serious questions on the viability of its affiliate province in Khorasan as well.
Second, extreme violence practiced by the ISK may also be ultimately working against them. The Taliban and many other Muslims call the Islamic State fighters as Khawarij, a term used for extremists who are considered as mischief mongers and even branded as non-Muslim. This ideological name calling may not seem very important to an outsider but it remains germane to the final outcome for the parties involved. The genesis of this dispute is nearly as old as Islam itself. During the reign of fourth caliph Ali Ibn Abi Talib a civil war broke out between him and the governor of Damascus, Muaviyah. It led to the Battle of Siffin in 657 AD, during which a compromise was reached between the warring parties. A group of supporters of Ali rebelled against him and blamed him of apostasy, saying that it was not for Ali to compromise in violation of divine will. This dispute led to a lot of bloodshed but the rebels finally succeeded in assassinating Ali. This group was called Khawarij or Khariji, meaning people who withdrew from the religion.5 The same theme is being played out today with some variations. The ISK calls the Taliban Murtad or apostate because, according to them, by negotiating with the US the Taliban have compromised. ISK also finds the Taliban to be “nationalistic” which is also anti-Islamic in its view. In this battle of narratives this label of Khawarij on the ISK is a handicap in its wider growth and acceptance.
Third, the ISK practices Takfir where they declare a Muslim to be an apostate even for minor doctrinal or practical deviation from their version of true Islam.6 This is extreme Salafi/Wahhabi strand in their practice. They want to first purge the Muslim societies of all the “deviations” and “sins”. This makes IS ideology perpetuate more violence and bloodshed within Muslim societies itself. Also, the Islamic State worldview is heavily influenced by the prophecies of doomsday and the day of judgement. They see signs of coming final battle between Muslims and Kuffar everywhere. This virulence, though has shock and awe effect in short term, also acts as a hindrance in their long-term sustenance. Taking a parallel from biology, an extremely virulent strain of some virus may be very dangerous but this virulence itself leads to killing of the host which ultimately limits the virus’s own growth.
Fourth, Islamic State ideology requires its adherent to migrate to the territory controlled by them. Therefore, there are always chances of lone wolf attacks or IS-inspired attacks outside but this migration makes these extremists create more mayhem in the IS-controlled areas only. This phenomenon also indirectly limits their violence-causing capacity outside. So, what can possibly explain its sudden emergence?
Cui Bono?
Right from the beginning there has been some confusion behind who or what is responsible for the emergence of ISIL or ISK? Another angle to the emergence of ISK may be long-held allegation that they are nothing but the cat’s paw of the ISI. Pattern of violence and target selection by the ISK in itself shows that they have been killing Shia Hazaras, Sikhs in Kabul, school-going girls and finally the US soldiers and people who assisted the last regime. By the principle of who benefits, it may be seen that they have been doing nothing new (as in there are other Sunni extremists groups who have been doing exactly the same) or they have only facilitated the Taliban. It is true that now the Taliban and the ISK appear to be fighting but people like Amrullah Saleh and other security experts have long accused the ISK to be doing the Taliban’s dirty jobs.7 Now, when the US is out, ISK may also be used by the ISI to give a not-so-gentle reminder to the Taliban if they break the line and try to be too nationalistic and independent-minded.
This allegation finds credence from the fact that somewhere around 2016, the ISK seemed to have been penetrated by the ISI. The last two Emirs of the ISK, Aslam Farooqi and Shahab al-Muhajjir have been known to have worked for the Haqqani Network.8 Aslam Farooqi also had long connections with the Lashkar-e-Taiba.9 LeT and Haqqani Network are known ISI affiliates.
Both Pakistan and the US are busy overplaying this threat from the ISK for their own reasons. The US wants to save face and avoid the political fallout of its capitulation in Kabul. Pakistan wants to get money and recognition for its perceived foster child in the form of the Taliban. Pakistan itself has become partially Talibanised and it supports its ideological bedfellow. This leads both of them to give the Taliban a somewhat benign colour.
Conclusion
As regard the long-term impact of the possible survival and mainstreaming of the Taliban regime, recent experience has shown that all the wishful thinking of the Taliban having changed their ways is just that. Women rights, rights of minorities, any kind of power sharing with rivals has received a setback. The Taliban remain committed to establish their version of the 7th century utopia with all the floggings, amputations and public stoning. Al Qaida and its South Asian version remains present in Afghanistan and their relationship with the Taliban is still very much intact.10 What makes the ISI and the Taliban more potent threat than the ISK is that they are just one shade rational in their ideology, which increases their chances of survival. They also have better state apparatus and resources at their command. The Taliban also derives their legitimacy from the larger Hanafi Deobandi school which has a vast following in South Asia with a potential to extend this influence. In tandem, the ISI remains committed to continuous jihad and bleeding India through 1,000 cuts. It is not easy to forget that the ISI and Pakistan Army still has Jihad fi Sabillilah as its motto.
In such a scenario, success of the Taliban project will reaffirm this ideology and further mainstream it. But they cannot achieve their objectives without international support. In this game, the ISK may just be a red herring and the proverbial boogey-man to make us all give Pakistan and the Taliban what they want.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The announcement of the trilateral security partnership “AUKUS” by Australia, UK and US, has prompted discussions on several issues, however, the submarine part of the agreement, about leveraging expertise from US and UK and facilitating the Australian acquisition of the nuclear-powered submarines, is attracting a lot of attention.
On 15 September 2021, two members of the Quad—the United States (US) and Australia—along with the United Kingdom (UK) issued a joint statement to create a higher “trilateral security partnership called ‘AUKUS’” to meet the new challenges of the 21st century. The statement, in the very opening sentence, clearly mentioned that these challenges are emanating from the Indo-Pacific region.
The announcement made the world talk. A number of issues ranging from geo-politics to non-proliferation to containment of China have been circulating in discussions. Many wonder whether the much talked about Quad Plus has started materialising. Like the Quad, the AUKUS does not refer to China as a challenge but the common understanding is that the preparatory work of maritime democracies to contain China in the Indo-Pacific is being bolstered through it.
The AUKUS as a geo-political issue may have generated a gentle debate and discussions in the world, but the submarine part of the agreement is being considered a “bombshell” in many quarters. It invoked strong reactions not only from the Chinese establishment but also from Biden’s friends and allies. The non-proliferation community also joined the debate highlighting the departure from the long-standing American position.
The AUKUS pledged to facilitate the Australian acquisition of the nuclear-powered submarines. The 15 September statement noted: “Today, we embark on a trilateral effort of 18 months to seek an optimal pathway to deliver this capability. We will leverage expertise from the United States and the United Kingdom, building on the two countries’ submarine programmes to bring an Australian capability into service at the earliest achievable date.”1
The joint statement, thus, makes it clear that it is not an immediate transfer of submarines, which Australia has been seeking for a number of years. For that purpose, it had a US$ 66 billion agreement apparently escalated to US$ 100 billion with France in the past. The acquisition of the submarines is supposed to boost “interoperability, commonality and mutual benefit” among the AUKUS countries. This would make the UK not merely a collaborator in development of nuclear-propelled submarines but also an active player in the Indo-Pacific security theatre.
As of now, Australia has very rudimentary capabilities in nuclear reactor business. It has built a 20 megawatt-thermal research reactor. For multiple reasons, it did not invest much in nuclear research and development or industry, though it has an impressive reserve of high-quality uranium. It seems that it is now serious about developing its nuclear industry, at least, to support the planned nuclear submarines’ acquisition.
In the coming weeks or months, more information may come out in the public domain about the nature of submarine transferred to or developed for Australia. The nuclear reactor which is going to be used in the submarine is also a matter of curiosity for the world. Moreover, the level of enrichment of uranium may further drive the discussion on it.
The reaction to the AUKUS nuclear-propelled submarine deal manifests multiple dimensions. The curious blend of geo-technology and geo-economics is synergised with geo-politics. All three are supporting and opposing each other simultaneously. It ranges from the breach of the commercial contract to the collaboration in the “prohibited technology” to implications for the non-proliferation regime.
Instantaneously, reactions in print, electronic and digital media highlight that the AUKUS will undermine the non-proliferation regime. Some express apprehensions that non-nuclear weapons states may compare the AUKUS to the India–US civil nuclear energy initiative, and may get “more ammunition in support of a narrative that the weapons states lack good faith in their commitments to disarmament”.2
Critics in the US and the Western countries look puzzled over the decision to sell/ transfer of naval reactor technology. The US has been resistant to the idea of transfer of technology to even its allies like France and Canada. Only the UK was an exception as a recipient but not as a seller. In the past, the UK was prevented from transacting naval nuclear fuel cycle relating nuclear attack submarines to Canada. Now, the US has made the UK team up in the AUKUS to deliver the nuclear-propelled submarine to Australia.
A section of the non-proliferation community is expressing reservations about the nuclear submarine transfer because of its proliferation potential. It is feared that such a transfer to the non-nuclear state may increase the possibility of diversion of fissile materials used in the submarine propulsion for nuclear explosive purposes.
Moreover, some opine that there is an increasing use of HEU (Highly Enriched Uranium) in nuclear reactor so that it becomes more “compact” in operation. The increasing use of HEU further raises the prospect of its misuse for nuclear weapons. Some academic activists have also been arguing for a long period that the existence of a huge amount of HEU in submarine reactors all over the world increases the danger of materials falling into wrong hands.3 This line of thinking maintains that the nuclear submarine deal will also dampen efforts towards converting HEU into LEU (Low Enriched Uranium), thereby increasing the possibility of nuclear terrorism.
As Australia had signed an agreement for 12 diesel propelled submarines with France, analysts assume as a requirement of 22 submarines by Australia, and then analyse the amount of HEU needed to run the submarines. One of the reports notes: “if Canberra wants to operate six to 12 nuclear submarines for about 30 years, it will need some three to six tons of HEU.”4 Since Australia does not have much capabilities in its nuclear establishment and considering the urgent security imperatives, the US and the UK will have to supply HEU.
One section of the non-proliferation community believes that after the US becomes a party to this deal, it will be difficult for it to check such a deal signed by another set of countries such as France and Russia with different recipients such as Brazil and China. It is anticipated that the AUKUS deal could be followed by an uncontrolled proliferation.
Most of these apprehensions and arguments fall in the grey area. Stretching the non-proliferation argument too far may harm the cause of non-proliferation itself. The bureaucratic approach to non-proliferation regime—blurring the distinction between a responsible country and irresponsible means a reckless proliferator—is risky. It allows the dangerous states to clandestinely operate and transact items, which may result in nuclear weapons. Australia has shown restraints, and as amply discussed, the nuclear submarine deal has nothing to do with nuclear weapons.
Even legally speaking, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the mainstay of the non-proliferation regime, does not prohibit development of nuclear submarines or transfer of nuclear materials used as propellant in the naval reactor/nuclear submarine. Moreover, the joint statement underlines Australia’s adherence to “the highest standards for safeguards, transparency, verification and accountancy measures to ensure the non-proliferation, safety, and security of nuclear material and technology”. It also indicates that Australia will continue to fulfil its obligations and will have an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
In fact, Australia signed a safeguards agreement in 19745 after ratifying the NPT in 1973, due to which it became famous for promoting the tools of non-proliferation. In 1987, it enacted the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act. It supplied uranium to several countries after signing the safeguards agreements. Later, it also became the first country to adopt additional protocol on 23 September 1997.6 The text of Additional Protocol was approved in the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on 15 May 1997.7
The continued engagement with the IAEA should remove apprehensions regarding the interpretation of the Article 14 of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement signed between Australia and the IAEA. The legal document signed between them explicitly gives direction to the Australian government what to do when nuclear materials are not under safeguards.
A section of the international community from time to time expresses scepticism of the information provided regarding fuel, its composition, and naval reactor designs, naval bases and military fuel cycle fabrication process.8 Australia’s commitment to the safeguards norm has been continued. Australia has apparently demonstrated enough confidence in its suppliers and the IAEA on the need for balancing confidentiality and transparency.
The IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi informed that the AUKUS countries had informed the agency about the agreement.9 He also told that the three countries communicated their commitment to the non-proliferation regime by underlining Australia’s “exemplary non-proliferation credentials”. He also notified the willingness of the three countries to remain engaged with the “IAEA in the coming months”. More significantly, he updated the international community by stating that “The IAEA will engage with them on this matter in line with its statutory mandate, and in accordance with their respective safeguards agreements with the Agency”.10
The nuclear submarine business has overlooked some archaic alarms as far as the nuclear non-proliferation regime is concerned. In India, too, some reports record displeasure over the submarine deal on the grounds that India was denied similar deal in the past. Unlike Australia, India has an operational nuclear submarine programme and a very robust nuclear industry. True, India may still need some of the technologies or the submarine depending on its requirements, however, the deal heralds a new era. A country like India with established responsible credentials, may also get the benefits in the future.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Trial of the 2015 Attacks: France's Pre-emptive Counter Terrorism
Saman Ayesha Kidwai
September 22, 2021
The 2015 terrorist attacks in France have seriously tested the nation’s faith in liberal and secular values as well as its tolerance for Political Islam. Taking a hands-on approach to combat terrorism, France has initiated what is being described as the “biggest trial” in its modern history.
Almost six years after the horrific terrorist attacks, France has initiated what is being described as the “biggest trial” in its modern history. With 300 lawyers and about the same number of witnesses, court proceedings for the trial of the 20 accused have begun on 9 September 2021, and are expected to continue for at least nine months.1
The trial will focus on the atrocities committed on 13 November 2015, when Islamic State terrorists carried out a series of attacks at Paris’ celebrated Bataclan Concert Hall, Stade de France (the national stadium where France was playing off against Germany) and several bars and restaurants. At least 130 people were killed and 350 were wounded on that fateful “night of terror”.2
These attacks had come on the heels of the “Charlie Hebdo Shooting” in January of the same year. Terrorists had shot down 12 people and wounded 11 over the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo’s publication of Prophet Muhammad’s caricatures.3
The trauma of the 2015 attacks, also called “the deadliest attacks on French soil after the Second World War”, has left France’s national psyche deeply scarred and has profoundly affected its body politic since then. Considered to be the birthplace of democracy, along with the US, the 2015 attacks have seriously tested the nation’s faith in liberal and secular values as well as its tolerance for Political Islam.
To pre-empt terrorist attacks, the French governments have introduced several counter-terrorism laws and security measures since 2015. These measures have come with their own set of compliments and complaints. Some Western political observers, particularly from the US, as well as global civil rights organisations and even French political parties such as La France Insoumise (France Unbowed) have questioned the allegedly intrusive and punitive nature of some measures that they claim runs contrary to liberal and secular values. For its part, France sees itself as taking a more hands-on approach in combating terrorism, as its tolerance for radical ideologies and religious extremism has run out. The government under President Macron is particularly suspicious of the extremist narratives of Political Islam, which it believes spawns violent extremism and poses a threat to liberal values and civil liberties enjoyed by French society. Some of the “pre-emptive” measures, including security and legislative reforms, taken by the Macron government are mentioned below.
Anti-terrorism Legislation
A new set of anti-terrorism legislation has given wide-ranging powers to security agencies, and these laws have remained in place even after the state of emergency was revoked in July 2017. Some of the fundamental tenets of the legislation enacted since 2015 are as follows:
Members of the armed forces/civil servants would be dismissed from service, if they are found to believe in jihadist ideology.
Muslim clerics advocating violent extremist views would be jailed, where they shall undergo counter-radicalisation training.
A law concerning closure of religious schools and places of worship that promote separatism and extremism has already come into effect.
Underlying Policy Drivers
The electoral factors seem to have played a major role in moulding the present counter-terrorism narrative in France.4 Far-right leaders such as Marine Le Pen are alleged to have used acts of terrorism in the country as a rallying point to unseat President Macron and the governments preceding him.5 The recent polls show her gaining ground before the next presidential elections in France in April 2022.6 Éric Zemmour, another upcoming popular far-right figure, is said to be taking the wind off the sails of President Macron’s re-election. Analysts opine that he may even announce his own candidature for the high office in the future.7
For several decades, France has struggled to deal with the fissures within its multi-ethnic and multi-religious demography, and the issue of a bourgeoning Muslim citizenry has now become a part of the political discourse. The long shadow of French colonial legacy in Algeria has also sullied communal harmony. The French conception of a more assertive secularism has also generated a sense of insecurity among the religiously devout sections of the ethnic Algerian community, which had mostly migrated to France after World War II.8 The sense of real and perceived socio-economic marginalisation of the community is believed to have worsened the divide. Even President Macron has acknowledged the impact of the French colonial legacy in worsening the level of separatism within the population, which he alluded to even while unveiling the anti-terrorism laws.9 This shows that his government has contextualised the colonial factor while formulating the new anti-terrorism laws and is cognizant of its broader implications.
The terrorist attacks and the prevalence of Islamist ideas in French society and culture has likewise generated a sense of insecurity and backlash by the majority of French nationals against the minority of mainly north African Muslims. In fact, a national poll conducted by Institut Français d’opinion publique (IFOP), an international polling and marketing research firm, reveals that majority of French citizens hold the extreme view that Islamists have declared war on their country.10
Even liberal politicians today speak of taking a more assertive approach on matters of national security. President Macron for one, is alleged to have transitioned from a centrist to a centre-right politician in the wake of this growing public mood. However, he has painstakingly clarified on several occasions that his stance is against violent extremism of all kinds and not against the religion of Islam. In a speech on 2 October 2020, he said: “Our challenge is to fight against those who go off the rails in the name of religion…while protecting those who believe in Islam and are full citizens of the republic.”11
Conclusion
The anti-terrorism laws enacted on 30 July 2021 are being considered necessary to combat the threats being faced by France in terms of its national security. However, the laws have also resulted in debates about the possible alienation of the Muslim populace, and the inadvertent effects of further radicalising individuals meant to be pre-emptively subdued.
Since 2015, Presidents Hollande and Macron have introduced wide-ranging and rather harsh anti-terrorism legislation, as some observers believe. Their criticism primarily stems from the view that the 2015 attacks have only reinforced the existing perceptions of discrimination felt by French Muslims.12
Notwithstanding the criticism, it is also true that incidents of terrorism in France have gone down since the introduction of sweeping reforms, as is evident in the Global Terrorism Index 2020, which has registered a reduction of two points on its score index.13 According to Prime Minister Jean Castex, the past four years have witnessed the containment of 36 terror attacks.14 Furthermore, La Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure (The General Directorate for Internal Security) has maintained a database of individuals whose radicalisation it needs to prevent. The number of such individuals has gone down from 10,000 to 7,768 between April 2018 and July 2021.15
India stands in solidarity with its strategic ally, France in its fight against terrorism, as has been made clear through the public affirmation of support by our government.16 India could also study and institutionalise some of the more effective and less contentious French strategies to counter the ideological challenge emanating now from Afghanistan that has the potential to pose major security risks across the region.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and its Relations with Afghan Taliban
Ashok K. Behuria
September 16, 2021
The relationship between TTP, or Pakistani Taliban, and Afghan Taliban will continue to be dictated by religious-ideological convergence, ethnic-fraternal linkages and the close camaraderie that emerged while they were fighting together against the foreign ‘occupying’ forces in Afghanistan.
To understand the interesting relationship between the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), also known as Pakistani Taliban, and the Afghan Taliban, one must peep into history to see how the linkages developed and why the Afghan Taliban are not responding in equal measure to Pakistan's repeated appeals to take conclusive action against the TTP.
Pakistan regards the TTP as a retrograde armed outfit. It is launching regular attacks against it, despite decisive operations conducted against it in the past. The TTP, in fact, claimed through a post on Telegram on 2 September that it had carried out 32 attacks inside Pakistan in August 2021 alone.1
Pakistan continues to refer to the TTP as a tool being used by India and other foreign powers to destabilise it. After the Taliban took over Kabul, Pakistan reportedly handed over a list of most-wanted TTP terrorists operating from Afghanistan to the Taliban chief Haibatullah Akhundzada, following which, the latter set up a three-member commission to investigate Pakistan’s claims.2 However, the Taliban’s public response has been rather tame and diplomatic. They have said that the TTP was a foreign outfit operating inside Pakistan, and they would not allow either the TTP or any other group to operate from the Afghan soil against any other country, whereas Pakistan would have liked them to take a conclusive action against the TTP.3
Coming to the TTP, it was formed in December 2007 when 13 militant Islamist outfits came together under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud (1972-2009). Today, it consists of about 40 outfits (accounts vary about the actual number). There were many precursor groups of the TTP which intended to bring Sharia rule to Pakistan, much like the Taliban had done in Afghanistan during 1996-2001. A well-known Mullah named Sufi Muhammad (1933-2019) had campaigned for Islamic rule in Pakistan ahead of the Afghan Taliban and raised an outfit called Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) in 1992. From 1994, he had started his black turban movement in the Malakand Division.
In December 1998, an outfit called Tehrik-e-Tulaba Pakistan demanded a Sharia rule in the Orakzai Agency in Pakistan. The Governor of then North West Frontier Province (NWFP), now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, had even introduced the Nizam-e-Shariat Regulation in 1994 in the Malakand Division and the Nizam-e-Adl Ordinance in 1999 in Kohistan to placate these forces, perhaps thinking that such concessions at the peripheries would help quarantine the virus locally and stop its spread elsewhere.
In fact, when the Afghan Taliban fanned out of Kandahar and began their conquest of Afghan cities in the mid-1990s, there were many willing recruits from Pakistan in the Taliban ranks. Later, when the Afghan Taliban faced the US attack in 2001, Sufi Muhammad reportedly led thousands of tribal Pakistani youth, who marched into Afghanistan to fight alongside the Taliban.
A policy somersault by Pakistan under American threat (to bomb Pakistan to stone-age) led to the banning of TNSM, arrest of Sufi Muhammad and operations in the tribal areas to rein in the Islamist militants who had come back home from Afghanistan to roost, principally because they had provided shelter to the foreign Al-Qaeda militants.
By 2006, Pakistan had deployed “approximately 17 infantry brigades, 45 infantry battalions, and some 58 Frontier Corps wings” in the tribal areas.4 It turned the local population against the army, even when such action was not as convincing as the Americans would have expected.
By 2007, multiple tribal Islamist groups were seen raising their heads in the tribal terrain including factions of various jihadi groups raised by the military for subversive action against India in Kashmir and sectarian ones like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, many of whose leaders had migrated to the tribal region, after Pervez Musharraf banned these groups following the 9/11 attacks.
Some factions affiliated to these jihadi elements have even carried out attacks in Punjab, the heartland of Pakistan, leading people to call them ‘Punjabi Taliban’. The TTP brought together these disparate Islamist outfits with an intent to coordinate their actions and mount a credible offensive against the Pakistani military.
The TTP is overwhelmingly Pashtun in composition (much like the Afghan Taliban), drawing its cadres mostly from the tribes in the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. It has used the border areas straddling the Durand Line for its operations and managed to invoke the sympathy of the local Afghan Taliban, for whom there was hardly any difference between them fighting the Afghan Army, which was funded and equipped by the Americans, and the TTP attacking the Pakistan Army, which was launching operations against their co-ethnics and co-religionists in the tribal areas allegedly at America’s prodding.
The TTP has waxed and waned over the years. Pakistan has launched several operations against it, the most recent being Operation Radd-ul-Fassad in 2017 and Zarb-e-Azb in 2014. In the past, Pakistan claimed total victory over the TTP. The joint US-Pak actions have also successfully targeted the TTP leaders from time to time. Further, some TTP factions have split away to form outfits like Jamat-ul-Ahrar, Hizb-ul-Ahrar, etc. All this has been interpreted as having led to a decline of the TTP.
However, in recent years, especially after Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud assumed leadership of the group following the killing in June 2018 of Mullah Fazlullah, the mastermind of the Peshawar Army Public School attack of December 2014, the TTP has demonstrated its capacity to resurge itself and take on the Pakistani military with a renewed zeal. Mufti Noor has brought back many split-away factions into the group enhancing its prowess in recent months.
The TTP has ideologically gravitated towards the extreme sectarian version of radical Sunni Islam, much like the Islamic State. Over the years, various groups within the TTP have maintained close contact with global Islamist organisations like Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. However, the main branch of TTP has always pledged its loyalty to the Amir of Afghan Taliban. Its uncompromising Islamist orientation has perhaps endeared itself to the Taliban, who have turned a blind eye to the TTP operations against the Pakistan state, even if the former maintained close contact with the Pakistani military and benefited from it.
Going by the TTP literature, various groups within it have brought out a number of online magazines and books, many of which have been co-produced and co-circulated on their websites over the last 14 years. One of these, Nawa-e-Afghan Jihad had an uninterrupted run during 2009-2020. It was replaced by Nawa-e-Ghazwa-e-Hind, which now runs as a mouthpiece of Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). There are other publications like books, monographs and another magazine called Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan.
The articles written by TTP members in these publications are known for their uncompromising stance against the Pakistan state. They emphasise the vices of democracy and the un-Islamic approach of the Pakistani military. There is a repeated refrain to defeat the Pakistan Army, put an end to the democratic experiment in Pakistan and introduce Shariat-e-Muhammadi there. In a series of articles in Nawa-e-Afghan Jihad, Adnan Rashid—a native Pakistani and former technician in the Pakistan Air Force, convicted and sentenced to death for his role in the assassination attempt on Musharraf but released by the TTP on 15 April 2012 from Bannu jail— argues very forcefully that Pakistan has a kafir army because it has kafir officers in it and, whoever dies in the army (whether he is a Christian, Hindu, Sikh or Shia) is called a shaheed or martyr which is unacceptable to him as a Muslim.5
About the Jihad in Kashmir, he says that he was asked to fight in Kashmir, but he did not accept it because he realised that even if Kashmir were to be liberated from the Indian control it would become part of a country, which did not function according to Islamic principles.6
The TTP publications are replete with accounts by Al-Qaeda, Taliban and Jihadi leaders from other theatres of the world. They would exhort the Muslims to wage an armed jihad and not to rest until the goal is achieved. Like the Jihadi literature elsewhere, there is a lot of hatred against the US, Israel and India and often these countries are bracketed together as an axis of evil against whom jihad was considered perfectly legitimate.
Even then, Pakistan continues to believe that the TTP is being sponsored by Indian intelligence. Some of the TTP members like Latif Mehsud and Ehsanullah Ehsan have been forced to issue statements to this effect to persuade the TTP to turn their guns away from Pakistan towards India. The anti-India propaganda pamphlets have been distributed in the tribal areas from time to time urging people to wage jihad against India in Kashmir. However, this strategy has not worked. Pakistan has also tried hard to use the Afghan Taliban to change the TTP’s outlook, without any success so far.
The Afghan Taliban’s dependence on Pakistan is likely to decrease in the coming days. Therefore, even if there may be a token response to Pakistan’s request, they are unlikely to take any conclusive action against the TTP, especially when elements within the Taliban favour TTP’s idea of bringing Pakistan under Islamic rule. Moreover, action against the TTP may alienate many groups within the Taliban, affecting internal unity that is so essential to the Taliban’s hold on power in Kabul, at a time when there are reports of various factions fighting internally for power. In these circumstances, the relationship between the TTP and the Afghan Taliban will continue to be dictated by religious-ideological convergence, ethnic-fraternal linkages and the close camaraderie that emerged while they were fighting together against the foreign ‘occupying’ forces in Afghanistan.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
1. It was shared on the Alemarah Urdu Telegram account on 2 September 2021 and was also available on the Umar Media the same day. (Accessed 2 September 2021).
4. Seth G. Jones and C. Christine Fair, “Counterinsurgency in Pakistan “, National Security Research Division, RAND Corporation, 2010, pp. 36-37 (Accessed 12 September 2021).
5. Adnan Rashid’s articles in Nawai Afghan Jihad, March-August 2013.
Technology and Peacekeeping: Can India become a Technology-Contributing Country
Rajeesh Kumar
September 14, 2021
To sustain its historical interest and influence in the UN peacekeeping operations, India should provide technical assistance to the missions while continuing to contribute troops, rather than a complete transformation from being a traditional troop contributor to a technology contributor.
In August 2021, under India's presidency, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted a statement recognising the importance of technology in peacekeeping. At the high-level Security Council open debate on “technology and peacekeeping”, India’s External Affairs Minister Dr S. Jaishankar stated that “21st-century peacekeeping must be anchored in a strong ecosystem of technology and innovation”.1 In the meeting, Secretary-General António Guterres outlined elements of a digital transformation strategy for peacekeeping. Another significant development of that day was the launch of UNITE AWARE, a technology platform developed by India in collaboration with the UN, aimed at providing terrain-related information to the UN peacekeepers to ensure their safety and security. These developments suggest that future peacekeeping operations will be technology-enabled. India shows enthusiasm and interest in this envisioned transformation. India is one of the largest troop-contributing countries (TCC) to UN peacekeeping missions, however, the question is whether it can become a technology-contributing country (TecCC) as well.
Technology and Peacekeeping
Calls for the use of technology in UN peacekeeping operations are not new. In 2000, the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, popularly known as the Brahimi Report2, proposed that peacekeeping be brought into the information age. The report identified the gaps in strategy, policy and practice that hampered the effective use of technology in peacekeeping operations and offered recommendations to bridge them.
Later, in 2014, the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping deliberated this issue thoroughly and proposed an extensive deployment of technology and innovative practices to strengthen peacekeeping operations. In February 2015, the Expert Panel submitted its report, which included the goal that the UN be able to deploy "digital peacekeepers". The Report also addressed the prevalent concerns of the member states that the use of technology in peacekeeping operations will lead to violations of basic principles of peacekeeping impartiality and state sovereignty. In the initial years of consultations, many member countries expressed their fear of misuse of technology for narrow political purposes, particularly technology such as Unmanned Aerial Systems or Vehicles (UAS or UAVs).
The Report focused on employing advanced technologies primarily in two areas of peacekeeping operations: providing the basics for missions and operational imperatives. While the basics include providing safety and security, shelter, water, energy, health and mobility, operational imperatives comprise command and control, monitoring, reconnaissance and reporting, and information and communications technologies.3 To enhance the security of individuals, camps and accommodation, patrols and convoys, the Panel recommended using technologies such as perimeter lighting, motion-detection technology, emergency communications, tamper-resistant tracking, counter-IED technologies, and camera technology using remote access to live feeds. Similarly, to find water, employing ground-penetrating radar and advanced geospatial imaging tools are recommended. GIS-enabled command and control, satellite imagery, UAVs, comprehensive sensor suites and big data are recommended to improve the operational imperatives including the command and control of the missions.
As peacekeeping mission bases have regularly come under direct attack in recent years, there was a systematic push to deploy many of the recommended technologies. Consequently, UAVs were used in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Mali and South Sudan. Furthermore, in Mali, the most sophisticated digital technologies such as IED forensic technologies and the Situational Awareness Geospatial Enterprise (Sage) were used. In 2017, the UN mission in Mali claimed that its “sense and warn” radar alert system detected rockets and mortar attacks and saved the lives of many peacekeepers.4
The latest developments related to technology and peacekeeping in the UN are the Secretary General's “Strategy for the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping”5 and the launching of the UNITE AWARE platform. The Secretary General's Strategy focuses on four objectives: first, technology innovation at the headquarters and the field; second, maximising the potential of new technologies to enhance the capacity of missions to carry out their mandates effectively; third, using technology to detect, analyse and address threats against civilians, peacekeepers and humanitarian missions; and fourth, ensuring the responsible use of digital technologies.6 The UNITE AWARE platform aims to gather datasets from missions and structure them into a shared database to enable situational awareness and decision making.
Can India become a TecCC?
India is one of the largest contributors of troops to UN Peacekeeping Operations. More than 2,50,000 Indian troops have served in 49 of the 71 peacekeeping operations deployed so far.7 At present, India is currently the second-largest troop contributor with 5,506 personnel deployed in nine UN peacekeeping missions.8 Moreover, India has also played a leadership role in many peacekeeping missions. It has provided Military Advisers, Civilian Police Advisers, Force Commanders and several Special Representatives of the UN Secretary-General to various missions. Korea, Cyprus, Namibia, Sinai, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Congo are a few examples. However, since the attacks against the peacekeepers are growing significantly and India lost more peacekeepers than any other troop-contributing country9, in future, India should focus predominantly on providing technology to the peace operations and equip its troops with modern technologies to manage complex emergencies.
Recently, India has been at the forefront of transforming the traditional peacekeepers into “digital peacekeepers”. For this purpose, during its UNSC presidency in August 2021, India convened a ministerial-level open debate on the theme of technology and peacekeeping. During the debate, India proposed a four-point framework for UN peacekeepers to meet contemporary threats. First, employing operationally proven, cost-effective, widely available, environment-friendly, reliable and field serviceable technologies. Second, need for a sound information and intelligence foundation to ensure early warning and mobilising early response. Third, ensure technological improvements are continuous and are available on the ground. Fourth, consistent training and capacity building of peacekeepers in the realm of technology.10 All these points were further emphasised in the unanimously adopted presidential statement on peacekeeping operations.
India has also spent US$ 1.64 million to develop the situational awareness technology platform UNITE AWARE in partnership with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Operational Support.11 This platform helps to visualise the entire peacekeeping operation and enable monitoring it on a real-time basis through modern surveillance technologies, including satellite-based solutions. However, though the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) has a Satellite Centre called UNOSAT for making satellite-based solutions and geographical information easily available for the UN, the organisation does not have its own satellites. Therefore, the UN primarily relies on freely available satellite data or purchases from private firms. India has low-cost satellite technology and its space agency, ISRO can collaborate with the UN for developing a dedicated constellation of Small Satellites (SmSats) for peacekeeping missions.
Satellite imagery data can be used to monitor the movements of conflicting parties, observing arms smuggling networks, identify the locations and needs of internally displaced persons and refugees, border management, human rights violations, etc. The optical imagery from very high-resolution satellites provides an accurate real-time happening on the ground. For instance, the Humanitarian Information Unit of the US Department of State extensively used satellite imagery data to identify the villages damaged or destroyed in Darfur during the civil war.12 Similarly, in 2018, an analysis of satellite imagery was able to establish an arms embargo violation in South Sudan.13 In March 2020, a BBC investigative report used satellite images to show that Turkey sent tanks and weapons to Libya via ship shortly after agreeing to a UN arms embargo.14 Recently, in Myanmar, satellite analysis combined with information on settlement locations helped the UN to identify the destroyed villages in Buthidaung, Maungdaw, and Rathedaung Townships in Northern Rakhine State.15
Similarly, India can contribute to the energy security of peacekeeping missions. Despite a booming global renewable energy market, the peacekeeping missions still depend on fossil fuels, especially diesel-power generators for energy needs. From the perspective of peacekeeping, reliance on diesel-power generation presents logistics and security challenges. Recently, the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and UN signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to advance the use of host-country generated renewable energy in peacekeeping missions.16 India could leverage its solar power credentials as the leader of the International Solar Alliance (ISA) to support the peacekeeping missions in meeting their energy requirements. India’s National Thermal Power Corporation Limited (NTPC) has been involved in solar projects in many African countries, including Mali, where peacekeeping missions are deployed.
India has also signed a MoU with the UNC4ISR Academy for Peace Operations (UNCAP) to support the Partnership for Technology in Peacekeeping initiative. With the help of UNCAP, the Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping (CUNPK) could provide specific pre-deployment training in information and communications technologies (ICT), Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) technologies and camp security and early warning technologies. The Centre would also consider developing E-Learning courses in advanced technologies that are accessible remotely to the missions and troops.
In short, to sustain its historical interest and influence in the UN peacekeeping operations, India should chart out specific strategies to become a technology-contributor country. However, such a strategy should be balanced, and focus on providing technical assistance to the missions while continuing to contribute troops, rather than a complete transformation from being a traditional troop contributor to a technology contributor. Also, India should consider utilising the goodwill it has earned over the years as a dedicated peacekeeper, particularly in Africa, to build enduring economic and strategic relationships with the host states.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
(Mis)Understanding the Communist Party of China’s Control
M.S. Prathibha
September 13, 2021
Certain sections of the elite in China seem to be speaking out against the tightening political control under President Xi Jinping. Whether the Chinese Communist Party is failing to elicit loyalty among its own members, and resorting to widespread ideological control to retain its legitimacy is a pertinent question to ponder upon.
The common narrative about the Communist Party of China (CPC) is that even though it has been successful in eradicating extreme poverty, it has done so by exerting overwhelming control over the Chinese society. The Party has no doubt been praised for ushering in economic development, however, it has also drawn criticism for ruthlessly penalising any dissent shown against exercising such control. Many point out to certain sections of the elite speaking out against the tightening political control under the Chinese President Xi Jinping.1 It raises the question whether the Party is indeed failing if it can no longer elicit loyalty among its own members.
The communist politics in China is authoritarian, which might lead to an understanding that the Party exerts far-reaching ideological control over the society to maintain its legitimacy, and it uses propaganda (to promote its political ideology) to achieve it. However, one of the important reasons why Deng Xiaoping introduced market reforms was that ideological control alone proved insufficient to govern China. The post-reform Chinese society, i.e., the repudiation of the Maoist path to economic development, was the counter to it. As a result of economic decentralisation, information is getting disseminated rapidly, leading to significant assertion of public opinion.
The Party does not control every aspect of Chinese life though. In fact, it struggles to determine as to what aspects to control, which explains why measures of control are mostly arbitrary and temporary. In the post-reform society, the party officials have been apprehensive about how the Chinese society responds to their policies. A case of local governance in Beijing is worth mentioning here. In 2013, the Beijing Subway was losing money and was unable to pay salaries to its employees through its revenues.2 It had a fixed rate of 2 yuan for travelling any distance in Beijing. In fact, it was one of the defining features of Beijing Subway, which was quite different from Shanghai where rates are varied and distance-based. The Beijing Subway is the city’s lifeline, facilitating commuters of different economic backgrounds thereby encouraging a wide range of economic activity. The authorities wanted to increase the fare to 4 yuan, however, public opposition to the rate hike was quite vocal.3 It generated heated debates and for an entire year, the authorities delayed the decision. Though the experts and authorities considered the low fares to be unsustainable,4 the authorities tasked governmental agencies to gauge public response, invited the media and political advisors, and conducted public hearings to weigh in on the decision to hike the rates.5 After a year of deliberations, the authorities raised it to 3 yuan instead of 4 yuan as the starting fare, and continued its promise to subsidise 50 per cent of the subway operation.6
This example highlights the uncertainty among party officials to gauge public perception—which means constantly juggling between welfare policies and economic logic. . The decentralisation of the economy has led to problems of coordination between the central and the local authorities. The central authorities are finding it difficult to assess the way in which policies are being implemented by the local authorities.7 Therefore, if the party wants to retain its legitimacy, then it has to reform its governance model in such a way that is best suited to accurately define public interest without being swayed either by public consensus or by a majority opinion as they may not necessarily represent public interest.
If propaganda is not meant to be a measure of sole legitimation strategy over the society, why does it play an important role? While the correlation between the two may be factually true, the public sometimes is the unintended audience of majority of Party’s propaganda.8 The message is for the party secretaries and government officials9 who have to be compelled with the long arm of the central leadership to make them accountable. To do so, the Party believes that it has to strengthen its supervisory capacity in provincial and local organisations. The daily lives of the Chinese are influenced much more by local authorities than by the central leadership. The local authorities often side-step legal protections and find innovative ways to deny compensations or benefits to ordinary people.
In democratic societies, poor governance is penalised through loss of political power for the ruling party or grievance redressal by an independent legal system. In China, officials had to be educated, repeatedly, through ideological education and core thoughts of leaders, as many tend to exploit the central policies to serve vested interests that might end up hurting public interest. This makes many believe that the Party does not conform to its own ideals. But one should not confuse corruption and risk-averse behaviour with systemic decay.
It is important to focus on elite cohesion rather than the Party’s control and propaganda measures as a sign of regime stability. The adaptive nature of the authoritarian regime in China has been well-documented.10 Yet, the Chinese elite are divided over the kind of political model that could transform its economy into a developed one.11 While some argue for Neo-Authoritarian model, whereby a strong leadership is needed to implement reforms and shape the conditions necessary for it,12 the liberals in China on the other hand argue that only democratic policies will help modernise the economy and politics.
The popularity of theory of authoritarian model (late 1980s) coincided with Deng Xiaoping’s push for expanding economic reforms, which culminated in the southern tour of 1992. Moreover, authoritarian model was useful to stem the tide of rising leftist turn in post-Tiananmen politics in China, and to appease the sceptics within the party. Those who support the theory by addressing transitory authoritarian model as a necessity before democratisation,13 there are plenty among liberals and party officials, who reject this theory to be inadequate in addressing the problems in today’s China.14
In Xi Jinping’s China, the popular perception is that a new phase in communist politics has begun where the authoritarian model is practised with an emphasis on recentralisation of political power. But the evidence shows that the communist rule encourages the leadership to provide ideological correction whenever differences emerge among different interest groups. For instance, Deng Xiaoping was far more autocratic than popularly believed,15 and he quite often exercised overwhelming control to carry out his vision of economic reforms. Therefore, even before Xi Jinping, there had been an emphasis on establishing leadership authority in China to prevent disruption of the reforms process. It is therefore not surprising that party leadership is considered crucial as long as there is a need for broad-range reforms in the Chinese society. No wonder, leadership authority continues to be a major force in Xi Jinping’s governance model.16
For the most part, the Party has accommodated and tolerated tensions between the liberals’ desire for democratic reforms and the discontent of the leftists (新左派) against capitalist expansion. Xi Jinping’s leadership is generally seen as a compromise between the two. Since Mao Zedong, the party has been achieving elite cohesion either through power-sharing or by coercion. Even though an eclectic mix of ideological forces are part of the communist system, they share power, enabled by the leadership’s ability to successfully implement policies in developing the country.17
However, once policy decisions are taken, the party leaders are generally expected to support the overall party line. For instance, during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang gave an alternative suggestion to boost the ailing economy. He advocated “stall economy”, where street vendors could be given orderly space to boost employment.18 Many perceived its quiet death as a conflict between Xi and Li. However, stall economy was seen as incompatible with China’s plans for its first-tier cities such as Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei Integrated Development Plan (2014) that seeks to integrate the urban spaces to boost high-tech economy.19 In other words, the national strategy is to use high-tech innovation and ecological conservation as a way to ease income inequality and raise safety rather than pursuing short-term solutions such as stall economy.20
Now the caveat seems to be that economic development alone cannot be the source of legitimacy. There is an acknowledgement among the party leadership that the demands of the Chinese society have moved away from raising income levels (economic development) to addressing the issues of income inequality and providing a better quality of life. Xi Jinping therefore is in charge of course correction as the uneven economic progress was reducing political trust with the central leadership.21 For the current leadership, the short answer seems to be to modernise its governance system under “Xi Jinping Thought”. For instance, the “Peaceful China Initiative” (平安中国建设) attempts to modernise the governance model (with an emphasis on rule of law and public participation) to address people’s concerns better.22
China faces an uphill task. Getting rich was easy compared to adopting a mode of governance to maintain domestic peace and distribute the wealth it has accrued.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
7.“China to Conduct Targeted Inspections on Policy Implementation”, Xinhua, 8 September 2021. From the perspective of the central leadership, the local prosperity leads to local power centres and vested interests, where central policies are adapted to further their access to power and wealth at the expense of the local public interest. But whether this approach compromises local experimentation and innovation remains to be seen.
8. The public propaganda works albeit in a different way. The party attempts to shape the behaviour of the public in economic life and social life. For instance, during the Beijing Olympics, there were intense propaganda to educate the Chinese over appropriate behaviour and etiquette. Similarly, the party uses the successes of their policies in their propaganda to garner support for their political model. However, such propaganda works only if they are accompanied by material benefits to the people. See, Dan Chen, “Local Distrust and Regime Support: Sources and Effects of Political Trust in China”, Political Research Quarterly, 2017, Vol. 70, No. 2, pp. 314–326.
10. Yan Xiaojun, “Regime Inclusion and the Resilience of Authoritarianism: The Local People’s Political Consultative Conference in Post-Mao Chinese Politics”, The China Journal, 2011, No. 66, pp. 53–75; He Baogang and Mark E. Warren, “Authoritarian Deliberation in China”, Daedalus, Vol. 146, No. 3, pp. 155–166.
11. There is some evidence that the Chinese leaders are fascinated with the Singapore model as it is both modern as well as Asian in characteristics. See, Stephen Ortmann and Mark R. Thompson, “Introduction: The ‘Singapore Model’ and China's Neo-Authoritarian Dream”, The China Quarterly, 2018, Vol. 236, pp. 930–945.
17. The party cohesion was disrupted during the Cultural Revolution, when the political, economic and cultural life of the Chinese society were disrupted.
20. Moreover, the city residents often view “stall economy” to be disruptive and public support is quite low.
21. Wu Jiebing, Li Yong and Song Chengcheng, “Temporal Dynamics of Political Trust in China: A Cohort Analysis”, China Information, 2020, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 109–136.
Yemeni crisis has been a challenge for Saudi Arabia’s standing and reputation as the leader of the Arab and the Islamic world. It is caught between the resilience of the Houthis to sustain their fight, and the growing cost of war and the allegations of innocents being victims of their air strikes.
Despite more than six years of Saudi-led military offensive against the Houthis, the situation in Yemen remains extremely complex and challenging for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Houthis have captured large parts of the Yemeni territory in the north-west of the country including the capital Sanaa. The Saudi-led military coalition’s twin objectives of pushing the Houthis back from Sanaa and reinstating the internationally recognised government of President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi remain unfulfilled.
The stalemate in Yemen continues as the Saudi-led coalition has imposed an air and sea blockade and has argued that access to the ports must be restricted in order to prevent the illegal flow of weapons to the Houthis. The Houthis, on the other hand, have demanded that the restrictions imposed on the ports must be removed before any ceasefire agreement can be agreed upon. This is a key factor blocking the political negotiations and ceasefire between the Houthis and the Yemeni government resulting in an impasse. Efforts to reach a ceasefire and a negotiated resolution to the conflict has not produced any concrete results as both sides have violated the ceasefire agreements in the past. Other sticky issues such as the exchange of prisoners and delivery of humanitarian aid remain unsettled in the absence of a consensus between the two parties.
For Saudi Arabia, its national security is closely linked to stability and security in Yemen. The fall of capital Sanaa was a red-line for Saudi Arabia as it believed that the Houthis are backed by its arch-rival Iran. The Houthis have attacked Saudi Arabia using rockets, missiles and UAVs targeting a number of vital installations including airports, military bases and oil installations. Saudi authorities have intercepted and destroyed a large number of rockets, missiles and UAVs launched by the Houthis.1 As long as the Houthis are armed, capturing territories in Yemen and launching attacks on Saudi Arabia, they would continue to pose a direct security threat for the Kingdom. The current situation has left Saudi Arabia with limited options to manoeuvre in Yemen. It is caught between the resilience of the Houthis to sustain their fight, on the one hand, and the growing cost of war and the allegations of innocents being victims of their air strikes, on the other. Withdrawing from the military operation in Yemen is a hard choice for Saudi Arabia as it would leave President Hadi’s forces vulnerable to the Houthi attacks. In the event of withdrawal of the Saudi-led coalition forces, the Houthis could capture more territories in the country.
Further, Saudi withdrawal would leave Iran to play a domineering role in Yemen which will have serious implications for the Kingdom from the security and strategic point of view. It will not only increase Iranian influence in Yemen but also in the adjacent maritime domains such as the Red Sea, Strait of Bab El Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden as well. Iranian dominance in these strategically important waterways would make Saudi Arabia extremely uncomfortable.
On the other hand, continuing with the military engagement against the Houthis would mean further protracting the conflict without any end in sight even after more than six years of fighting. It would also mean high costs for the Saudi exchequer and the military. Besides, it would continue to draw criticism for allegedly killing innocent civilians, violating human rights and enforcing blockade on several parts of the country.
Further, the changing US policy towards Yemen under President Biden is yet another challenge for Saudi Arabia. In January 2021, the Trump administration designated the Houthis as a terrorist organisation. After Biden assumed office, his administration revoked the decision in February 2021, while assuring the Kingdom of American support against attacks by the Houthis.2 Earlier, in the same month, President Biden had announced the US withdrawal from the “offensive operations in the war in Yemen, including relevant arm sales”. Biden administration emphasised diplomatic solution to the Yemeni crisis and appointed Timothy Lenderking as the Special Envoy to Yemen. US support is critical for Saudi Arabia to continue military operations in Yemen. The reduced US military support in the fight against the Houthis certainly adds to the worries of Saudi Arabia in Yemen.
For Iran, staying engaged with the Houthis in Yemen works to its strategic advantage vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia. Iran has condemned the military strikes and has urged the coalition to end the blockade imposed on Yemen. By supporting the Houthis, Iran has emerged as a key player and is likely to have an influential role in the future of Yemen. Such unwavering Iranian support for the Houthis further constrains Saudi options in Yemen. Though Iranian and Saudi officials held talks in Baghdad to discuss Yemen and other issues in April this year but no workable solution emerged.3 Riyadh will still have to negotiate with Tehran to find a sustainable solution to the Yemeni crisis. However, given the history of acrimonious relationship between the two countries, the possibility of such an understanding looks highly improbable.
Besides, the Yemeni crisis has been a challenge for Saudi Arabia’s standing and reputation as the leader of the Arab and the Islamic world. The Kingdom has been involved in the crisis from the very beginning, right from negotiating with former president Ali Abdullah Saleh to step down to drafting the “GCC Initiative”, and from steering the power transition process to proactively working with the UN and international community to restore stability in the country. Withdrawing from the country without any substantial gains, such as, restoring stability in Yemen or ensuring its own national security would be an embarrassment for Saudi Arabia at the hands of the Iranian-backed Houthis. The military and strategic factors may necessitate a prolonged Saudi military involvement in Yemen as long as the situation is not in its favour. But there is certainly a huge financial and human cost to the long and uncertain war in Yemen.
Saudi Arabia has now agreed to talk with the Houthis for a ceasefire and a political solution to the crisis.4 This could be the result of the growing realisation on the part of the Kingdom that Yemen requires a political solution to the present crisis. The best possible scenario for Riyadh would be an honourable exit from Yemen with its core national security interests uncompromised. This is easier said than done, but clearly, Riyadh’s options in Yemen at present are limited and shrinking.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The recent statement by the former Amirs (chiefs) of Jama’at-e-Islami Jammu and Kashmir, which was banned in 2019, seems to be a tactical move by the leadership to save the organisational structure from any kind of damage and to continue Islamisation of the society at the grassroots level.
On 11 August 2021, just three days after the National Investigation Agency (NIA) raided around 56 locations linked to the banned Jama’at-e-Islami in Jammu and Kashmir, three former Amirs (chiefs) of the organisation issued a longish and a very important statement to the press.1 The three-part statement challenges the charges levelled against the organisation and explains in detail the evolution of the Jama’at-e-Islami in Jammu and Kashmir, its core ideology and relations with Hurriyat Conference and armed groups like Hizbul Mujahideen. It was the first statement issued by the organisation since it was banned in 2019.
The Jama’at-e-Islami Jammu and Kashmir was banned by the Ministry of Home Affairs for five years on 28 February 20192 under section 3 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. The Union Home Ministry, in a Notification, declared that Jama’at “has been indulging in activities which are prejudicial to internal security and public order and have the potential of disrupting the unity and integrity of the country”.3 The decision of banning the Jama’at as an “unlawful association” was confirmed by the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Tribunal in August 2019, after it perused various evidences including the background note and affidavits submitted respectively by the Union government and the Jammu and Kashmir Police about the “secessionist tendencies” of Jama’at.4
After the Tribunal upheld the decision of the Union government, the Jama’at moved the Delhi High Court challenging the ban and the Tribunal Order of 27 August 2019 and filed a petition under Articles 226 and 2275. It is pertinent to mention that this was the third time Jama’at was banned. The first time it was banned was in 1975 when it protested against the Indira–Abdullah Accord. The second ban on the organisation was imposed in 1990 which lasted till 1995.
Interestingly, the petition that Jama’at submitted to the Delhi High Court and the statement issued by the three Jama’at leaders have the same tone and content. Both documents seek to clarify that the sole purpose of the organisation is to “spread the word of Islam”.6 Both documents emphasise that its constitution does not support “agitational politics” and that it was formed purely as a “socio-religious” group committed to democratic and constitutional methods. The idea that the organisation supports militancy is a “misconception” and is the creation of those with “vested interests” against the Jama’at.7
It is true that Jama’at is a socio-religious and political organisation and is committed to social reformation of the society, but that is not the whole truth. From the very beginning, Jama’at had a clear political position. It always advocated the “Right to Self-determination” for Jammu and Kashmir. This is purposely not touched either in the petition or in the statement issued later. This is a timely tactical move by the leadership to save the cadre and the organisational structure from any kind of damage so that they are able to focus on Islamisation of the society at the grassroots level till they find a favourable time for operating at a much larger platform. The fact is that Jama’at is explicitly an Islamist organisation free of secular pretentions. This will remain unchanged though there could be changes in its strategies with changes in the overall political situation.
Formation and Changing Strategies
The Jama’at-e-Islami as a separate organisation in Jammu and Kashmir was officially established in 1952.8 Till that time it operated under the Constitution of Jama’at-e-Islami India.
In the 1950s, the Jama’at in Jammu and Kashmir reached out to people in different regions of the state and started mobilising them for the establishment of a system based on Islamic principles. Starting with just four members, the organisation now has 5000 basic and committed members across the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir. It is important to mention here that one becomes a basic member only after years of training and scrutiny. The mobilisation drive was successful because it happened through Jama’at’s own schools, madrassas, libraries and most importantly and paradoxically, through participation in elections. It seems that Jama’at violated its own constitution by contesting elections in a secular country. The fact is that it was done for the fulfillment of the larger Islamisation project. Elections were used as a tool to expand the base to reach out to more and more sections of people.
The Jama’at succeeded in achieving its preliminary objective. The message and the ideology of political Islam reached every corner of Jammu and Kashmir, which appealed to the educated younger generation belonging to the lower middle-class families. At the same time, the emphasis on political Islam was not just a tacit challenge to the Indian rule but it also challenged the conventional Sufi traditions which encouraged coexistence of different cultures and had existed in the state for centuries.9 The Sufis had failed to address the issues affecting the educated youths who were witnessing transformation in every sphere of their lives. The Jama’at, which had heavily invested in schools and in the distribution of Islamic literature, especially books and pamphlets written by Maududi, easily filled this gap by introducing people to a more activist version of Islam and integrating them with the modern world.
By the 1980s, the organisation was comparatively stronger and in a better position to influence the public opinion. It actively participated in electoral process from 1969 to 1987. The Jama’at was an important constituent of Muslim United Front (MUF) in the late 1980s10, which contested election against the National Conference–Congress alliance. Without Jama’at, the idea of MUF would have never materialised because Jama’at was the only religio-political party, which had resources and manpower with experience in electoral politics. The alleged rigging of the election and the consequent failure of MUF triggered armed insurgency in the valley of Kashmir. Many Jama’at leaders including Muhammad Yusuf Shah, who later came to be known as Sayeed Salahuddin now heading the United Jehad Council (UJC), crossed the Line of Control (LoC) for arms training. Although Jama’at consistently denied having any direct role in insurgency, a founding member of the Pakistan-sponsored Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) called HM as the “sword arm of Jama’at”.11 Later, it was associated with the Hurriyat Conference from the early 1990s till 2008 when it formally distanced itself from the conglomerate. The decision was the result of a decade-long debate within the organisation.12
The Jama’at has consistently changed its strategy in response to the changing political reality in the state. It does this without deviating from its core ideology. Scholars who have extensively written about Jama’at believe that the organisation’s own framework allows it to take “multifarious positions” in order to achieve its desired objectives.13 The fact is that all Islamist movements including Jama’at abhor the doctrine of secularism and have an antagonistic relationship with secular states. If this is not expressed explicitly, it does not imply acceptance of a secular doctrine. Islamists conveniently shift to a strategy of “war of position” or in other words an “intellectual moral reform” of a society if they find it difficult to confront a secular state at any particular time.
Jama’at is the only religious organisation in Jammu and Kashmir that has remained politically active since its formation in 1952. Its politics is a bit complex. They have been a part of the mainstream politics and at the same time vociferously represent political Islam. The founders and various other leaders have from the very beginning employed a much nuanced and ambiguous strategy to achieve their objectives. With this, they have been able to Islamise and politically mobilise people across the state. However, these strategic maneuvers have not gone unnoticed. The repeated ban on the organisation by the Union government reaffirms this fact.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Given its geo-strategic importance, Indonesia’s cooperation is crucial for success of any regional security framework in the Indo-Pacific. It is therefore important that regional powers pay attention to Indonesia’s concern over Australia’s decision to acquire nuclear-powered submarines under the newly constituted AUKUS, especially in view of the increasing US–China rivalry in the region.
The Indonesian foreign ministry in a statement has expressed concern over Australia’s decision to acquire nuclear-powered submarines under the newly constituted AUKUS pact between Australia, the US and the UK. The statement further reads into Jakarta’s anxiety over “continuing arms race and power projection” in the region.1 Indonesia–Australia strategic relationship has been driven by their close geography, however apparent lack of dialogue between the two countries has recently exposed its vulnerabilities.
Indonesia has been a strong advocate of rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific and has played a crucial role in drafting the “ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific”.2 Security arrangements like AUKUS may have similar goals of freedom and peace, and therefore it is desirable that regional powers take Jakarta into confidence, especially amidst increasing uncertainty due to US–China rivalry in the region. Given its geo-strategic importance, Indonesia’s cooperation will be essential for success of any regional security framework in the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, Indonesia may find it more pragmatic to participate in frameworks outside of ASEAN, such as engagement with supply chain resilience cooperation or the Quad plus, to avoid sitting on the sidelines during vital restructuring in the Indo-Pacific balance of power.
Indonesia–Australia Relations
The bilateral relationship has a strong element of defence. However, the rhetoric of “most important security partner” coming out of Canberra repeatedly for Indonesia falls short in the face of their defence engagement over the years.3 A Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement was signed in 2018, building on the first bilateral defence agreement signed in 1995. But Australia’s Defence Cooperation Program (DCP) has never allocated largest share of its funding to Indonesia, nor has Indonesia been Australia’s most frequent defence training partner. Indonesia’s defence exercises with the Australian Defence Force (ADF) between 1997 and 2015 represent only 8 per cent of ADF’s total defence exercises, compared to 25 per cent (highest number) in case of the United States and ADF.4 Even other ASEAN nations like Thailand and Malaysia have trained more with Australia than Indonesia.
That is not to discount the strategic importance Indonesia holds in Australian policy and academic circles. The defence white paper in 2009 and in 2016 both acknowledge Indonesia’s significance to Australian national security. The incongruity has arisen due to insufficient follow-up on the narrative. Given their positioning in the Pacific Ocean, any threat to Australia will come from or through Indonesia. Richard Tanter from Nautilus Institute calls the bilateral relationship asymmetric because Indonesia is more important to Australia from a security perspective than Australia is to Indonesia.5 But as he also mentions in his paper, the two countries have very different histories and political evolution, which has likely led to ambiguity in their bilateral relations.
Australia’s role in separation of East Timor in 1999 badly affected its relationship with Indonesia, and has sustained Jakarta’s suspicion of Australia to this day. The defence cooperation at that time was suspended only to be normalised many years later in 2006 through the Lombok Treaty.6 In 2013, Indonesia uncovered that Australia was spying on the-then president Yudhoyono and people close to him. As a consequence, it had suspended mutual intelligence cooperation.7 Hence, in matters of strategic conduct, Indonesia has preferred a cautious and calibrated approach in its relationship with Australia. The unsteady course of their bilateral relationship makes Indonesia’s current reactions unsurprising. The secretive manner in which AUKUS was conceived has irked many of Australia’s security partners. But Canberra’s clear preference for closer defence relationship with allies in Anglosphere has alienated Indonesia.8 In recent years, there has been greater realisation within Jakarta of the country’s maritime vulnerabilities. President Joko Widodo’s “Global Maritime Fulcrum” policy revolves around propelling Indonesia as a strong maritime power, given substantial economic and logistical dependencies on the sea.9 In that scenario, a development like AUKUS, which further complicates the regional security environment where Indonesia could be victimised in a great power conflict, has naturally pronounced Jakarta’s insecurities.
ASEAN Dynamics
As over most geo-political issues, ASEAN members have a differing stance on the AUKUS deal. While Indonesia and Malaysia openly expressed their concerns, the Philippines welcomed it and Singapore chose to take a moderate position. While Australia has tried to allay concerns over an emerging arms race in the region, it cannot be denied that Southeast Asia will effectively be the theatre for any conflict that breaks among larger powers like China, Australia and the US. Indonesia has advocated “ASEAN Centrality” of the Indo-Pacific on multiple forums and also in the ASEAN outlook on Indo-Pacific. And even though newer security arrangements like the Quad or AUKUS may declare commitment to ASEAN centrality, their emergence itself can be seen in relation to ASEAN’s performance as a regional organisation.10 ASEAN’s consensus-based decision-making process has prevented any conclusive step on contentious issues like the South China Sea conflict, and more recently the Myanmar crisis.
The ASEAN may choose either to continue avoiding confrontation with regional security issues and focus on economic integration instead, or it may transform its internal workings to foster more concrete decisions on regional security. In both ways it will remain the most formidable grouping of the Indo-Pacific around which other frameworks may revolve, but the latter will allow it to engage large powers without the absolute need for newer security arrangements. It will also help ASEAN retain the upper hand in setting the tone for security discourse on Indo-Pacific. Consequentially, any anxieties regarding new groupings among larger powers will not be acute. But given ASEAN’s track record of handling conflicts in the region, a radical change in its outlook is unlikely.
Indonesia’s Role in the Region
Indonesia, as the largest economy and most populous ASEAN nation, has assumed a leadership role within the organisation. Maintaining an independent foreign policy has compelled Jakarta to prevent taking sides between the US, its closest security partner, and China, its closest economic partner. So it has promoted ASEAN as the primary regional organisation in Indo-Pacific. But exclusive association with ASEAN and ASEAN-led organisations may limit Indonesia’s strategic engagements as larger powers do not look to ASEAN for resolution of crisis situations anymore.
Senior researcher at CSIS Evan Laksmana opines that it may be useful for Indonesia to consider “flexible coalitions” with “like-minded powers such as Australia, India, Japan and South Korea”.11 India has reaffirmed its policy of multi-alignment,12 and is already a member of Quad with Australia and Japan. Jakarta’s unease with newer security arrangements in the region, even though not unfounded, may be more due to lack of its own participation. Indonesia is a vibrant democracy and straddles the most significant oceanic trade routes of the world. It has shown commitment to international peace and has consistently been one of the largest contributors of troops to UN peacekeeping operations across the globe.13 If it views itself as a regional leader, it is incumbent upon large powers to acclimatise their foreign policies accordingly.
Conclusion
Some analysts have lauded Australia with its AUKUS deal as an example of standing up to China14, notwithstanding that it may make Australia a bigger and clearer target for Beijing’s punitive methods like economic sanctions.15 It is also possible that escalations of a military nature could be intensified in the region. For Southeast Asian nations to join or constitute among themselves any military-centric grouping like AUKUS or Quad will certainly provoke China. Beijing’s grey-zone operations on adversaries is a testimony of its assertive actions against countries with perceived anti-China stance. In that case, it becomes important what the smaller power in such an arrangement is getting out of that deal. For instance, Australia is getting the prized nuclear technology from the US, which was only shared with the UK up until founding of AUKUS.
Indonesia is the largest archipelagic country with long coastlines to defend. Coastal surveillance and maritime intelligence sharing could be of great benefit to Indonesia considering the Chinese incursions into its northern maritime territory of Natuna Regency in 2020. Indonesian defence acquisitions in the past have been focussed on aircrafts, and there are long-term future plans to acquire 230 combat aircraft of different varieties as well.16 More importantly, if Indonesia would consider the idea of participating in a multilateral security framework, it could command cooperation in all areas of traditional security, including cyber technologies. It remains to be seen if Jakarta may be willing to assume a multi-faceted leadership role in the region and upscale its engagements with the countries involved in the Indo-Pacific. A reinvigorated and nuanced security policy will allow it to respond accordingly to fast-changing security environment in the region.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Baghdad Conference is significant for a variety of reasons including Iraq’s attempt to emerge as a regional mediator and reduce tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia on the one hand, and Turkey and Egypt–UAE, on the other. However, at the core of it, the event was aimed at reviving Iraq’s economic and political fortunes.
On 28 August 2021, Iraq hosted the first “Baghdad Conference for Cooperation and Partnership” with participation of eight regional countries, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait and Jordan, besides France as a co-sponsor. While Egypt, Jordan, Qatar and France were represented by the heads of state, Kuwait and UAE sent their prime ministers. From Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran, their foreign ministers attended the event. The heads of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Arab League and Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) were also present at the Conference. The Baghdad Conference is significant for a variety of reasons including Iraq’s attempt to emerge as a regional mediator and reduce tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia on the one hand, and Turkey and Egypt–UAE, on the other. But at the core of it, the event was aimed at reviving Iraq’s economic and political fortunes.
The Conference is the brainchild of Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi who took charge of Iraqi government in May 2020 after months of uncertainty over finding the successor to Adel Abdul-Mahdi who had resigned in November 2019 after a series of protests across Iraq against his government’s failure in checking corruption and in providing basic amenities like water and electricity. Kadhimi emerged as a consensus choice because of his reputation as a successful chief of Iraqi intelligence service, especially in the fight against the Islamic State (ISIS), and his good working relations with the three major external stakeholders—the United States (US), Iran and Saudi Arabia. After assuming power, Kadhimi’s priority has been to revive the Iraqi economy and to undertake a more prominent regional role to reduce tensions among regional countries.
As part of effort to reduce tensions and promote regional cooperation, Iraq has reportedly organised several rounds of talks between Iranian and Saudi officials, besides hosting a tripartite summit attended by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, Jordanian King Abdullah-II and Iraqi President Barham Saleh in June 2021. The Baghdad Conference is a continuation of the same attempt as noted in the final communiqué issued after the meeting.1 Among the key issues discussed in the Conference were the conflict in Yemen, the situation in Lebanon and overcoming the economic disruptions caused by the COVID-19. The communiqué noted that the regional countries face “common challenges” and they need “to deal with them on the basis of joint cooperation and mutual interests”. It further highlighted the importance of economic reforms being undertaken by the Government of Iraq and emphasised the need for regional support for Iraq’s economic revival.
While the challenges facing Iraq and the causes of regional tensions are much deeper to expect any breakthrough, the fact that Iraq was able to bring together representatives from Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Turkey and UAE on the same table is no mean achievement. Significantly, the organisers were not really aiming for any diplomatic breakthrough and were realistic in their objective as noted by Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein who underlined the need for initiating a dialogue rather than expecting any serious outcome.2 Notably, the Conference decided to form a follow-up committee comprising foreign ministers of participating countries who will explore the possibilities for further cooperation and “prepare for periodic future sessions, and discuss strategic economic and investment projects proposed by Iraq.”3
Several factors contributed to Iraq’s success in organising the Conference and bringing the rival regional powers on the same platform. Firstly, the transition in Washington earlier this year has had a striking impact on the regional geopolitics. The Biden administration not only extended its support for the Conference but has been encouraging the Kadhimi government to bring reforms and end the endemic corruption in Iraq. Secondly, the ongoing reorientation in US foreign policy has created a regional environment for the regional countries to amend their foreign policy behaviour to avoid security threats emanating from regional rivalries and tensions. One of the first instances of the change in the behaviour of regional countries came with the signing of the Al-Ula Declaration to end the boycott of Qatar by Saudi Arabia and its regional allies—Bahrain, Egypt and UAE ending the nearly four-year GCC crisis. The kingdom also attempted to end the Yemen conflict by declaring a unilateral ceasefire in March. Similarly, there have been attempts by the UAE, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran to engage each other given that the Biden administration, unlike its predecessor, is not keen to get involved in the cantankerous regional politics.
Thirdly, and most importantly, the Baghdad Conference is a result of Kadhimi government’s three-pronged strategy to revive Iraq’s fortune. Prime Minister Kadhimi knows that without the support of the neighbouring countries, Iraq cannot overcome the economic, political and security challenges it is facing. He also understands that playing a mediatory role serves the purpose of striking a balance in relations with rival regional powers, and at the same time, generate the goodwill and confidence among international investors and major global powers. In terms of domestic politics, the successful conduct of the Conference can be showcased as an achievement for the government approaching an election, and at the same time, it can pave the ground for reviving regional trade and investments in Iraq, significant for the much-needed economic recovery.
From an Indian perspective, it is important to keep an eye on the developments in Iraq, not only because of Baghdad’s attempts to emerge as a regional mediator but also because of the significance of Iraq as India’s energy partner and the economic opportunities that it offers in terms of bilateral trade and investments. Besides, the Baghdad Conference was noteworthy from the regional diplomacy viewpoint and the fact that France was a co-organiser of the Conference underlines the scope for international diplomacy. Given India’s interests and diplomatic capital in West Asia, it posits an opportunity for New Delhi to partner with the like-minded international powers to engage the regional countries.
The Baghdad Conference is a significant development so far as Iraq’s future is concerned. The country debilitated by war, insurgency and terrorism during the past two decades needs extraordinary initiatives to revive its fortunes. It is still early days to predict if the Conference will lead to a tangible outcome but the initial response it has garnered within Iraq and from the regional and international community confirms that an opportunity lies therein.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The rising threat of Islamic State Khorasan (ISK) since the Taliban’s capture of Afghanistan could be a red herring as it seems to be overplayed by Pakistan to mainstream and help the Taliban regime.
A new wave of violence has emerged since the US troops’ withdrawal from Afghanistan and the takeover by Taliban. After the Kabul airport attack on 26 August 2021, in which nearly 170 people died including 13 US soldiers, Jalalabad was rocked by bomb blasts on 18–19 September 2021. Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK) has claimed responsibility for these attacks. This existing threat of ISK is being harped upon by various commentators as having potential to destabilise the wider region. How serious and credible is this threat? Pakistan is asking the wider world to cooperate with the Taliban to defeat it. Should we encourage that? If yes, what may be the long-term implications of this cooperation?
For this analysis, let’s first consider the strengths and weaknesses of the threat posed by the ISK.
Who are the ISK?
ISK was formed as a Wilayah (province) of the earlier Islamic State of Syria and Levant (ISIL) in the year 2015. It was initially said to be formed by the disgruntled elements of the Tahreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Orakzai agency of Pakistan, which then shifted across the border to Nangarhar and Kunar in Afghanistan. Subsequently, the disgruntled elements of Taliban, Al Qaida and Haqqani Network joined the ISK.1 Their numbers are estimated to be between 1,500 and 2,2002 .
Figure 1: Total Fatalities
Note: The data only includes fatalities exclusively attributed to the ISK in Afghanistan.
Source: “Data Export Tool” [Database], The Armed Conflict & Location Event Data Project (ACLED).3
Their activity was the highest in year 2017–2018 and then it tapered down. The ostensible reason for this fall post-2018 was due to the concerted action against them by the Afghan and the NATO forces. Figure 1 shows a sudden jump in August 2021 due to the Kabul airport blast. In all this recent buzz around ISK, it is pertinent to analyse how serious this threat is.
In theory, as the Islamic State operates on the ideology of a global caliphate, ISK also, by definition, has a potential global ideological reach. It is known to recruit from across the world. It is noteworthy that as per the reports, a terrorist from Kerala was involved in the Kabul Gurudwara attack.4 Again, Islamic State is known to use extreme and graphic violence to instill terror. Its ideology may also inspire lone wolf attacks. A caveat may be necessary here as many a times lone wolves find ISIL ideology convenient to justify their attacks. It is also seen that many a times ISIL claims random terror attacks for propaganda purposes.
Inherent Limitations
Notwithstanding the aforementioned strengths, there are some distinct weaknesses as well.
First, an Islamic State of this kind requires territory which it controls, a caliph and Dawla (state). As of now, ISIL does not control any territory and their caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is dead. As the state exists no more, this puts serious questions on the viability of its affiliate province in Khorasan as well.
Second, extreme violence practiced by the ISK may also be ultimately working against them. The Taliban and many other Muslims call the Islamic State fighters as Khawarij, a term used for extremists who are considered as mischief mongers and even branded as non-Muslim. This ideological name calling may not seem very important to an outsider but it remains germane to the final outcome for the parties involved. The genesis of this dispute is nearly as old as Islam itself. During the reign of fourth caliph Ali Ibn Abi Talib a civil war broke out between him and the governor of Damascus, Muaviyah. It led to the Battle of Siffin in 657 AD, during which a compromise was reached between the warring parties. A group of supporters of Ali rebelled against him and blamed him of apostasy, saying that it was not for Ali to compromise in violation of divine will. This dispute led to a lot of bloodshed but the rebels finally succeeded in assassinating Ali. This group was called Khawarij or Khariji, meaning people who withdrew from the religion.5 The same theme is being played out today with some variations. The ISK calls the Taliban Murtad or apostate because, according to them, by negotiating with the US the Taliban have compromised. ISK also finds the Taliban to be “nationalistic” which is also anti-Islamic in its view. In this battle of narratives this label of Khawarij on the ISK is a handicap in its wider growth and acceptance.
Third, the ISK practices Takfir where they declare a Muslim to be an apostate even for minor doctrinal or practical deviation from their version of true Islam.6 This is extreme Salafi/Wahhabi strand in their practice. They want to first purge the Muslim societies of all the “deviations” and “sins”. This makes IS ideology perpetuate more violence and bloodshed within Muslim societies itself. Also, the Islamic State worldview is heavily influenced by the prophecies of doomsday and the day of judgement. They see signs of coming final battle between Muslims and Kuffar everywhere. This virulence, though has shock and awe effect in short term, also acts as a hindrance in their long-term sustenance. Taking a parallel from biology, an extremely virulent strain of some virus may be very dangerous but this virulence itself leads to killing of the host which ultimately limits the virus’s own growth.
Fourth, Islamic State ideology requires its adherent to migrate to the territory controlled by them. Therefore, there are always chances of lone wolf attacks or IS-inspired attacks outside but this migration makes these extremists create more mayhem in the IS-controlled areas only. This phenomenon also indirectly limits their violence-causing capacity outside. So, what can possibly explain its sudden emergence?
Cui Bono?
Right from the beginning there has been some confusion behind who or what is responsible for the emergence of ISIL or ISK? Another angle to the emergence of ISK may be long-held allegation that they are nothing but the cat’s paw of the ISI. Pattern of violence and target selection by the ISK in itself shows that they have been killing Shia Hazaras, Sikhs in Kabul, school-going girls and finally the US soldiers and people who assisted the last regime. By the principle of who benefits, it may be seen that they have been doing nothing new (as in there are other Sunni extremists groups who have been doing exactly the same) or they have only facilitated the Taliban. It is true that now the Taliban and the ISK appear to be fighting but people like Amrullah Saleh and other security experts have long accused the ISK to be doing the Taliban’s dirty jobs.7 Now, when the US is out, ISK may also be used by the ISI to give a not-so-gentle reminder to the Taliban if they break the line and try to be too nationalistic and independent-minded.
This allegation finds credence from the fact that somewhere around 2016, the ISK seemed to have been penetrated by the ISI. The last two Emirs of the ISK, Aslam Farooqi and Shahab al-Muhajjir have been known to have worked for the Haqqani Network.8 Aslam Farooqi also had long connections with the Lashkar-e-Taiba.9 LeT and Haqqani Network are known ISI affiliates.
Both Pakistan and the US are busy overplaying this threat from the ISK for their own reasons. The US wants to save face and avoid the political fallout of its capitulation in Kabul. Pakistan wants to get money and recognition for its perceived foster child in the form of the Taliban. Pakistan itself has become partially Talibanised and it supports its ideological bedfellow. This leads both of them to give the Taliban a somewhat benign colour.
Conclusion
As regard the long-term impact of the possible survival and mainstreaming of the Taliban regime, recent experience has shown that all the wishful thinking of the Taliban having changed their ways is just that. Women rights, rights of minorities, any kind of power sharing with rivals has received a setback. The Taliban remain committed to establish their version of the 7th century utopia with all the floggings, amputations and public stoning. Al Qaida and its South Asian version remains present in Afghanistan and their relationship with the Taliban is still very much intact.10 What makes the ISI and the Taliban more potent threat than the ISK is that they are just one shade rational in their ideology, which increases their chances of survival. They also have better state apparatus and resources at their command. The Taliban also derives their legitimacy from the larger Hanafi Deobandi school which has a vast following in South Asia with a potential to extend this influence. In tandem, the ISI remains committed to continuous jihad and bleeding India through 1,000 cuts. It is not easy to forget that the ISI and Pakistan Army still has Jihad fi Sabillilah as its motto.
In such a scenario, success of the Taliban project will reaffirm this ideology and further mainstream it. But they cannot achieve their objectives without international support. In this game, the ISK may just be a red herring and the proverbial boogey-man to make us all give Pakistan and the Taliban what they want.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The announcement of the trilateral security partnership “AUKUS” by Australia, UK and US, has prompted discussions on several issues, however, the submarine part of the agreement, about leveraging expertise from US and UK and facilitating the Australian acquisition of the nuclear-powered submarines, is attracting a lot of attention.
On 15 September 2021, two members of the Quad—the United States (US) and Australia—along with the United Kingdom (UK) issued a joint statement to create a higher “trilateral security partnership called ‘AUKUS’” to meet the new challenges of the 21st century. The statement, in the very opening sentence, clearly mentioned that these challenges are emanating from the Indo-Pacific region.
The announcement made the world talk. A number of issues ranging from geo-politics to non-proliferation to containment of China have been circulating in discussions. Many wonder whether the much talked about Quad Plus has started materialising. Like the Quad, the AUKUS does not refer to China as a challenge but the common understanding is that the preparatory work of maritime democracies to contain China in the Indo-Pacific is being bolstered through it.
The AUKUS as a geo-political issue may have generated a gentle debate and discussions in the world, but the submarine part of the agreement is being considered a “bombshell” in many quarters. It invoked strong reactions not only from the Chinese establishment but also from Biden’s friends and allies. The non-proliferation community also joined the debate highlighting the departure from the long-standing American position.
The AUKUS pledged to facilitate the Australian acquisition of the nuclear-powered submarines. The 15 September statement noted: “Today, we embark on a trilateral effort of 18 months to seek an optimal pathway to deliver this capability. We will leverage expertise from the United States and the United Kingdom, building on the two countries’ submarine programmes to bring an Australian capability into service at the earliest achievable date.”1
The joint statement, thus, makes it clear that it is not an immediate transfer of submarines, which Australia has been seeking for a number of years. For that purpose, it had a US$ 66 billion agreement apparently escalated to US$ 100 billion with France in the past. The acquisition of the submarines is supposed to boost “interoperability, commonality and mutual benefit” among the AUKUS countries. This would make the UK not merely a collaborator in development of nuclear-propelled submarines but also an active player in the Indo-Pacific security theatre.
As of now, Australia has very rudimentary capabilities in nuclear reactor business. It has built a 20 megawatt-thermal research reactor. For multiple reasons, it did not invest much in nuclear research and development or industry, though it has an impressive reserve of high-quality uranium. It seems that it is now serious about developing its nuclear industry, at least, to support the planned nuclear submarines’ acquisition.
In the coming weeks or months, more information may come out in the public domain about the nature of submarine transferred to or developed for Australia. The nuclear reactor which is going to be used in the submarine is also a matter of curiosity for the world. Moreover, the level of enrichment of uranium may further drive the discussion on it.
The reaction to the AUKUS nuclear-propelled submarine deal manifests multiple dimensions. The curious blend of geo-technology and geo-economics is synergised with geo-politics. All three are supporting and opposing each other simultaneously. It ranges from the breach of the commercial contract to the collaboration in the “prohibited technology” to implications for the non-proliferation regime.
Instantaneously, reactions in print, electronic and digital media highlight that the AUKUS will undermine the non-proliferation regime. Some express apprehensions that non-nuclear weapons states may compare the AUKUS to the India–US civil nuclear energy initiative, and may get “more ammunition in support of a narrative that the weapons states lack good faith in their commitments to disarmament”.2
Critics in the US and the Western countries look puzzled over the decision to sell/ transfer of naval reactor technology. The US has been resistant to the idea of transfer of technology to even its allies like France and Canada. Only the UK was an exception as a recipient but not as a seller. In the past, the UK was prevented from transacting naval nuclear fuel cycle relating nuclear attack submarines to Canada. Now, the US has made the UK team up in the AUKUS to deliver the nuclear-propelled submarine to Australia.
A section of the non-proliferation community is expressing reservations about the nuclear submarine transfer because of its proliferation potential. It is feared that such a transfer to the non-nuclear state may increase the possibility of diversion of fissile materials used in the submarine propulsion for nuclear explosive purposes.
Moreover, some opine that there is an increasing use of HEU (Highly Enriched Uranium) in nuclear reactor so that it becomes more “compact” in operation. The increasing use of HEU further raises the prospect of its misuse for nuclear weapons. Some academic activists have also been arguing for a long period that the existence of a huge amount of HEU in submarine reactors all over the world increases the danger of materials falling into wrong hands.3 This line of thinking maintains that the nuclear submarine deal will also dampen efforts towards converting HEU into LEU (Low Enriched Uranium), thereby increasing the possibility of nuclear terrorism.
As Australia had signed an agreement for 12 diesel propelled submarines with France, analysts assume as a requirement of 22 submarines by Australia, and then analyse the amount of HEU needed to run the submarines. One of the reports notes: “if Canberra wants to operate six to 12 nuclear submarines for about 30 years, it will need some three to six tons of HEU.”4 Since Australia does not have much capabilities in its nuclear establishment and considering the urgent security imperatives, the US and the UK will have to supply HEU.
One section of the non-proliferation community believes that after the US becomes a party to this deal, it will be difficult for it to check such a deal signed by another set of countries such as France and Russia with different recipients such as Brazil and China. It is anticipated that the AUKUS deal could be followed by an uncontrolled proliferation.
Most of these apprehensions and arguments fall in the grey area. Stretching the non-proliferation argument too far may harm the cause of non-proliferation itself. The bureaucratic approach to non-proliferation regime—blurring the distinction between a responsible country and irresponsible means a reckless proliferator—is risky. It allows the dangerous states to clandestinely operate and transact items, which may result in nuclear weapons. Australia has shown restraints, and as amply discussed, the nuclear submarine deal has nothing to do with nuclear weapons.
Even legally speaking, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the mainstay of the non-proliferation regime, does not prohibit development of nuclear submarines or transfer of nuclear materials used as propellant in the naval reactor/nuclear submarine. Moreover, the joint statement underlines Australia’s adherence to “the highest standards for safeguards, transparency, verification and accountancy measures to ensure the non-proliferation, safety, and security of nuclear material and technology”. It also indicates that Australia will continue to fulfil its obligations and will have an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
In fact, Australia signed a safeguards agreement in 19745 after ratifying the NPT in 1973, due to which it became famous for promoting the tools of non-proliferation. In 1987, it enacted the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act. It supplied uranium to several countries after signing the safeguards agreements. Later, it also became the first country to adopt additional protocol on 23 September 1997.6 The text of Additional Protocol was approved in the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on 15 May 1997.7
The continued engagement with the IAEA should remove apprehensions regarding the interpretation of the Article 14 of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement signed between Australia and the IAEA. The legal document signed between them explicitly gives direction to the Australian government what to do when nuclear materials are not under safeguards.
A section of the international community from time to time expresses scepticism of the information provided regarding fuel, its composition, and naval reactor designs, naval bases and military fuel cycle fabrication process.8 Australia’s commitment to the safeguards norm has been continued. Australia has apparently demonstrated enough confidence in its suppliers and the IAEA on the need for balancing confidentiality and transparency.
The IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi informed that the AUKUS countries had informed the agency about the agreement.9 He also told that the three countries communicated their commitment to the non-proliferation regime by underlining Australia’s “exemplary non-proliferation credentials”. He also notified the willingness of the three countries to remain engaged with the “IAEA in the coming months”. More significantly, he updated the international community by stating that “The IAEA will engage with them on this matter in line with its statutory mandate, and in accordance with their respective safeguards agreements with the Agency”.10
The nuclear submarine business has overlooked some archaic alarms as far as the nuclear non-proliferation regime is concerned. In India, too, some reports record displeasure over the submarine deal on the grounds that India was denied similar deal in the past. Unlike Australia, India has an operational nuclear submarine programme and a very robust nuclear industry. True, India may still need some of the technologies or the submarine depending on its requirements, however, the deal heralds a new era. A country like India with established responsible credentials, may also get the benefits in the future.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The 2015 terrorist attacks in France have seriously tested the nation’s faith in liberal and secular values as well as its tolerance for Political Islam. Taking a hands-on approach to combat terrorism, France has initiated what is being described as the “biggest trial” in its modern history.
Almost six years after the horrific terrorist attacks, France has initiated what is being described as the “biggest trial” in its modern history. With 300 lawyers and about the same number of witnesses, court proceedings for the trial of the 20 accused have begun on 9 September 2021, and are expected to continue for at least nine months.1
The trial will focus on the atrocities committed on 13 November 2015, when Islamic State terrorists carried out a series of attacks at Paris’ celebrated Bataclan Concert Hall, Stade de France (the national stadium where France was playing off against Germany) and several bars and restaurants. At least 130 people were killed and 350 were wounded on that fateful “night of terror”.2
These attacks had come on the heels of the “Charlie Hebdo Shooting” in January of the same year. Terrorists had shot down 12 people and wounded 11 over the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo’s publication of Prophet Muhammad’s caricatures.3
The trauma of the 2015 attacks, also called “the deadliest attacks on French soil after the Second World War”, has left France’s national psyche deeply scarred and has profoundly affected its body politic since then. Considered to be the birthplace of democracy, along with the US, the 2015 attacks have seriously tested the nation’s faith in liberal and secular values as well as its tolerance for Political Islam.
To pre-empt terrorist attacks, the French governments have introduced several counter-terrorism laws and security measures since 2015. These measures have come with their own set of compliments and complaints. Some Western political observers, particularly from the US, as well as global civil rights organisations and even French political parties such as La France Insoumise (France Unbowed) have questioned the allegedly intrusive and punitive nature of some measures that they claim runs contrary to liberal and secular values. For its part, France sees itself as taking a more hands-on approach in combating terrorism, as its tolerance for radical ideologies and religious extremism has run out. The government under President Macron is particularly suspicious of the extremist narratives of Political Islam, which it believes spawns violent extremism and poses a threat to liberal values and civil liberties enjoyed by French society. Some of the “pre-emptive” measures, including security and legislative reforms, taken by the Macron government are mentioned below.
Anti-terrorism Legislation
A new set of anti-terrorism legislation has given wide-ranging powers to security agencies, and these laws have remained in place even after the state of emergency was revoked in July 2017. Some of the fundamental tenets of the legislation enacted since 2015 are as follows:
Underlying Policy Drivers
The electoral factors seem to have played a major role in moulding the present counter-terrorism narrative in France.4 Far-right leaders such as Marine Le Pen are alleged to have used acts of terrorism in the country as a rallying point to unseat President Macron and the governments preceding him.5 The recent polls show her gaining ground before the next presidential elections in France in April 2022.6 Éric Zemmour, another upcoming popular far-right figure, is said to be taking the wind off the sails of President Macron’s re-election. Analysts opine that he may even announce his own candidature for the high office in the future.7
For several decades, France has struggled to deal with the fissures within its multi-ethnic and multi-religious demography, and the issue of a bourgeoning Muslim citizenry has now become a part of the political discourse. The long shadow of French colonial legacy in Algeria has also sullied communal harmony. The French conception of a more assertive secularism has also generated a sense of insecurity among the religiously devout sections of the ethnic Algerian community, which had mostly migrated to France after World War II.8 The sense of real and perceived socio-economic marginalisation of the community is believed to have worsened the divide. Even President Macron has acknowledged the impact of the French colonial legacy in worsening the level of separatism within the population, which he alluded to even while unveiling the anti-terrorism laws.9 This shows that his government has contextualised the colonial factor while formulating the new anti-terrorism laws and is cognizant of its broader implications.
The terrorist attacks and the prevalence of Islamist ideas in French society and culture has likewise generated a sense of insecurity and backlash by the majority of French nationals against the minority of mainly north African Muslims. In fact, a national poll conducted by Institut Français d’opinion publique (IFOP), an international polling and marketing research firm, reveals that majority of French citizens hold the extreme view that Islamists have declared war on their country.10
Even liberal politicians today speak of taking a more assertive approach on matters of national security. President Macron for one, is alleged to have transitioned from a centrist to a centre-right politician in the wake of this growing public mood. However, he has painstakingly clarified on several occasions that his stance is against violent extremism of all kinds and not against the religion of Islam. In a speech on 2 October 2020, he said: “Our challenge is to fight against those who go off the rails in the name of religion…while protecting those who believe in Islam and are full citizens of the republic.”11
Conclusion
The anti-terrorism laws enacted on 30 July 2021 are being considered necessary to combat the threats being faced by France in terms of its national security. However, the laws have also resulted in debates about the possible alienation of the Muslim populace, and the inadvertent effects of further radicalising individuals meant to be pre-emptively subdued.
Since 2015, Presidents Hollande and Macron have introduced wide-ranging and rather harsh anti-terrorism legislation, as some observers believe. Their criticism primarily stems from the view that the 2015 attacks have only reinforced the existing perceptions of discrimination felt by French Muslims.12
Notwithstanding the criticism, it is also true that incidents of terrorism in France have gone down since the introduction of sweeping reforms, as is evident in the Global Terrorism Index 2020, which has registered a reduction of two points on its score index.13 According to Prime Minister Jean Castex, the past four years have witnessed the containment of 36 terror attacks.14 Furthermore, La Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure (The General Directorate for Internal Security) has maintained a database of individuals whose radicalisation it needs to prevent. The number of such individuals has gone down from 10,000 to 7,768 between April 2018 and July 2021.15
India stands in solidarity with its strategic ally, France in its fight against terrorism, as has been made clear through the public affirmation of support by our government.16 India could also study and institutionalise some of the more effective and less contentious French strategies to counter the ideological challenge emanating now from Afghanistan that has the potential to pose major security risks across the region.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The relationship between TTP, or Pakistani Taliban, and Afghan Taliban will continue to be dictated by religious-ideological convergence, ethnic-fraternal linkages and the close camaraderie that emerged while they were fighting together against the foreign ‘occupying’ forces in Afghanistan.
To understand the interesting relationship between the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), also known as Pakistani Taliban, and the Afghan Taliban, one must peep into history to see how the linkages developed and why the Afghan Taliban are not responding in equal measure to Pakistan's repeated appeals to take conclusive action against the TTP.
Pakistan regards the TTP as a retrograde armed outfit. It is launching regular attacks against it, despite decisive operations conducted against it in the past. The TTP, in fact, claimed through a post on Telegram on 2 September that it had carried out 32 attacks inside Pakistan in August 2021 alone.1
Pakistan continues to refer to the TTP as a tool being used by India and other foreign powers to destabilise it. After the Taliban took over Kabul, Pakistan reportedly handed over a list of most-wanted TTP terrorists operating from Afghanistan to the Taliban chief Haibatullah Akhundzada, following which, the latter set up a three-member commission to investigate Pakistan’s claims.2 However, the Taliban’s public response has been rather tame and diplomatic. They have said that the TTP was a foreign outfit operating inside Pakistan, and they would not allow either the TTP or any other group to operate from the Afghan soil against any other country, whereas Pakistan would have liked them to take a conclusive action against the TTP.3
Coming to the TTP, it was formed in December 2007 when 13 militant Islamist outfits came together under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud (1972-2009). Today, it consists of about 40 outfits (accounts vary about the actual number). There were many precursor groups of the TTP which intended to bring Sharia rule to Pakistan, much like the Taliban had done in Afghanistan during 1996-2001. A well-known Mullah named Sufi Muhammad (1933-2019) had campaigned for Islamic rule in Pakistan ahead of the Afghan Taliban and raised an outfit called Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) in 1992. From 1994, he had started his black turban movement in the Malakand Division.
In December 1998, an outfit called Tehrik-e-Tulaba Pakistan demanded a Sharia rule in the Orakzai Agency in Pakistan. The Governor of then North West Frontier Province (NWFP), now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, had even introduced the Nizam-e-Shariat Regulation in 1994 in the Malakand Division and the Nizam-e-Adl Ordinance in 1999 in Kohistan to placate these forces, perhaps thinking that such concessions at the peripheries would help quarantine the virus locally and stop its spread elsewhere.
In fact, when the Afghan Taliban fanned out of Kandahar and began their conquest of Afghan cities in the mid-1990s, there were many willing recruits from Pakistan in the Taliban ranks. Later, when the Afghan Taliban faced the US attack in 2001, Sufi Muhammad reportedly led thousands of tribal Pakistani youth, who marched into Afghanistan to fight alongside the Taliban.
A policy somersault by Pakistan under American threat (to bomb Pakistan to stone-age) led to the banning of TNSM, arrest of Sufi Muhammad and operations in the tribal areas to rein in the Islamist militants who had come back home from Afghanistan to roost, principally because they had provided shelter to the foreign Al-Qaeda militants.
By 2006, Pakistan had deployed “approximately 17 infantry brigades, 45 infantry battalions, and some 58 Frontier Corps wings” in the tribal areas.4 It turned the local population against the army, even when such action was not as convincing as the Americans would have expected.
By 2007, multiple tribal Islamist groups were seen raising their heads in the tribal terrain including factions of various jihadi groups raised by the military for subversive action against India in Kashmir and sectarian ones like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, many of whose leaders had migrated to the tribal region, after Pervez Musharraf banned these groups following the 9/11 attacks.
Some factions affiliated to these jihadi elements have even carried out attacks in Punjab, the heartland of Pakistan, leading people to call them ‘Punjabi Taliban’. The TTP brought together these disparate Islamist outfits with an intent to coordinate their actions and mount a credible offensive against the Pakistani military.
The TTP is overwhelmingly Pashtun in composition (much like the Afghan Taliban), drawing its cadres mostly from the tribes in the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. It has used the border areas straddling the Durand Line for its operations and managed to invoke the sympathy of the local Afghan Taliban, for whom there was hardly any difference between them fighting the Afghan Army, which was funded and equipped by the Americans, and the TTP attacking the Pakistan Army, which was launching operations against their co-ethnics and co-religionists in the tribal areas allegedly at America’s prodding.
The TTP has waxed and waned over the years. Pakistan has launched several operations against it, the most recent being Operation Radd-ul-Fassad in 2017 and Zarb-e-Azb in 2014. In the past, Pakistan claimed total victory over the TTP. The joint US-Pak actions have also successfully targeted the TTP leaders from time to time. Further, some TTP factions have split away to form outfits like Jamat-ul-Ahrar, Hizb-ul-Ahrar, etc. All this has been interpreted as having led to a decline of the TTP.
However, in recent years, especially after Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud assumed leadership of the group following the killing in June 2018 of Mullah Fazlullah, the mastermind of the Peshawar Army Public School attack of December 2014, the TTP has demonstrated its capacity to resurge itself and take on the Pakistani military with a renewed zeal. Mufti Noor has brought back many split-away factions into the group enhancing its prowess in recent months.
The TTP has ideologically gravitated towards the extreme sectarian version of radical Sunni Islam, much like the Islamic State. Over the years, various groups within the TTP have maintained close contact with global Islamist organisations like Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. However, the main branch of TTP has always pledged its loyalty to the Amir of Afghan Taliban. Its uncompromising Islamist orientation has perhaps endeared itself to the Taliban, who have turned a blind eye to the TTP operations against the Pakistan state, even if the former maintained close contact with the Pakistani military and benefited from it.
Going by the TTP literature, various groups within it have brought out a number of online magazines and books, many of which have been co-produced and co-circulated on their websites over the last 14 years. One of these, Nawa-e-Afghan Jihad had an uninterrupted run during 2009-2020. It was replaced by Nawa-e-Ghazwa-e-Hind, which now runs as a mouthpiece of Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). There are other publications like books, monographs and another magazine called Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan.
The articles written by TTP members in these publications are known for their uncompromising stance against the Pakistan state. They emphasise the vices of democracy and the un-Islamic approach of the Pakistani military. There is a repeated refrain to defeat the Pakistan Army, put an end to the democratic experiment in Pakistan and introduce Shariat-e-Muhammadi there. In a series of articles in Nawa-e-Afghan Jihad, Adnan Rashid—a native Pakistani and former technician in the Pakistan Air Force, convicted and sentenced to death for his role in the assassination attempt on Musharraf but released by the TTP on 15 April 2012 from Bannu jail— argues very forcefully that Pakistan has a kafir army because it has kafir officers in it and, whoever dies in the army (whether he is a Christian, Hindu, Sikh or Shia) is called a shaheed or martyr which is unacceptable to him as a Muslim.5
About the Jihad in Kashmir, he says that he was asked to fight in Kashmir, but he did not accept it because he realised that even if Kashmir were to be liberated from the Indian control it would become part of a country, which did not function according to Islamic principles.6
The TTP publications are replete with accounts by Al-Qaeda, Taliban and Jihadi leaders from other theatres of the world. They would exhort the Muslims to wage an armed jihad and not to rest until the goal is achieved. Like the Jihadi literature elsewhere, there is a lot of hatred against the US, Israel and India and often these countries are bracketed together as an axis of evil against whom jihad was considered perfectly legitimate.
Even then, Pakistan continues to believe that the TTP is being sponsored by Indian intelligence. Some of the TTP members like Latif Mehsud and Ehsanullah Ehsan have been forced to issue statements to this effect to persuade the TTP to turn their guns away from Pakistan towards India. The anti-India propaganda pamphlets have been distributed in the tribal areas from time to time urging people to wage jihad against India in Kashmir. However, this strategy has not worked. Pakistan has also tried hard to use the Afghan Taliban to change the TTP’s outlook, without any success so far.
The Afghan Taliban’s dependence on Pakistan is likely to decrease in the coming days. Therefore, even if there may be a token response to Pakistan’s request, they are unlikely to take any conclusive action against the TTP, especially when elements within the Taliban favour TTP’s idea of bringing Pakistan under Islamic rule. Moreover, action against the TTP may alienate many groups within the Taliban, affecting internal unity that is so essential to the Taliban’s hold on power in Kabul, at a time when there are reports of various factions fighting internally for power. In these circumstances, the relationship between the TTP and the Afghan Taliban will continue to be dictated by religious-ideological convergence, ethnic-fraternal linkages and the close camaraderie that emerged while they were fighting together against the foreign ‘occupying’ forces in Afghanistan.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
To sustain its historical interest and influence in the UN peacekeeping operations, India should provide technical assistance to the missions while continuing to contribute troops, rather than a complete transformation from being a traditional troop contributor to a technology contributor.
In August 2021, under India's presidency, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted a statement recognising the importance of technology in peacekeeping. At the high-level Security Council open debate on “technology and peacekeeping”, India’s External Affairs Minister Dr S. Jaishankar stated that “21st-century peacekeeping must be anchored in a strong ecosystem of technology and innovation”.1 In the meeting, Secretary-General António Guterres outlined elements of a digital transformation strategy for peacekeeping. Another significant development of that day was the launch of UNITE AWARE, a technology platform developed by India in collaboration with the UN, aimed at providing terrain-related information to the UN peacekeepers to ensure their safety and security. These developments suggest that future peacekeeping operations will be technology-enabled. India shows enthusiasm and interest in this envisioned transformation. India is one of the largest troop-contributing countries (TCC) to UN peacekeeping missions, however, the question is whether it can become a technology-contributing country (TecCC) as well.
Technology and Peacekeeping
Calls for the use of technology in UN peacekeeping operations are not new. In 2000, the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, popularly known as the Brahimi Report2, proposed that peacekeeping be brought into the information age. The report identified the gaps in strategy, policy and practice that hampered the effective use of technology in peacekeeping operations and offered recommendations to bridge them.
Later, in 2014, the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping deliberated this issue thoroughly and proposed an extensive deployment of technology and innovative practices to strengthen peacekeeping operations. In February 2015, the Expert Panel submitted its report, which included the goal that the UN be able to deploy "digital peacekeepers". The Report also addressed the prevalent concerns of the member states that the use of technology in peacekeeping operations will lead to violations of basic principles of peacekeeping impartiality and state sovereignty. In the initial years of consultations, many member countries expressed their fear of misuse of technology for narrow political purposes, particularly technology such as Unmanned Aerial Systems or Vehicles (UAS or UAVs).
The Report focused on employing advanced technologies primarily in two areas of peacekeeping operations: providing the basics for missions and operational imperatives. While the basics include providing safety and security, shelter, water, energy, health and mobility, operational imperatives comprise command and control, monitoring, reconnaissance and reporting, and information and communications technologies.3 To enhance the security of individuals, camps and accommodation, patrols and convoys, the Panel recommended using technologies such as perimeter lighting, motion-detection technology, emergency communications, tamper-resistant tracking, counter-IED technologies, and camera technology using remote access to live feeds. Similarly, to find water, employing ground-penetrating radar and advanced geospatial imaging tools are recommended. GIS-enabled command and control, satellite imagery, UAVs, comprehensive sensor suites and big data are recommended to improve the operational imperatives including the command and control of the missions.
As peacekeeping mission bases have regularly come under direct attack in recent years, there was a systematic push to deploy many of the recommended technologies. Consequently, UAVs were used in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Mali and South Sudan. Furthermore, in Mali, the most sophisticated digital technologies such as IED forensic technologies and the Situational Awareness Geospatial Enterprise (Sage) were used. In 2017, the UN mission in Mali claimed that its “sense and warn” radar alert system detected rockets and mortar attacks and saved the lives of many peacekeepers.4
The latest developments related to technology and peacekeeping in the UN are the Secretary General's “Strategy for the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping”5 and the launching of the UNITE AWARE platform. The Secretary General's Strategy focuses on four objectives: first, technology innovation at the headquarters and the field; second, maximising the potential of new technologies to enhance the capacity of missions to carry out their mandates effectively; third, using technology to detect, analyse and address threats against civilians, peacekeepers and humanitarian missions; and fourth, ensuring the responsible use of digital technologies.6 The UNITE AWARE platform aims to gather datasets from missions and structure them into a shared database to enable situational awareness and decision making.
Can India become a TecCC?
India is one of the largest contributors of troops to UN Peacekeeping Operations. More than 2,50,000 Indian troops have served in 49 of the 71 peacekeeping operations deployed so far.7 At present, India is currently the second-largest troop contributor with 5,506 personnel deployed in nine UN peacekeeping missions.8 Moreover, India has also played a leadership role in many peacekeeping missions. It has provided Military Advisers, Civilian Police Advisers, Force Commanders and several Special Representatives of the UN Secretary-General to various missions. Korea, Cyprus, Namibia, Sinai, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Congo are a few examples. However, since the attacks against the peacekeepers are growing significantly and India lost more peacekeepers than any other troop-contributing country9, in future, India should focus predominantly on providing technology to the peace operations and equip its troops with modern technologies to manage complex emergencies.
Recently, India has been at the forefront of transforming the traditional peacekeepers into “digital peacekeepers”. For this purpose, during its UNSC presidency in August 2021, India convened a ministerial-level open debate on the theme of technology and peacekeeping. During the debate, India proposed a four-point framework for UN peacekeepers to meet contemporary threats. First, employing operationally proven, cost-effective, widely available, environment-friendly, reliable and field serviceable technologies. Second, need for a sound information and intelligence foundation to ensure early warning and mobilising early response. Third, ensure technological improvements are continuous and are available on the ground. Fourth, consistent training and capacity building of peacekeepers in the realm of technology.10 All these points were further emphasised in the unanimously adopted presidential statement on peacekeeping operations.
India has also spent US$ 1.64 million to develop the situational awareness technology platform UNITE AWARE in partnership with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Operational Support.11 This platform helps to visualise the entire peacekeeping operation and enable monitoring it on a real-time basis through modern surveillance technologies, including satellite-based solutions. However, though the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) has a Satellite Centre called UNOSAT for making satellite-based solutions and geographical information easily available for the UN, the organisation does not have its own satellites. Therefore, the UN primarily relies on freely available satellite data or purchases from private firms. India has low-cost satellite technology and its space agency, ISRO can collaborate with the UN for developing a dedicated constellation of Small Satellites (SmSats) for peacekeeping missions.
Satellite imagery data can be used to monitor the movements of conflicting parties, observing arms smuggling networks, identify the locations and needs of internally displaced persons and refugees, border management, human rights violations, etc. The optical imagery from very high-resolution satellites provides an accurate real-time happening on the ground. For instance, the Humanitarian Information Unit of the US Department of State extensively used satellite imagery data to identify the villages damaged or destroyed in Darfur during the civil war.12 Similarly, in 2018, an analysis of satellite imagery was able to establish an arms embargo violation in South Sudan.13 In March 2020, a BBC investigative report used satellite images to show that Turkey sent tanks and weapons to Libya via ship shortly after agreeing to a UN arms embargo.14 Recently, in Myanmar, satellite analysis combined with information on settlement locations helped the UN to identify the destroyed villages in Buthidaung, Maungdaw, and Rathedaung Townships in Northern Rakhine State.15
Similarly, India can contribute to the energy security of peacekeeping missions. Despite a booming global renewable energy market, the peacekeeping missions still depend on fossil fuels, especially diesel-power generators for energy needs. From the perspective of peacekeeping, reliance on diesel-power generation presents logistics and security challenges. Recently, the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and UN signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to advance the use of host-country generated renewable energy in peacekeeping missions.16 India could leverage its solar power credentials as the leader of the International Solar Alliance (ISA) to support the peacekeeping missions in meeting their energy requirements. India’s National Thermal Power Corporation Limited (NTPC) has been involved in solar projects in many African countries, including Mali, where peacekeeping missions are deployed.
India has also signed a MoU with the UNC4ISR Academy for Peace Operations (UNCAP) to support the Partnership for Technology in Peacekeeping initiative. With the help of UNCAP, the Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping (CUNPK) could provide specific pre-deployment training in information and communications technologies (ICT), Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) technologies and camp security and early warning technologies. The Centre would also consider developing E-Learning courses in advanced technologies that are accessible remotely to the missions and troops.
In short, to sustain its historical interest and influence in the UN peacekeeping operations, India should chart out specific strategies to become a technology-contributor country. However, such a strategy should be balanced, and focus on providing technical assistance to the missions while continuing to contribute troops, rather than a complete transformation from being a traditional troop contributor to a technology contributor. Also, India should consider utilising the goodwill it has earned over the years as a dedicated peacekeeper, particularly in Africa, to build enduring economic and strategic relationships with the host states.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Certain sections of the elite in China seem to be speaking out against the tightening political control under President Xi Jinping. Whether the Chinese Communist Party is failing to elicit loyalty among its own members, and resorting to widespread ideological control to retain its legitimacy is a pertinent question to ponder upon.
The common narrative about the Communist Party of China (CPC) is that even though it has been successful in eradicating extreme poverty, it has done so by exerting overwhelming control over the Chinese society. The Party has no doubt been praised for ushering in economic development, however, it has also drawn criticism for ruthlessly penalising any dissent shown against exercising such control. Many point out to certain sections of the elite speaking out against the tightening political control under the Chinese President Xi Jinping.1 It raises the question whether the Party is indeed failing if it can no longer elicit loyalty among its own members.
The communist politics in China is authoritarian, which might lead to an understanding that the Party exerts far-reaching ideological control over the society to maintain its legitimacy, and it uses propaganda (to promote its political ideology) to achieve it. However, one of the important reasons why Deng Xiaoping introduced market reforms was that ideological control alone proved insufficient to govern China. The post-reform Chinese society, i.e., the repudiation of the Maoist path to economic development, was the counter to it. As a result of economic decentralisation, information is getting disseminated rapidly, leading to significant assertion of public opinion.
The Party does not control every aspect of Chinese life though. In fact, it struggles to determine as to what aspects to control, which explains why measures of control are mostly arbitrary and temporary. In the post-reform society, the party officials have been apprehensive about how the Chinese society responds to their policies. A case of local governance in Beijing is worth mentioning here. In 2013, the Beijing Subway was losing money and was unable to pay salaries to its employees through its revenues.2 It had a fixed rate of 2 yuan for travelling any distance in Beijing. In fact, it was one of the defining features of Beijing Subway, which was quite different from Shanghai where rates are varied and distance-based. The Beijing Subway is the city’s lifeline, facilitating commuters of different economic backgrounds thereby encouraging a wide range of economic activity. The authorities wanted to increase the fare to 4 yuan, however, public opposition to the rate hike was quite vocal.3 It generated heated debates and for an entire year, the authorities delayed the decision. Though the experts and authorities considered the low fares to be unsustainable,4 the authorities tasked governmental agencies to gauge public response, invited the media and political advisors, and conducted public hearings to weigh in on the decision to hike the rates.5 After a year of deliberations, the authorities raised it to 3 yuan instead of 4 yuan as the starting fare, and continued its promise to subsidise 50 per cent of the subway operation.6
This example highlights the uncertainty among party officials to gauge public perception—which means constantly juggling between welfare policies and economic logic. . The decentralisation of the economy has led to problems of coordination between the central and the local authorities. The central authorities are finding it difficult to assess the way in which policies are being implemented by the local authorities.7 Therefore, if the party wants to retain its legitimacy, then it has to reform its governance model in such a way that is best suited to accurately define public interest without being swayed either by public consensus or by a majority opinion as they may not necessarily represent public interest.
If propaganda is not meant to be a measure of sole legitimation strategy over the society, why does it play an important role? While the correlation between the two may be factually true, the public sometimes is the unintended audience of majority of Party’s propaganda.8 The message is for the party secretaries and government officials9 who have to be compelled with the long arm of the central leadership to make them accountable. To do so, the Party believes that it has to strengthen its supervisory capacity in provincial and local organisations. The daily lives of the Chinese are influenced much more by local authorities than by the central leadership. The local authorities often side-step legal protections and find innovative ways to deny compensations or benefits to ordinary people.
In democratic societies, poor governance is penalised through loss of political power for the ruling party or grievance redressal by an independent legal system. In China, officials had to be educated, repeatedly, through ideological education and core thoughts of leaders, as many tend to exploit the central policies to serve vested interests that might end up hurting public interest. This makes many believe that the Party does not conform to its own ideals. But one should not confuse corruption and risk-averse behaviour with systemic decay.
It is important to focus on elite cohesion rather than the Party’s control and propaganda measures as a sign of regime stability. The adaptive nature of the authoritarian regime in China has been well-documented.10 Yet, the Chinese elite are divided over the kind of political model that could transform its economy into a developed one.11 While some argue for Neo-Authoritarian model, whereby a strong leadership is needed to implement reforms and shape the conditions necessary for it,12 the liberals in China on the other hand argue that only democratic policies will help modernise the economy and politics.
The popularity of theory of authoritarian model (late 1980s) coincided with Deng Xiaoping’s push for expanding economic reforms, which culminated in the southern tour of 1992. Moreover, authoritarian model was useful to stem the tide of rising leftist turn in post-Tiananmen politics in China, and to appease the sceptics within the party. Those who support the theory by addressing transitory authoritarian model as a necessity before democratisation,13 there are plenty among liberals and party officials, who reject this theory to be inadequate in addressing the problems in today’s China.14
In Xi Jinping’s China, the popular perception is that a new phase in communist politics has begun where the authoritarian model is practised with an emphasis on recentralisation of political power. But the evidence shows that the communist rule encourages the leadership to provide ideological correction whenever differences emerge among different interest groups. For instance, Deng Xiaoping was far more autocratic than popularly believed,15 and he quite often exercised overwhelming control to carry out his vision of economic reforms. Therefore, even before Xi Jinping, there had been an emphasis on establishing leadership authority in China to prevent disruption of the reforms process. It is therefore not surprising that party leadership is considered crucial as long as there is a need for broad-range reforms in the Chinese society. No wonder, leadership authority continues to be a major force in Xi Jinping’s governance model.16
For the most part, the Party has accommodated and tolerated tensions between the liberals’ desire for democratic reforms and the discontent of the leftists (新左派) against capitalist expansion. Xi Jinping’s leadership is generally seen as a compromise between the two. Since Mao Zedong, the party has been achieving elite cohesion either through power-sharing or by coercion. Even though an eclectic mix of ideological forces are part of the communist system, they share power, enabled by the leadership’s ability to successfully implement policies in developing the country.17
However, once policy decisions are taken, the party leaders are generally expected to support the overall party line. For instance, during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang gave an alternative suggestion to boost the ailing economy. He advocated “stall economy”, where street vendors could be given orderly space to boost employment.18 Many perceived its quiet death as a conflict between Xi and Li. However, stall economy was seen as incompatible with China’s plans for its first-tier cities such as Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei Integrated Development Plan (2014) that seeks to integrate the urban spaces to boost high-tech economy.19 In other words, the national strategy is to use high-tech innovation and ecological conservation as a way to ease income inequality and raise safety rather than pursuing short-term solutions such as stall economy.20
Now the caveat seems to be that economic development alone cannot be the source of legitimacy. There is an acknowledgement among the party leadership that the demands of the Chinese society have moved away from raising income levels (economic development) to addressing the issues of income inequality and providing a better quality of life. Xi Jinping therefore is in charge of course correction as the uneven economic progress was reducing political trust with the central leadership.21 For the current leadership, the short answer seems to be to modernise its governance system under “Xi Jinping Thought”. For instance, the “Peaceful China Initiative” (平安中国建设) attempts to modernise the governance model (with an emphasis on rule of law and public participation) to address people’s concerns better.22
China faces an uphill task. Getting rich was easy compared to adopting a mode of governance to maintain domestic peace and distribute the wealth it has accrued.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
新发展新飞跃).
Yemeni crisis has been a challenge for Saudi Arabia’s standing and reputation as the leader of the Arab and the Islamic world. It is caught between the resilience of the Houthis to sustain their fight, and the growing cost of war and the allegations of innocents being victims of their air strikes.
Despite more than six years of Saudi-led military offensive against the Houthis, the situation in Yemen remains extremely complex and challenging for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Houthis have captured large parts of the Yemeni territory in the north-west of the country including the capital Sanaa. The Saudi-led military coalition’s twin objectives of pushing the Houthis back from Sanaa and reinstating the internationally recognised government of President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi remain unfulfilled.
The stalemate in Yemen continues as the Saudi-led coalition has imposed an air and sea blockade and has argued that access to the ports must be restricted in order to prevent the illegal flow of weapons to the Houthis. The Houthis, on the other hand, have demanded that the restrictions imposed on the ports must be removed before any ceasefire agreement can be agreed upon. This is a key factor blocking the political negotiations and ceasefire between the Houthis and the Yemeni government resulting in an impasse. Efforts to reach a ceasefire and a negotiated resolution to the conflict has not produced any concrete results as both sides have violated the ceasefire agreements in the past. Other sticky issues such as the exchange of prisoners and delivery of humanitarian aid remain unsettled in the absence of a consensus between the two parties.
For Saudi Arabia, its national security is closely linked to stability and security in Yemen. The fall of capital Sanaa was a red-line for Saudi Arabia as it believed that the Houthis are backed by its arch-rival Iran. The Houthis have attacked Saudi Arabia using rockets, missiles and UAVs targeting a number of vital installations including airports, military bases and oil installations. Saudi authorities have intercepted and destroyed a large number of rockets, missiles and UAVs launched by the Houthis.1 As long as the Houthis are armed, capturing territories in Yemen and launching attacks on Saudi Arabia, they would continue to pose a direct security threat for the Kingdom. The current situation has left Saudi Arabia with limited options to manoeuvre in Yemen. It is caught between the resilience of the Houthis to sustain their fight, on the one hand, and the growing cost of war and the allegations of innocents being victims of their air strikes, on the other. Withdrawing from the military operation in Yemen is a hard choice for Saudi Arabia as it would leave President Hadi’s forces vulnerable to the Houthi attacks. In the event of withdrawal of the Saudi-led coalition forces, the Houthis could capture more territories in the country.
Further, Saudi withdrawal would leave Iran to play a domineering role in Yemen which will have serious implications for the Kingdom from the security and strategic point of view. It will not only increase Iranian influence in Yemen but also in the adjacent maritime domains such as the Red Sea, Strait of Bab El Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden as well. Iranian dominance in these strategically important waterways would make Saudi Arabia extremely uncomfortable.
On the other hand, continuing with the military engagement against the Houthis would mean further protracting the conflict without any end in sight even after more than six years of fighting. It would also mean high costs for the Saudi exchequer and the military. Besides, it would continue to draw criticism for allegedly killing innocent civilians, violating human rights and enforcing blockade on several parts of the country.
Further, the changing US policy towards Yemen under President Biden is yet another challenge for Saudi Arabia. In January 2021, the Trump administration designated the Houthis as a terrorist organisation. After Biden assumed office, his administration revoked the decision in February 2021, while assuring the Kingdom of American support against attacks by the Houthis.2 Earlier, in the same month, President Biden had announced the US withdrawal from the “offensive operations in the war in Yemen, including relevant arm sales”. Biden administration emphasised diplomatic solution to the Yemeni crisis and appointed Timothy Lenderking as the Special Envoy to Yemen. US support is critical for Saudi Arabia to continue military operations in Yemen. The reduced US military support in the fight against the Houthis certainly adds to the worries of Saudi Arabia in Yemen.
For Iran, staying engaged with the Houthis in Yemen works to its strategic advantage vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia. Iran has condemned the military strikes and has urged the coalition to end the blockade imposed on Yemen. By supporting the Houthis, Iran has emerged as a key player and is likely to have an influential role in the future of Yemen. Such unwavering Iranian support for the Houthis further constrains Saudi options in Yemen. Though Iranian and Saudi officials held talks in Baghdad to discuss Yemen and other issues in April this year but no workable solution emerged.3 Riyadh will still have to negotiate with Tehran to find a sustainable solution to the Yemeni crisis. However, given the history of acrimonious relationship between the two countries, the possibility of such an understanding looks highly improbable.
Besides, the Yemeni crisis has been a challenge for Saudi Arabia’s standing and reputation as the leader of the Arab and the Islamic world. The Kingdom has been involved in the crisis from the very beginning, right from negotiating with former president Ali Abdullah Saleh to step down to drafting the “GCC Initiative”, and from steering the power transition process to proactively working with the UN and international community to restore stability in the country. Withdrawing from the country without any substantial gains, such as, restoring stability in Yemen or ensuring its own national security would be an embarrassment for Saudi Arabia at the hands of the Iranian-backed Houthis. The military and strategic factors may necessitate a prolonged Saudi military involvement in Yemen as long as the situation is not in its favour. But there is certainly a huge financial and human cost to the long and uncertain war in Yemen.
Saudi Arabia has now agreed to talk with the Houthis for a ceasefire and a political solution to the crisis.4 This could be the result of the growing realisation on the part of the Kingdom that Yemen requires a political solution to the present crisis. The best possible scenario for Riyadh would be an honourable exit from Yemen with its core national security interests uncompromised. This is easier said than done, but clearly, Riyadh’s options in Yemen at present are limited and shrinking.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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