Far-Right Extremism in Europe: From Margins to Mainstream
Julia Jose
April 02, 2024
Far-right extremism is spreading in the European body politic at a rapid pace.
The first-ever electoral win of Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands late last year, which saw it win 37 out of the 150 House of Representatives seats, highlights the growth of far-right extremism across Europe. PVV is considered a far-right political party due to its extremist positions on issues such as border control, immigration, asylum and Islam. Wilders’ electoral success aligns with the region-wide ethno-nationalist and anti-globalist tilt and a retreating embrace of multi-culturalism, the rule of law, and liberalism, which formed the bedrock of the European political system since 1945. Similar scenarios have unfolded in other European countries like Sweden, Finland, Poland, France and Italy, where the far-right has established a prominent presence.
Key Drivers
Far-right extremist beliefs and conspiracy theories promote a hierarchical narrative wherein non-Whites are deemed inferior to the White race and disseminate a warning of the Islamisation of Europe. Europe’s restive immigrant population has contributed to exacerbating the far-right extremist threat across the continent. The influx of migrants over the decades has festered resentment within the local European population, who fear the undermining of ethno-national identities and access to adequate social and economic opportunities.
This has resulted in swelling support for exclusionary nationalist rhetoric,1 rising instances of Islamophobia, and dissemination of conspiracy theories such as eco-fascism and the Great Replacement, worsening the crisis. The Great Replacement Theory, endorsed by far-right political leaders such as Marine Le Pen, Viktor Orbán and Matteo Salvini, asserts that ‘replacist elites’ are purposely replacing White Christian communities with multi-ethnic and multi-religious groups through illegal immigration.2
Furthermore, conservative intellectuals and organisations have openly expressed xenophobic views. Douglas Murray, in his book The Strange Death of Europe, argued that rising immigration levels have resulted in the ‘streets in cold and rainy northern towns of Europe filled with people dressed with the foothills of Pakistan or the sandstorms of Arabia.’3 Many White supremacists and conspiracy theorists frequently highlight census data and express concerns that White European citizens will become a minority by 2044.4
Eco-fascists attribute environmental degradation to a surging immigration population. They advocate creating homogenous White Christian communities.5 This ideology has inspired incidents of far-right extremism, including the Christchurch shooting in March 2019. The Euro crisis, resulting in large-scale unemployment and the COVID-19 outbreak, which devastated economies and various industries, further deepened anxieties and the impact of continued immigration into their countries.
Additionally, self-radicalisation through technological advancements and social media has heightened the risks of lone-wolf extremist acts carried out by the far-right. Technological advancements have also facilitated the cultivation of online communities among the far-right on 8chan and Facebook, among other forums.
Right-Wing Extremist Incidents
One of the earliest physical manifestations of far-right extremism in Europe occurred when Anders Breivik, a neo-Nazi, killed 77 people in Norway in July 2011. His manifesto and actions, driven by his apprehension about the Islamisation of the predominantly Christian West, have been emulated by others years after his arrest.6 In June 2019, Walter Lübcke, a Christian Democratic Union leader, was fatally shot near the city of Kessel by Stephan Ernst, a neo-Nazi for his pro-immigration views.7
A few months leading up to this attack in Germany, Christchurch in New Zealand was devastated by mass shootings in March 2019, in which over 50 people were killed. These attacks were carried out on two mosques by another neo-Nazi, Brenton Tarrant, who was inspired by Breivik. Additionally, a boy based in Darlington was arrested in the United Kingdom as part of an investigation into far-right extremism. It was found that he was an active participant in racist online forums and possessed information useful for committing terrorist acts, such as manuals for making explosives.8
In December 2022, adherents of the far-right Reichsbürger movement attempted to violently seize power in Germany by overthrowing the democratically-elected government.9 However, their plan was thwarted by German officials following which mass arrests occurred. One of the detainees was Birgit Malsack-Winkemann, a former lawmaker associated with the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party. Raids and seizures were also carried out throughout the country across multiple properties.
More recently, following a stabbing incident near a school in Dublin in December 2023, far-right extremists damaged public infrastructure and targeted police forces. Following the attack, police concluded that unrest was driven by a ‘lunatic, hooligan faction driven by a far-right ideology’ and warned against ‘misinformation’.10 About 34 people were arrested as part of the investigations into the rioting carried out by the far-right.11
Counter-Measures
Various European countries have been taking countermeasures to tackle the scourge of violent extremism. Finland, for instance, since 2012 has put forward National Action Plans after extensive collaboration between governmental and non-governmental organisations, along with researchers and religious communities. These plans contain measures to identify recruitment methods of different radical extremist groups, steps to prevent participation of young people in radical activity, help promote safety and security of premises of religious communities, among other provisions.12
The Swedish Center for Preventing Violent Extremism, established in 2018, is primarily tasked with developing knowledge-based and cross-sector work involved in preventing violent extremism at national, regional and local levels. The Center works to promote the development of preventive work at the national, regional and local levels; strive to attain a high degree of coordination and effectiveness concerning preventive measures; provide support to agencies in addressing issues relating to VE and collect and disseminate information about preventing violent extremism.13 Sweden also appointed a National Coordinator to safeguard democracy against violent extremism in 2015.14
The Netherlands’ National Counter-terrorism Strategy for 2022–26 calls for ‘extra attention’ towards the threat posed by potentially violent, extremist lone actors, flags the need to privilege innovative (technological) solutions to facilitate the detection and combating of the dissemination of violent extremist and terrorist content and calls for measures designed to ensure the safe re-integration of individuals after detention.15 The United Kingdom’s ‘Prevent’ strategy supports police and security agencies in identifying individuals and groups at risk of radicalisation.16
Germany passed the Federal Government’s Strategy to Prevent Extremism and Promote Democracy in 2016 which calls for coordinated efforts by federal, regional and local authorities in association with civil society. More than 700 civil society organisations are funded by the federal government on measures to prevent extremism. Germany has established federal agencies for civic education and anti-discrimination.17 Germany also has initiatives such as Exit Germany which counsels families impacted by right-wing extremism.18
Despite these significant measures, far-right extremism continues to be a sociological challenge that has significantly undermined multi-culturalism, liberal democracy and rules-based order in Europe. Continuing and enhanced cooperation between intelligence agencies, NGOs and community activists is necessary for addressing this critical threat.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
India–Bhutan Relations after Prime Ministerial Visits
Sneha M
March 28, 2024
Bhutan PM's five-day visit to India in March 2024 which was followed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s two-day visit to Bhutan is expected to ease mutual concerns about a possible border agreement with China.
Overseas visits by heads of state and governments help countries recalibrate their bilateral relations. These engagements play a pivotal role in reinforcing mutual trust and understanding, thereby establishing the groundwork for enduring diplomatic relations. Such high-profile visits provide officials the opportunity to reshape bilateral relationships to the advantage of their countries. Additionally, these interactions serve as catalysts for policy adjustments and political engagement, often garnering considerable attention from the media.
A notable instance of such diplomatic exchange was the visit of Bhutanese Prime Minister Tshering Tobgay, at the invitation of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, from 14 March to 18 March 2024.1 His delegation included various dignitaries from Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Ministry for Industry, Commerce and Employment, and other senior officials from the Royal Government of Bhutan.2 Prime Minister Modi undertook a reciprocal visit to Bhutan three days later on 21–22 March 2024. These visits signify the importance both countries attach to bilateral relations, which has stood the test of time.
Historical Aspects
The enduring friendship between India and Bhutan is rooted in mutual warmth and goodwill, reinforced by frequent high-level exchanges. This bond assumed a lot of significance after India gained independence. India–Bhutan relationship traces its roots back to the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in March–April 1947, when Jawaharlal Nehru, then Vice-President of the interim Viceroy's Executive Council, extended an invitation to the Bhutanese delegation, which marked the beginning of formal engagement between the two nations.
Subsequently, when Nehru became the first prime minister of India, he developed an extremely cordial relationship with Bhutanese King Jigme Dorji Wangchuck. Under their watch, bilateral negotiations ensued, culminating in the signing of the Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendship in 1949. All the succeeding governments in New Delhi have regarded this relationship as important and invested heavily in it. In fact, keeping Bhutanese sensitivities in mind, in 2007, a new treaty of friendship was signed, supplanting the 1949 Treaty as the cornerstone for cooperation and bilateral interactions between the two countries.3 These milestones underscore the historical significance of India–Bhutan bilateral relations, shaping their camaraderie till today.
Prime Minister Modi's visits to Bhutan in 2014, 2019 and now in 2024, have further deepened bilateral cooperation across sectors like hydropower, trade and education. The visit by present King of Bhutan, Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck's to India in September 2022 and subsequent engagements in April 2023 and November 2023 underscored the robust nature of bilateral relations. Additionally, the King's visits to Assam and Maharashtra further strengthened ties between Bhutan and these Indian states. Such high-level engagements continue to shape the strategic partnership between India and Bhutan, fostering regional stability and prosperity.
Geopolitical Dynamics
Bhutanese PM’s visit to India holds a particular significance against the backdrop of Bhutan's economic challenges and its complex relationship with China. PM Tobgay's inaugural visit after assuming office following his party’s success in the 2024 elections proved very useful, with both governments reaffirming their commitment to increased collaboration across various sectors. A joint announcement emphasised its importance for regional stability and prosperity.4
Undoubtedly, India is Bhutan's primary ally for development and has played a pivotal role in Bhutan’s socio-economic progress. India has supported several projects as well as contributed substantially to Bhutan’s developmental aspirations. In early March, just before PM Tobgay’s visit, Bhutan unveiled a 15 billion Bhutanese Ngultrum (Nu) economic stimulus package, with India's backing, which is aimed at alleviating economic slowdown in key sectors such as tourism, technology and small enterprises.5
Hydro-power collaboration is a significant cornerstone of the economic partnership between India and Bhutan. In the joint statement issued after Tobgay’s visit, both parties expressed contentment with the advancements made in the construction of the 1020 MW Punatshangchhu-II hydro-power project and anticipated its commissioning in 2024.6 Furthermore, both countries also agreed to broaden the current India–Bhutan energy alliance to encompass non-hydro renewables like solar and wind energy for enhancing energy efficiency and conservation measures.7
Interestingly, PM Tobgay’s visit took place amid speculations that Bhutan and China are engaged in negotiations concerning their border dispute, which is reportedly at an advanced stage. This has sparked a lot of interest in India due to its implications for regional security. During his first term as prime minister from 2013 to 2018, Tobgay had initially tried to restore stability in bilateral relations after his predecessor, Jigme Thinley, faced accusations of pursuing anti-India policies, leading to India suspending subsidised LPG supplies to Bhutan.
However, as his tenure drew to a close in 2018, PM Tobgay had made a pledge before the National Assembly to cultivate a strategic and enduring relationship with China, aimed at safeguarding Bhutan's national interests, which had raised concerns in India.8 His March 2024 visit to India, immediately after assuming office, is expected to assure New Delhi of his intent to pursue a path of deeper engagement and take bilateral relations forward.
As for Bhutan–China discussions on the border issue, in October 2023, Bhutan's former Foreign Minister Tandi Dorji met Chinese counterpart Wang Yi in Beijing.9 China's statement on the meeting suggests that Bhutan emphasised adherence to the One-China principle and expressed its willingness to collaborate on resolving the boundary issue.10 Earlier, in October 2021, China and Bhutan had agreed on a three-step roadmap to resolve their boundary dispute, four years after the Doklam standoff. India was apprehensive about the potential implications of any such settlement on the status of the Doklam plateau, situated near the Bhutan–China–India tri-junction. Nevertheless, India had urged China to adhere to a 2012 agreement stipulating that tri-junction points between India, China and third countries should be determined in consultation with the relevant nations.
The deliberate Chinese trespasses into Bhutan's northern regions, considered sacred by Bhutan but not by Beijing, along with the claim over Sakteng in eastern Bhutan in 2020, detract attention from China's clear aims in the western area.11 According to Professor Ian Hall of the Griffith Asia Institute, these objectives primarily revolve around resolving the border dispute by acquiring the Doklam plateau. Such an acquisition would bolster China's territorial jurisdiction and apply further pressure on India's Siliguri Corridor, potentially providing leverage for Beijing in future crises with New Delhi.12
Conclusion
The back-to-back visits of Bhutanese Prime Minister to India and the Indian Prime Minister to Bhutan serve as strong reaffirmations of the enduring economic and developmental partnership between the two nations. Prime Minister Modi doubled India's support for Bhutan's Five Year Plan from Rs 5,000 crores to Rs 10,000 crores, showcasing India’s unwavering commitment. India and Bhutan exchanged several MoUs and signed agreements in the fields of energy, trade, digital connectivity, space, rail links and agriculture. Additionally, Bhutan’s King honoured PM Modi with the country’s highest civilian award, acknowledging India’s support during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Following the national elections in January 2024, PM Tobgay's tweet, stating ‘Bhutan is open to Business’, indicated that he considered his visit to India as a positive development for both his government and the nation. However, this statement can have multiple interpretations. For instance, it suggests Bhutan's political leadership's interest in forging diplomatic relations with China and embracing Chinese investments. Bhutan also refused India’s proposal for a motorable road from Bletting in Tawang to Doksum in Bhutan, citing concerns about potential disruption to ongoing boundary negotiations, at a time when it is awaiting resolution of its border dispute with China.13
Therefore, numerous questions remain unanswered. Early in the 1980s, Thimphu quietly relinquished its claim to the 154-square-mile Kula Khari area on its northern border with China, describing that claim was due to ‘cartographic mistakes’.14 Could another territorial concession be made without alerting India? Alternatively, should this visit be seen as a period of tranquillity preceding potential challenges in the bilateral relationship? Or perhaps, it is just Bhutan’s national interests at play.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Can the Security Council Help Bring Peace to Gaza?
Rajeesh Kumar
March 28, 2024
Resolution 2728, adopted by the United Nations Security Council on 25 March 2024 carries political implications beyond its text, particularly due to the US decision to abstain.
After 171 days of conflict in Gaza, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) finally adopted a resolution demanding an immediate ceasefire for the month of Ramadan. Introduced by Mozambique on behalf of the elected Council members (E-10) on 25 March, Resolution 2728 received 14 votes in favour and one abstention (United States).1 It calls for a ceasefire respected by all parties for lasting peace, demanding the unconditional release of hostages and ensuring humanitarian access.
The resolution ended the state of paralysis of the Security Council and its repeated failures to effectively address the conflict in Gaza. However, despite the unified stance of the Council on ceasefire, Israel's response has raised doubts about the resolution's effectiveness in achieving peace. The US decision to abstain from the vote prompted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to cancel the scheduled visit of his top advisers to the US for discussions on the offensive.2 Two ministers in Netanyahu’s war cabinet have also declared that the country will not abide by the resolution, further complicating the path to peace.3
Security Council and the Gaza War
On 7 October 2023, the Palestinian militant group Hamas launched a large-scale armed attack against Israel, firing thousands of rockets and conducting raids in border areas, resulting in approximately 1,200 civilian deaths and the capture of 253 hostages. In response, Israel conducted air strikes against Hamas in Gaza. Subsequently, on 28 October, Israel initiated a ground offensive with the objective of eliminating Hamas and rescuing the hostages. United Nations reports that since 7 October, over 1,200 Israelis were killed, with more than 5,500 injured, while nearly 32,000 Palestinians were killed and about 73,000 injured.4
Since the conflict began, the Security Council has voted on nine resolutions; however, only two have been adopted. The first three drafts were vetoed by the US. The first resolution on 16 October 2023 drafted by Russia proposed an immediate humanitarian ceasefire. It was however not adopted due to US veto.5 The draft received support from China, Gabon, Mozambique and the United Arab Emirates, while France, Japan, the US and the United Kingdom voted against it. The remaining six Council members abstained from voting.6
The second resolution was drafted by Brazil, and voted on 18 October. Twelve of the Council’s 15 members voted in favour, while the US voted against, and Russia and the UK abstained.7 The UNSC also rejected two amendments proposed by Russia in the Brazilian draft, which called for an immediate, durable and full ceasefire, as well as for stopping attacks against civilians. The US explained the veto by stating that the resolution did not mention Israel's right of self-defence.8
On 25 October, the UNSC voted on two competing draft resolutions—one from the US and the other from Russia—addressing the war and humanitarian crisis in Gaza. The US' draft failed due to the vetoes of China and Russia. The Russian draft saw the US and the UK voting against it, while China, Gabon, Russia and the UAE favoured it, with nine members abstaining.9
After a series of negotiations, on 15 November, the UNSC adopted its first resolution on Gaza since the war began. Proposed by Malta, the resolution called for urgent and extended humanitarian pauses and corridors throughout the Gaza Strip to facilitate the provision of essential goods and services. It was adopted with 12 votes in favour and three abstentions (Russia, the UK and the US).10 However, on 8 December, the US vetoed another resolution drafted by the UAE. There were 13 votes in favour and the United Kingdom abstained.11
On 22 December, the UNSC adopted a resolution requesting the Secretary-General to appoint a Senior Humanitarian and Reconstruction Coordinator to establish a UN mechanism for speeding up humanitarian aid to Gaza.12 The resolution called for ‘urgent and extended humanitarian pauses and corridors throughout the Gaza Strip for a sufficient number of days to enable full, rapid, safe, and unhindered humanitarian access’.13 It also emphasised the need for creating conditions for a sustainable cessation of hostilities.
On 20 February 2024, Algeria drafted a resolution calling for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire. Despite receiving support from 13 out of 15 members, the resolution failed to pass, with the UK abstaining and the US voting against it.14 Again on 22 March, Russia and China vetoed a US draft that demanded a temporary ceasefire in Gaza.15 Three days later, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2728, effectively ending the nearly six-month-long paralysis of the Council regarding a ceasefire in Gaza.
Resolution 2728 and its Implications
Resolution 2728 calls for an immediate ceasefire during the month of Ramadan, which should be respected by all parties and lead to a lasting and sustainable ceasefire. It also demands the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages, along with ensuring humanitarian access to address their medical and other needs. Furthermore, it demands that all parties comply with their obligations under international law regarding the detainees.
The resolution carries political implications beyond its text, particularly due to the US decision to abstain, which enabled its adoption. In the past six months, the United States has vetoed five draft resolutions, three of which demanded a ceasefire in Gaza.
Following the abstention, US explained that it did not oppose Resolution 2728 because its text aligns with Washington's position that any ceasefire text must include provisions for the release of hostages.16 The US said that a ceasefire would strengthen negotiations by Egypt, Israel, Qatar, and the US to achieve the release of hostages.
The US decision not to veto the resolution signalled the White House's growing frustration with Israeli actions, including hospital attacks and aid restrictions in Gaza. Previously, the US had warned against Netanyahu's plans for a ground offensive in Rafah.17 Furthermore, criticism against the Biden administration is mounting, both domestically and internationally. Nonetheless, the US abstention did not signify a change in Washington's policy towards Israel. Last week, the US Congress approved US$ 3.8 billion in military aid to Israel and suspended funding to the UN Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) until March 2025.
Israel's response to the resolution indicates its reluctance to accept a ceasefire in Gaza. Israel has a history of flouting UNSC resolutions. For instance, in December 2016, the UNSC passed a resolution condemning Israeli settlements in Palestine as illegal and a violation of international law. Despite receiving 14 votes in favour and a US abstention, Israel chose to ignore this resolution.
If Israel chooses the same path on Resolution 2728, the UNSC has limited options. The Council can pass another resolution specifically addressing the breach. This subsequent resolution may include punitive measures, such as imposing sanctions. However, it is unlikely that the US supports a resolution at the UNSC that imposes punitive measures against Israel. In such a scenario, Resolution 2728 would serve solely as a symbolic gesture, recognising the UNSC's limited influence on global peace and security issues. Nevertheless, the Council's ability to reach a consensus on the text, after five previous vetoes on the matter, may be viewed as a glimmer of hope.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Pacific Media: A New Arena of Competition between the United States and China
Aditi Dhaundiyal
March 12, 2024
The media landscape in the Pacific Island countries is vulnerable to Chinese influence given the developmental needs and lack of robust regulatory mechanisms.
The United States (US) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have been jostling for greater influence among the tiny yet strategically important Pacific Island states. As this competition for influence gets more heated, new areas of contestations between the two powers have emerged. One of the latest areas of contention relates to control over the Pacific media. Australia and New Zealand have been major content providers in the Pacific. However, funding cuts and changing geopolitical dynamics have paved the way for China to seek space within the Pacific media landscape. Australia’s shortwave radio frequencies, for instance, shut down in 2017, were taken over by China two years later.1
China and the Pacific Media
In 2023, Chinese Media Group inaugurated a new headquarters for its Asia-Pacific branch in Hong Kong SAR. This branch, aimed at projecting a favourable image of China to the Indo-Pacific, is broadcast in 41 countries and is said to have a viewership of over 3.3 billion.2 With regard to the Pacific Island countries, Chinese media has established its presence in the region through the radio and television format. State broadcaster China Central Television broadcasts documentaries in the Pacific Island states of FSM, Samoa, Vanuatu, Fiji and Tonga through its CGTN Documentary channel (formerly known as CCTV-9 Documentary).3
The PRC has also been peddling favourable narratives through its embassies in the region. Zhang and Watson note the publication of 92 articles by Chinese diplomats, in major Pacific media outlets, between August 2016 and September 2020.4 PRC’s public outreach has also involved promoting the government stance on domestic and international issues through interviews with the local journalists.
A 2022 Australia Broadcasting Corporation Four Corners report dug into the possible links between the Chinese government and the Solomon Islands President Manasseh Sogavare. The investigation revealed an alleged PRC involvement in the form of political bribery to help the Sogavare regime survive the no confidence motion in the parliament.5 Furthermore, the PRC was alleged to have identified the Kolombangara Island as the location of a possible Chinese military base in the region.6
In response to the report, President Sogavare issued a statement condemning foreign media’s coverage of China’s activity in Solomon Islands, equating any scepticism of the China–SI bonhomie to an act of “racial profiling”.7 He went on to threaten a ban on journalists providing a negative coverage of the bilateral relationship although no legal action has been taken by the government so far. However, such an attitude towards foreign media is unsurprising when viewed alongside the Sogavare government’s censorship back at home. National broadcaster Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation, that is now fully state-funded, has reported instructions to project the state in positive light only.
An Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) exposé has revealed a funding request to the PRC on behalf of Solomon Star, a leading Solomon Islands daily, of a sum of SBD 1,150,000 (INR 11,356,366) in exchange for a favourable coverage of PRC and its intentions in the Indo-Pacific.8
China exporting its brand of journalism to the Pacific Islands undermines the democratic ecosystem of the Pacific Island states. It gives the PRC the ability to ‘tell the China story well’ (traditional Chinese: 講好中國故事) and thereby manage the narrative. The journalistic landscape in the Pacific Island countries is especially vulnerable because of developmental needs and a lack of robust regulatory mechanisms in the region.9
The PRC is the second largest development partner of the Pacific Island Countries (PICs), second only to Australia. It has been able to leverage financial incentives to achieve diplomatic objectives. A case in point is Nauru’s switch of diplomatic recognition to China. Economic aid from the PRC translates into adoption of the Chinese model of development and governance. The export of digital authoritarianism is evident in the case of Solomon Islands, where direct financial incentives to the leading Solomon daily coupled with government directives make for a friendly relationship with the local media outlets. On the other hand, Pacific journalists such as Scott Wade and Dan McGarry have faced repercussions, such as suspension and visa revocation respectively, for negative reportage of Chinese activities in their countries.10
Export of the Chinese model of digital governance finds support among PIC governments that are predisposed to censorship as a means of dealing with criticism. News media in Solomon Islands, Fiji, Vanuatu, PNG and Tonga have experienced curbs on freedom of expression for being critical of the establishment.11 Pacific journalists have been subjected to intimidation and physical assaults in PNG, Solomon Islands and Fiji.12
US Counter Moves
China’s rising influence has been a cause of concern for the United States. The US Department of State released a report titled ‘How the People’s Republic of China Seeks to Reshape the Global Information Environment’ in September 2023, which lists five main facets to China's media growing global influence. These include leveraging propaganda and censorship, promoting digital authoritarianism, exploiting international organisations and bilateral partnerships, pairing co-optation and pressure, and exercising control of Chinese-language media.13
The GEC report also delves into the use of bots to increase traction on the social media accounts of Chinese diplomats, content sharing agreements with foreign media that contain exclusivity clauses, and real word intimidation. Having identified a dubious international relations commentator named Yi Fan, the report alleges PRC’s use of ‘manufactured personas’ without any overt association with the government to peddle the official narrative in foreign media. Absence of direct political affiliation to the Chinese establishment gives the impression of objectivity, lending credence to the seemingly non-biased opinion pieces being published.
The US Under-Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Elizabeth Allen, during her October 2023 visit to the Pacific Island countries, revealed Washington’s desire to collaborate with the regional media sectors across the Pacific. This intent has so far manifested in the American support for the establishment of Digital Communication Network (DCN) hub for the East Asia and Pacific (EAP) region in Australia.14
At the DCN-EAP’s inaugural forum in 2023, ‘Information Integrity in the Digital Age’, professionals and participants from across South-east Asia and Oceania were brought together to discuss the impact of media and information systems on all aspects of society. The event was also open to participants from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Mongolia, with the PRC being an apparent exclusion among the East Asian states. The agenda of the event was centred on the themes of ‘Cultivating Resilience’, ‘Building Trust’ and ‘Shaping Influence’.15
The DCN-EAPinitiative is a welcome step towards US engagement with the Pacific on the theme of democratic media landscape. The United States has been slow to recognise China’s increasing soft power in the region because of its tendency to view the Indo-Pacific from a largely securitised lens. This is not to assert a complete lack of cooperation between the American and Pacific Island journalistic circles.
The East-West Center, a Honolulu-based research institute established by the US Congress in 1960, provides 15 PIC media outlets the license to republish The New York Times articles. The institute has also worked with the National Public Radio’s Next Generation Radio Project to offer mentorship programmes to budding journalists and staff at the University of the South Pacific.
However, given the rapid expansion of Chinese media networks in the region, the US has a lot of ground to cover. There is a need to channel more diplomatic energy and resources into ensuring freedom of press in the region. US allies such as Australia and the United Kingdom have made progress in the media sector through Australian Broadcasting Corporation International Development (ABCID) and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Media Action respectively.16
The US, given its marginal influence in the PICs vis-à-vis regional players like Australia and New Zealand, needs to work in tandem with its allies to support the Pacific’s national media associations such as the Pacific Islands News Associations (PINA), and Pacifica Media Association (PasiMA). There is scope to expand cooperation with the region’s new agencies in the form of content sharing and capacity building initiatives.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Aditi Dhaundiyal, Intern, Southeast Asia and Oceania Centre, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi
Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Caucasus Conflict
Jason Wahlang
March 11, 2024
The Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict has called into question the CSTO’s role as a regional security guarantor.
On 23 February 2024, Armenian Prime Minister Nicol Pashinyan announced Armenia’s suspension of its membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) due to the organisation’s inability to fulfil its security mandate of safeguarding Armenia in the event of an armed conflict. This step was taken following Azerbaijan’s attack on the Kapan municipality’s Nerkin Hand and Srashen villages in the Syunik district of Armenia. This was the latest military invasion launched by Azerbaijan after establishing control over Nagorno-Karabakh which it had taken control in 2023.
These events and inability of CSTO to defend Armenia have strained ties between Armenia and the regional organisation and to that effect, has put the country at odds with Russia, the most prominent CSTO member. The worsening ties could reduce organisational influence and its relevance as a security provider in the Caucasus. Given these developments, it is open to question if the CSTO can continue to play a vital role in upholding member countries’ sovereignty and preserve the regional security architecture amid increasing geopolitical complexities.
CSTO and Past Conflicts
The CSTO, established in 2003, comprises Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Its role was defined as that of a security provider and in maintaining regional stability and territorial integrity of these countries. These objectives were highlighted mainly because the region was already suffering from historical turmoil amongst the states, including border disputes between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and the Armenia and Azerbaijan conflict.1
Articles 2 and 4 of its charter underline its primary obligations to the member states. According to Article 2, if a member's security, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty are undermined, then the other members must come to its aid.2 Article 4 emphasises that aggression faced by any member state would be equivalent to an attack on the organisation.3
Notably, Russia exercises an overarching role over the remaining members, providing the majority of the resources in its effort to remake its image as successor state of Soviet Union. Any statements which come out of the organisation is also painted as part of the greater Russian narrative, and therefore, inaction on the part of the organisation puts into question the Russian stake in CSTO, its influence and the organisation’s capacity to resolve conflicts among member states when required.
The Eurasian region has been affected by protests within their territory and also cross-border conflicts between the various nations. There have been specific conflicts in which the CSTO has been asked to intervene, including in Kyrgyzstan (2010) and in Armenia (2020, 2023). However, the CSTO, despite having defined objectives, has refused to intervene in most disputes, with the protests in Kazakhstan (2022) being an exception.4 It was the first known involvement of the organisation at the request of a member state. Although the non-interventionist nature of CSTO had not affected its relationship between the member countries, that changed after the Second Nagorno Karabakh War in 2020.
The Caucasus has long been fraught with instability due to the Nagorno-Karabakh War, with the Armenians claiming victory in the first Karabakh war in 1994 and the Azerbaijanis claiming victory in the Second Karabakh War in 2020. While the CSTO was not established when the first war broke out, its reluctance to effectively intervene in the next phase of the war has soured ties between Armenia and Russia, the latter considered the organisation’s most influential voice.
In 2021, the initial divisions within the CSTO became visible after its refused to invoke Article 2, even as Azerbaijan launched attacks deep into 45 sq km of Armenian territory.5 Furthermore, deprived of organisational assistance, in a retaliatory move, the Armenian government refrained from participating in scheduled meetings,6 followed by relinquishing the post of CSTO’s Deputy Secretary General and refusing to sign a joint declaration at an organisational summit and host a CSTO exercise.7
These actions raised questions about CSTO’s continued relevance and pitted Armenia against Russia. This has pushed Armenia to the fold of Western powers that are looking for an opportunity to corner Russia. Moscow has responded by threatening Armenia against its alignment with the United States and European Union.8
CSTO’s Joint Staff, Andrey Serdyukov, on 14 February 2024, stressed that the potential for conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is high considering the attacks in Armenia’s Syunik district. Despite such statements released by CSTO, it maintained its non-confrontational approach to the conflict between the Caucasus neighbours.
Future of CSTO in the Caucasus
CSTO’s limited involvement in maintaining regional security, barring the Kazakh issue in January 2022, has led to growing criticism by member states of its role. It has become even more pronounced with its lacklustre performance in the Caucasus.
Nevertheless, Armenia's responses to CSTO’s shying away from its security obligations have no bearing on its relationship with Russia despite statements from the Russian regime, which remains a prominent feature of its ‘complementarist’ foreign policy. Armenia has only sought to diversify its collaborative partners and strengthen relationships with actors such as the European Union and France to have geopolitical elbow room in its conflict with Azerbaijan.
As a result, while Russia would remain an essential cog in Armenian foreign policy, Armenia’s attempts to diversify its defence and military cooperation with European nations (France and Greece) could diminish Russian influence in the long run. Russia also does not want to get dragged to the conflict here given its involvement in the Ukraine war.
In the current complex geopolitical context, the CSTO’s future in the Caucasus appears bleak, especially if Armenia’s growing frustrations result in its severing ties with the organisation in the future due to its inability to respond to Azerbaijani actions, as it would hinder CSTO’s access to the region. There exist two precedents on this front: Azerbaijan and Georgia, former members of CSTO’s predecessor, the Collective Security Treaty, exited the group in 1999. Nonetheless, in Central Asia, mainly due to the organisations’ rapid involvement in Kazakhstan, it gives a hope that it would remain relevant as a security provider.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
4. The CSTO did not intervene in the conflict between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. See Erdenetsogt Dorjpalam, “Russia, Central Asia and the CSTO”, Valdai Club, 17 May 2023.
Neo-Nazi Music Concerts: Incubators of Far-Right Extremism
Saman Ayesha Kidwai
February 28, 2024
Neo-Nazi music concerts have become a fertile ground for the mobilisation and financing of far-right extremists.
Far-right extremist music concerts Call of Terror and Hot Shower in France and Italy respectively in February–March 2024 are expected to intensify the far-right movement moving forward. This is the first time such concerts are being organised since the COVID-19 outbreak. These concerts, like Ukraine’s Asgardsrei festival—a famous black metal Neo-Nazi musical event that was held annually until the pandemic—are pivotal to the mobilisation and recruitment of hardened extremists.
Such concerts feature bands who promote a bigoted and racist ideology, including one of the most notorious sub-genres within the black metal musical arena, i.e., National Socialist Black Metal or NSBM. Racist neo-Nazis have used this genre of music to disseminate a violent and xenophobic ideology which espouses White supremacy, anti-establishment narratives, Holocaust denial and anti-Jewish sentiments. At the same time, they have popularised music as a key avenue for transnational networking of like-minded individuals who ardently support a virulent ideological belief, raising millions of Euros in revenue.1
The network established among such ideologically inclined individuals (neo-Nazi black metal followers) spans the European continent and encompasses Russia as well as the United States. It brings together those driven by White supremacist narratives, glorification of violence, and call for violent actions aimed at realisation of ethno-national racial and cultural superiority.
The resurgence of Call of Terror and Hot Shower needs to be contextualised in the backdrop of legalisation of the fascist salute in Italy, the remigration debate in Germany, and the far-right in Europe gaining increasing popularity as the only viable alternative to address the electorate’s socio-economic concerns while pushing for the adoption of a more hardliner approach on immigration.
It also needs to be understood within the ambit of the ongoing Israel–Hamas conflict and the Ukrainian crisis, which have resulted in widespread anti-Semitism, racist ethno-nationalism, and vilifying rhetoric against Jews propounded by Neo-Nazis across Europe and the United States. Ukrainian neo-Nazi groups like Azov Batallion have showcased Nazi insignia on their uniforms. This group has been integrated into the Ukrainian armed forces to fight against Russia’s military actions.
Music’s role within the far-right extremist culture is critical to understanding why concerts and musical gatherings have retained their prominence and have attracted an increasing number of recruits to the racially divisive ideological belief and value system. Robert Futrell and Pete Simi have explained that
‘The music does more than convey anger, hatred, and outrage towards racial enemies; like all music, it is heavy with emotions like pride, dignity, love, and pleasure, which creates a collective bond that strengthens members’ commitment to the cause.’2
Neo-Nazi music has provided some youth with the opportunity to freely advocate and glamourise their extremist propaganda and violence, and indulge in proscribed symbolic gestures. Moreover, it has forged ethno-nationalist, emotive and community ties that surpass territorial boundaries.
While neo-Nazi black metal initially appeared to have burst onto the musical scene in the 1990s, music’s role in promoting a racist worldview has its roots in the anti-Semitic compositions created by Richard Wagner, who was celebrated by Adolf Hitler and in the Third Reich’s efforts to ban music considered to be ‘degenerate’, i.e., associated with Jews.3 Violence is encouraged, aided and abetted among neo-Nazis in this industry and against those considered as the ‘other’, including police officials and members of the LGBTQ+ community.4
As part of its investigative report, VICE News has pointed out a critical fact that must be considered while strengthening efforts to clamp down on the occurrence of such activities and framing counter-extremism strategies. It notes that
‘These music events serve as a key revenue stream for the traditional neo-Nazi underground scene, with much of the money raised put back into far-right activity. These activities include financing the publication of political material, organising events, covering legal fees for extremists who fall foul of the law.’5
The sale of tickets, merchandise, memorabilia and catering leading up to and during such events is expected to facilitate the financing of extremist agendas and dissemination of a divisive ideology riddled with hate and linkages to the Nazi era.
Additionally, Identitarianism is a movement which has denounced Islam, immigration, pluralism, globalism and refugees, has been associated with anti-Semitic figures like Martin and Brittany Sellner. It is believed to play a central role in facilitating the establishment of bridges between trans-national far-right extremists who are in attendance for such concerts.6
This specific brand of black metal musical sub-culture features Nazi symbols and demonises liberals, left-leaning politicians and minorities. For example, in the past, Erschiessungskommando, a neo-Nazi band, released a song the lyrics of which explicitly targeted a left-leaning member of Thuringia’s State Parliament, Katharina König-Press—‘You will die cruelly, that is not the question’—and her father, a vocal opponent of far-right extremism.7 Notably, Thuringia is one of the key bastions of Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, a far-right party in Germany), which has been declared as extremist along with its youth wing in several states across the country by the domestic intelligence agency.
Organisers and attendees of these music concerts rely on encrypted channels or those whose membership is closely regulated by far-right elements to avoid being prosecuted by the authorities for their deliberations and actions. This explains why there is often much ambiguity and loopholes regarding the precise logistical details of most of the events and the attendees’ details, among others.
At the same time, relatively small-scale gatherings such as those held in Hungary in November 2023 organised by Nordic Sun Records mentioned on its website the relevant details—the date of the musical events, the entrance fee, bands performing on said dates, and the area in which the events would be held.8 The brazen attitude displayed by the promoters signals widespread complicity of authorities and political elites, perhaps even Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who has been known to attend several far-right events. Orban’s policies have led to the ascendance of far-right values which has nurtured a fertile environment for neo-Nazi extremist groups to prosper.
Notably, France, Hungary, Ukraine, Germany and Italy are some of the countries which (whether due to the backing of far-right elements who might have infiltrated various state institutions covertly or overtly) now play host and incubator even perhaps, to well-known far-right elements and a neo-Nazi black metal scene. In fact, former Ukrainian Prime Minister Oleksiy Honcharuk and former Minister of Temporarily Occupied Territories, IDPs and Veterans Oksana Koliada attended a neo-Nazi concert held in Kyiv in October 2019, where the main attraction was a holocaust denier neo-Nazi band, Sokyra Peruna.9
After the pandemic abruptly disrupted Asgardsrei, a festival considered to have been critical in constructing ‘a pan-European community of right-wing extremists’,10 Call of Terror and Hot Shower could generate greater traction and unprecedented revenue, and could even replace Asgardsrei as the epicentre of the neo-Nazi black metal congregation.
Conclusion
Neo-Nazis have exploited music’s potency to generate a cult-based following among radicalised individuals. This has resulted in strengthening the far-right scene across the Atlantic and networks forged by individuals with shared interests. While there is a dearth of information about the precise attendees of these concerts, a rough estimate stands at a few hundred. It must be understood that those who fall into this category are hardened extremists who can carry out significant damage and promote far-right propaganda, especially with social media and encrypted forums at their disposal.
Despite the abovementioned warning signs and seriousness of these threats visible to policymakers and intelligence agencies, the announcement of Call of Terror and Hot Shower and other simultaneous small-scale gatherings indicate that they have been largely disregarded. As a result, given the swelling support for far-right populist politicians and agendas internationally, it is unlikely that serious efforts will be undertaken to clamp down on them in the foreseeable future. These developments can be expected to have a long-term and damaging effect on efforts by moderate politicians and allied agencies to conserve globalist and pluralist societies across communities, resulting in growing fissures and socio-economic polarisation.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Turkiye effectively leveraged its NATO membership to secure benefits aligned with its defence, counter-terrorism and foreign policy priorities, vis-à-vis Sweden’s accession bid.
Introduction
Turkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan signed a presidential decree on 25 January 2024 approving the ratification law passed by the Turkish Grand National Assembly to allow Sweden to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).1 This decree formally promulgated Turkiye’s ratification of Sweden’s NATO accession agreement that the Turkish Parliament adopted on 23 January 2024. Turkiye though extracted substantial concessions from Sweden and other nations in exchange for approving Sweden’s bid to join NATO. While Turkiye supports NATO expansion to counter Russian aggression, it leveraged its position as an existing member with veto power to negotiate benefits aligned with its national interests.
Arms Embargo
Turkiye initially opposed Sweden’s bid when Sweden formally decided to pursue NATO membership in May 2022 in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. To secure Ankara’s support, Sweden authorised military equipment deliveries to Turkiye in September 2022, reversing restrictions imposed in October 2019.2 These included electronic systems, software and technical assistance from Swedish defence companies. The licensing decision by Sweden was taken in consultations with the cross-party Export Control Council to ensure broad political support. This decision reflected the changed defence and security circumstances based on Sweden’s NATO membership bid and the importance of cooperation with NATO allies like Turkiye. Sweden assessed cooperation with Turkiye through NATO as essential for national and mutual security interests.
PKK Concerns
One specific condition Turkiye set for approving Sweden’s NATO membership bid was that Sweden stop providing support to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). As per Turkiye’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, over its more than 35 years of insurgency against the Turkish State, PKK, designated as a terrorist organisation by Turkiye, the US, the UK and the European Union, has been responsible for over 40,000 fatalities through its violent tactics to advance the Kurdish nationalist cause.3 Turkiye had accused Sweden of harbouring PKK members and allowing PKK fundraising and recruiting on its soil. To address Turkiye’s concerns, Sweden amended its constitution, changed counter-terrorism laws, and expanded counter-terrorism cooperation against the PKK as per the 2022 Trilateral Memorandum between Sweden, Finland and Turkiye.4
The Swedish Government adopted a new comprehensive national strategy to address the evolving threat from violent extremism and terrorism.5 This updated comprehensive strategy will mobilise various security agencies, including the Swedish Security Service, Police, Contingencies Agency and the Swedish Centre for Preventing Violent Extremism. Sweden’s Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson justified the shift due to the insufficient nature of the previous framework given the heightened risks, signifying a strategic priority to reinforce counter-terrorism policies and institutions against violent groups.6
In July 2023, Sweden and Turkiye agreed to continue cooperation through the Permanent Joint Mechanism established at the 2022 Madrid NATO Summit, as well as a new bilateral Security Compact that will meet annually at the ministerial level and create working groups as needed.7 After a series of negotiations and commitments from Sweden to crack down on PKK activities, Turkiye declared that Sweden had adequately satisfied this membership criterion related to the militant Kurdish group.
With this PKK-related stipulation met to Turkiye’s satisfaction alongside security assurances, Turkiye formally ratified Sweden’s accession to the NATO alliance.8 However, as per media reports, there is a prevailing sense of discontent within the Swedish Kurdish community. Members of the sizeable Kurdish population, comprising an estimated 50,000–100,000 individuals, hailing from Turkiye, Iran, Iraq and Syria, feel targeted by the Swedish authorities amid efforts to appease Erdogan’s demands.9
US Approves F-16 Aircraft
On 26 January 2024, the US State Department authorised a potential Foreign Military Sale to Turkiye involving the purchase of 40 new F-16 aircraft and the modernisation of 79 existing F-16s to V-Configuration at an approximate cost of US$ 23 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) officially informed Congress of this prospective sale.10 The proposed sale aims to assist Turkiye, a NATO ally, in expanding and modernising its F-16 fleet, addressing the impending retirement of older aircraft. By acquiring these new and upgraded aircraft, Turkiye seeks to bolster its defence capabilities, contribute to NATO missions for regional security, defend NATO allies, and uphold interoperability with US and NATO forces.
Notably, in December 2020, the US imposed sanctions on Turkiye’s Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB) under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017 (CAATSA) legislation for procuring the Russian S-400 surface-to-air missile system.11 Despite repeated warnings from the US about security risks and boosting Russia’s defence sector, Turkiye decided to acquire the S-400. Consequently, Turkiye was suspended from the F-35 programme, given the S-400’s incompatibility with NATO systems.
On 26 January 2024, US Senator Ben Cardin, Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, highlighted that he had predicated approval of the F-16 sale to Turkiye on the condition that Ankara support Stockholm’s NATO accession bid. While acknowledging Turkiye’s strategic value as a regional NATO ally, Cardin specifically conveyed that ongoing discussions aimed to compel improvements in Turkiye’s human rights record on issues like the imprisonment of journalists and civil society leaders, cooperation on holding Russia accountable for aggression against Ukraine, and inflammatory rhetoric regarding the Middle East.12
On 14 February 2024, US Ambassador to Turkiye Jeff Flake emphasised the importance of selling F-16 fighter jets to Turkiye, arguing it would strengthen NATO, ensure future interoperability between allies, and enhance Turkiye’s capacity to contribute to collective security, having the Alliance’s second-largest military.13 He contended that improved US–Turkiye relations would advance American security, power and prosperity interests across multiple fronts.
Flake also highlighted Turkiye’s expanding domestic defence industry production of drones, components, engines and artillery as integral to the US defence supply chain and NATO strength. He cited a partnership with Turkish defence firms to increase diminished US munition stockpiles that have been heavily tapped to assist Ukraine against Russia’s invasion. Flake noted that new Texas production lines purchased from a Turkish defence company by 2025 are expected to supply 30 per cent of all American-made 155 mm artillery rounds, further exemplifying the benefits of US–Turkiye defence industry collaboration.
Canada and Arms Exports
The Canadian Government found credible evidence that some Canadian military goods and technologies exported to Turkiye, specifically sensors integrated into Turkish Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), have been utilised in the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Libya and Syria, contrary to Canada’s export permit requirements and end-use assurances.14 Therefore, on 16 April 2020, Canada implemented a presumptive denial policy for applications to export or broker munitions to Turkiye.15 Notably, Canada is bound under the international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), as its Article 11 covering diversion specifies that State Parties take measures to prevent the diversion of conventional arms.16
After Turkiye’s ratification of Sweden’s application to NATO membership, Canada lifted the presumptive denial policy for applications to export or broker munitions and related items to Turkiye on 29 January 2024. Applications will now be assessed on a case-by-case basis as per Canada’s risk assessment framework and ATT commitments. For items where Turkish government entities are the end user, exporters must obtain end-use assurances from the importer stating whether items will be re-exported outside NATO and outlining the permitted end use.17 An established notification procedure covers certain components, like the Wescam sensors used in Turkiye’s Bayraktar TB2 drones and specified dual-use goods and arms, as part of the lawful international arms trade18 to ensure accountability and transparency.
Turkiye has expressed that it will soon achieve self-sufficiency in manufacturing key drone components currently imported from abroad.19 This includes achieving domestic production capabilities for specialised optical sensors and other technologies utilised in unmanned aerial systems like the Bayraktar TB2. By localising production, Turkiye aims to establish its own reliable and sovereign supply chain for strategic aerospace and defence equipment needs.
Conclusion
Through a transactional approach tied to Sweden’s NATO accession process, Turkiye effectively leveraged concessions from Sweden and other NATO allies, including lifting of restrictions on arms exports and expanding security cooperation. Going forward, Turkiye will have to demonstrate greater accountability and transparency on issues like human rights, regional conflicts and end-user usage of arms to address concerns from the US, Canada and other NATO allies.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The border region between Turkiye and Syria continues to remain highly unstable, posing a potential risk of armed conflict.
The outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011 led to the displacement of nearly 12 million people to neighbouring countries such as Turkiye, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt.1 Turkiye hosts approximately 3.6 million Syrian refugees, making it the country with the largest refugee population from Syria.2 Turkiye shares the longest land border with Syria amongst its neighbouring nations. Initially, Turkiye adopted an 'open door' policy to admit victims of the Syrian civil war into the country. However, as the situation in Syria continued to deteriorate, Turkiye gradually adopted measures to protect its borders.
During the Syrian civil war, the Kurds in Syria fought against the Assad regime as well as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The Kurds declared autonomy in Kurdish-majority north-eastern Syria and established the Rojava autonomous region. This emerged as a security challenge for Turkiye, which feared that the Turkish Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) would be further strengthened by their Syrian compatriots, the People's Protection Units (YPG).
Syrian refugees in Turkiye and the rising threat from Kurds in northern Syria pushed Ankara to take steps to enhance its border security. Ankara decided to create a buffer zone in northern Syria along its borders which it termed as ‘safe zones’.3 Its objectives were primarily to contain the flow of Syrian refugees and to ensure that the northern Syrian region is not used by the Kurds to launch attacks on Turkiye. As the Syrian crisis continued to linger, Ankara decided to settle Syrian refugees in the safe zone. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu stated in 2015 that once ISIS was eliminated from northern Syria, the safe zones would naturally emerge as havens for displaced Syrian refugees.4
Turkiye took a series of measures to protect its border with Syria. It built four-metre high concrete wall with barbed wire and employed various security measures, including aerial and land surveillance systems, active border patrol units, among other steps.5 Turkiye also launched military operations to eradicate ISIS presence. It launched Operation Euphrates Shield in August 2016 to eradicate ISIS presence from the Syrian border area and prevent the establishment of a ‘terror corridor’.6 More than 2,000 ISIS terrorists were neutralised in this operation. In January 2018, Turkiye launched Operation Olive Branch to counter the Kurdish and ISIS threats in Afrin. Turkiye claimed that it cleared an area of approximately 2,000 Sq kms by March 2018. Again, in October 2019, Turkiye launched Operation Peace Spring to liberate approximately 8,234 Sq kms of territory in northern Syria, extending up to 30 kilometres from the border, which was previously controlled by various terrorist factions.7 Similarly, Operation Winter Eagle was conducted in February 2022 and Operation Claw-Sword was carried out in November 2022 primarily against Kurdish militia groups.
Turkiye justified its military interventions in Syria on multiple grounds, including the prevention of potential waves of migration, counterterrorism, and protection of its borders. Turkiye has been able to keep the Kurdish militias away from the border and has created a buffer zone. This has allowed Turkiye to build the infrastructure required for settling the refugees in those areas. In 2023, Turkiye's Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu stated that over 550,000 Syrian refugees have returned to Syria since the creation of the safe zone.8 He also stated that Turkiye is talking with the Syrian government and urged the UN and the international community for support in this regard.
Syrian Response
Following Turkiye’s military interventions and creation of a safe zone in Northern Syria, the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates stated that Turkiye’s actions were blatant violations of international law and the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Syria. Syria alleged that the Turkish behaviour contradicted the understandings and outputs of the Astana process. Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal stated that as per international law, the Turkish Armed Forces must take all possible measures to avoid and minimise the loss of civilian life, injuries to civilians and damage to civilian objects during military operations. He also added that Turkiye should provide compensation for civilian deaths and injuries as well.9
As for the Astana process, it was initiated in 2017 by Russia, Iran and Turkiye to help resolve the Syrian conflict. It focused on de-escalation zones, ceasefire monitoring, and humanitarian aid delivery, with initial meetings held in the Kazakh capital, Astana. The Astana process aimed to create conditions for voluntary return of refugees by establishing stability and security, but challenges such as ongoing violence and destruction caused by the civil war hindered success.
The 21st round of Astana process was held in January 2024, where issues relating to the fight against terrorism, regional developments, political process, the return of Syrians as well as matters of humanitarian assistance were discussed. The Joint Statement released at the end of the meeting called for
‘continuation of efforts for the restoration of relations between Türkiye and Syria on the basis of mutual respect, goodwill and good-neighborly relations in order to combat terrorism, create proper conditions for the safe, voluntary and dignified return of Syrians with the involvement of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), revitalize the political process and ensure the unimpeded flow of humanitarian aid to all Syrians.’10
Conclusion
Turkiye's establishment of safe zones in Northern Syria served a dual purpose – to create a protective buffer area and facilitate the relocation of Syrian refugees from Turkiye, while preventing the spill over of terrorism into Turkish territory. However, the volatile nature of the region, characterised by the presence of various armed groups and conflicting interests of different states and non-state groups, have been the major challenges for Turkiye.
The conflict in Syria meanwhile has reached a stalemate, presenting limited prospects for a prompt political resolution. While violence has significantly decreased, sporadic skirmishes persist in both the northwest and northeast regions of Syria. The Assad government exerts control over approximately 70 per cent of Syrian territory. The Syrian government's efforts to reclaim territories lost during the civil war adds another layer of complexity to the situation.
Five foreign powers (Russia, Iran, Turkey, Israel, and the United States) have military presence in the region. Additionally, the remnants of ISIS periodically launch attacks, further complicating the situation. Consequently, the border region between Turkiye and Syria remains highly unstable, posing a potential risk of armed conflict.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Despite a difficult economic situation, the Taliban have advertised their efforts towards infrastructure development over the last two years.
The Taliban have advertised their efforts towards infrastructure development over the last two years, since taking over power in August 2021. The Taliban Deputy Minister of Economy Abdul Latif Nazari stated in August 2023 that “overall 3575 development projects of $1.9 billion have been launched in the field of infrastructure, health, energy and transportation”.1 Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid stated that funding for these developmental projects in 2023 was more than the previous year.2
Regional connectivity projects such as the Khaf–Herat Railway Project, a connectivity link between Afghanistan and Iran, are touted to be ready for operation, as per the spokesperson of Afghanistan Railway Authority in December 2023.3 The Ministry of Mines and Petroleum in March 2023 stated that they were genuinely interested in the Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (TAPI) project as it will create direct or indirect employment and will help in energy production. Spokesperson Mujahid noted that several meetings were held with the countries involved in the project, to help take it forward.4 TAPI was on the agenda when the acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi along with the Minister for Mines and Petroleum met Turkmenistan Foreign Minister Rasit Meredow on 17 December 2023.5
Another regional connectivity project, the Trans-Afghanistan railway project, was signed in February 2021 between Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the project expected to cost $5 billion, prior to the Taliban taking over power. The Taliban government are now trying to secure funding for the project from Qatar or the UAE.6
As for major domestic projects, the 285-km long Qosh Tapa Canal Project aims to convert 550,000 hectares of desert into farmland by diverting 20 per cent water from the Amu Darya River. This project is being built in the Kaldar District of northern Balkh Province. On 11 October 2023, Taliban Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Abdul Ghani Baradar inaugurated the second phase of this project. Officials of the Islamic Emirate have assured that they will address concerns, if any, of regional countries such as Uzbekistan, who had expressed apprehension about the project.7 The Deputy Minister of Water and Energy, Mujib Rahman Akhundzada, stated that a plan to build a hydroelectric dam on the Kunar River was not being implemented immediately though due to its high cost. It is envisaged that the dam will irrigate one and a half lakh acres of agricultural land and produce 45 megawatts of electricity.8
Apart from these mega projects that are being constructed or being planned, the Taliban regime has announced many road construction projects.9 As per the Taliban-run public works ministry, 90 maintenance projects have already been completed in 2023 and it plans to initiate 110 developmental projects, which include 30 bridge piers, 1500 check bridge piers, Kabul–Kandahar Highway, Afghan Ring Road and the reconstruction of the Salang Highway.10 Afghanistan electricity company, Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS) has also developed a five-year strategic plan to develop 710 MW of renewable energy, with funding from internal sources. On 26 July 2023, DABS released annual report on major achievements in 2022 noting that electricity line from Kajaki to Kandahar, which is 170-km long, has been completed.11
Economic Realities
The Taliban’s focus on infrastructure development though is up against the hard realities of a difficult economic situation. After the Taliban took over power in August 2021, the country witnessed a major decline in its economy. The United States froze the Afghan Central Bank reserves of about $7 billion and the European Union and the World Bank stopped disbursing aid. Sanctions were also imposed. The World Bank notes that Afghanistan’s services sector, which contributes 45 per cent of the country’s GDP, shrank by 6.5 per cent in 2022, following a 30 per cent drop in 2021. The agriculture sector which contributes 36 per cent of GDP declined by 6.6 per cent while the industrial sector also saw a contraction of 5.7 per cent in 2022.12
According to the Afghanistan Economic Monitor released by the World Bank, Afghanistan government collected a total revenue of $2.3 billion for the initial ten months of 2023-2024.13 Such finances will not be sufficient, therefore, to implement the projects they have planned and are in progress. The role of funding and expertise from regional countries like China and India, therefore, assumes significance.
Chinese Investments
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s surprise visit to Afghanistan on 24 March 2022 and invitation extended to the Taliban to attend the Third Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held on 30–31 March 2022 in Tunxi in East China's Anhui Province was proof of China’s proactive stance in its engagement with the Taliban. China had earlier made investments in the Aynak copper mine. At the Fourth Pakistan–China Foreign Ministers’ Strategic Dialogue held in Islamabad on 6 May 2023, it announced that it wanted to extend the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Afghanistan.
The Taliban have shown interest in CPEC and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with the hope that it would strengthen the Afghan economy and bring in investments. In October 2023, Taliban Commerce Minister Haji Nooruddin Azizi said: “China, which invests all over the world, should also invest in Afghanistan... we have everything they need, such as lithium, copper and iron”.14
In January 2023, China National Petroleum Corporation signed an agreement with the Taliban to invest $150 million. In the coming three years, it will invest $540 million dollars to extract oil from the Amu Darya basin and develop an oil reserve in the country’s northern Sar-e Pul Province.15
Despite China’s bid to extend CPEC to Afghanistan, the Wakhan corridor continues to raise China’s angst given concerns about possible entry of Uyghur terrorists through this route.16 In September 2023, the Taliban’s Ambassador to China, Mohammad Sadiq, mentioned that he had detailed discussions with Chinese authorities regarding the commencement of traffic through the Wakhan Corridor.17 Opening of this corridor would strengthen trade links between the two countries if the Taliban manages to address the Chinese concerns.
India’s Stakes
India is still the largest regional donor for Afghanistan and fifth largest in the world with an investment of $3.4 billion in Afghan reconstruction, development and humanitarian efforts. On 14 August 2022, the Taliban requested India to complete its pending projects and even requested to train their security personnel.18 This came close on the heels of India announcing its presence in Afghanistan under Technical Mission in June 2022.19
In December 2022, Taliban’s Minister for Urban Development, Hamdullah Nomani, interacted with members of the Indian technical team in Kabul where he talked about renewal of Indian projects, invited investment in New Kabul Town, raised visa issues and urged more scholarships for Afghan students. After this interaction, many senior diplomats met with Taliban officials in West Asian countries.
Recently, the Indian Embassy in UAE invited Afghan envoy Badruddin Haqqani for Republic day celebrations at Abu Dhabi. Indian delegations have participated in regional cooperation initiative meeting organised by Taliban in Kabul on 29 January 2024. The Ministry of External Affairs on 1 February 2024 reiterated India’s relation with the Afghan people and acknowledged that Indian diplomats have been engaging the Taliban in “various formats”.20
India’s efforts have also been acknowledged by the Taliban. Hafiz Zia Ahmed, the Deputy spokesperson of Foreign Ministry, recently shared the statement attributed to an Indian representative on social media platform X which noted that:
“India actively takes part in international and regional initiatives regarding Afghanistan, and supports every effort leading to the stability and the development of Afghanistan”21
Conclusion
The Taliban are likely to make more efforts in the coming future aimed at cultivating other countries for investments to boost the Afghan economy. India should continue to calibrate its moves towards the Taliban government to ensure that its humanitarian and possible developmental re-engagement promote an environment of trust and understanding and help the Afghan population benefit from its intervention.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Dynamics of Central Asian Engagement with the Taliban Government
Jason Wahlang
February 19, 2024
Geopolitical and geo-economic reasons account for the Central Asian nations, barring Tajikistan, following a multi-vector approach towards the Afghan Taliban regime.
On 29 December 2023, Kazakhstan announced the removal of the Taliban from its list of terror organisations. This was the latest step taken by a Central Asian country in attempting to accommodate the regime in the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Apart from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan have engaged diplomatically with the Taliban. The realignment in their approach marks a stark contrast to their acrimonious attitude towards the first Taliban regime during the 1990s. However, Tajikistan continues to take a hostile stance toward the Taliban regime. Geopolitical and geo-economic considerations have ensured that these nations, barring Tajikistan, maintain a multi-vector approach towards the Afghan Taliban regime so as to create space for cooperation and collaboration.
In the 1990s, the regional countries, excluding Turkmenistan, had adopted a hostile approach towards the Taliban, fearing spill over of radicalised Deobandi ideology spreading from a destabilised Afghanistan. This was despite their shared socio-cultural connect. Tajikistan, by then, served as a cautionary tale of the impact of radicalisation, having experienced a civil war between the Islamists and the first post-Soviet government under Emomali Rahmon.
Post the collapse of the first Taliban regime in the 2001, the major concern of the Central Asian states was on the home-grown terror groups who were engaged in jihad in Afghanistan such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Islamic Jihadi Union. These groups had pledged allegiance to the Taliban for decades until the rise of Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP).
Central Asian countries, though, have refrained from bestowing official diplomatic recognition on the Taliban. Nonetheless, frequent engagement between representatives at various levels has been established since 2021 after Taliban took over Kabul. Turkmenistan, owing to its neutrality policy, has maintained continuity in its approach towards the regime as it did in the 1990s. Along with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, it has also maintained trade relations with Afghanistan and assisted in the reintegration of the Afghan economy into the regional economy.1
One of the first countries to establish direct talks with the Afghan regime was Uzbekistan. It has maintained its ties with the Taliban for over two years to shield the country from attacks launched from the bordering areas of Northern Afghanistan (Hairatan town in Balkh Province) near Termez, Uzbekistan and also to safeguard its projects within Afghanistan such as the Termez-Mazar-I-Sharif-Peshawar Railroad.2 With the Uzbeks following a more open foreign policy3 under the leadership of Shavkat Mirziyoyev, it suits them to interact with the Islamic Emirate. Recently, a temporary new chief was appointed in the Afghanistan embassy in Uzbekistan who belonged to the Taliban after Ahmed Khalid Eli, appointed by the previous Afghan government completed his tenure.4
The Kazakh government has taken initiatives to stabilise Afghanistan and develop the country's infrastructure to integrate Afghanistan into the regional economy. Kazakhstan participates in cross border transport development projects, energy and agriculture.5 Furthermore, it has provided much-needed humanitarian aid (approximately $472 million)6 and has delivered 70 per cent of total flour exported to Afghanistan to overcome food insecurity.7 During his visit to Kabul on 3 August 2023, the Kazakh Deputy Prime Minister Serik Zhumangarin invited the Taliban to open a trade mission in Astana. The economic ties have persevered even after the Taliban take over, with joint trade totalling an approximate $ 987.9 million in 2022.8
The lack of a contiguous border has allowed the Kyrgyz government to adopt a more calculated approach. The conveyance of caution about the security situation in Afghanistan at various intervals has been accompanied by an extension of humanitarian aid and a reiteration of the need to maintain trade ties. One such example was the visit of the Taalatbek Masarykov, Kyrgyz President’s Special Representative to Kabul, where he held discussion on avenues of cooperation and pledged to provide assistance in various sectors.9 Bishkek recently provided 111 tons of aid to Afghanistan as part of its humanitarian aid assistance.10 Another important diplomatic visit has been that of the Kyrgyz Minister of Economy and Commerce to Kabul in January 2024 to discuss improving trade relations and enhancing the import and export capacity.11
The Turkmen government, retaining its earlier stance (based on positive neutrality) on the Taliban, was one of the first countries to establish communication with the new Afghan regime. The Turkmenistan Afghanistan Pakistan India (TAPI) project is vital to their relationship, and the Taliban has provided a security guarantee for the pipeline.12 Moreover, there is also a delegation-level visit from Ashgabat to discuss the Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan electricity project.13
Despite being the first regional country to welcome a Taliban envoy to the Afghan embassy in Ashgabat, the Turkmen-Afghan relationship has experienced some tension recently. Clashes between the border guards on both sides in the Khamab border in Jawzjan province resulted in the alleged loss of lives of one Afghan civilian and four Turkmen soldiers.14 However, their ties continue to have some space for negotiations, with projects being prioritised.
Tajikistan has emerged as the only regional actor that has refused to parlay with the Taliban owing to historical complexities and the latter’s treatment of ethnic Tajiks. Like other countries of Central Asia, it has expressed concern regarding the spill over of terrorism and security threats that could recreate the conflict-ridden situation that was discernible during the civil war.
The presence of Tehrik-e Taliban Tajikistan in the bordering areas (Kuf Ab, Khawan, Maimay, Nusay and Shekay in the Northern Province of Badakhshan) has further hindered cooperation between the two.15
Tajikistan has historically been the most vocal opponent of the Taliban regime. In the past, it had supported the anti-Taliban resistance forces led by fellow Tajik Ahmed Shah Masood and later the National Resistance Front led by Masood’s son. The Taliban recruitment of Ismaili Shias from Gorno Badakhshan as part of its cohorts has added to the animosity. The main reason for such inclusion has been the conflict between the Gorno Badakhshan population and the Tajik government which has seen major protests in the past year.
Central Asian Concerns
As mentioned earlier, security serves as a key driver behind Central Asian countries’ engagement with the Taliban. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, mainly, have suffered from terrorism emanating from Afghanistan in the past. For example, groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Islamic Jihadi Union (IJU), and Tehrik-e- Taliban Tajikistan (TTT) have sought support from groups based in Afghanistan. TTT’s presence near the border in the hostile Gorno Badakhshan district of Tajikistan is a significant security concern for the Emomali Rahmon government.
For Uzbekistan, the strong linkages between the ISKP and the IMU are greatly concerning. The IMU has remained one of the primary security threats for the Uzbek nation since the first Taliban period. Despite the group’s apparent weakened status, it has received support from the ISKP, with the IMU shifting its allegiance from the Taliban to the ISKP in 2015. This has also pitted IMU against the Taliban. The ISKP also sees the Taliban as an organisation that has shifted from its objective to create an Islamic State and has been interested to establish network with the ‘Kafirs’(infields). The recent attacks on Uzbekistan are seen as one important reason for engaging the Taliban with the hope that it would neutralise threats to Uzbekistan’s aspirations in Afghanistan. The same can be said for Turkmenistan, with threats of regime change being given by the ISKP from the across the border.
The expulsion of Afghan refugees from Pakistan could contribute to escalating socio-economic instability in Central Asia, a region undergoing challenges such as surging housing prices and inflation due to the influx of Russians amid mobilisation drives. Earlier, refugee movement from Afghanistan toward Central Asia after August 2021 was restricted by the Central Asian leadership, fearing that it could lead to instability in the region.
Regardless of the assurances extended by the Taliban’s Defence Ministry on the TAPI pipeline and projects linked to the Belt and Road Initiative, ISKP challenge to these projects remain. Currently, the ISKP has just used its media channels (Al-Azaim, Voice of Khorasan, Movaraunnaha, Khurasan Wilayah News, Tor Bairghuna, Al-Millat Media, and Khurasan Ghag Radio) to highlight the projects and has vowed to destroy any foreign projects on Afghan soil.
Additionally, the discriminatory treatment faced by Afghanistan’s ethnic minorities has been a concerning issue even for those Central Asian regimes engaging the Taliban who recall how the Tajik, Turkmen, and Uzbek minorities were mistreated and persecuted by Taliban 1.0. The equitable treatment of minorities remains one of the primary conditions required to be fulfilled by the Afghan leaders to gain diplomatic recognition from the international community, including the Central Asian countries.
Conclusion
Central Asian nations, barring Tajikistan, have established a limited and calculated relationship with the Taliban. The Central Asian nations have taken into consideration the crucial dynamics of security and economy while accommodating the Taliban in the current geopolitical complexities that are plaguing the region.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
3. Shavkat Mirziyoyev, in an address to the Oily Majlis (Parliament), stressed that it would Uzbekistan's primary goal is to “strengthened multi-faceted and mutually beneficial cooperation with its neighbouring countries and strategic partners in the world and international organizations.” See Bahtiyar Abdulkerimov and Burc Eruygur, “Uzbekistan to strengthen cooperation with neighbouring countries, strategic partners: President”Anadolu Agency, 20 December 2022.
13. The project that came up in 2018 is a high-voltage power transmission line to deliver a long-term power supply, support Afghanistan's energy needs, and enable power trade and exchange between the three countries. The project attempts to transfer up to 4,000 megawatts of power from Turkmenistan into Afghanistan and Pakistan. See Asian Development Bank, “Power Interconnection Project to Strengthen Power Trade Between Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Pakistan,” 28 February 2018.
Far-right extremism is spreading in the European body politic at a rapid pace.
The first-ever electoral win of Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands late last year, which saw it win 37 out of the 150 House of Representatives seats, highlights the growth of far-right extremism across Europe. PVV is considered a far-right political party due to its extremist positions on issues such as border control, immigration, asylum and Islam. Wilders’ electoral success aligns with the region-wide ethno-nationalist and anti-globalist tilt and a retreating embrace of multi-culturalism, the rule of law, and liberalism, which formed the bedrock of the European political system since 1945. Similar scenarios have unfolded in other European countries like Sweden, Finland, Poland, France and Italy, where the far-right has established a prominent presence.
Key Drivers
Far-right extremist beliefs and conspiracy theories promote a hierarchical narrative wherein non-Whites are deemed inferior to the White race and disseminate a warning of the Islamisation of Europe. Europe’s restive immigrant population has contributed to exacerbating the far-right extremist threat across the continent. The influx of migrants over the decades has festered resentment within the local European population, who fear the undermining of ethno-national identities and access to adequate social and economic opportunities.
This has resulted in swelling support for exclusionary nationalist rhetoric,1 rising instances of Islamophobia, and dissemination of conspiracy theories such as eco-fascism and the Great Replacement, worsening the crisis. The Great Replacement Theory, endorsed by far-right political leaders such as Marine Le Pen, Viktor Orbán and Matteo Salvini, asserts that ‘replacist elites’ are purposely replacing White Christian communities with multi-ethnic and multi-religious groups through illegal immigration.2
Furthermore, conservative intellectuals and organisations have openly expressed xenophobic views. Douglas Murray, in his book The Strange Death of Europe, argued that rising immigration levels have resulted in the ‘streets in cold and rainy northern towns of Europe filled with people dressed with the foothills of Pakistan or the sandstorms of Arabia.’3 Many White supremacists and conspiracy theorists frequently highlight census data and express concerns that White European citizens will become a minority by 2044.4
Eco-fascists attribute environmental degradation to a surging immigration population. They advocate creating homogenous White Christian communities.5 This ideology has inspired incidents of far-right extremism, including the Christchurch shooting in March 2019. The Euro crisis, resulting in large-scale unemployment and the COVID-19 outbreak, which devastated economies and various industries, further deepened anxieties and the impact of continued immigration into their countries.
Additionally, self-radicalisation through technological advancements and social media has heightened the risks of lone-wolf extremist acts carried out by the far-right. Technological advancements have also facilitated the cultivation of online communities among the far-right on 8chan and Facebook, among other forums.
Right-Wing Extremist Incidents
One of the earliest physical manifestations of far-right extremism in Europe occurred when Anders Breivik, a neo-Nazi, killed 77 people in Norway in July 2011. His manifesto and actions, driven by his apprehension about the Islamisation of the predominantly Christian West, have been emulated by others years after his arrest.6 In June 2019, Walter Lübcke, a Christian Democratic Union leader, was fatally shot near the city of Kessel by Stephan Ernst, a neo-Nazi for his pro-immigration views.7
A few months leading up to this attack in Germany, Christchurch in New Zealand was devastated by mass shootings in March 2019, in which over 50 people were killed. These attacks were carried out on two mosques by another neo-Nazi, Brenton Tarrant, who was inspired by Breivik. Additionally, a boy based in Darlington was arrested in the United Kingdom as part of an investigation into far-right extremism. It was found that he was an active participant in racist online forums and possessed information useful for committing terrorist acts, such as manuals for making explosives.8
In December 2022, adherents of the far-right Reichsbürger movement attempted to violently seize power in Germany by overthrowing the democratically-elected government.9 However, their plan was thwarted by German officials following which mass arrests occurred. One of the detainees was Birgit Malsack-Winkemann, a former lawmaker associated with the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party. Raids and seizures were also carried out throughout the country across multiple properties.
More recently, following a stabbing incident near a school in Dublin in December 2023, far-right extremists damaged public infrastructure and targeted police forces. Following the attack, police concluded that unrest was driven by a ‘lunatic, hooligan faction driven by a far-right ideology’ and warned against ‘misinformation’.10 About 34 people were arrested as part of the investigations into the rioting carried out by the far-right.11
Counter-Measures
Various European countries have been taking countermeasures to tackle the scourge of violent extremism. Finland, for instance, since 2012 has put forward National Action Plans after extensive collaboration between governmental and non-governmental organisations, along with researchers and religious communities. These plans contain measures to identify recruitment methods of different radical extremist groups, steps to prevent participation of young people in radical activity, help promote safety and security of premises of religious communities, among other provisions.12
The Swedish Center for Preventing Violent Extremism, established in 2018, is primarily tasked with developing knowledge-based and cross-sector work involved in preventing violent extremism at national, regional and local levels. The Center works to promote the development of preventive work at the national, regional and local levels; strive to attain a high degree of coordination and effectiveness concerning preventive measures; provide support to agencies in addressing issues relating to VE and collect and disseminate information about preventing violent extremism.13 Sweden also appointed a National Coordinator to safeguard democracy against violent extremism in 2015.14
The Netherlands’ National Counter-terrorism Strategy for 2022–26 calls for ‘extra attention’ towards the threat posed by potentially violent, extremist lone actors, flags the need to privilege innovative (technological) solutions to facilitate the detection and combating of the dissemination of violent extremist and terrorist content and calls for measures designed to ensure the safe re-integration of individuals after detention.15 The United Kingdom’s ‘Prevent’ strategy supports police and security agencies in identifying individuals and groups at risk of radicalisation.16
Germany passed the Federal Government’s Strategy to Prevent Extremism and Promote Democracy in 2016 which calls for coordinated efforts by federal, regional and local authorities in association with civil society. More than 700 civil society organisations are funded by the federal government on measures to prevent extremism. Germany has established federal agencies for civic education and anti-discrimination.17 Germany also has initiatives such as Exit Germany which counsels families impacted by right-wing extremism.18
Despite these significant measures, far-right extremism continues to be a sociological challenge that has significantly undermined multi-culturalism, liberal democracy and rules-based order in Europe. Continuing and enhanced cooperation between intelligence agencies, NGOs and community activists is necessary for addressing this critical threat.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Bhutan PM's five-day visit to India in March 2024 which was followed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s two-day visit to Bhutan is expected to ease mutual concerns about a possible border agreement with China.
Overseas visits by heads of state and governments help countries recalibrate their bilateral relations. These engagements play a pivotal role in reinforcing mutual trust and understanding, thereby establishing the groundwork for enduring diplomatic relations. Such high-profile visits provide officials the opportunity to reshape bilateral relationships to the advantage of their countries. Additionally, these interactions serve as catalysts for policy adjustments and political engagement, often garnering considerable attention from the media.
A notable instance of such diplomatic exchange was the visit of Bhutanese Prime Minister Tshering Tobgay, at the invitation of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, from 14 March to 18 March 2024.1 His delegation included various dignitaries from Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Ministry for Industry, Commerce and Employment, and other senior officials from the Royal Government of Bhutan.2 Prime Minister Modi undertook a reciprocal visit to Bhutan three days later on 21–22 March 2024. These visits signify the importance both countries attach to bilateral relations, which has stood the test of time.
Historical Aspects
The enduring friendship between India and Bhutan is rooted in mutual warmth and goodwill, reinforced by frequent high-level exchanges. This bond assumed a lot of significance after India gained independence. India–Bhutan relationship traces its roots back to the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in March–April 1947, when Jawaharlal Nehru, then Vice-President of the interim Viceroy's Executive Council, extended an invitation to the Bhutanese delegation, which marked the beginning of formal engagement between the two nations.
Subsequently, when Nehru became the first prime minister of India, he developed an extremely cordial relationship with Bhutanese King Jigme Dorji Wangchuck. Under their watch, bilateral negotiations ensued, culminating in the signing of the Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendship in 1949. All the succeeding governments in New Delhi have regarded this relationship as important and invested heavily in it. In fact, keeping Bhutanese sensitivities in mind, in 2007, a new treaty of friendship was signed, supplanting the 1949 Treaty as the cornerstone for cooperation and bilateral interactions between the two countries.3 These milestones underscore the historical significance of India–Bhutan bilateral relations, shaping their camaraderie till today.
Prime Minister Modi's visits to Bhutan in 2014, 2019 and now in 2024, have further deepened bilateral cooperation across sectors like hydropower, trade and education. The visit by present King of Bhutan, Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck's to India in September 2022 and subsequent engagements in April 2023 and November 2023 underscored the robust nature of bilateral relations. Additionally, the King's visits to Assam and Maharashtra further strengthened ties between Bhutan and these Indian states. Such high-level engagements continue to shape the strategic partnership between India and Bhutan, fostering regional stability and prosperity.
Geopolitical Dynamics
Bhutanese PM’s visit to India holds a particular significance against the backdrop of Bhutan's economic challenges and its complex relationship with China. PM Tobgay's inaugural visit after assuming office following his party’s success in the 2024 elections proved very useful, with both governments reaffirming their commitment to increased collaboration across various sectors. A joint announcement emphasised its importance for regional stability and prosperity.4
Undoubtedly, India is Bhutan's primary ally for development and has played a pivotal role in Bhutan’s socio-economic progress. India has supported several projects as well as contributed substantially to Bhutan’s developmental aspirations. In early March, just before PM Tobgay’s visit, Bhutan unveiled a 15 billion Bhutanese Ngultrum (Nu) economic stimulus package, with India's backing, which is aimed at alleviating economic slowdown in key sectors such as tourism, technology and small enterprises.5
Hydro-power collaboration is a significant cornerstone of the economic partnership between India and Bhutan. In the joint statement issued after Tobgay’s visit, both parties expressed contentment with the advancements made in the construction of the 1020 MW Punatshangchhu-II hydro-power project and anticipated its commissioning in 2024.6 Furthermore, both countries also agreed to broaden the current India–Bhutan energy alliance to encompass non-hydro renewables like solar and wind energy for enhancing energy efficiency and conservation measures.7
Interestingly, PM Tobgay’s visit took place amid speculations that Bhutan and China are engaged in negotiations concerning their border dispute, which is reportedly at an advanced stage. This has sparked a lot of interest in India due to its implications for regional security. During his first term as prime minister from 2013 to 2018, Tobgay had initially tried to restore stability in bilateral relations after his predecessor, Jigme Thinley, faced accusations of pursuing anti-India policies, leading to India suspending subsidised LPG supplies to Bhutan.
However, as his tenure drew to a close in 2018, PM Tobgay had made a pledge before the National Assembly to cultivate a strategic and enduring relationship with China, aimed at safeguarding Bhutan's national interests, which had raised concerns in India.8 His March 2024 visit to India, immediately after assuming office, is expected to assure New Delhi of his intent to pursue a path of deeper engagement and take bilateral relations forward.
As for Bhutan–China discussions on the border issue, in October 2023, Bhutan's former Foreign Minister Tandi Dorji met Chinese counterpart Wang Yi in Beijing.9 China's statement on the meeting suggests that Bhutan emphasised adherence to the One-China principle and expressed its willingness to collaborate on resolving the boundary issue.10 Earlier, in October 2021, China and Bhutan had agreed on a three-step roadmap to resolve their boundary dispute, four years after the Doklam standoff. India was apprehensive about the potential implications of any such settlement on the status of the Doklam plateau, situated near the Bhutan–China–India tri-junction. Nevertheless, India had urged China to adhere to a 2012 agreement stipulating that tri-junction points between India, China and third countries should be determined in consultation with the relevant nations.
The deliberate Chinese trespasses into Bhutan's northern regions, considered sacred by Bhutan but not by Beijing, along with the claim over Sakteng in eastern Bhutan in 2020, detract attention from China's clear aims in the western area.11 According to Professor Ian Hall of the Griffith Asia Institute, these objectives primarily revolve around resolving the border dispute by acquiring the Doklam plateau. Such an acquisition would bolster China's territorial jurisdiction and apply further pressure on India's Siliguri Corridor, potentially providing leverage for Beijing in future crises with New Delhi.12
Conclusion
The back-to-back visits of Bhutanese Prime Minister to India and the Indian Prime Minister to Bhutan serve as strong reaffirmations of the enduring economic and developmental partnership between the two nations. Prime Minister Modi doubled India's support for Bhutan's Five Year Plan from Rs 5,000 crores to Rs 10,000 crores, showcasing India’s unwavering commitment. India and Bhutan exchanged several MoUs and signed agreements in the fields of energy, trade, digital connectivity, space, rail links and agriculture. Additionally, Bhutan’s King honoured PM Modi with the country’s highest civilian award, acknowledging India’s support during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Following the national elections in January 2024, PM Tobgay's tweet, stating ‘Bhutan is open to Business’, indicated that he considered his visit to India as a positive development for both his government and the nation. However, this statement can have multiple interpretations. For instance, it suggests Bhutan's political leadership's interest in forging diplomatic relations with China and embracing Chinese investments. Bhutan also refused India’s proposal for a motorable road from Bletting in Tawang to Doksum in Bhutan, citing concerns about potential disruption to ongoing boundary negotiations, at a time when it is awaiting resolution of its border dispute with China.13
Therefore, numerous questions remain unanswered. Early in the 1980s, Thimphu quietly relinquished its claim to the 154-square-mile Kula Khari area on its northern border with China, describing that claim was due to ‘cartographic mistakes’.14 Could another territorial concession be made without alerting India? Alternatively, should this visit be seen as a period of tranquillity preceding potential challenges in the bilateral relationship? Or perhaps, it is just Bhutan’s national interests at play.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Resolution 2728, adopted by the United Nations Security Council on 25 March 2024 carries political implications beyond its text, particularly due to the US decision to abstain.
After 171 days of conflict in Gaza, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) finally adopted a resolution demanding an immediate ceasefire for the month of Ramadan. Introduced by Mozambique on behalf of the elected Council members (E-10) on 25 March, Resolution 2728 received 14 votes in favour and one abstention (United States).1 It calls for a ceasefire respected by all parties for lasting peace, demanding the unconditional release of hostages and ensuring humanitarian access.
The resolution ended the state of paralysis of the Security Council and its repeated failures to effectively address the conflict in Gaza. However, despite the unified stance of the Council on ceasefire, Israel's response has raised doubts about the resolution's effectiveness in achieving peace. The US decision to abstain from the vote prompted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to cancel the scheduled visit of his top advisers to the US for discussions on the offensive.2 Two ministers in Netanyahu’s war cabinet have also declared that the country will not abide by the resolution, further complicating the path to peace.3
Security Council and the Gaza War
On 7 October 2023, the Palestinian militant group Hamas launched a large-scale armed attack against Israel, firing thousands of rockets and conducting raids in border areas, resulting in approximately 1,200 civilian deaths and the capture of 253 hostages. In response, Israel conducted air strikes against Hamas in Gaza. Subsequently, on 28 October, Israel initiated a ground offensive with the objective of eliminating Hamas and rescuing the hostages. United Nations reports that since 7 October, over 1,200 Israelis were killed, with more than 5,500 injured, while nearly 32,000 Palestinians were killed and about 73,000 injured.4
Since the conflict began, the Security Council has voted on nine resolutions; however, only two have been adopted. The first three drafts were vetoed by the US. The first resolution on 16 October 2023 drafted by Russia proposed an immediate humanitarian ceasefire. It was however not adopted due to US veto.5 The draft received support from China, Gabon, Mozambique and the United Arab Emirates, while France, Japan, the US and the United Kingdom voted against it. The remaining six Council members abstained from voting.6
The second resolution was drafted by Brazil, and voted on 18 October. Twelve of the Council’s 15 members voted in favour, while the US voted against, and Russia and the UK abstained.7 The UNSC also rejected two amendments proposed by Russia in the Brazilian draft, which called for an immediate, durable and full ceasefire, as well as for stopping attacks against civilians. The US explained the veto by stating that the resolution did not mention Israel's right of self-defence.8
On 25 October, the UNSC voted on two competing draft resolutions—one from the US and the other from Russia—addressing the war and humanitarian crisis in Gaza. The US' draft failed due to the vetoes of China and Russia. The Russian draft saw the US and the UK voting against it, while China, Gabon, Russia and the UAE favoured it, with nine members abstaining.9
After a series of negotiations, on 15 November, the UNSC adopted its first resolution on Gaza since the war began. Proposed by Malta, the resolution called for urgent and extended humanitarian pauses and corridors throughout the Gaza Strip to facilitate the provision of essential goods and services. It was adopted with 12 votes in favour and three abstentions (Russia, the UK and the US).10 However, on 8 December, the US vetoed another resolution drafted by the UAE. There were 13 votes in favour and the United Kingdom abstained.11
On 22 December, the UNSC adopted a resolution requesting the Secretary-General to appoint a Senior Humanitarian and Reconstruction Coordinator to establish a UN mechanism for speeding up humanitarian aid to Gaza.12 The resolution called for ‘urgent and extended humanitarian pauses and corridors throughout the Gaza Strip for a sufficient number of days to enable full, rapid, safe, and unhindered humanitarian access’.13 It also emphasised the need for creating conditions for a sustainable cessation of hostilities.
On 20 February 2024, Algeria drafted a resolution calling for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire. Despite receiving support from 13 out of 15 members, the resolution failed to pass, with the UK abstaining and the US voting against it.14 Again on 22 March, Russia and China vetoed a US draft that demanded a temporary ceasefire in Gaza.15 Three days later, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2728, effectively ending the nearly six-month-long paralysis of the Council regarding a ceasefire in Gaza.
Resolution 2728 and its Implications
Resolution 2728 calls for an immediate ceasefire during the month of Ramadan, which should be respected by all parties and lead to a lasting and sustainable ceasefire. It also demands the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages, along with ensuring humanitarian access to address their medical and other needs. Furthermore, it demands that all parties comply with their obligations under international law regarding the detainees.
The resolution carries political implications beyond its text, particularly due to the US decision to abstain, which enabled its adoption. In the past six months, the United States has vetoed five draft resolutions, three of which demanded a ceasefire in Gaza.
Following the abstention, US explained that it did not oppose Resolution 2728 because its text aligns with Washington's position that any ceasefire text must include provisions for the release of hostages.16 The US said that a ceasefire would strengthen negotiations by Egypt, Israel, Qatar, and the US to achieve the release of hostages.
The US decision not to veto the resolution signalled the White House's growing frustration with Israeli actions, including hospital attacks and aid restrictions in Gaza. Previously, the US had warned against Netanyahu's plans for a ground offensive in Rafah.17 Furthermore, criticism against the Biden administration is mounting, both domestically and internationally. Nonetheless, the US abstention did not signify a change in Washington's policy towards Israel. Last week, the US Congress approved US$ 3.8 billion in military aid to Israel and suspended funding to the UN Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) until March 2025.
Israel's response to the resolution indicates its reluctance to accept a ceasefire in Gaza. Israel has a history of flouting UNSC resolutions. For instance, in December 2016, the UNSC passed a resolution condemning Israeli settlements in Palestine as illegal and a violation of international law. Despite receiving 14 votes in favour and a US abstention, Israel chose to ignore this resolution.
If Israel chooses the same path on Resolution 2728, the UNSC has limited options. The Council can pass another resolution specifically addressing the breach. This subsequent resolution may include punitive measures, such as imposing sanctions. However, it is unlikely that the US supports a resolution at the UNSC that imposes punitive measures against Israel. In such a scenario, Resolution 2728 would serve solely as a symbolic gesture, recognising the UNSC's limited influence on global peace and security issues. Nevertheless, the Council's ability to reach a consensus on the text, after five previous vetoes on the matter, may be viewed as a glimmer of hope.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The media landscape in the Pacific Island countries is vulnerable to Chinese influence given the developmental needs and lack of robust regulatory mechanisms.
The United States (US) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have been jostling for greater influence among the tiny yet strategically important Pacific Island states. As this competition for influence gets more heated, new areas of contestations between the two powers have emerged. One of the latest areas of contention relates to control over the Pacific media. Australia and New Zealand have been major content providers in the Pacific. However, funding cuts and changing geopolitical dynamics have paved the way for China to seek space within the Pacific media landscape. Australia’s shortwave radio frequencies, for instance, shut down in 2017, were taken over by China two years later.1
China and the Pacific Media
In 2023, Chinese Media Group inaugurated a new headquarters for its Asia-Pacific branch in Hong Kong SAR. This branch, aimed at projecting a favourable image of China to the Indo-Pacific, is broadcast in 41 countries and is said to have a viewership of over 3.3 billion.2 With regard to the Pacific Island countries, Chinese media has established its presence in the region through the radio and television format. State broadcaster China Central Television broadcasts documentaries in the Pacific Island states of FSM, Samoa, Vanuatu, Fiji and Tonga through its CGTN Documentary channel (formerly known as CCTV-9 Documentary).3
The PRC has also been peddling favourable narratives through its embassies in the region. Zhang and Watson note the publication of 92 articles by Chinese diplomats, in major Pacific media outlets, between August 2016 and September 2020.4 PRC’s public outreach has also involved promoting the government stance on domestic and international issues through interviews with the local journalists.
A 2022 Australia Broadcasting Corporation Four Corners report dug into the possible links between the Chinese government and the Solomon Islands President Manasseh Sogavare. The investigation revealed an alleged PRC involvement in the form of political bribery to help the Sogavare regime survive the no confidence motion in the parliament.5 Furthermore, the PRC was alleged to have identified the Kolombangara Island as the location of a possible Chinese military base in the region.6
In response to the report, President Sogavare issued a statement condemning foreign media’s coverage of China’s activity in Solomon Islands, equating any scepticism of the China–SI bonhomie to an act of “racial profiling”.7 He went on to threaten a ban on journalists providing a negative coverage of the bilateral relationship although no legal action has been taken by the government so far. However, such an attitude towards foreign media is unsurprising when viewed alongside the Sogavare government’s censorship back at home. National broadcaster Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation, that is now fully state-funded, has reported instructions to project the state in positive light only.
An Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) exposé has revealed a funding request to the PRC on behalf of Solomon Star, a leading Solomon Islands daily, of a sum of SBD 1,150,000 (INR 11,356,366) in exchange for a favourable coverage of PRC and its intentions in the Indo-Pacific.8
China exporting its brand of journalism to the Pacific Islands undermines the democratic ecosystem of the Pacific Island states. It gives the PRC the ability to ‘tell the China story well’ (traditional Chinese: 講好中國故事) and thereby manage the narrative. The journalistic landscape in the Pacific Island countries is especially vulnerable because of developmental needs and a lack of robust regulatory mechanisms in the region.9
The PRC is the second largest development partner of the Pacific Island Countries (PICs), second only to Australia. It has been able to leverage financial incentives to achieve diplomatic objectives. A case in point is Nauru’s switch of diplomatic recognition to China. Economic aid from the PRC translates into adoption of the Chinese model of development and governance. The export of digital authoritarianism is evident in the case of Solomon Islands, where direct financial incentives to the leading Solomon daily coupled with government directives make for a friendly relationship with the local media outlets. On the other hand, Pacific journalists such as Scott Wade and Dan McGarry have faced repercussions, such as suspension and visa revocation respectively, for negative reportage of Chinese activities in their countries.10
Export of the Chinese model of digital governance finds support among PIC governments that are predisposed to censorship as a means of dealing with criticism. News media in Solomon Islands, Fiji, Vanuatu, PNG and Tonga have experienced curbs on freedom of expression for being critical of the establishment.11 Pacific journalists have been subjected to intimidation and physical assaults in PNG, Solomon Islands and Fiji.12
US Counter Moves
China’s rising influence has been a cause of concern for the United States. The US Department of State released a report titled ‘How the People’s Republic of China Seeks to Reshape the Global Information Environment’ in September 2023, which lists five main facets to China's media growing global influence. These include leveraging propaganda and censorship, promoting digital authoritarianism, exploiting international organisations and bilateral partnerships, pairing co-optation and pressure, and exercising control of Chinese-language media.13
The GEC report also delves into the use of bots to increase traction on the social media accounts of Chinese diplomats, content sharing agreements with foreign media that contain exclusivity clauses, and real word intimidation. Having identified a dubious international relations commentator named Yi Fan, the report alleges PRC’s use of ‘manufactured personas’ without any overt association with the government to peddle the official narrative in foreign media. Absence of direct political affiliation to the Chinese establishment gives the impression of objectivity, lending credence to the seemingly non-biased opinion pieces being published.
The US Under-Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Elizabeth Allen, during her October 2023 visit to the Pacific Island countries, revealed Washington’s desire to collaborate with the regional media sectors across the Pacific. This intent has so far manifested in the American support for the establishment of Digital Communication Network (DCN) hub for the East Asia and Pacific (EAP) region in Australia.14
At the DCN-EAP’s inaugural forum in 2023, ‘Information Integrity in the Digital Age’, professionals and participants from across South-east Asia and Oceania were brought together to discuss the impact of media and information systems on all aspects of society. The event was also open to participants from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Mongolia, with the PRC being an apparent exclusion among the East Asian states. The agenda of the event was centred on the themes of ‘Cultivating Resilience’, ‘Building Trust’ and ‘Shaping Influence’.15
The DCN-EAPinitiative is a welcome step towards US engagement with the Pacific on the theme of democratic media landscape. The United States has been slow to recognise China’s increasing soft power in the region because of its tendency to view the Indo-Pacific from a largely securitised lens. This is not to assert a complete lack of cooperation between the American and Pacific Island journalistic circles.
The East-West Center, a Honolulu-based research institute established by the US Congress in 1960, provides 15 PIC media outlets the license to republish The New York Times articles. The institute has also worked with the National Public Radio’s Next Generation Radio Project to offer mentorship programmes to budding journalists and staff at the University of the South Pacific.
However, given the rapid expansion of Chinese media networks in the region, the US has a lot of ground to cover. There is a need to channel more diplomatic energy and resources into ensuring freedom of press in the region. US allies such as Australia and the United Kingdom have made progress in the media sector through Australian Broadcasting Corporation International Development (ABCID) and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Media Action respectively.16
The US, given its marginal influence in the PICs vis-à-vis regional players like Australia and New Zealand, needs to work in tandem with its allies to support the Pacific’s national media associations such as the Pacific Islands News Associations (PINA), and Pacifica Media Association (PasiMA). There is scope to expand cooperation with the region’s new agencies in the form of content sharing and capacity building initiatives.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Aditi Dhaundiyal, Intern, Southeast Asia and Oceania Centre, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi
The Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict has called into question the CSTO’s role as a regional security guarantor.
On 23 February 2024, Armenian Prime Minister Nicol Pashinyan announced Armenia’s suspension of its membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) due to the organisation’s inability to fulfil its security mandate of safeguarding Armenia in the event of an armed conflict. This step was taken following Azerbaijan’s attack on the Kapan municipality’s Nerkin Hand and Srashen villages in the Syunik district of Armenia. This was the latest military invasion launched by Azerbaijan after establishing control over Nagorno-Karabakh which it had taken control in 2023.
These events and inability of CSTO to defend Armenia have strained ties between Armenia and the regional organisation and to that effect, has put the country at odds with Russia, the most prominent CSTO member. The worsening ties could reduce organisational influence and its relevance as a security provider in the Caucasus. Given these developments, it is open to question if the CSTO can continue to play a vital role in upholding member countries’ sovereignty and preserve the regional security architecture amid increasing geopolitical complexities.
CSTO and Past Conflicts
The CSTO, established in 2003, comprises Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Its role was defined as that of a security provider and in maintaining regional stability and territorial integrity of these countries. These objectives were highlighted mainly because the region was already suffering from historical turmoil amongst the states, including border disputes between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and the Armenia and Azerbaijan conflict.1
Articles 2 and 4 of its charter underline its primary obligations to the member states. According to Article 2, if a member's security, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty are undermined, then the other members must come to its aid.2 Article 4 emphasises that aggression faced by any member state would be equivalent to an attack on the organisation.3
Notably, Russia exercises an overarching role over the remaining members, providing the majority of the resources in its effort to remake its image as successor state of Soviet Union. Any statements which come out of the organisation is also painted as part of the greater Russian narrative, and therefore, inaction on the part of the organisation puts into question the Russian stake in CSTO, its influence and the organisation’s capacity to resolve conflicts among member states when required.
The Eurasian region has been affected by protests within their territory and also cross-border conflicts between the various nations. There have been specific conflicts in which the CSTO has been asked to intervene, including in Kyrgyzstan (2010) and in Armenia (2020, 2023). However, the CSTO, despite having defined objectives, has refused to intervene in most disputes, with the protests in Kazakhstan (2022) being an exception.4 It was the first known involvement of the organisation at the request of a member state. Although the non-interventionist nature of CSTO had not affected its relationship between the member countries, that changed after the Second Nagorno Karabakh War in 2020.
The Caucasus has long been fraught with instability due to the Nagorno-Karabakh War, with the Armenians claiming victory in the first Karabakh war in 1994 and the Azerbaijanis claiming victory in the Second Karabakh War in 2020. While the CSTO was not established when the first war broke out, its reluctance to effectively intervene in the next phase of the war has soured ties between Armenia and Russia, the latter considered the organisation’s most influential voice.
In 2021, the initial divisions within the CSTO became visible after its refused to invoke Article 2, even as Azerbaijan launched attacks deep into 45 sq km of Armenian territory.5 Furthermore, deprived of organisational assistance, in a retaliatory move, the Armenian government refrained from participating in scheduled meetings,6 followed by relinquishing the post of CSTO’s Deputy Secretary General and refusing to sign a joint declaration at an organisational summit and host a CSTO exercise.7
These actions raised questions about CSTO’s continued relevance and pitted Armenia against Russia. This has pushed Armenia to the fold of Western powers that are looking for an opportunity to corner Russia. Moscow has responded by threatening Armenia against its alignment with the United States and European Union.8
CSTO’s Joint Staff, Andrey Serdyukov, on 14 February 2024, stressed that the potential for conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is high considering the attacks in Armenia’s Syunik district. Despite such statements released by CSTO, it maintained its non-confrontational approach to the conflict between the Caucasus neighbours.
Future of CSTO in the Caucasus
CSTO’s limited involvement in maintaining regional security, barring the Kazakh issue in January 2022, has led to growing criticism by member states of its role. It has become even more pronounced with its lacklustre performance in the Caucasus.
Nevertheless, Armenia's responses to CSTO’s shying away from its security obligations have no bearing on its relationship with Russia despite statements from the Russian regime, which remains a prominent feature of its ‘complementarist’ foreign policy. Armenia has only sought to diversify its collaborative partners and strengthen relationships with actors such as the European Union and France to have geopolitical elbow room in its conflict with Azerbaijan.
As a result, while Russia would remain an essential cog in Armenian foreign policy, Armenia’s attempts to diversify its defence and military cooperation with European nations (France and Greece) could diminish Russian influence in the long run. Russia also does not want to get dragged to the conflict here given its involvement in the Ukraine war.
In the current complex geopolitical context, the CSTO’s future in the Caucasus appears bleak, especially if Armenia’s growing frustrations result in its severing ties with the organisation in the future due to its inability to respond to Azerbaijani actions, as it would hinder CSTO’s access to the region. There exist two precedents on this front: Azerbaijan and Georgia, former members of CSTO’s predecessor, the Collective Security Treaty, exited the group in 1999. Nonetheless, in Central Asia, mainly due to the organisations’ rapid involvement in Kazakhstan, it gives a hope that it would remain relevant as a security provider.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Neo-Nazi music concerts have become a fertile ground for the mobilisation and financing of far-right extremists.
Far-right extremist music concerts Call of Terror and Hot Shower in France and Italy respectively in February–March 2024 are expected to intensify the far-right movement moving forward. This is the first time such concerts are being organised since the COVID-19 outbreak. These concerts, like Ukraine’s Asgardsrei festival—a famous black metal Neo-Nazi musical event that was held annually until the pandemic—are pivotal to the mobilisation and recruitment of hardened extremists.
Such concerts feature bands who promote a bigoted and racist ideology, including one of the most notorious sub-genres within the black metal musical arena, i.e., National Socialist Black Metal or NSBM. Racist neo-Nazis have used this genre of music to disseminate a violent and xenophobic ideology which espouses White supremacy, anti-establishment narratives, Holocaust denial and anti-Jewish sentiments. At the same time, they have popularised music as a key avenue for transnational networking of like-minded individuals who ardently support a virulent ideological belief, raising millions of Euros in revenue.1
The network established among such ideologically inclined individuals (neo-Nazi black metal followers) spans the European continent and encompasses Russia as well as the United States. It brings together those driven by White supremacist narratives, glorification of violence, and call for violent actions aimed at realisation of ethno-national racial and cultural superiority.
The resurgence of Call of Terror and Hot Shower needs to be contextualised in the backdrop of legalisation of the fascist salute in Italy, the remigration debate in Germany, and the far-right in Europe gaining increasing popularity as the only viable alternative to address the electorate’s socio-economic concerns while pushing for the adoption of a more hardliner approach on immigration.
It also needs to be understood within the ambit of the ongoing Israel–Hamas conflict and the Ukrainian crisis, which have resulted in widespread anti-Semitism, racist ethno-nationalism, and vilifying rhetoric against Jews propounded by Neo-Nazis across Europe and the United States. Ukrainian neo-Nazi groups like Azov Batallion have showcased Nazi insignia on their uniforms. This group has been integrated into the Ukrainian armed forces to fight against Russia’s military actions.
Music’s role within the far-right extremist culture is critical to understanding why concerts and musical gatherings have retained their prominence and have attracted an increasing number of recruits to the racially divisive ideological belief and value system. Robert Futrell and Pete Simi have explained that
Neo-Nazi music has provided some youth with the opportunity to freely advocate and glamourise their extremist propaganda and violence, and indulge in proscribed symbolic gestures. Moreover, it has forged ethno-nationalist, emotive and community ties that surpass territorial boundaries.
While neo-Nazi black metal initially appeared to have burst onto the musical scene in the 1990s, music’s role in promoting a racist worldview has its roots in the anti-Semitic compositions created by Richard Wagner, who was celebrated by Adolf Hitler and in the Third Reich’s efforts to ban music considered to be ‘degenerate’, i.e., associated with Jews.3 Violence is encouraged, aided and abetted among neo-Nazis in this industry and against those considered as the ‘other’, including police officials and members of the LGBTQ+ community.4
As part of its investigative report, VICE News has pointed out a critical fact that must be considered while strengthening efforts to clamp down on the occurrence of such activities and framing counter-extremism strategies. It notes that
The sale of tickets, merchandise, memorabilia and catering leading up to and during such events is expected to facilitate the financing of extremist agendas and dissemination of a divisive ideology riddled with hate and linkages to the Nazi era.
Additionally, Identitarianism is a movement which has denounced Islam, immigration, pluralism, globalism and refugees, has been associated with anti-Semitic figures like Martin and Brittany Sellner. It is believed to play a central role in facilitating the establishment of bridges between trans-national far-right extremists who are in attendance for such concerts.6
This specific brand of black metal musical sub-culture features Nazi symbols and demonises liberals, left-leaning politicians and minorities. For example, in the past, Erschiessungskommando, a neo-Nazi band, released a song the lyrics of which explicitly targeted a left-leaning member of Thuringia’s State Parliament, Katharina König-Press—‘You will die cruelly, that is not the question’—and her father, a vocal opponent of far-right extremism.7 Notably, Thuringia is one of the key bastions of Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, a far-right party in Germany), which has been declared as extremist along with its youth wing in several states across the country by the domestic intelligence agency.
Organisers and attendees of these music concerts rely on encrypted channels or those whose membership is closely regulated by far-right elements to avoid being prosecuted by the authorities for their deliberations and actions. This explains why there is often much ambiguity and loopholes regarding the precise logistical details of most of the events and the attendees’ details, among others.
At the same time, relatively small-scale gatherings such as those held in Hungary in November 2023 organised by Nordic Sun Records mentioned on its website the relevant details—the date of the musical events, the entrance fee, bands performing on said dates, and the area in which the events would be held.8 The brazen attitude displayed by the promoters signals widespread complicity of authorities and political elites, perhaps even Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who has been known to attend several far-right events. Orban’s policies have led to the ascendance of far-right values which has nurtured a fertile environment for neo-Nazi extremist groups to prosper.
Notably, France, Hungary, Ukraine, Germany and Italy are some of the countries which (whether due to the backing of far-right elements who might have infiltrated various state institutions covertly or overtly) now play host and incubator even perhaps, to well-known far-right elements and a neo-Nazi black metal scene. In fact, former Ukrainian Prime Minister Oleksiy Honcharuk and former Minister of Temporarily Occupied Territories, IDPs and Veterans Oksana Koliada attended a neo-Nazi concert held in Kyiv in October 2019, where the main attraction was a holocaust denier neo-Nazi band, Sokyra Peruna.9
After the pandemic abruptly disrupted Asgardsrei, a festival considered to have been critical in constructing ‘a pan-European community of right-wing extremists’,10 Call of Terror and Hot Shower could generate greater traction and unprecedented revenue, and could even replace Asgardsrei as the epicentre of the neo-Nazi black metal congregation.
Conclusion
Neo-Nazis have exploited music’s potency to generate a cult-based following among radicalised individuals. This has resulted in strengthening the far-right scene across the Atlantic and networks forged by individuals with shared interests. While there is a dearth of information about the precise attendees of these concerts, a rough estimate stands at a few hundred. It must be understood that those who fall into this category are hardened extremists who can carry out significant damage and promote far-right propaganda, especially with social media and encrypted forums at their disposal.
Despite the abovementioned warning signs and seriousness of these threats visible to policymakers and intelligence agencies, the announcement of Call of Terror and Hot Shower and other simultaneous small-scale gatherings indicate that they have been largely disregarded. As a result, given the swelling support for far-right populist politicians and agendas internationally, it is unlikely that serious efforts will be undertaken to clamp down on them in the foreseeable future. These developments can be expected to have a long-term and damaging effect on efforts by moderate politicians and allied agencies to conserve globalist and pluralist societies across communities, resulting in growing fissures and socio-economic polarisation.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Turkiye effectively leveraged its NATO membership to secure benefits aligned with its defence, counter-terrorism and foreign policy priorities, vis-à-vis Sweden’s accession bid.
Introduction
Turkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan signed a presidential decree on 25 January 2024 approving the ratification law passed by the Turkish Grand National Assembly to allow Sweden to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).1 This decree formally promulgated Turkiye’s ratification of Sweden’s NATO accession agreement that the Turkish Parliament adopted on 23 January 2024. Turkiye though extracted substantial concessions from Sweden and other nations in exchange for approving Sweden’s bid to join NATO. While Turkiye supports NATO expansion to counter Russian aggression, it leveraged its position as an existing member with veto power to negotiate benefits aligned with its national interests.
Arms Embargo
Turkiye initially opposed Sweden’s bid when Sweden formally decided to pursue NATO membership in May 2022 in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. To secure Ankara’s support, Sweden authorised military equipment deliveries to Turkiye in September 2022, reversing restrictions imposed in October 2019.2 These included electronic systems, software and technical assistance from Swedish defence companies. The licensing decision by Sweden was taken in consultations with the cross-party Export Control Council to ensure broad political support. This decision reflected the changed defence and security circumstances based on Sweden’s NATO membership bid and the importance of cooperation with NATO allies like Turkiye. Sweden assessed cooperation with Turkiye through NATO as essential for national and mutual security interests.
PKK Concerns
One specific condition Turkiye set for approving Sweden’s NATO membership bid was that Sweden stop providing support to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). As per Turkiye’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, over its more than 35 years of insurgency against the Turkish State, PKK, designated as a terrorist organisation by Turkiye, the US, the UK and the European Union, has been responsible for over 40,000 fatalities through its violent tactics to advance the Kurdish nationalist cause.3 Turkiye had accused Sweden of harbouring PKK members and allowing PKK fundraising and recruiting on its soil. To address Turkiye’s concerns, Sweden amended its constitution, changed counter-terrorism laws, and expanded counter-terrorism cooperation against the PKK as per the 2022 Trilateral Memorandum between Sweden, Finland and Turkiye.4
The Swedish Government adopted a new comprehensive national strategy to address the evolving threat from violent extremism and terrorism.5 This updated comprehensive strategy will mobilise various security agencies, including the Swedish Security Service, Police, Contingencies Agency and the Swedish Centre for Preventing Violent Extremism. Sweden’s Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson justified the shift due to the insufficient nature of the previous framework given the heightened risks, signifying a strategic priority to reinforce counter-terrorism policies and institutions against violent groups.6
In July 2023, Sweden and Turkiye agreed to continue cooperation through the Permanent Joint Mechanism established at the 2022 Madrid NATO Summit, as well as a new bilateral Security Compact that will meet annually at the ministerial level and create working groups as needed.7 After a series of negotiations and commitments from Sweden to crack down on PKK activities, Turkiye declared that Sweden had adequately satisfied this membership criterion related to the militant Kurdish group.
With this PKK-related stipulation met to Turkiye’s satisfaction alongside security assurances, Turkiye formally ratified Sweden’s accession to the NATO alliance.8 However, as per media reports, there is a prevailing sense of discontent within the Swedish Kurdish community. Members of the sizeable Kurdish population, comprising an estimated 50,000–100,000 individuals, hailing from Turkiye, Iran, Iraq and Syria, feel targeted by the Swedish authorities amid efforts to appease Erdogan’s demands.9
US Approves F-16 Aircraft
On 26 January 2024, the US State Department authorised a potential Foreign Military Sale to Turkiye involving the purchase of 40 new F-16 aircraft and the modernisation of 79 existing F-16s to V-Configuration at an approximate cost of US$ 23 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) officially informed Congress of this prospective sale.10 The proposed sale aims to assist Turkiye, a NATO ally, in expanding and modernising its F-16 fleet, addressing the impending retirement of older aircraft. By acquiring these new and upgraded aircraft, Turkiye seeks to bolster its defence capabilities, contribute to NATO missions for regional security, defend NATO allies, and uphold interoperability with US and NATO forces.
Notably, in December 2020, the US imposed sanctions on Turkiye’s Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB) under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017 (CAATSA) legislation for procuring the Russian S-400 surface-to-air missile system.11 Despite repeated warnings from the US about security risks and boosting Russia’s defence sector, Turkiye decided to acquire the S-400. Consequently, Turkiye was suspended from the F-35 programme, given the S-400’s incompatibility with NATO systems.
On 26 January 2024, US Senator Ben Cardin, Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, highlighted that he had predicated approval of the F-16 sale to Turkiye on the condition that Ankara support Stockholm’s NATO accession bid. While acknowledging Turkiye’s strategic value as a regional NATO ally, Cardin specifically conveyed that ongoing discussions aimed to compel improvements in Turkiye’s human rights record on issues like the imprisonment of journalists and civil society leaders, cooperation on holding Russia accountable for aggression against Ukraine, and inflammatory rhetoric regarding the Middle East.12
On 14 February 2024, US Ambassador to Turkiye Jeff Flake emphasised the importance of selling F-16 fighter jets to Turkiye, arguing it would strengthen NATO, ensure future interoperability between allies, and enhance Turkiye’s capacity to contribute to collective security, having the Alliance’s second-largest military.13 He contended that improved US–Turkiye relations would advance American security, power and prosperity interests across multiple fronts.
Flake also highlighted Turkiye’s expanding domestic defence industry production of drones, components, engines and artillery as integral to the US defence supply chain and NATO strength. He cited a partnership with Turkish defence firms to increase diminished US munition stockpiles that have been heavily tapped to assist Ukraine against Russia’s invasion. Flake noted that new Texas production lines purchased from a Turkish defence company by 2025 are expected to supply 30 per cent of all American-made 155 mm artillery rounds, further exemplifying the benefits of US–Turkiye defence industry collaboration.
Canada and Arms Exports
The Canadian Government found credible evidence that some Canadian military goods and technologies exported to Turkiye, specifically sensors integrated into Turkish Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), have been utilised in the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Libya and Syria, contrary to Canada’s export permit requirements and end-use assurances.14 Therefore, on 16 April 2020, Canada implemented a presumptive denial policy for applications to export or broker munitions to Turkiye.15 Notably, Canada is bound under the international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), as its Article 11 covering diversion specifies that State Parties take measures to prevent the diversion of conventional arms.16
After Turkiye’s ratification of Sweden’s application to NATO membership, Canada lifted the presumptive denial policy for applications to export or broker munitions and related items to Turkiye on 29 January 2024. Applications will now be assessed on a case-by-case basis as per Canada’s risk assessment framework and ATT commitments. For items where Turkish government entities are the end user, exporters must obtain end-use assurances from the importer stating whether items will be re-exported outside NATO and outlining the permitted end use.17 An established notification procedure covers certain components, like the Wescam sensors used in Turkiye’s Bayraktar TB2 drones and specified dual-use goods and arms, as part of the lawful international arms trade18 to ensure accountability and transparency.
Turkiye has expressed that it will soon achieve self-sufficiency in manufacturing key drone components currently imported from abroad.19 This includes achieving domestic production capabilities for specialised optical sensors and other technologies utilised in unmanned aerial systems like the Bayraktar TB2. By localising production, Turkiye aims to establish its own reliable and sovereign supply chain for strategic aerospace and defence equipment needs.
Conclusion
Through a transactional approach tied to Sweden’s NATO accession process, Turkiye effectively leveraged concessions from Sweden and other NATO allies, including lifting of restrictions on arms exports and expanding security cooperation. Going forward, Turkiye will have to demonstrate greater accountability and transparency on issues like human rights, regional conflicts and end-user usage of arms to address concerns from the US, Canada and other NATO allies.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The border region between Turkiye and Syria continues to remain highly unstable, posing a potential risk of armed conflict.
The outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011 led to the displacement of nearly 12 million people to neighbouring countries such as Turkiye, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt.1 Turkiye hosts approximately 3.6 million Syrian refugees, making it the country with the largest refugee population from Syria.2 Turkiye shares the longest land border with Syria amongst its neighbouring nations. Initially, Turkiye adopted an 'open door' policy to admit victims of the Syrian civil war into the country. However, as the situation in Syria continued to deteriorate, Turkiye gradually adopted measures to protect its borders.
During the Syrian civil war, the Kurds in Syria fought against the Assad regime as well as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The Kurds declared autonomy in Kurdish-majority north-eastern Syria and established the Rojava autonomous region. This emerged as a security challenge for Turkiye, which feared that the Turkish Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) would be further strengthened by their Syrian compatriots, the People's Protection Units (YPG).
Syrian refugees in Turkiye and the rising threat from Kurds in northern Syria pushed Ankara to take steps to enhance its border security. Ankara decided to create a buffer zone in northern Syria along its borders which it termed as ‘safe zones’.3 Its objectives were primarily to contain the flow of Syrian refugees and to ensure that the northern Syrian region is not used by the Kurds to launch attacks on Turkiye. As the Syrian crisis continued to linger, Ankara decided to settle Syrian refugees in the safe zone. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu stated in 2015 that once ISIS was eliminated from northern Syria, the safe zones would naturally emerge as havens for displaced Syrian refugees.4
Turkiye took a series of measures to protect its border with Syria. It built four-metre high concrete wall with barbed wire and employed various security measures, including aerial and land surveillance systems, active border patrol units, among other steps.5 Turkiye also launched military operations to eradicate ISIS presence. It launched Operation Euphrates Shield in August 2016 to eradicate ISIS presence from the Syrian border area and prevent the establishment of a ‘terror corridor’.6 More than 2,000 ISIS terrorists were neutralised in this operation. In January 2018, Turkiye launched Operation Olive Branch to counter the Kurdish and ISIS threats in Afrin. Turkiye claimed that it cleared an area of approximately 2,000 Sq kms by March 2018. Again, in October 2019, Turkiye launched Operation Peace Spring to liberate approximately 8,234 Sq kms of territory in northern Syria, extending up to 30 kilometres from the border, which was previously controlled by various terrorist factions.7 Similarly, Operation Winter Eagle was conducted in February 2022 and Operation Claw-Sword was carried out in November 2022 primarily against Kurdish militia groups.
Turkiye justified its military interventions in Syria on multiple grounds, including the prevention of potential waves of migration, counterterrorism, and protection of its borders. Turkiye has been able to keep the Kurdish militias away from the border and has created a buffer zone. This has allowed Turkiye to build the infrastructure required for settling the refugees in those areas. In 2023, Turkiye's Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu stated that over 550,000 Syrian refugees have returned to Syria since the creation of the safe zone.8 He also stated that Turkiye is talking with the Syrian government and urged the UN and the international community for support in this regard.
Syrian Response
Following Turkiye’s military interventions and creation of a safe zone in Northern Syria, the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates stated that Turkiye’s actions were blatant violations of international law and the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Syria. Syria alleged that the Turkish behaviour contradicted the understandings and outputs of the Astana process. Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal stated that as per international law, the Turkish Armed Forces must take all possible measures to avoid and minimise the loss of civilian life, injuries to civilians and damage to civilian objects during military operations. He also added that Turkiye should provide compensation for civilian deaths and injuries as well.9
As for the Astana process, it was initiated in 2017 by Russia, Iran and Turkiye to help resolve the Syrian conflict. It focused on de-escalation zones, ceasefire monitoring, and humanitarian aid delivery, with initial meetings held in the Kazakh capital, Astana. The Astana process aimed to create conditions for voluntary return of refugees by establishing stability and security, but challenges such as ongoing violence and destruction caused by the civil war hindered success.
The 21st round of Astana process was held in January 2024, where issues relating to the fight against terrorism, regional developments, political process, the return of Syrians as well as matters of humanitarian assistance were discussed. The Joint Statement released at the end of the meeting called for
‘continuation of efforts for the restoration of relations between Türkiye and Syria on the basis of mutual respect, goodwill and good-neighborly relations in order to combat terrorism, create proper conditions for the safe, voluntary and dignified return of Syrians with the involvement of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), revitalize the political process and ensure the unimpeded flow of humanitarian aid to all Syrians.’10
Conclusion
Turkiye's establishment of safe zones in Northern Syria served a dual purpose – to create a protective buffer area and facilitate the relocation of Syrian refugees from Turkiye, while preventing the spill over of terrorism into Turkish territory. However, the volatile nature of the region, characterised by the presence of various armed groups and conflicting interests of different states and non-state groups, have been the major challenges for Turkiye.
The conflict in Syria meanwhile has reached a stalemate, presenting limited prospects for a prompt political resolution. While violence has significantly decreased, sporadic skirmishes persist in both the northwest and northeast regions of Syria. The Assad government exerts control over approximately 70 per cent of Syrian territory. The Syrian government's efforts to reclaim territories lost during the civil war adds another layer of complexity to the situation.
Five foreign powers (Russia, Iran, Turkey, Israel, and the United States) have military presence in the region. Additionally, the remnants of ISIS periodically launch attacks, further complicating the situation. Consequently, the border region between Turkiye and Syria remains highly unstable, posing a potential risk of armed conflict.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Despite a difficult economic situation, the Taliban have advertised their efforts towards infrastructure development over the last two years.
The Taliban have advertised their efforts towards infrastructure development over the last two years, since taking over power in August 2021. The Taliban Deputy Minister of Economy Abdul Latif Nazari stated in August 2023 that “overall 3575 development projects of $1.9 billion have been launched in the field of infrastructure, health, energy and transportation”.1 Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid stated that funding for these developmental projects in 2023 was more than the previous year.2
Regional connectivity projects such as the Khaf–Herat Railway Project, a connectivity link between Afghanistan and Iran, are touted to be ready for operation, as per the spokesperson of Afghanistan Railway Authority in December 2023.3 The Ministry of Mines and Petroleum in March 2023 stated that they were genuinely interested in the Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (TAPI) project as it will create direct or indirect employment and will help in energy production. Spokesperson Mujahid noted that several meetings were held with the countries involved in the project, to help take it forward.4 TAPI was on the agenda when the acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi along with the Minister for Mines and Petroleum met Turkmenistan Foreign Minister Rasit Meredow on 17 December 2023.5
Another regional connectivity project, the Trans-Afghanistan railway project, was signed in February 2021 between Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the project expected to cost $5 billion, prior to the Taliban taking over power. The Taliban government are now trying to secure funding for the project from Qatar or the UAE.6
As for major domestic projects, the 285-km long Qosh Tapa Canal Project aims to convert 550,000 hectares of desert into farmland by diverting 20 per cent water from the Amu Darya River. This project is being built in the Kaldar District of northern Balkh Province. On 11 October 2023, Taliban Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Abdul Ghani Baradar inaugurated the second phase of this project. Officials of the Islamic Emirate have assured that they will address concerns, if any, of regional countries such as Uzbekistan, who had expressed apprehension about the project.7 The Deputy Minister of Water and Energy, Mujib Rahman Akhundzada, stated that a plan to build a hydroelectric dam on the Kunar River was not being implemented immediately though due to its high cost. It is envisaged that the dam will irrigate one and a half lakh acres of agricultural land and produce 45 megawatts of electricity.8
Apart from these mega projects that are being constructed or being planned, the Taliban regime has announced many road construction projects.9 As per the Taliban-run public works ministry, 90 maintenance projects have already been completed in 2023 and it plans to initiate 110 developmental projects, which include 30 bridge piers, 1500 check bridge piers, Kabul–Kandahar Highway, Afghan Ring Road and the reconstruction of the Salang Highway.10 Afghanistan electricity company, Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS) has also developed a five-year strategic plan to develop 710 MW of renewable energy, with funding from internal sources. On 26 July 2023, DABS released annual report on major achievements in 2022 noting that electricity line from Kajaki to Kandahar, which is 170-km long, has been completed.11
Economic Realities
The Taliban’s focus on infrastructure development though is up against the hard realities of a difficult economic situation. After the Taliban took over power in August 2021, the country witnessed a major decline in its economy. The United States froze the Afghan Central Bank reserves of about $7 billion and the European Union and the World Bank stopped disbursing aid. Sanctions were also imposed. The World Bank notes that Afghanistan’s services sector, which contributes 45 per cent of the country’s GDP, shrank by 6.5 per cent in 2022, following a 30 per cent drop in 2021. The agriculture sector which contributes 36 per cent of GDP declined by 6.6 per cent while the industrial sector also saw a contraction of 5.7 per cent in 2022.12
According to the Afghanistan Economic Monitor released by the World Bank, Afghanistan government collected a total revenue of $2.3 billion for the initial ten months of 2023-2024.13 Such finances will not be sufficient, therefore, to implement the projects they have planned and are in progress. The role of funding and expertise from regional countries like China and India, therefore, assumes significance.
Chinese Investments
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s surprise visit to Afghanistan on 24 March 2022 and invitation extended to the Taliban to attend the Third Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held on 30–31 March 2022 in Tunxi in East China's Anhui Province was proof of China’s proactive stance in its engagement with the Taliban. China had earlier made investments in the Aynak copper mine. At the Fourth Pakistan–China Foreign Ministers’ Strategic Dialogue held in Islamabad on 6 May 2023, it announced that it wanted to extend the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Afghanistan.
The Taliban have shown interest in CPEC and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with the hope that it would strengthen the Afghan economy and bring in investments. In October 2023, Taliban Commerce Minister Haji Nooruddin Azizi said: “China, which invests all over the world, should also invest in Afghanistan... we have everything they need, such as lithium, copper and iron”.14
In January 2023, China National Petroleum Corporation signed an agreement with the Taliban to invest $150 million. In the coming three years, it will invest $540 million dollars to extract oil from the Amu Darya basin and develop an oil reserve in the country’s northern Sar-e Pul Province.15
Despite China’s bid to extend CPEC to Afghanistan, the Wakhan corridor continues to raise China’s angst given concerns about possible entry of Uyghur terrorists through this route.16 In September 2023, the Taliban’s Ambassador to China, Mohammad Sadiq, mentioned that he had detailed discussions with Chinese authorities regarding the commencement of traffic through the Wakhan Corridor.17 Opening of this corridor would strengthen trade links between the two countries if the Taliban manages to address the Chinese concerns.
India’s Stakes
India is still the largest regional donor for Afghanistan and fifth largest in the world with an investment of $3.4 billion in Afghan reconstruction, development and humanitarian efforts. On 14 August 2022, the Taliban requested India to complete its pending projects and even requested to train their security personnel.18 This came close on the heels of India announcing its presence in Afghanistan under Technical Mission in June 2022.19
In December 2022, Taliban’s Minister for Urban Development, Hamdullah Nomani, interacted with members of the Indian technical team in Kabul where he talked about renewal of Indian projects, invited investment in New Kabul Town, raised visa issues and urged more scholarships for Afghan students. After this interaction, many senior diplomats met with Taliban officials in West Asian countries.
Recently, the Indian Embassy in UAE invited Afghan envoy Badruddin Haqqani for Republic day celebrations at Abu Dhabi. Indian delegations have participated in regional cooperation initiative meeting organised by Taliban in Kabul on 29 January 2024. The Ministry of External Affairs on 1 February 2024 reiterated India’s relation with the Afghan people and acknowledged that Indian diplomats have been engaging the Taliban in “various formats”.20
India’s efforts have also been acknowledged by the Taliban. Hafiz Zia Ahmed, the Deputy spokesperson of Foreign Ministry, recently shared the statement attributed to an Indian representative on social media platform X which noted that:
“India actively takes part in international and regional initiatives regarding Afghanistan, and supports every effort leading to the stability and the development of Afghanistan”21
Conclusion
The Taliban are likely to make more efforts in the coming future aimed at cultivating other countries for investments to boost the Afghan economy. India should continue to calibrate its moves towards the Taliban government to ensure that its humanitarian and possible developmental re-engagement promote an environment of trust and understanding and help the Afghan population benefit from its intervention.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Geopolitical and geo-economic reasons account for the Central Asian nations, barring Tajikistan, following a multi-vector approach towards the Afghan Taliban regime.
On 29 December 2023, Kazakhstan announced the removal of the Taliban from its list of terror organisations. This was the latest step taken by a Central Asian country in attempting to accommodate the regime in the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Apart from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan have engaged diplomatically with the Taliban. The realignment in their approach marks a stark contrast to their acrimonious attitude towards the first Taliban regime during the 1990s. However, Tajikistan continues to take a hostile stance toward the Taliban regime. Geopolitical and geo-economic considerations have ensured that these nations, barring Tajikistan, maintain a multi-vector approach towards the Afghan Taliban regime so as to create space for cooperation and collaboration.
In the 1990s, the regional countries, excluding Turkmenistan, had adopted a hostile approach towards the Taliban, fearing spill over of radicalised Deobandi ideology spreading from a destabilised Afghanistan. This was despite their shared socio-cultural connect. Tajikistan, by then, served as a cautionary tale of the impact of radicalisation, having experienced a civil war between the Islamists and the first post-Soviet government under Emomali Rahmon.
Post the collapse of the first Taliban regime in the 2001, the major concern of the Central Asian states was on the home-grown terror groups who were engaged in jihad in Afghanistan such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Islamic Jihadi Union. These groups had pledged allegiance to the Taliban for decades until the rise of Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP).
Central Asian countries, though, have refrained from bestowing official diplomatic recognition on the Taliban. Nonetheless, frequent engagement between representatives at various levels has been established since 2021 after Taliban took over Kabul. Turkmenistan, owing to its neutrality policy, has maintained continuity in its approach towards the regime as it did in the 1990s. Along with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, it has also maintained trade relations with Afghanistan and assisted in the reintegration of the Afghan economy into the regional economy.1
One of the first countries to establish direct talks with the Afghan regime was Uzbekistan. It has maintained its ties with the Taliban for over two years to shield the country from attacks launched from the bordering areas of Northern Afghanistan (Hairatan town in Balkh Province) near Termez, Uzbekistan and also to safeguard its projects within Afghanistan such as the Termez-Mazar-I-Sharif-Peshawar Railroad.2 With the Uzbeks following a more open foreign policy3 under the leadership of Shavkat Mirziyoyev, it suits them to interact with the Islamic Emirate. Recently, a temporary new chief was appointed in the Afghanistan embassy in Uzbekistan who belonged to the Taliban after Ahmed Khalid Eli, appointed by the previous Afghan government completed his tenure.4
The Kazakh government has taken initiatives to stabilise Afghanistan and develop the country's infrastructure to integrate Afghanistan into the regional economy. Kazakhstan participates in cross border transport development projects, energy and agriculture.5 Furthermore, it has provided much-needed humanitarian aid (approximately $472 million)6 and has delivered 70 per cent of total flour exported to Afghanistan to overcome food insecurity.7 During his visit to Kabul on 3 August 2023, the Kazakh Deputy Prime Minister Serik Zhumangarin invited the Taliban to open a trade mission in Astana. The economic ties have persevered even after the Taliban take over, with joint trade totalling an approximate $ 987.9 million in 2022.8
The lack of a contiguous border has allowed the Kyrgyz government to adopt a more calculated approach. The conveyance of caution about the security situation in Afghanistan at various intervals has been accompanied by an extension of humanitarian aid and a reiteration of the need to maintain trade ties. One such example was the visit of the Taalatbek Masarykov, Kyrgyz President’s Special Representative to Kabul, where he held discussion on avenues of cooperation and pledged to provide assistance in various sectors.9 Bishkek recently provided 111 tons of aid to Afghanistan as part of its humanitarian aid assistance.10 Another important diplomatic visit has been that of the Kyrgyz Minister of Economy and Commerce to Kabul in January 2024 to discuss improving trade relations and enhancing the import and export capacity.11
The Turkmen government, retaining its earlier stance (based on positive neutrality) on the Taliban, was one of the first countries to establish communication with the new Afghan regime. The Turkmenistan Afghanistan Pakistan India (TAPI) project is vital to their relationship, and the Taliban has provided a security guarantee for the pipeline.12 Moreover, there is also a delegation-level visit from Ashgabat to discuss the Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan electricity project.13
Despite being the first regional country to welcome a Taliban envoy to the Afghan embassy in Ashgabat, the Turkmen-Afghan relationship has experienced some tension recently. Clashes between the border guards on both sides in the Khamab border in Jawzjan province resulted in the alleged loss of lives of one Afghan civilian and four Turkmen soldiers.14 However, their ties continue to have some space for negotiations, with projects being prioritised.
Tajikistan has emerged as the only regional actor that has refused to parlay with the Taliban owing to historical complexities and the latter’s treatment of ethnic Tajiks. Like other countries of Central Asia, it has expressed concern regarding the spill over of terrorism and security threats that could recreate the conflict-ridden situation that was discernible during the civil war.
The presence of Tehrik-e Taliban Tajikistan in the bordering areas (Kuf Ab, Khawan, Maimay, Nusay and Shekay in the Northern Province of Badakhshan) has further hindered cooperation between the two.15
Tajikistan has historically been the most vocal opponent of the Taliban regime. In the past, it had supported the anti-Taliban resistance forces led by fellow Tajik Ahmed Shah Masood and later the National Resistance Front led by Masood’s son. The Taliban recruitment of Ismaili Shias from Gorno Badakhshan as part of its cohorts has added to the animosity. The main reason for such inclusion has been the conflict between the Gorno Badakhshan population and the Tajik government which has seen major protests in the past year.
Central Asian Concerns
As mentioned earlier, security serves as a key driver behind Central Asian countries’ engagement with the Taliban. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, mainly, have suffered from terrorism emanating from Afghanistan in the past. For example, groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Islamic Jihadi Union (IJU), and Tehrik-e- Taliban Tajikistan (TTT) have sought support from groups based in Afghanistan. TTT’s presence near the border in the hostile Gorno Badakhshan district of Tajikistan is a significant security concern for the Emomali Rahmon government.
For Uzbekistan, the strong linkages between the ISKP and the IMU are greatly concerning. The IMU has remained one of the primary security threats for the Uzbek nation since the first Taliban period. Despite the group’s apparent weakened status, it has received support from the ISKP, with the IMU shifting its allegiance from the Taliban to the ISKP in 2015. This has also pitted IMU against the Taliban. The ISKP also sees the Taliban as an organisation that has shifted from its objective to create an Islamic State and has been interested to establish network with the ‘Kafirs’(infields). The recent attacks on Uzbekistan are seen as one important reason for engaging the Taliban with the hope that it would neutralise threats to Uzbekistan’s aspirations in Afghanistan. The same can be said for Turkmenistan, with threats of regime change being given by the ISKP from the across the border.
The expulsion of Afghan refugees from Pakistan could contribute to escalating socio-economic instability in Central Asia, a region undergoing challenges such as surging housing prices and inflation due to the influx of Russians amid mobilisation drives. Earlier, refugee movement from Afghanistan toward Central Asia after August 2021 was restricted by the Central Asian leadership, fearing that it could lead to instability in the region.
Regardless of the assurances extended by the Taliban’s Defence Ministry on the TAPI pipeline and projects linked to the Belt and Road Initiative, ISKP challenge to these projects remain. Currently, the ISKP has just used its media channels (Al-Azaim, Voice of Khorasan, Movaraunnaha, Khurasan Wilayah News, Tor Bairghuna, Al-Millat Media, and Khurasan Ghag Radio) to highlight the projects and has vowed to destroy any foreign projects on Afghan soil.
Additionally, the discriminatory treatment faced by Afghanistan’s ethnic minorities has been a concerning issue even for those Central Asian regimes engaging the Taliban who recall how the Tajik, Turkmen, and Uzbek minorities were mistreated and persecuted by Taliban 1.0. The equitable treatment of minorities remains one of the primary conditions required to be fulfilled by the Afghan leaders to gain diplomatic recognition from the international community, including the Central Asian countries.
Conclusion
Central Asian nations, barring Tajikistan, have established a limited and calculated relationship with the Taliban. The Central Asian nations have taken into consideration the crucial dynamics of security and economy while accommodating the Taliban in the current geopolitical complexities that are plaguing the region.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
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