The ASEAN Maritime Outlook (AMO) launched at the 13th ASEAN Maritime Forum in Bali on 1 August 2023 serves as a reference guide to understand regional maritime trends and challenges. Maritime cooperation was one of the key focus areas of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) adopted in June 2019. The AMO seeks to streamline the work of the various institutions under the ASEAN framework to aid in the implementation of the AOIP.

These include institutional mechanisms like the East Asian Summit (EAS), ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (AMM), ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM Plus, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Maritime Forum, ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Environment (AMME), among others.

Some of the key elements of the AOIP and the AMO are outlined below in the context of ASEAN Indo-Pacific Forum (APIF) which was held for the first time in September 2023.

ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific

ASEAN unveiled the AOIP in 2019 in the backdrop of rising geopolitical tensions in the South China Sea. US–China rivalry amplified the importance of Indo-Pacific in geopolitical narrative. ASEAN acknowledged that a stable Indo-Pacific is of vital importance to global peace, security, and prosperity. ASEAN centrality through ASEAN-led mechanisms was emphasised amidst regional geopolitical shifts.

The AOIP noted that the Indian and Pacific Oceans are the most dynamic regions in the world along with being the major hubs for economic growth. ASEAN envisages developing appropriate cooperation mechanisms with regional and sub-regional mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions on specific areas of common interest to complement the relevant initiatives.1

The AOIP is a significant step as it recognises the integration of the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions and highlights ASEAN’s interests and areas of concern vis-à-vis the Indo-Pacific. It emphasises dialogue and cooperation instead of rivalry, the advancement of development and prosperity of all and the importance of the maritime domain in the regional architecture.

AOIP recognises that Southeast Asia and the larger Indo-Pacific are in constant flux given geopolitical challenges primarily related to maritime issues like unresolved maritime disputes, unsustainable exploitation of maritime resources, and maritime pollution, among others. In order to realise the ASEAN vision on the Indo-Pacific, the AOIP focusses on four priority areas—maritime cooperation; connectivity; UN Sustainable Goals 2030; and economic and other areas of cooperation.2

Maritime cooperation has been identified as the first goal as countries in Southeast Asia have been grappling with both existing and emerging geopolitical challenges tied to maritime issues. Unresolved maritime disputes pose the risk of potential conflict, while the unsustainable exploitation of maritime resources and pollution have grown as major concerns. ASEAN, therefore, envisages cooperation in line with international law principles, such as resolving disputes peacefully, enhancing maritime safety and security, fostering sustainable resource management, combating transnational crimes, addressing pollution, and promoting marine science collaboration and capacity-building.3

AOIP's second focus in the Indo-Pacific involves enhancing connectivity in line with Master Plan of ASEAN Connectivity 2025 (MPAC 2025). This was adopted in 2017 at the 28th ASEAN Summit at Vientiane, Lao People’s Democratic Republic. It seeks to promote an integrated, competitive and inclusive region through physical, institutional and people-to-people linkages, guided by ASEAN's vision and the 6th East Asia Summit declaration. This entails prioritising MPAC 2025, leveraging public–private partnerships, and engaging sub-regional frameworks. Initiatives like the Seamless ASEAN Sky, people-to-people connections, and the ASEAN Smart Cities Network address urbanisation challenges while maintaining environmental sustainability.4

AOIP identified UN SDGs as the third goal. It notes that the SDGs are aligned with ASEAN Community Vision 2025 – adopted at the 27th ASEAN Summit held in 2015 at Kuala Lumpur and the broader EAS vision. ASEAN pledges to align regional development with the SDGs, and flags collaboration with institutions like the ASEAN Center for Sustainable Development Studies.5

Other possible areas of cooperation flagged include South-South Cooperation, trade facilitation, digital economy, SMEs, science and technology, climate change, active aging, economic integration, Fourth Industrial Revolution, and private sector development.6

ASEAN Maritime Outlook

At the 40th ASEAN Summit held on 11 November 2022, the Leaders’ Declaration pledged to mainstream the four priority areas of AOIP noted above.7 The ASEAN Maritime Outlook released on 1 August 2023 serves as a guideline for ASEAN maritime cooperation by building synergy amongst the various institutions and programmes within the framework of ASEAN.

The AMO is divided into three sections. The first section presents an overview of ASEAN's maritime domain, emphasising its importance and challenges. It positions maritime domain as integral to ASEAN's strategic, economic, political and social landscape, with a significant impact on member nations. Additionally, it highlights the strategic importance of sea lines of communication (SLOCs), especially the Straits of Malacca. It also recognises the role of the maritime domain in intra-regional travel and food security. The AMO also flags concerns relating to marine debris, labour conditions in the fishing industry, piracy, and marine heritage conservation (Coral Triangle).8 9

There are four objectives of AMO.

1. To serve as a practical tool to inform ASEAN Leaders, Ministers, Sectoral Bodies, and Partners about maritime cooperation;
2. Promote common principles based on international law and ASEAN values;
3. Identify opportunities for technical and financial assistance to enhance member states' maritime capacities; and
4. Serve as a reference for maritime trends, opportunities and challenges, guiding ASEAN's efforts to avoid duplication and enhance synergy across relevant Sectoral Bodies.

AMO highlights principles like openness, transparency, inclusivity, a rules-based framework, good governance, respect for sovereignty, non-intervention, complementing with existing international and regional frameworks. It also promotes ASEAN Centrality as the underlying principle for promoting cooperation in the maritime domain.10

The second section discusses the state of maritime cooperation in ASEAN, highlighting key actors and processes across three main pillars:

1. ASEAN Political-Security Community;
2. ASEAN Economic Community; and
3. ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.

It details the initiatives undertaken by these institutions and includes extensive annexes listing related documents and activities. There are also extensive annexes which list the maritime–related documents issued, and activities undertaken by ASEAN sectoral bodies, mechanisms, and processes, along with maritime cooperation with external partners based on their practical cooperation areas and respective plans of action.11

The third section addresses the need for improved coordination in maritime cooperation, suggesting the establishment of an overarching framework to oversee cross-pillar and cross-sectoral issues. It emphasises the role of the Lead Sectoral Body (LSB) for Maritime Cooperation, promoting better coordination and communication among sector-specific bodies and mechanisms. Bodies and mechanisms like the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting (ASEAN SOM) and ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) are especially discussed as key institutional decision-making mechanisms for enabling coordination among ASEAN mechanisms when working on maritime domain. However, the relationship between AMF and ASEAN SOM within the LSB context is yet to be defined. 12

The document underscores the importance of implementing and streamlining the AOIP and engaging with external partners for identified projects. It identifies blue economy as a major area of evolving cooperation. It also outlines emerging maritime issues like marine debris, piracy, environmental impacts of maritime transport, irregular migration, cyberattacks, offshore mining, illegal fishing, and offshore renewable energy.

AMO concludes by echoing its role as a practical tool to capture the breadth and dynamics of maritime issues within ASEAN. It stresses its intent to enhance coordination and avoid duplication across different bodies within the ASEAN framework and partner countries without overruling their decision-making powers.13

ASEAN Indo-Pacific Forum

ASEAN Indo-Pacific Forum (AIPF) took place for the first time in Jakarta, Indonesia, on 5–6 September 2023. The Forum aimed to build stronger and more inclusive cooperation and collaboration between ASEAN Member States and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, leading to establishment of ASEAN as an epicentre of growth. The AIPF also served as a platform for public, state-owned enterprises, and private sectors of ASEAN Member States, and ASEAN’s external partners to engage in constructive discussions, cooperate on concrete projects, and enhance collaboration in the Indo-Pacific region.14

The AIPF focused on four issues of common interest, namely, green infrastructure; resilient supply chains; digital transformation and creative economy; as well as sustainable and innovative financing. It highlights the need to implement the AOIP and aims to make the Indo-Pacific region more integrated and interconnected through inclusive collaboration.15

This is seen as another push from ASEAN nations to see Indo-Pacific as a domain of cooperation and not competition without polarising or isolating any particular nation. However, this got overshadowed, like many other developments and agendas with this year’s ASEAN Summit, where the dominant topic was the South China Sea dispute, the situation in Myanmar, among other issues.

Conclusion

Both AMO and AIPF have emphasised cooperation over competition in the Indo-Pacific. While AMO focuses on coordinating efforts in the maritime domain within ASEAN and partner states, AIPF, on the other hand, expands cooperation to include private sector and state-owned enterprises in implementing AOIP, which includes the maritime domain. These initiatives have the potential to address pressing maritime concerns like transnational organised crime, piracy, IUU fishing and resource sustainability. These policy documents reflect ASEAN's growing cohesion to address common challenges in the maritime domain.

While there is a defining push towards the notion of ASEAN centrality, there are challenges ahead, as evidenced by recent ASEAN Summit events. These challenges include the South China Sea dispute, which has witnessed an increase in tensions with recent face-off between the Philippines and China, the junta rule in Myanmar and rising US–China rivalry.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “ASEAN Outlook on Indo–Pacific”, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 23 June 2019.
• 2. Ibid.
• 3. Ibid., p. 4.
• 4. Ibid., p. 4.
• 5. Ibid., pp. 4–5.
• 6. Ibid., p. 5.
• 7. “ASEAN Leaders’ Declaration on Mainstreaming Four Priority Areas of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific Within ASEAN-led Mechanisms”, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 25 November 2022.
• 8. "ASEAN Maritime Outlook”, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1 August 2023, pp. 1–9.
• 9. The Coral Triangle is a marine area located in the western Pacific Ocean. It includes the waters of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Timor Leste and Solomon Islands.
• 10. "ASEAN Maritime Outlook”, no. 8, pp. 10–11.
• 11. Ibid., pp. 13–35.
• 12. Ibid., pp. 37–44.
• 13. Ibid.
• 14. "Press Release ASEAN Summit 2023: Creating a Platform for an Inclusive Indo-Pacific Region, Indonesia will hold the ASEAN-Indo-Pacific Forum (AIPF): Implementation of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific”, Kemenparekraf/Baparekraf RI.
• 15. Ibid.

Public diplomacy is increasingly an important part of modern diplomatic strategy in democracies as well as authoritarian regimes, as both seek to secure their legitimacy amongst their citizens. Though an ongoing case, the diplomatic feud that has erupted between the Japanese and Chinese governments regarding Japan’s discharge of treated wastewater from the crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactor into the Pacific Ocean in August 2023 offers an interesting study of how both governments have marshalled arguments supporting their stances.

To summarise, the Japanese strategy aims to appeal to scientific authority and accentuates its own tragic history with nuclear power to convince an international audience. On the other hand, China’s strategy portrays Japan’s decision as a unilateral decision that creates a nuclear threat to lives and livelihoods in the region in an attempt to convince a mainly domestic audience.

Background

On 24 August 2023, Japan commenced the release of an initial instalment of treated water used to cool down the crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactor into the Pacific Ocean. The reactor, which had melted down in the wake of the catastrophic earthquake and tsunami referred to as the Great East Japan Earthquake (Higashi Nihon Daishinsai) in 2011, was being cooled by seawater pumped in from the ocean. The approximately 350 million litres of water used in the process was then stored in reinforced tanks set up on-site.

However, after nearly a decade, it became clear that there was no more land for storage. As a result, the government of Japan began a process of engagement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to secure permission to release the water into the Pacific Ocean after leaching it of most of its harmful radioactive elements through the Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS).1   After the green light was given by the IAEA in July 2023, the government decided to start the disposal by August.

Regional Responses

From the outset, a host of countries in the region expressed their disapproval. To mollify them, Japan invited panels of experts from countries like South Korea to visit the plant and ascertain the veracity of Japan’s claims of having treated the wastewater to remove most of the radioactive components. It also held informal consultations with China and Russia on the issue, where the latter countries proposed that Japan release the treated water in an aerosolized manner, instead of pumping it into the ocean.2 These efforts had some effect: the South Korean government officially gave its approval to the wastewater disposal plan, despite significant opposition from citizens.3

However, China remained resolute in its opposition to the plan, pre-emptively declaring a ban on Japanese fisheries. Since the release, China’s opposition to Japan was expressed both through official and unofficial channels, with Chinese Foreign Ministry spokespersons publicly criticizing Japan at press conferences, and stoking protests and acts of vandalism against the Japanese Embassy and Japanese schools in China.

A new form of protest also attracted attention – since August 2023, Tokyo reported over 100,000 cases of prank calls being made from China to various municipalities and businesses around the country, where most callers were recorded using abusive words to address the person on the Japanese side.4 Tokyo in turn escalated its rhetoric against Beijing’s actions, and hinted that it would consider taking China to the World Trade Organisation for what it termed Beijing’s “politically-motivated” attacks.

Both sides have launched spirited diplomatic campaigns for and against the discharge. Japan aggressively promoted its stance and the endorsement its actions from the international community through both traditional and social media channels. On the other hand, China has used international platforms such as the United Nations Security Council to make its case against Japan’s ‘unilateral’ decision.5 It is too early to tell who will ‘win’ in this contest, but it is clear that there are some valuable lessons to be learned from the rhetorical strategies utilised by both sides.

Japanese Strategies

The most prominent rhetorical strategy utilised by Japanese public diplomacy is an appeal to scientific rationality. This is best seen in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ X (formerly Twitter) feed, where a series of posts on the issue display the two prominent prongs of this strategy. The first prong is encapsulated in the hashtag #LetTheScienceTalk, which implicitly paints opposition to Japan’s actions as an unscientific, and therefore unreasonable stance not supported by ‘facts’ and claims for Japan the scientific ‘high ground’ in line with Enlightenment values of the primacy of reason. The second prong of the strategy consists of the publication of tweets containing IAEA factsheets which convey the safety of the wastewater being discharged.6 This is a more classical appeal to authority, whereby the IAEA, as the agency tasked with monitoring nuclear power facilities around the world, is portrayed as an infallible judge.

Another strategy applied by Japanese public diplomacy consists of the accentuation of Japan’s history with nuclear power. This strategy, while not as prominent as the first one, has nevertheless been adopted by several commentators.7 Again there are two inter-related threads – the reclaiming of Japan’s victim status using the example of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the minimization of the downsides of nuclear power. The first is self-explanatory. As Japan has been a victim of nuclear weapons in the past, it would not wilfully expose other publics to the danger of radioactive contamination, as alleged by its opponents.

The second thread emerges in light of widespread anti-discharge protests organised by anti-nuclear power groups around East Asia, which these commentators view as blind opposition to nuclear power’s role as a viable renewable energy source. These commentators argue (not without reason, as argued below) that Chinese and South Korean opposition to the Fukushima discharge stem from an irrational urge to paint nuclear power as inherently unsafe, thus denying countries (including Japan) the right to energy security, especially as all countries attempt to reduce CO2 emissions as part of net-zero goals. They marshal evidence that shows how nuclear power has been responsible for less deaths per capita than coal or oil, and argue from these premises that nuclear power, while not entirely waste-free, represents the best hope for renewable energy transitions until more radical technologies come to fruition.8

These diplomatic strategies make sense only when we consider the prospective audiences for them, which in Japan’s case is the international community. Japan’s public diplomacy on this issue thus has a pronounced external dimension, as can be seen from the effort it has invested in high-quality translations of the IAEA factsheets and promotional videos posted on social media outlets such as You Tube and X. Even Chinese translations are available, which diplomatic personnel in China have been disseminating using Weibo and WeChat.9 The goal here seems to be to isolate criticism of its actions to a few governments, which, as they are traditional opponents anyway, can be safely disregarded as ‘crying wolf’ over a non-issue.

Chinese Strategies

China’s strategies are moving in parallel, but with inverted objectives. The first strategy utilised by China involves, as mentioned above, the instrumentalisation of the nuclear taboo possessed in equal measure by most educated people around the world. As seen in addresses at the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, China has consistently attempted to portray Japan’s actions as a nuclear threat, routinely invoking the harmful effects of radiation on human health and the environment.10 Its rationale for the seafood import ban in July applies the same narrative. This strategy is extremely effective as it generates a categorical claim against which no reasoned, scientific counter-claim can operate; after all, no rational actor can argue that citizens of another polity have a duty to consume contaminated foods tainted by radiation.

Another thread of the Chinese narrative concerns the ‘unilateralism’ of Japan’s actions. This thread primarily appears in statements issued by Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokespersons as well as state-backed media publications.11 While accusations of unilateralism seemingly have to do with the purported lack of formal multilateral discussions Japan should have conducted with other stakeholders around the Pacific Ocean rim, they are deeply connected with traditional themes of Japan’s historical culpability for its military aggression in the region since 1937. In this narrative, Japan always oppresses its neighbours through its unilateral actions, which in the past took the form of war, but now takes the form of releasing hazardous materials into the public commons of the ocean, harming the lives and livelihoods of many.

These narratives, some of which are presented in an international context, are not entirely directed at convincing international audiences. Instead, it must be argued that China’s public diplomacy on this issue has as much to do with convincing its domestic audience that the government of President Xi Jinping is capable of standing up to the traditional oppressor in the region. This is best evidenced by the fact that unlike the Japanese, the Chinese have focused their propaganda efforts primarily at domestic social media outlets such as Weibo and WeChat, where morphed pictures of purported ‘victims’ of radiation, as well as recycled footage of other natural disasters in the region are pressed into service to show the ‘effects’ of Japan’s ‘contamination’ of the seas.12 Even the phone call campaign seems to have been coordinated internally in order to drive up participation in a new form of ‘patriotic resistance’ to the wartime invader by engaging in a form of psychological warfare.13 Therefore, though it welcomes the concerned actions of anti-nuclear groups around the world, China is not primarily addressing them; instead, it aims to stoke anti-Japanese feelings among its own people to achieve a ‘rally around the flag’ effect.

Conclusion

It is clear that both countries have achieved some of their aims as a result of their diplomacy. Public concern is at its peak in countries around the region with several Pacific Island states expressing their reservations regarding the discharge. Protests have been stoked within China, and record numbers of people in Japan have expressed their unfavourable views of China. However, the issue has also created an opportunity to restart China-Japan dialogue, though the terms of the same are as yet unclear. It would be instructive to see how both countries manage the outrage among domestic and international audiences, and what compromises they may have to make to do so.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “Fukushima Daiichi ALPS Treated Water Discharge”, International Atomic Energy Agency.
• 2. Kyodo News, “China and Russia sought vapor release plan for Fukushima water”, The Japan Times, 22 August 2023.
• 3. Kim Tong-Hyung, “South Korea vouches for safety of plans to release Fukushima wastewater but citizens’ fears persist”, Associated Press, 7 July 2023.
• 4. Kiyoshi Takenaka and Martin Quin Pollard, “Japan complains of harassment calls from China over Fukushima water release”, Reuters, 28 August 2023.
• 5. Shi Jingtao, “Fukushima row: China hits out at Japan’s ‘self-serving and irresponsible’ actions at UN Security Council”, South China Morning Post, 26 August 2023.
• 6. For example, see MOFA of Japan’s X channel.
• 7. Anthony M. Hooker, “We need to put low-dose radiation into perspective”, The Japan Times, 6 September 2023; Kuni Miyake, “China’s actions on Japan and religion are cut from the same cloth”, The Japan Times, 30 August 2023.
• 8. David Fickling, “The Fukushima hysteria has a lesson for the nuclear renaissance”, The Japan Times, 24 August 2023.
• 9. As an example, see “什麼是ALPS處理水？” (What is ALPS Treated Water?), Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.
• 10. See, for example, “Rejecting Multilateralism Risks ‘Sliding Back on a Terrible Trail Tread Before’, First Committee Hears in General Debate”, GA/DIS/3713, United Nations, 6 October 2023.
• 11. “China reiterates firm opposition to Japan's unilateral decision to discharge nuclear-contaminated water”, CGTN, 5 October 2023; Tong Zhao, “China’s Disinformation Fuels Anger Over Fukushima Water Release”, Commentary, Asia-Pacific Leadership Network, 3 September 2023.
• 12. Zhao, op.cit.
• 13. Miho Tamura and Akiko Yoshinaga, “Crank Callers from China Say They Dialed Japan Just for Kicks or To Kill Time”, The Japan News by the Yomiuri Shimbun, 31 August 2023.

Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan visited India on an official state visit from 8 to 10 October 2023, during which the two countries announced the elevation of their bilateral relationship to the level of ‘Strategic Partnership’.1 With this, Tanzania became the fourth African country after South Africa, Rwanda, and Egypt, with whom India has elevated ties to the level of strategic partnership. The move is hardly surprising since both India and Tanzania are extended maritime neighbours across the Indian Ocean and have enjoyed cordial ties for more than 62 years. The visionary leadership of Julius Nyerere and Jawaharlal Nehru and their shared understanding of ideologies like self-reliance, Non-Aligned Movement, South-South Cooperation, and foreign affairs laid the foundations of a strong partnership between the two nations.

President Hassan’s visit came close on the heels of India hosting the G20 summit in September 2023 in New Delhi. In fact, she is the first African President to visit New Delhi after the inclusion of the African Union (AU) as a permanent member of the G20, a cause which was strongly advocated for by India. In recent years, both countries have taken substantial steps to strengthen their diplomatic ties. The Presidential visit from Tanzania took place after a period of eight years and served to inject fresh impetus into India–Tanzania bilateral ties. From the Indian side, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Dar es Salaam in July 2016 marked a significant milestone and cemented the strong developmental partnership of both countries. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar in July 2023 co-chaired the 10th India–Tanzania Joint Commission on Economic, Technical, and Scientific Cooperation in Dar es Salaam.2

Nature of existing cooperation

Tanzania is an important partner and a key linchpin of India’s overall outreach towards Africa and serves as a gateway for Indian access to other landlocked countries in Africa. Over two thousand years ago, trade thrived between Mandvi port in Gujarat and Zanzibar. The Sidi tribe of India traces its origins to the Zanzi coast of East Africa. Currently, there are over 60,000 People of Indian Origin in Tanzania who are treated as one of Tanzania’s tribes known as ‘Wahindi’. They are well-known for their enterprising culture and are mostly involved in trade and small businesses.

Despite the challenges posed by COVID-19 pandemic, India and Tanzania’s bilateral trade continues to grow, and currently stands at US$ 6.5 billion.3 Tanzania mostly imports petroleum products, medicines, and engineering goods from India, while exporting cereals, cashew nuts, pigeon peans and avocado to India. Tanzania is also a major beneficiary of India’s Duty-Free Tariff Preference (DFTP) scheme under which 98 per cent of product lines from Tanzania are imported tariff-free. Air Tanzania operates a direct flight from Mumbai to Dar es Salaam three times a week, which has helped to increase connectivity between the two countries.

Additionally, India is also among the top five investment sources for Tanzania whereby 630 investment projects worth US$ 3.74 billion have been registered.4 This is expected to create 60,000 new jobs for local Tanzanians. Indian investors are also exploring the possibility of setting up an Investment Park in Tanzania for which 1,000 acres of land will be allocated. The possibility of conducting trade in local currencies (Rupees and Tanzanian Shillings) are also being explored under which authorised banks in India will open Special Rupee Vostro Accounts (SVRA) of correspondent banks in Tanzania.5

The development cooperation aspect of the relationship merits special mention. India has been strongly involved in sectors like water, health, capacity building, scholarships, information, and communications technology (ICT), among others. India’s Export Import Bank (EXIM Bank) has extended Lines of Credit (LoC) worth US$ 1.1 billion for various projects, particularly in the water sector.6 India’s water projects in Tanzania are expected to enable access to safe drinking water to 6 million residents across 24 towns of Tanzania. Some notable projects are the Kiduthani project in Zanzibar and the Kibamba project in Dar es Salaam.

In terms of scholarships for capacity building, India offers 450 slots under its ITEC programme and 70 under ICCR scholarships to Tanzanian nationals. The ITEC slots for Tanzania are now increased to 1,000 and will cover emerging areas like Smart Ports, Space, Artificial Intelligence, Biotechnology, Aviation Management, etc.

India is also looking to export its digital solutions to African countries, including Tanzania, by encouraging more participation from the private sector. To increase Africa’s digital connectivity, India’s digital stack, including biometrics, Jan Dhan technology, and mobile connectivity can be leveraged.7 India has also set up a vocational training center in Pemba, Zanzibar and two ICT Centers at Dar es Salaam Institute of Technology and Nelson Mandela African Institute for Science & Technology (NMAIST) in Arusha. The most commendable development has been the opening of Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Madras campus in Zanzibar, which is the first offshore IIT campus to be inaugurated in early November 2023.8

Outcomes of President Samia’s visit

A host of key initiatives were undertaken during President Samia’s visit to New Delhi. The elevation of the bilateral ties to the level of ‘Strategic Partnership’ is consequential. Tanzania’s proximity and location along the East African coast of the Indian Ocean and its stable political system makes it a natural partner for New Delhi. Being maritime neighbours, Tanzania holds an important place in India’s vision of Security and Growth for all in the Region (SAGAR). As the centre of gravity is moving towards the Indo-Pacific region, which also encompasses the east coast of Africa, India and Tanzania’s role will be critical in tackling the emerging non-traditional challenges, blue crimes, and for ensuring secure, free, and open shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean Region.

During the visit, a total of 6 MoUs were signed.9 These related to sharing of successful digital solutions to be implemented at population scale for digital transformation, an MoU on cultural exchange programme from 2023 to 2027, an MoU between National Sports Council of Tanzania and Sports Authority of India, MoU on setting up of an industrial park in Tanzania, a Technical Agreement between the Indian Navy and Tanzanian Shipping Cooperation Agencies on White Shipping, and an MoU between Cochin Shipyards Ltd and Marine Services Co. Ltd on Cooperation in Maritime Industry.

From training-centric to a strategic partnership

There are important developments particularly in the defence and security sector which has seen visible improvement in bilateral ties. At the second Joint Defence Cooperation Committee meeting held in Arusha in June 2023, India and Tanzania set up a five-year roadmap for defence cooperation. Earlier in October 2023, India’s Chief of Army Staff Gen. Manoj Pande went to Tanzania to take stock of current defence ties and explore areas of further collaboration. Tanzanian Defence Minister Stergomena Tax has also visited India in August 2022 and February 2023. Additionally, India has deployed an Indian Military Training Team (IMTT) at Tanzania’s Command and Staff College in Duluti.

The fact that India has successfully hosted mini-Defence Expos twice in Dar es Salaam in May 2022 and October 2023 is an indication of the growing interest between both the countries in expanding their cooperation in the defence industry. The Tanzanian example serves as a perfect template which India should try to implement in other African countries along the Western Indian Ocean region like Kenya, Mozambique, South Africa, among others. Blue Economy is another emerging focus area where potential for collaboration exists in areas like tourism, marine scientific research, seabed mining, and ocean conservation.

Although bilateral ties between India and Tanzania have improved, they continue to be constrained by inadequate awareness of the potential opportunities and the strong rise of China’s involvement in Tanzania’s business space. While India does recognise it cannot match China in terms of sheer economic heft, it can focus on its core competencies in areas like ICT, human resource development, healthcare, agriculture, capacity building, etc. Till now, the nature of India and Tanzania’s defence and security cooperation have for the most part been training-centric. Given the challenges posed by China in the Indian Ocean, it is time for both India and Tanzania to re-orient their relations from focusing on training to a partnership that is more strategic in nature.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “Joint Statement during the State Visit of the President  of Tanzania to India and Launch of Strategic Partnership between India and Tanzania (8-10 October 2023)”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 9 October 2023.
• 2. “Opening Remarks by EAM, Dr. S. Jaishankar at the 10th India-Tanzania Joint Commission Meeting”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 8 July 2023.
• 3. “Remarks by External Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar at the Joint Press Briefing with the Foreign Minister of Tanzania”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 9 July 2023.
• 4. “Joint Statement during the State Visit of the President  of Tanzania to India and Launch of Strategic Partnership between India and Tanzania (8-10 October 2023)”, no. 1.
• 5. “India, Tanzania Begin Trade Settlements in Local Currencies”, The Hindu, 8 July 2023.
• 6. “Joint Statement during the State Visit of the President  of Tanzania to India and Launch of Strategic Partnership between India and Tanzania (8-10 October 2023)”, no. 1.
• 7. Subhayan Chakraborty, “India’s JAM Trinity to Push Africa’s Digital Reach: Sunil Bharti Mittal”, Business Standard, 6 June 2023.
• 8. “IIT-M Zanzibar Campus Operations to Begin Early November: First 70 Students Finalised”, The Indian Express, 11 October 2023.
• 9. “List of Outcomes: State Visit of H.E. Samia Suluhu Hassan, President of the United Republic of Tanzania to India (October 8-10, 2023)”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 9 October 2023.

Nepali Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal “Prachanda” will undertake an official visit to China on 22 September 2023. This would be his second foreign visit after assuming office. His first foreign visit was to New Delhi, India in May–June 2023. This visit is being deemed as important in Nepal given the preceding government’s ‘neighbours first’ policy, which meant Nepal would maintain good relations with both its important neighbours—India and China. According to the Foreign Ministry of Nepal, relationship of the country with its neighbours is based on the principles of ‘sovereign equality, goodwill, mutual trust and benefits, understanding of each other's concerns and sensitivities and cooperation for prosperity and development’.1

It is a truism to say that Nepal’s sustainability and progress depend on maintaining cordial relations with both India and China. Therefore, Prachanda’s visit to Nepal is only natural after his visit to India in May–June 2023. Despite the fact that India and China have different governance systems and differing perspectives on global politics, managing these two major powers has been a difficult task for the Nepali leaders. While there is a view in Kathmandu that the visit will balance his earlier visit to India, Prachanda could ill afford to delay it further, given the growing engagement of China in many sectors of Nepalese economy in the last few years.

Nepal, due to its own internal constraints, is dependent on its neighbours for its development. While India has been engaged in this field for a long time, the entry of China into the development sector in recent years has been received well by the people at large, although there is skepticism in some sections that overdependence on China could lead Nepal to a ‘debt trap’ on the one hand and complicate relationship with India on the other.

Issues and Challenges

There are several projects in the pipeline which the Nepali side is expected to discuss with its Chinese counterparts. Some of these include infrastructure development projects such as the Seti Fast track road, Hilsa-Surkhet Road, Tokha-Chahare tunnel, and the upgrading of the Araniko Highway, implementation of the 2016 Trade and Transit Agreement with China and construction of the international exhibition center in Kathmandu.2 The health sector is another important issue to be discussed. China has, of late, expressed its interest to expand the Civil Service Hospital and relocate Bir Hospital to Bhaktapur for upgraded medical facilities.

There is a popular enthusiasm in Nepal about the country joining China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2017, and some Nepali commentators would say that BRI has made its mark by “driving urban transformation in Nepal, reconfiguring geopolitical and geoeconomic relations and remaking the sociopolitical, cultural and material fabric of hitherto peripheral spaces”.3 The impact on the ground, however, may not have been as noticeable as it is being made out to be. For example, much like the special economic zone (SEZs) in the Terai region, there were plans to develop cross-border SEZs along the Nepal–China border. However, the MoU with China in 2016 to this effect has not been implemented till now.

There are many challenges that have affected Nepal–China relationship in the past. One major challenge has been chronic political instability in recent years. As per the informal agreements that led to formation of the incumbent government headed by Prachanda, the mantle of leadership may have to be passed on to another leader of the coalition after two and half years. Such changes may interfere with the momentum of policy implementation and affect the image of Nepal in the region. There are observers in Nepal who point out that Nepal’s regional standing has plummeted so much that it was not invited to the G20 meeting in New Delhi while Bangladesh was given a chance to participate in it.4

Another important issue has been the high interest rate levied by China for loans it has extended to Nepal. The 2 per cent interest rate China has negotiated for its loan to build the Pokhara International Airport is being discussed in Nepal as an uncharitable gesture, which raises questions about China’s long-term strategic intention. This airport has not been fully operational since its inauguration on 1 January 2023. The Chinese have claimed this airport as part of BRI unilaterally, even though there was no BRI when Nepal had signed contract for this airport with the Exim Bank of China.  Prachanda must, therefore, discuss the possibility of waiving off the loan for six civilian aircrafts that Nepal has received from China. These aircrafts have so far been grounded due to technical, manpower and spares issues leading to loss of over NPR 2 billion.5

There is also the issue of lukewarm response from the Chinese side to import from Nepal. China has allowed zero-tariff entry for 8,000 goods of Nepali origin,6 . but this duty-free arrangement has so far not been implemented even after two years of the pandemic. This has led to Nepali goods rotting at the border. Prachanda and his team need to get assurance for easy and barrier-free access to Nepali products that can reduce trade deficit with China.7

Recently, the Chinese Ambassador to Nepal gave an ‘undiplomatic’ remark about India’s role in Nepal.8 He said that Nepal had been in a losing position vis-à-vis India in the field of trade and commerce and it can get many more benefits from its trade with China. Such rhetoric is often accepted uncritically by the people of Nepal. However, the facts stated above speak otherwise. The Chinese diplomats also had similar things to say during the case of Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the US diplomats had rebuffed such remarks.9 Such expressions only indicate how desperate China is to snap Nepal’s relationship with India, US and other friendly countries and betray a sense of anxiety about Nepal’s policy of seeking mutual trust with all.

There is also the issue of cultural difference. The exposure of Nepali people to Chinese tourists has not been very pleasant so far. In fact, when Chinese tourist stranded in Kathmandu due to COVID-19 lockdown attacked the Nepal Police, there was unnecessary anxiety in bilateral relations.10 Nepal was forced to remain silent lest any lawful action against the tourists would impair relationship with China. 

Of late, China is forcing Nepal to join various Chinese projects, i.e., the Global Security Initiative (GSI), Global Civilizational Initiative (GCI) and the Global Development Initiative (GDI). In fact, the GSI has been generally viewed as China’s version of NATO.11 Such initiatives look like a strategic alliance of some sort and militates against Nepal’s foreign policy goals. Prachanda should clarify Nepal’s position on these issues.

Way forward

Nepal has a considerably large electorate wedded to left-leaning communist thinking, who idealise China as its closest friend. Moreover, they reflexively turn to China to balance India, a country with which they have deep and inerasable historical, geographical, cultural and familial bonds. As it happens in any such close association, proximity is often taken for granted and ignored, without objective analysis of the costs of dissolution of such relationship.

History is witness to the fact that China did not stand by Nepal when it passed through difficult times. Nepal–China border has not been fully operational since the 2015 earthquake followed by the COVID-19 pandemic even if China has ensured continued flow of Chinese goods while limiting flow of Nepali goods into China. There has been a hue and cry over the ‘text’ of the MCC compact but there has been no discussion over the terms and conditions of BRI in Nepal.

While managing relationships with both China and India can present challenges, Nepal would generally find negotiations with India to be easier, given the deep-rooted historical and cultural ties it shares with India, as opposed to dealing with China. The cultural links that some people in Nepal often claim with China do not point to a continued relationship anymore. China itself does not invoke these linkages currently. China is quietly proclaiming its Pax Sinica in the region and beyond, of which Nepal should be wary of. Nepal should avoid getting ‘trapped’ in the ‘Five Fingers Policy’ of Mao Zedong.12

Nepal has a difficult task ahead in sustaining its relationship with China in the backdrop of growing India–US partnership, US–China rivalry and declining India–China relationship. Securing its own interests would require perceptive appreciation of the evolving regional and global geopolitics and dealing with its two neighbours through effective and efficient diplomacy without getting caught up in the adversarial maze of relationship among countries, Nepal regards important for its progress and development.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• 1. “Annual Report 2022”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nepal.
• 2. Anil Giri, “Cabinet Okays 8 Deals with China”, The Kathmandu Post, 16 September 2023.
• 3. Elia Apostolopoulou and Hitesh Pant, “‘Silk Road Here We Come’: Infrastructural Myths, Post-disaster Politics, and the Shifting Urban Geographies of Nepal”, Political Geography, Vol. 98, October 2022.  
• 4. Kamal Dev Bhattarai, “G20 and Nepal”, The Annapurna Express, 11 September 2023.
• 5. Sangam Prasain, “Fed up of losses, Nepal Airlines Comes Up with Options to Get Rid of Six Chinese Aircraft”, The Kathmandu Post, 1 December 2020.
• 6. Krishana Prasain, “Experts Doubt Implementation of Latest Trade Deal with China”, The Kathmandu Post, 1 April 2022.
• 7. According to the latest available data from Central Bank of Nepal, the Nepal Rastra Bank, in the first month of 2023/24 imported commodities from China to Nepal was NPR 1727 million, whereas exported goods from Nepal to China in the same period was NPR 109 million. See “Current Macroeconomic and Financial Situation of Nepal (Based on First Month Data Ending Mid-August, 2023/24)”, Nepal Rastra Bank.
• 8.   Dipanjan Roy Chowdhury, “China's Ambassador Slams India's Nepal Policy, Calls it 'less than ideal'”, The Economic Times, 6 September 2023.
• 9. “Remarks by Spokesperson of Chinese Embassy on the so-called ‘China’s Disinformation Campaign’ by the US Ambassador-nominee”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Nepal, 15 July 2022.
• 10. “Unruly Chinese Nationals Attack Police in front of Nepal’s Administrative Hub”, KhabarHub, 8 May 2020.
• 11. Saurav Raj Pant, “Nepal’s Compelled Choice: Joining Indo-American Lobbying Front or Chinese Lobbying Front”, KhabarHub, 9 July 2023.
• 12. Anil Gupta, “Five Fingers Policy of Mao Zedong”, Indian Defence Review, 28 January 2021.