The political divisions and economic challenges facing the country have complicated the government’s response to the pandemic, putting the population at risk and threatening to undermine the popularity of President Erdogan.
Like other parts of the world, West Asia (or the Middle East) too is hit hard by the spread of COVID-19 and Turkey is no exception. In fact, Turkey is the second worst hit country after Iran in the region. As of April 13, 2020, Turkey reported 56,956 confirmed cases of COVID-19; while 3,446 people recovered, and 1,198 died because of the infection.1 Globally, Turkey has reported the ninth-largest cluster of cases. In comparison to the other global hotspots such as the United States, Italy, Spain and others, Turkey has reported a lower rate of fatalities. However, the prevailing political and economic conditions in the country have complicated its response to the pandemic.
Between the first confirmed case of COVID-19 recorded on March 112 and the first reported death on March 17,3 the number of cases in the country jumped to 191.4 The rapid spread of infection was mainly attributed to the government’s failure to stop the inflow of people, goods and services from abroad including from China and Iran until mid-February, and a slow response in restricting the movement of people, goods and services within the country. It was not until March 27 that Turkey decided to completely stop all international flights and restrict domestic movements.5 By this time, the number of cases had already reached 6,000 and about 90 had perished from COVID-19.6 Despite the curbs coming into effect, and assurances from the government, the number of cases continued to rise rapidly. The partial nature of curbs and the failure of the local administration to take adequate preventive measures further compounded the situation. In the first week of April, Turkey reportedly had “the fastest rising number of confirmed cases in the world.”7
The first set of curbs and restrictions announced on March 27 included a nationwide restriction on movement either by roads, railways or airways and suspension of all international flights. Domestic movement was allowed only in case of emergencies with permission from local governors. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan while announcing the curbs urged people to “voluntarily quarantine” in case they suffer from any illness or symptoms of flu.8 He especially urged the aged population beyond 65 years to remain inside their homes and follow social distancing. Other measures included a complete lockdown in 12 population centres in the Black Sea provinces of Rize and Trabzon.9 Erdogan also announced partial lockdown in 30 metropolitan areas in the country including the capital Ankara and country’s financial hub Istanbul, as well as the two other most populous cities of Kocaeli and Izmir where only limited public transport was allowed and curbs were put on non-essential services.10
As the situation continued to deteriorate due to a combination of policy failure and non-compliance of the precautionary measures, the government announced new measures on April 3 to completely restrict the movement of people above 65 years and below 20 years, as well as the movement of private vehicles in 31 provinces including in major metropolitan areas.11 Turkey announced the formation of pandemic board in all 81 provinces to monitor the situation at the local level and take quicker decisions for lockdown in case of necessity. Schools, universities and other educational institutions, as well as public places including archaeological sites and picnic spots have also been closed though places of worship have only been directed to maintain social distancing. In the meanwhile, Turkey has mandated the use of masks in public and is trying to boost healthcare capacity by building temporary facilities to provide treatment to those affected.12 The Turkish National Assembly is also debating a bill to protect the healthcare workers with increased penalty on any form of violence against them.
The country is facing an uncertain economic situation. The fear of a global recession because of the uncertainties and near halting of economic activities has all the countries preparing for the worst. For Turkey, already facing economic slowdown over the last three years because of the currency and debt crisis and also due to the economic crises in Europe, the economic impact of the pandemic could be even more debilitating. The country had only recently begun to recover from economic problems. After witnessing negative growth in 2018, the Turkish economy showed signs of growth in 2019 riding on fiscal measures introduced by the government and improved foreign trade with countries in Central Asia, Arab Gulf as well as China.13 Though the growth was in decimal numbers, the World Bank had projected that given the signs of recovery the economy will grow by 3 per cent in 2020. Other economic indicators including current account deficit and inflation had also shown improvement in 2019. The banking and finance sectors too were witnessing a recovery.14 However, with challenges arising from the COVID-19 pandemic, the growth projections are likely to remain unmet.
Though Turkey’s central bank has denied that the economy will be severely affected arguing that with “its dynamic structure, the Turkish economy will be one of the economies to see the least damage”.15 However, international rating and economic assessment agencies warn that given its vulnerabilities, the Turkish economy is expected to be “hit hardest” among the G20 nations from the “unprecedented shock to the global economy caused by the corona virus.”16 Moody revised the forecast for economic growth for 2020 from 3 per cent to 1.4 per cent. In a report released recently, it is projected that Turkey’s GDP will undergo “a cumulative contraction” of about 7 per cent in the second and third quarters of 2020.17
In fact, one of the reasons for the slow response of the government was to avoid hampering the economic recovery. On April 5, two days after the second set of restrictions came into force, Turkey relaxed the restrictions for people under 20-years working in farm or agriculture sector or in private enterprises to mitigate the impact on the economy. This has fuelled criticism from the opposition leaders who argue that the government’s move will hamper the fight against the pandemic.
The main opposition leader from the Republican People’s Party (CHP), Kemal Kilicdaroglu, not only criticised the delay in effecting curbs but also underlined that the half-hearted measures might not be enough given the magnitude of the situation.18 Kilicdaroglu said, “At this stage, it is evident that we need a comprehensive, wide and effective stay-at-home and quarantine” against the “voluntary quarantine” being urged by the government.19 He further noted that given the gravity of the situation, “It is not possible to solve this issue with campaigns like ‘Stay Home Turkey’ and by leaving it to the will and initiative of our citizens while not providing any wage or job security and abandoning them to fate.”20 Other opposition parties too have joined CHP in criticising the government for its handling of the situation and also for intensifying the political squabbling within the country.21
Like many other countries in the world, Turkey was caught unprepared to fight the COVID-19 pandemic. The political divisions and economic challenges facing the country have complicated the government’s response, putting the population at risk and threatening to undermine the popularity of President Erdogan.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Coping with New Guidelines on Expenditure Management
Amit Cowshish
April 13, 2020
The present crisis is as much of a challenge as an opportunity to infuse financial realism in defence planning and bring about concomitant reforms in the quickest possible timeframe.
Acknowledging that the cash position of the government may be stressed during the first quarter of the current fiscal due to the slowdown caused by the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic, the Department of Economic Affairs of the Ministry of Finance (MoF) has issued fresh guidelines for cash management on April 8, 2020.1
The New Guidelines
The new guidelines divide the 100-odd demands for grant of various central ministries and departments into three categories. The first category, or category A, comprises 17 grants related to sectors like food and agriculture, health, civil aviation, textiles, railways and rural development. In the current situation, the ministries administering these grants are the vanguard of the fight against the pandemic. No new restrictions have been imposed on grants covered by this category.
This category also includes demands which largely provide for charged or obligatory expenses, such as those related to the President and Supreme Court of India, Central Vigilance Commission, interest payment, transfer to states, and the Union Public Service Commission.
It is the other two categories which would be of interest to the Ministry of Defence (MoD) as three of its four demands for grant – defence services (revenue), capital outlay on defence services and defence pensions - figure in category B which covers 31 grants, while the fourth one – MoD (Civil) - is included in category C which covers as many as 52 grants.
The revenue and capital grants of the defence services, incidentally, also cater to other departments and organisations like the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), ordnance factories, Rashtriya Rifles, and the Ex-Servicemen Contributory Health Scheme (ECHS), to name a few.
The guidelines provide that the monthly expenditure in respect of the grants included in category B may be kept at 8 per cent of the budget estimates (BE) of the FY 2020-21 for the first month, and at 6 per cent for each of the last two months of the first quarter (April to June 2020). The restrictions in respect of the grants in category C are more stringent, with the guidelines prescribing a cap of 5 per cent for each of the three months of the quarter.
Implications for Defence
In so far as the revenue and capital expenditure of the armed forces is concerned, it may not be impossible to adhere to the monthly cap stipulated in the guidelines as, even in the normal circumstances, the pace of expenditure in the first quarter is generally quite slow, except for the expenditure on salaries, as the salary for the month of March is also paid and booked in the account for the month of April.
Containing the expenditure may, however, pose a bit of a challenge if a substantial amount of payments, due towards the end of the previous financial year but held back because of shortage of funds, are to be released in this month. Release of the dearness allowance instalment, due from January 2020, could also add to the pressure.
What is surprising is the inclusion of defence pensions in category B. The demand for grant for defence pensions caters predominantly for the obligatory expenses on payment of pension. Going by averages, the monthly expenditure on pensions would be around 8 per cent of the total allocation.
Considering that, like salaries, pension for the month of March is also paid and booked to the account for the month of April, it is difficult to imagine how the expenditure can be consciously restricted to 8 per cent of the BE in the first month of the quarter.
Defence pension is disbursed by thousands of pension disbursing authorities all over the country. They have no authority to withhold or curtail the pension payable to a pensioner. Nor do they have any means of ensuring that the payments made by them are within the cap on the monthly expenditure.
The defence ministry spokesman did clarify on April 10 that the MoD had taken up the matter with MoF and that “no problem with regards to payment of pensions is envisaged at this stage”.2 This is unlikely to prevent confusion among the pension disbursing authorities and needless anxiety among the pensioners.
The government would do well to formally clarify the position in the next couple of days. A simple solution could be to shift defence pensions from category B to category A and issue a formal press notification, giving it a wide publicity.
For the organisations covered by category C also, such as the Coast Guard and Border Roads Organisation (BRO), it is going to be tough, though not impossible, to keep the expenditure within 5 per cent in each of the three months of the quarter. They, as well as the services and other organisations covered by category B, will have to pull out all the stops to abide by the guidelines stipulating the monthly cap on expenditure.
The situation calls for a two-pronged strategy to deal with the emergency. One, to the extent possible, the priority should be to make contractual payments as the businesses, which are going to be the key to economic recovery, are badly in need of cash at the present juncture. Two, all new proposals for procurement of goods and services and carrying out other activities should be screened and those which can be deferred, even on pain of suffering some consequences which the services and other organisations could live with, should be put off for the time being.
This will inevitably mean being ruthless in shelving all expenditure proposals which do not have immediate relevance, preventing wasteful expenditure, adopting cost-saving methods of working, and making a beginning in enforcing jointness.
Long Term Impact
The economic situation is unlikely to improve any time soon. The government’s resources will remain under stress for a considerable time due to severe constraints on its ability to raise additional resources and pressing demand from other sectors of the economy and the state governments for fiscal packages. This raises the possibility of the current year’s allocation being slashed later this year. In fact, it may take a few years before the situation comes back to the normal.
In the circumstances, all organisations under the administrative control of the MoD, including the services, would do well to draw up emergency expenditure plans for the current year as well as for the next five years or so, which is what it might take for the situation to normalise. These plans must take into account the financial constraints faced by the government and should not be premised upon fanciful assumptions about the availability of funds.
The present crisis is as much of a challenge as an opportunity to infuse financial realism in defence planning and bring about concomitant reforms in the quickest possible timeframe. There has been no dearth of ideas about how this can be done. Several committees have made numerous recommendations in the past. It is time to act upon them.
Civil War Complicates Fight Against COVID-19 in Syria
Lakshmi Priya
April 13, 2020
Syria’s fragile health care system on account of the continuing conflict hinders the country’s effort to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic.
Syria reported its first case of COVID-19 on March 23, 2020, while its first death was confirmed on March 29. As of April 9, the number of confirmed cases in the country stood at 19.1 Some reports do note that the spread of the infection is more widespread than acknowledged by official agencies.2 Syria has imposed a lockdown and a nationwide night curfew to check the spread of COVID-19 since the first case was reported. Businesses, schools, universities, mosques, government offices and public transport have been shut. The movement of people between governorates has been sealed and only army vehicles and essential services are allowed to move. While commercial flights at Damascus Airport have stopped, the government has ordered the closure of main border crossings with neighbouring states.
Speculations are rife that Iranian militias operating inside the country are the primary sources of infection. Iranian pilgrims also visit the Sayeda Zainab shrine in Damascus. Iranian airlines, Mahan Air, still has regular flights from Tehran to Damascus, despite Iran reporting nearly 40,000 cases and over 2,500 deaths due to coronavirus. In addition, the presence of Turkish troops, Russian military, and foreign aid workers increase the chances of COVID-19 transmission.
Unequipped Health Facilities
Syria is not equipped to handle the spread of coronavirus as the health facilities have undergone massive degeneration as a result of the civil war and access to health care is severely restricted. As per the World Health Organisation (WHO), only fifty per cent of public hospitals are fully functional in Syria, with private hospitals mainly confined to the major cities.3 The head of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) noted that given the frequently moving population, along with complexities in acquiring medical supplies and protective equipment and the challenges of practicing social distancing in crowded refugee camps, Syria’s fragile health system poses a grave hurdle in battling the virus.4 70 per cent of the total worldwide attacks on healthcare facilities have taken place in Syria, leading the WHO to create a Surveillance System of Attacks on Health Care (SSA) in January 2018.5 The extent of attacks on health facilities is such that the Red Cross and the Red Crescent have been forced to remove their symbols from health facilities run by them.
The Precarious Case of Idlib
While the situation in the whole country is precarious, the areas under rebel or opposition forces, especially Idlib in the northwest, the three small pockets held by Turkish forces and their Syrian allies in the north (Idlib, Afrin, and Tal Abyad) and the area east of the Euphrates River up to the border with Iraq controlled by the United States (US)-backed and Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces, are at greater risk from the pandemic. For instance, a major regime offensive in Idlib since December 2019, codenamed “Dawn of Idlib 2”, has led to massive displacement of people, forcing the rebel leaders to establish 200 refugee camps with inadequate sanitation facilities.
Lack of adequate aid from the international community, constant air bombardment and the absence of the formal presence of the UN, makes it extremely difficult to handle any health emergency in Idlib. The UN has confirmed that a total of 51 medical facilities have been damaged as a result of attacks since the offensive began in Idlib.6 Attacks on the national hospital of Jisr al-Shughour, south wing of health centre in Maarat al-Numan and the facilities at Saraqeb are the cases in point. The condition of internally displaced people in Idlib has worsened with fears of unimaginable loss of life, as flagged by the UN Special Envoy for Syria, Geir Pedersen, who has called for an immediate nationwide ceasefire in Syria to enable an all-out effort to combat the corona pandemic.7
Regional and International Response
Syria is receiving regional and international support in its fight against coronavirus but it might not be sufficient. The US committed an additional $16.8 million for humanitarian programming for Syria under the US Agency for International Development’s (USAID) $274 million fund for countries affected by the coronavirus.8 The WHO has shipped 300 test kits to Idlib, and promised to supply an additional 2,000 tests, while deploying an additional 1,000 health personnel, 10,000 masks and 500 respirators to the city and the neighbouring areas.9 The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has assured Syrian President Bashar al-Assad that Syria will not be left alone during these critical times.10 China has called for the lifting of sanctions on Syria. While the international support for Syria is a positive development, given its highly deficient healthcare system and the ongoing conflict, the coronavirus situation in the country could take a turn for the worse sooner than later. The COVID-19 pandemic adds another layer to Syria’s continuing misery.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Video Conferencing Apps: A New Playground for Cyber Criminals
Kritika Roy
April 11, 2020
With a new found celebrity status among the video conferencing applications, Zoom now faces a massive privacy and security threat as the platform’s default settings are not secure enough.
The Covid-19 outbreak has curbed the movement of more than half of the world’s population. This has pushed the working population to become remote workers, many for the first time. The sudden spike in people working from home has led to an increase in demand for videoconferencing apps, chat systems and online collaboration tools. Today, business conferences are being held online, schools and universities are conducting online classes, and even yoga sessions are being held online. Notably, government meetings too have shifted to the online mode. The United Kingdom Government has been holding its daily cabinet meetings online while India has held a video conference with South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) leaders to brainstorm means to curb the spread of Covid-19.1
It will not be an exaggeration to say that it took a global scale disease outbreak to shift people from talking about digitalisation to actually imbibing digital models in their conventional workspaces. What we are, therefore, witnessing today is a truly digitalised world. However, this has also led to the rise of a plethora of opportunities for malicious actors to exploit the existing vulnerabilities.
Dark Side of Video Conferencing Apps
Many of these online tools have been available for a long time even though they were rarely fully employed. However, the sudden surge in usage of different online platforms like Zoom, Classroom, Slack, Cisco WebEx, etc., for taking classes or conducting online meetings has exposed the dark side of several of these applications. There has been a mass adaptation of online platforms without giving much consideration to the security settings of these platforms. This has paved the way for cyber criminals to take advantage of loopholes for malicious purposes.
Educational apps and student online programmes track students’ every response, thereby developing a profile-based understanding of each student. This has forced many users to demand more accountability and transparency from software developers, particularly when many apps sell data to third party data brokers for unspecified uses.2 While the major concern of the educational institutions remains the privacy and security of students’ data, it is the businesses which have a lot more to fear and lose. Last year, Slack listed a litany of cyber security related threats, including the traditional hacking techniques of malware, ransomware, password spraying3, phishing, credential stuffing and Denial of Service Attacks (DoS).4
‘ZOOMING’ Out in Popularity and Vulnerabilities
Zoom Video Communications, a California based company, provides a remote conferencing service that combines online meetings, video conferencing, chats and mobile collaborations.5 With the ongoing endeavour of social distancing and working from home gaining traction, Zoom has seen a considerable uptick in its usage as well as breaching attempts.6 With a new found celebrity status among the video conferencing applications, it now faces a massive privacy and security threat as the platform’s default settings are not secure enough.
Last year, Zoom’s web server was quietly removed from Macs over a serious vulnerability issue that “allowed any website to open up a Zoom conference call on your computer automatically with the webcam on. Even if the Zoom application was uninstalled, the web server persisted on the machine and it could reinstall the application automatically.”7 In 2020, a research published by Checkpoint - a cyber security company - stated that Zoom has witnessed an exponential rise in malicious domain registrations.8 It was also reported that the hackers have discovered a technique to identify and join active Zoom Meetings.9 This phenomenon has been tagged as “Zoombombing”10, wherein nefarious actors may join calls and broadcast porn or prank videos. The Boston office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has warned against Zoom, cautioning individuals from making meetings on the site public or sharing links after it received two reports of anonymous individuals disrupting school sessions.11
Privacy has been another major concern among users. In March 2020, Zoom was sued for illegally disclosing personal data to Facebook and other third parties.12 Zoom clarified in its statements that it has removed the code that sent data to Facebook. However, this was not the end of Zoom’s troubles. The company has had to update its privacy policy which earlier allowed it to collect data and transcripts from users’ meetings via the software’s chat feature in order to target ads at the users.13 The new privacy policy published by the company articulates in detail the kind of data being collected. This includes the user name and phone numbers.14 Nevertheless, the new policy did not provide clarity on whether any kind of facial data or video footage is being stored for artificial intelligence (AI) and object recognition training.
Zoom also claims that it implements end-to-end encryption (E2E) for video and audio content. E2E is understood as the most discreet form of internet communication, protecting conversations from any external interception including the host platform.15 However, the connection between the Zoom app running on a user’s system or phone and Zoom’s server is encrypted similar to the connection between a user’s web browser and this article is encrypted. This form of encryption, called transport encryption, is different from E2E because the Zoom service itself can access the unencrypted video and audio content of the Zoom meetings.16
With the government and businesses holding meetings on the Zoom platform, there has been a constant fear of espionage and violation of privacy. Several organisations and companies like the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and SpaceX have issued advisories to their employees to use more traditional means of communication like email, text or phone to interact with each other.17 In order to allay these fears, Zoom has recently committed to human rights group Access Now’s open letter to publish “a transparency report that details information related to requests for data, records and content.”18
India’s Response
The Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) has warned of the dangers of unprotected use of this digital platform, given its susceptibility to cyberattacks, including pilferage of sensitive data. In a reported incident, Broadcast Audience Research Council (BARC), while hosting a virtual conference of about 600 people via Zoom on television and smartphone consumption trends, was forced to stop the briefing midway because of a hacking incident.19
In this context, India’s national cybersecurity agency has released an advisory to secure communications while using the app. It includes:
Keeping the Zoom software patched by its regular updation.
Using strong and difficult-to-guess passwords for all meetings and webinars, and locking the meeting session once all attendees have joined.
Enabling the waiting room feature, for meetings involving discussion of sensitive information, so that the host can have control over the participants.
Restricting the call record feature to trusted participants only and limiting screen sharing to the host only.
Restricting or disabling file transfers – unless essential – and ensuring that removed participants are unable to re-join meetings.20
Securing the New Normal
Businesses and educational institutions have always preferred time-tested traditional methods of face-to-face meetings, classroom teaching modules, and paper-pencil mechanisms. However, today, the disruptions caused by the pandemic have compelled them to reassess their options and adopt online applications while often overlooking its security aspects. Invariably, this has led to an increase in cybercrimes since the outbreak of Covid-19 and specifically in phishing attacks in most of the leading communication application.
In this context, the adage that “if it is free, you are probably the product” should act as a motivation for individuals to examine the privacy policy of any particular app. This can help one verify the app’s motive of collecting, selling or sharing one’s data and whether it is being used for funding the provision of its ‘free’ service. The examination of the privacy policy should, therefore, be accorded primary importance. Additionally, encryption and password-protection should always be the first line of defence wherever possible.
It is likely that the ongoing churnings will bring about a pervasive change in the way people live and work. Video conferencing apps are a great tool to conduct meetings and conferences online, while saving up significantly on travel time and costs. It may, therefore, become the new normal. However, concerns about security are legitimate and should be given due consideration.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
Covid-19 and Bangladesh: Looming Crisis in the Horizon
Smruti S. Pattanaik
April 09, 2020
The Hasina Government is in overdrive to meet the Covid-19 challenge head on, and ensure that this unforeseen threat does not snowball into a major national crisis.
Bangladesh economy has been growing at seven per cent for the past five years. The country is supposed to graduate from a least developed country (LDC) to a developing one by 2021. However, the coronavirus pandemic or Covid-19 has emerged as a major challenge for the country’s economy at a moment, when most analysts believe that the economic stability has contributed to political stability, lent legitimacy to the Sheikh Hasina Government and weakened the opposition.
The Hasina Government is now in overdrive to meet the challenge head on, and ensure that this unforeseen threat does not snowball into a major national crisis. It ordered a complete lockdown in the country, starting March 26, for 10 days to begin with, and later extended it till April 10. As of April 8, Bangladesh has reported 218 positive cases of Covid-19, with 33 recoveries and 21 deaths. Besides, 111 people have been kept in isolation and a total of 68,324 people have been quarantined and 58,167 people have been released from quarantine.1 What explains the government’s cautious approach is its realisation that being a densely populated country of more than 160 million people, the health-care system is not adequate to deal with possible escalation in country-wide transmission of the virus.
Government’s Initiatives
The Covid-19 pandemic has demonstrated how ill-prepared most of the countries are, including in South Asia, to deal with such a challenge. Bangladesh, like other countries in the region, reacted slowly to the pandemic even though the first confirmed case was reported on March 8, ordering a lockdown starting as late as March 26, whereby all public and private offices were closed and travel by air, road and waterways were stopped till April 6 which has now been extended to April 10. The Department of Immigration stopped issuing fresh passports until further notice. To further prevent Covid-19 from spreading, the domestic flights too were stopped from March 31.
The government also banned flights originating from Bahrain, India, Kuwait, Malaysia, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), countries where many Bangladeshis are employed. Except for the United Kingdom (UK), it banned flights from other destinations in Europe and declared that after March 30 it would not allow its national carrier to fly to two destinations in the UK. However, the government notified that commercial flights to and from China, Hong Kong, Thailand and UK will continue their operations until further notice. From March 15, the government had also discontinued visa on arrival facility. Though on March 1 it flew back 312 of its citizens from Wuhan, it could not arrange flights to bring back 171 more citizens. An India Air Force special flight that went to Wuhan carrying medical supplies, evacuated 23 Bangladeshis along with Indians and also people from Maldives, Sri Lanka and Nepal.2 According to the Chinese Embassy in Bangladesh, 5,760 Bangladeshis are living in China.
Before government enforced the 10-day lockdown, starting March 26, thousands of people left Dhaka for their villages in other parts of the country in overcrowded buses, railways and ferries that were packed several times over their capacity. In her address to the nation on the eve of Bangladesh’s independence day on March 26, Hasina appraised the people about steps taken by the government and suggested them to follow instructions provided by the health department and not to panic.3 She later addressed the government officials working in 64 districts over video to coordinate Bangladesh’s fight against Covid-19 and extended the lockdown period till April 10. The government has drawn out a national action plan to deal with possible surge in Covid-19 cases. It has set up “committees from the national up to the upazila level with multisectoral involvement representing the relevant ministries and national and international organizations and development partners.”4
Many analysts attribute such low numbers to poor testing facility and believe that many more may have been affected. According to a report, only one suspected case is being tested for approximately 100,499 people in Bangladesh.5 While the Institute of Epidemiology, Disease Control and Research (IEDCR) remain the nodal agency, nine testing facilities are open in Dhaka and five outside of Dhaka.6 According to reports, the government has set up 1,050 isolation beds in the capital and 4,515 in the divisions and districts.7 However, the government’s efforts are well-supported by the Bangladesh Army, which has deployed 399 teams to work with the civil administration in 62 out of 64 districts. More than 5,000 troops have been deployed to help curb the spread of coronavirus across the country.8 The World Bank, to help Bangladesh, has fast tracked the approval of $100 million to prevent, detect, and respond to Covid-19 as per the national action plan of the government. India has provided 30,000 surgical masks and 15,000 head-cover to support the efforts of the Bangladesh Government.9 UK also has announced Tk 2.18 billion in aid.
The most difficult task before the government is how to prevent people from visiting mosques as it is a sensitive issue. The Islamic Foundation of Bangladesh has suggested that muftis must stay away from rumours and allow the continuation of the azan, Friday prayers and fazr prayers with a limited number of people. It has barred those who have returned from virus-affected countries or have symptoms of coronavirus, and those who are old and have serious ailments. However, such guidelines have remained on paper and largely ignored till date. The government, even though it denied permission for popular congregations, did not take any action when nearly 25,000 people gathered at Raipur in Lakshmipur District on March 19, for a mass prayer to contain coronavirus by chanting six Quranic verses of healing.10 On April 6, the Ministry of Religious Affair finally decided to suspend prayers for public at the mosques.
Another real danger for Bangladesh is the extremely congested Rohingya refugee camps. Most of the refugees stay in small huts and work outside the camp, exposing them to Covid-19 infection. Recently, a case was reported from Chittagong where these camps are located. Enforcing social distancing in these camps is practically impossible. What makes the situation more problematic is poor access to health facility and monitoring of suspicious cases in the camps. Refugees, however, are very much part of the government’s National Preparedness and Response Plan.
Impact on Economy
The lockdown is going to affect the country’s garment sector hugely. Already, H&M, a Swedish company and one of the major importers of garments from Bangladesh, has stopped placing orders. The Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA) has informed that around 1,025 readymade garment (RMG) factories have reported postponement and cancellation of export orders worth $2.90 billion, affecting 2.10 million workers as of March 31.11 According to a report “cancellations of planned orders, for April-December, amounted to nearly $1.7 billion.”12 Most of the garment manufacturing units have closed down following the government order.
In financial year 2019, the country’s export earnings from the RMG sector were to the tune of US$ 34.13 billion, 83.52 per cent of the country’s overall export earnings. This sector also imported raw materials worth $12.18 billion.13 Due to the order banning movement of non-essential goods, some of the exporters are fearing congestion at the Chittagong Port. The total storage capacity of the port is 49,018 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs). However, the number of loaded containers has already risen to 40,000 TEUs.14 Therefore, given the lockdown, both import of raw materials, machinery and other products that feeds into the garment industry as well as export is likely to be affected.
It is important to note that the garment industries in Bangladesh employ mostly women and many of them are sole breadwinners for their families. Therefore, the government has not closed down the garment industries, leaving their management to individual manufacturers. According to a report, the industry employs around 3.5 million workers. As per section 16 of the Bangladesh Labour Act, which deals with the rights of laid-off workers for compensation, the companies have to pay half-day salary to the workers.15 In some cases, the garment workers stopped coming to the industry and some owners who were forced to shut down their industries have threatened to invoke section 13/1 of the Bangladesh Labour Act, according to which absence from work means employees are on strike and which would mean no payment.
According to Bangladesh Bank, “Earnings from woven garments and knitwear fell by 5.88 percent and 5.17 percent respectively during July-February 2019-20, as compared to the same period in the previous fiscal year.”16 This sector is already under stress and with Covid-19 the impact on this sector would be serious. The following chart shows the contribution of the garment industry to export earnings of the country.
To deal with this situation, the government has announced Tk 5,000 crore (US$ 590 million) bailout package to pay salary and wages to the workers employed in the garment industry and has offered loan at two per cent interest. The government has also announced an additional Tk 67,750 crore financial stimulus package. Any protracted lockdown combined with unchecked spread of the contagion would lead to unmitigated economic crisis and complicate the government’s response to it.
Bangladesh is also likely to receive low remittances, which is a major source of its foreign exchange, since most of the West Asian countries, Malaysia and other European countries, where 80 per cent of the Bangladeshi overseas workers are employed, are under lockdown too.17 Due to suspension of flights, many of these are stranded in West Asia without work and some of them who were preparing to leave are unable to return due to cancellation of flights. In many cases, these people pay huge amounts to middlemen and also take help of the Bangladesh Association of International Recruiting Agencies (BAIRA) and thousands of private agencies to find employment in these countries. Between 2009 and 2019, according to the Bureau of Manpower Employment and Training (BMET), 58,13,499 people have migrated out of Bangladesh for work.18 Following pie chart reflects the remittances send by the Bangladeshi workers.
To conclude, Covid-19 is likely to have a severe impact on the Bangladesh economy. Apart from affecting the garment industry, the mainstay of Bangladesh’s export earnings, the possible reduction in remittances and loss of jobs due to global downturn could contribute to the fiscal deficit, which was 5.1 per cent of the GDP last year – an 11-year high. The government has now announced short, medium and long term programmes to boost the economy by encouraging public spending, providing working capital at reduced rates for small scale industries and facilitating raw material imports under back-to-back LC.
However, the problem is, given the spread of epidemic and lockdown across the world, the import and export markets too have been affected. Amid the lockdown, some garment exporters have announced the opening of their industries, triggering a mad rush to reach Dhaka by walking as the workers fear that they would lose their jobs. This has brought widespread criticism as some of the owners are politicians or have close connection to the ruling party. Whether this could snowball into a political challenge for the government would largely depend on the nature, scope and intensity of the impact of Covid-19 on the economy, and the perception of the people about measures undertaken by the government to deal with the looming crisis.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
1.Press Release, National Coordination Authority, Government of Bangladesh, April 08, 2020.
4. Coordinated at five levels: Inter-ministerial National Committee, headed by the Minister, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW); Divisional-level Multi-sectoral Coordination Committees; District-level Multi-sectoral Coordination Committees, headed by the Civil Surgeons; City Corporation-level Multi-sectoral Coordination Committees headed by the Mayors; and, Upazila-level Multisectoral Coordination Committees headed by the Upazila Nirbahi Officers. See “National Preparedness and Response Plan for COVID-19, Bangladesh”, Version 5, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of Bangladesh, March 2020. P.4. According to this report, the present government has taken steps to revitalise PHC services by making the community clinics operational. These community clinics, one for every 6000 rural populations, were constructed in 2000-2001 but were not used for service delivery during the previous governments, see https://dghs.gov.bd/images/docs/Notice/Notice_20_03_2020_Revised_NPRP%20COVID-19_V6_18032020.pdf , p.7.
6. In Dhaka: Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib Medical University (BSMMU), Dhaka Shishu (Children) Hospital, the Institute of Public Health (IPH), ICDC, ICDDRB, RArmed Forces Institute of Pathology, CHRF & MCH, BSMRU, ideSHi, Dhaka Medical College, National Institute of Laboratory Medicine. Outside of Dhaka: Bangladesh Institute of Tropical and Infectious Disease, Mymensingh Medical College, Rajshahi Medical College, Rangpur Medical College, Cox’s Bazar Medical College. See Press Release, Bangladesh Government National Coordination Centre, April 05, 2020.
15. See “The Bangladesh Labour Act, 2006”, ACT NO. XLII OF 2006 Amendment, Department of Printing and Publications, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, October 11, 2016, p. 7904.
COVID-19 Should Qualify as Force Majeure in Defence Contracts
Amit Cowshish
April 06, 2020
There is a need to act quickly on the issue of force majeure to scotch all speculations about how the MoD is going to deal with the inevitable delay in performance of contracts and instil confidence among the vendors.
The COVID-19 pandemic has, among other things, disrupted the manufacturing activities and left the supply-chain in disarray across the globe. Its impact on the ongoing contracts must be agonising the vendors as they may not be able to adhere to the delivery timelines, potentially exposing them to the penal clauses in the contract.
The question in everyone’s mind seems to be whether the Force Majeure Clause (FMC)1 in the contract provides some protection against such penal consequences and, if so, in what way. A big spending department like the Ministry of Defence (MoD) would do well to allay this and other related anxieties. What would it take to do this?
Need for a Comprehensive Clarificatory Order
The Ministry of Finance had issued a clarificationin February 2020 to the effect that the outbreak of coronavirus in China or any other country should be considered as a case of natural calamity and FMC may be invoked, wherever considered necessary, following the due procedure.2
Since this clarification is in the context of that ministry’s Manual for Procurement of Goods, 2017 which does not govern the defence contracts, MoD needs to issue a separate clarificatory order on similar lines covering every conceivable aspect of the problem. This will not require prior consultation with the finance ministry so long as the order does not violate the spirit underlying the clarification issued by that ministry in February.
Applicability of Clarificatory Order
The clarificatory order should be applicable to the contracts and supply orders concluded under any edition of the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP), Defence Procurement Manual (DPM), or the purchase manuals followed by the Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB).
It will be desirable to issue a single order for all contracts/supply orders, irrespective of the manual under which these were concluded/placed. If that is not possible (as these are administered by various departments in MoD), similar orders should be issued by all the departments concerned simultaneously, though the Department of Defence Production may have to issue a separate policy directive to the Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs).
Other Issues Requiring Clarification
There are some other issues that need to be clarified, some of which are illustrated below with reference to the standard FMC in the defence contracts covered by DPP 2016. Article 24 on Force Majeure in DPP 2016 reads as follows:
24.1 Should any Force Majeure circumstances arise, each of the contracting party shall be excused for the non-fulfilment or for the delayed fulfilment of any of its contractual obligations, if the affected party within (days) of its occurrence informs in a written form the other party.
24.2 Force Majeure shall mean fires, floods, natural disasters or other acts, that are unanticipated or unforeseeable and not brought about at the instance of, the party claiming to be affected by such event, or which, if anticipated or foreseeable, could not be avoided or provided for and which has caused the non-performance or delay in performance, such as war, turmoil, strikes, sabotage, explosions, beyond the control of either party.
24.3 A party claiming Force Majeure shall exercise reasonable diligence to seek to overcome the Force Majeure event and to mitigate the effects thereof on the performance of its obligations under this contract.
24.4 Provided the acts of The Government or any state parties of the seller which may affect the discharge of the Seller’s obligation under the contract shall not be treated as Force Majeure.3
Communication in Writing
Some vendors may find it difficult to convey to the MoD in writing, as required by the first sub-clause of the FMC, that there is likely to be a delay in achieving the delivery milestones because of the disruption in postal and courier services. It should, therefore, be acceptable if such communication is sent by email at the address(es) to be notified in the clarificatory order. If even that is not possible for a vendor, any communication sent after the period stipulated in the sub-clause should be acceptable. The vendors should not also be required to submit any document or government notification regarding shutdown/closure of units, etc. along with the communication.
Duration of Force Majeure
The standard FMC presumes that there would be a determin able starting and end dates for a force majeure situation. This may not be a valid presumption under the present circumstances.
To ease the difficulty in determination of the duration of force majeure, the clarificatory order could stipulate that the force majeure will be deemed to have commenced from the date the World Health Organisation (WHO) declared the outbreak of Novel COVID-19 as a pandemic, which is March 11, 2020, in the case of foreign vendors, or from March 24, 2020 when the nation-wide lockdown was announced, in the case of Indian vendors. If these dates do not suit a vendor, he could be permitted to request for the date on which his production/supply chain was disrupted to be determined at a later stage after the situation normalises.
It is difficult to say when the situation would normalise. This may differ from one vendor to the other. The clarificatory order could stipulate that the date of cessation of force majeure will be determined in individual cases, based on the information provided by the vendors. This problem could also be discussed with the industry representatives in due course and supplementary orders issued in the next couple of days.
Liquidated Damages
The first sub-clause of the FMC simply says that the contracting parties shall be ‘excused’ for non-fulfilment or delayed fulfilment of any contractual obligation because of the force majeure. There is nothing in the FMC or the standard clause related to liquidated damages (LD) which specifically says that LD, or any other penalty, will not be applicable for delays caused by force majeure. It will be reassuring if the MoD clarifies that the duration of force majeure will be excluded while calculating the delay in delivery of contracted equipment or services and imposition of LD.
Acts of Foreign Governments
The last sub-clause of the FMC provides that the acts of the governments or any state parties of the seller which may affect the discharge of obligation under the contract shall not be treated as force majeure. This sub-clause should be declared as inoperative where the delay is on account of causes attributable to the ongoing crisis, as it was clearly intended as a bulwark against actions taken by a foreign government on geopolitical considerations which threaten to disrupt the performance of an ongoing contract.
Assurance Against Termination of Contract
The standard termination clause in defence contracts gives MoD the right to terminate a contract, partially or in full, if, inter alia, delivery of the goods or services is delayed due to force majeure beyond the period stipulated in the contract. This may be a matter of great concern for the vendors as no one knows when it will be possible to resume normal activities. It is important that MoD assures the vendors that the termination clause will not be invoked where delay is only on account of the present crisis.
Supply Orders Without FMC
Some supply orders, and possibly some contracts, may not contain an FMC. These should be deemed to have been amended to include a standard FMC, whose text can be specified in the clarificatory order. This will go a long way in dousing the anxiety of the vendors who find themselves in the unenviable situation of having to execute a supply order that does not have an FMC.
To conclude, there is a need to act quickly on this time-sensitive issue to scotch all speculations about how the MoD is going to deal with the inevitable delay in performance of contracts and instil confidence in the vendors that the matter will be dealt with equitably and, above all, with compassion which is the need of the hour.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
1. Generally speaking, ‘force majeure’implies unforeseeable circumstances that prevent someone from fulfilling any or all the obligations under a contract. A force majeure clause is normally included in the contracts to mitigate the penal consequences arising from partial or complete breach of contract on account of natural, unavoidable, or other circumstances as specified in the contract that impede its execution.
COVID-19 presents a unique opportunity to the global new-age mega corporations to up their game and showcase their innovativeness and resourcefulness.
COVID-19 as a pandemic has literally taken the world by storm. Never before in recent history has the globe been more physically disconnected and isolated. What started as a trickle in China turned into a flood in that country before spreading to the rest of the world, with the worse yet to be over. Thanks to mega corporations and cyberspace, the global community has been able to take several timely measures and has saved innumerable lives. The instant global communication across a wide variety of formats like text, voice, video and documents has made it extremely easy for a cross-section of society ranging from common individuals to scientific communities and nations to interact and collaborate at an unprecedented scale.
On March 15, 2020, the Prime Minister held a video conference with the leaders /representatives of all member states of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to brainstorm ways and means to tackle the pandemic. This novel way of sharing ideas amongst leaders on combating a common threat was widely appreciated. It also subsequently resulted in the extraordinary virtual summit of G20 leaders on March 26, 2020.
What should be the role of mega global corporations in times of such crisis is the moot question which needs to be deliberated upon. This is the time to have a relook at the role of new-age mega corporations which have deep pockets, operate globally, have access to unprecedented data of common people of different nationalities, and possess the best of human skillsets and new-age tools such as artificial intelligence (AI), big data analytics and blockchain.
Most business schools profess that the only purpose of a business entity is to grow and generate maximum profits for the shareholders. All activities, therefore, need to focus on product, customer and net profit/returns. Politics and governance are best left to the political class and the bureaucracy. By and large, the approach of a business entity towards government is reactive, i.e., act only when asked to by the relevant authority.
Cyberspace as a domain is very unique. Not only does it span the entire globe, but being an artificial resource can rapidly grow or shrink. What is also distinct is that much of it is owned and managed by global mega corporations. In fact, mega global corporations like Facebook and Google have more knowledge about any country’s citizens than their own government. So, in a knowledge-based world where data can provide deep insights which can help prevent the spread of disease and also empower governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), should the mega corporations solely focus on growth and profits or take a more proactive approach in collaborating with the nations in combating common global threats? Role of Facebook in the current COVID-19 pandemic is briefly presented here to offer insight to the readers.
Facebook is the world’s most popular social media company with 2.9 billion people using one or more of its products (including WhatsApp, Instagram and Messenger). India has 260 million active Facebook users and has the largest user base in the world, followed by the United States with a user base of 160 million. In 2019, Facebook had a revenue of US$ 70.7 billion with advertising being the largest contributor towards its revenue. Its average revenue per user in 2019 was US$ 29.25.1 Thus, India contributed revenue worth US$ 7.605 billion to Facebook in 2019. This is approximately Rs. 57,334 Crore.
Spread of fake news and rumour mongering specially on social media platforms has been a major problem in the country during the current pandemic. On March 31, 2020, the Supreme Court of India finally directed the Union government to set up a portal to curb the spread of fake news in the country.2 The Maharashtra cyber police has also filed 36 FIRs recently against rumour mongers and perpetrators of fake and misleading news.3 This leads to the question, how can Facebook help in combating the spread of fake news in the country?
Having a central COVID-19 information centre on the home screen definitely helps the user in getting authentic information and staying away from fake news and rumour mongers. One of the major challenges facing the government and law enforcement agencies (LEAs) is the end-to-end encryption of messages, voice and video chats as well as the non-traceability of messages. The easier problem to solve amongst the two is to ensure traceability of messages. It is possible to maintain end-to-end encryption of messages as well as trace each and every message/post as it gets uploaded on the Facebook platform (Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram and Messenger). By attributing the ownership of each message as it is generated, modified or transmitted, Facebook can promote a sense of responsibility amongst the users which will definitely decrease the spread of fake and malicious messages.
Another problem facing the cyberspace is anonymity. Each user can generate multiple accounts using fictitious unverifiable information. Having more user accounts benefits the social media companies as they have a direct bearing on advertising revenues. The US Joint Publication 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, describes cyberspace as comprising of three layers, i.e., the physical, logical and cyber-persona.4 The physical layer comprises of all the hardware elements like switches, cables, computers, mobiles, routers, etc., while the logical layer comprises of the software portion or various operating systems and applications that are used to store, modify, analyse, move and destroy information. The cyber-persona layer consists of various user accounts which provides access to social media or other platforms and their relations with one another. Facebook is in a unique position to maintain a cyber-persona relationship of its users and is capable to predict the number of multiple accounts being operated by an individual. This sensitive information should be proactively shared with the concerned governments and LEAs, especially cases flagged by the Facebook.
Facebook is also capable of ascertaining the gathering of people in large numbers in real time. This information when proactively shared with the police authorities can help in curbing the spread of disease under current conditions. Similarly, machine learning can be utilised to predict hot spots and future outbreak of infections so that timely mitigating strategies can be adopted. There are innumerable ways and means through which the new-age mega corporations can assist governments and other agencies in tackling pandemics like COVID-19.
Another issue which needs to be flagged is the response of mega corporations to governments and LEAs of countries other than their country of origin. It has been observed that mega corporations generally have a formal and somewhat defensive response when dealing with other countries. It is quite evident that as major players, majority owners of global cyberspace domain and custodians of a large number of citizen’s personal data, these companies are important stakeholders in the nation’s geopolitical and geostrategic landscape.
Most of the measures elucidated above, however, do not come easy and cheap. There is a cost in terms of skilled manpower and resources which mega corporations would need to invest in order to reap the dividends of massive data being generated by account holders in real time. Investments in such collaborative and proactive measures between mega corporations and nations would definitely bring down profits in the short term. However, the goodwill generated and lives saved would more than make up for the minuscule drop in profits.
The steps taken by Facebook, be it the launch of a COVID-19 information centre or using AI for content moderation, in support of the ongoing global effort against the pandemic, are just not enough given the size of the company and its capabilities. Much more is expected and demanded of Facebook, especially in a country like India, which has its largest subscriber base.
COVID-19 thus presents a unique opportunity to the global new-age mega corporations to up their game and showcase their innovativeness and resourcefulness. The world appears ready for new players in the fight against common global threats. The question is: Are the mega corporations ready? The time to act is now.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
1. For details, see Statista, 4th Quarter 2019 (Accessed March 31, 2020).
While maintaining cyber hygiene in these disruptive times is indeed a challenge, each organisation should work towards putting in place a tailor-made work-from-home cyber defence strategy.
COVID-19 has claimed thousands of lives across the world since its outbreak in Wuhan, China. The temporary lockdowns to mitigate the spread of the virus has resulted in significant negative economic repercussions. Consequently, majority of corporate operations have adopted the work-from-home model, compelling people to operate in less secure environments. Weakened security barriers have opened up avenues for hackers, spammers and scammers to thrive. These nefarious actors are using varied techniques of social engineering, spoofing or phishing to gain access to confidential and sensitive information.
Surge in cyber risks
The pandemic has created a visible surge in cyber exploitations.1Work-for-home might be the safest option for individuals health-wise but the same is not true for the data and services that such individuals have to access remotely. Remote connections make it difficult for most of the threat detection tools to differentiate the genuine from the malicious.
Cybersecurity threats in such an environment are generally higher as unlike the networks of the workplace, which have due security measures like web filtering, required encryption, anomaly detection monitors or firewalls in place, the cyber networks at home usually do not have the same defence mechanisms. Moreover, the Virtual Private Networks (VPN) may not always be secure. Reports note that even some leading corporate VPNs have major vulnerabilities that organisations don’t always take the time to patch.2
Some reports indicate that ‘thousands’ of COVID-19 scams and malware sites have been created.3 Many of these sites are being used to disseminate malware files, host phishing attacks, or commit financial fraud,including tricking individuals into paying for forged Covid-19 cures, kits, vaccines or supplements.
On March 13, one of the Czech Republic’s biggest testing laboratories, Brno University Hospital, was hit by a cyberattack.4 As a result, the hospital had to postpone urgent surgical interventions and transfer patients with acute conditions to a different hospital. Additionally, they also had to shut down their entire IT network. This attack also impacted other branches of the hospital, including the maternity and the children’s wings.
Earlier in that week, Champaign-Urbana Public Health District’s website in the US was attacked by new ransomware called NetWalker.5 Ransomware is a malicious software that locks people out of their own systems. Victims receive a ransom demand for the encryption key to regain access to their data. This ransomware camouflages itself within essential Windows functions to evade anti-virus detection. Health district employees became aware of the ransomware attack on March 10 when they lost access to files.
In India too, an email feigning to be an official notification related to the closure of schools and hall in Delhi has been circulated and those who have clicked it for further information have got their systems and phones compromised.6
Even the World Health Organization (WHO) has stated that it is aware of many ‘suspicious email messages attempting to take advantage of the 2019 novel coronavirus emergency’.7There have been several reports of fabricated emails claiming to be from WHO employees asking the recipients to provide confidential details or click on malignant links.
These attacks have not just been limited to monetary gains, but have also been related to more insidious operations. Android applications positing as a genuine COVID-19 tracking map from the Johns Hopkins University for instance was found to be a spyware linked to a surveillance operation against mobile users in Libya.8
Securing the work-from-home model
Hospitals and banks are common targets as many malicious actors believe that the urgent need to function for these critical entities would push administrators to give in to their demands quickly. A cyberattack on a health care or financial sector entity during these critical times would have severe repercussions. Some cyber security firms like Coveware and Emsisoft have offered free ransomware curative services to healthcare organisations for the duration of the pandemic.9 The CEO of another firm, SafeGuard Cyber, has called for close coordination between cyber-security teams and stakeholders to secure all cloud environments.10
With employees having to operate outside the secured workplace, managing machine sprawl — when the numbers of virtual machines on a network increase, securing hundreds of thousands of endpoints becomes a much bigger challenge. Organisations therefore need to underscore the need to maintain cyber hygiene in these tumultuous times. These could relate to reminding employees about the importance of managing updates and security patches on their individual devices or home systems, circulating an updated list of websites that should be avoided, among others. Additionally, there is a need to follow a zero-trust approach at all levels and perform risk-assessment on a regular basis. Scrupulously adhering to such aspects as multi-factor authentication, whereby a user’s identity is verified by using multiple credentials, is essential. Equal attention should be paid to emergency response planning and disaster recovery,in order to minimize damage post-incidence. Given that the inimical impact of the COVID-19 pandemic will be long-drawn, organisations should work towards putting in place a tailor-made work-from-home cyber defence strategy.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The SIPRI report on the volume of international arms transfers during 2015-19 highlights the strengths of key strategic partnerships such as Russia-India, US-Japan and China-Pakistan, reinforced by arms trade.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) released a report showcasing an increase of 5.5 per cent in the volume of international arms transfers during 2015–19, compared with the previous five-year period.1 The report highlights the strength of key strategic partnerships such as Russia-India, US-Japan and China-Pakistan, reinforced by arms trade. While Russia accounted for 56 per cent of India’s arms imports, 96 per cent of Japan’s arms imports came from the US and Chinese equipment made up 73 per cent of Pakistan’s arms imports. The United States, Russia, France, Germany and China continue to be the world’s largest arms exporters.
The growth of arms trade from Europe, especially France and Germany,is a significant change. French arms exports registered a 72 per cent increase in 2015-19, reaching their highest level for any five-year period since 1990 and accounted for 7.9 per cent of total global arms exports. Similarly, Germany’s arms exports were 17 per cent higher in 2015–19, compared with 2010–14, and accounted for 5.8 per cent of global trade. The United Kingdom however registered a negative growth of 15 per cent. Asia and Oceania became even bigger markets for the US, Russia and China in the past five years, generating 30 per cent of trade for the US, 57 per cent for Russia and 74 per cent for China.
It was also interesting to note the distinct patterns in Africa, Latin America and Northeast Asia. While Brazilian arms imports in 2015–19 were the highest in South America — accounting for 31 per cent of the sub-region’s arms imports, South Africa, the largest arms importer in sub-Saharan Africa in 2005–2009, imported almost no major arms in 2015–19. In Northeast Asia, South Korea’s arms exports rose by 143 per cent during 2015-19, as compared to 2010-14, propelling it to the list of the top 10 largest exporters for the first time.
Countries in the turbulent and conflict-ridden Middle East registered a 61 per cent increase in arms imports, accounting for 35 per cent of the global total over the past five years. United Arab Emirates (UAE) was the eighth-largest arms importer in 2015–19.Egypt’s arms imports tripled in volume in 2015-19 and Saudi Arabia’s imports increased by 130 per cent, accounting for 12 per cent of global arms imports in 2015–19. Nearly three-fourths of Saudi Arabia’s arms imports came from the US and 13 per cent from the UK. The report though flags a decrease in Turkish arms imports, which were 48 per cent lower than in the previous five-year period.
The US has further strengthened its position as the world’s largest arms exporter, with its exports of major arms being 76 per cent higher than those of the second largest arms exporter in the world, the Russian Federation. Between 2010–14 and 2015–19, major arms exports from the USgrew by 23 per cent, and it was the primary exporter to 19 of the top 25 arms importers in the world. Overall, the US transferred arms to 96 countries. The Middle East was its biggest market, with 51 per cent share and Saudi Arabia — the world’s largest arms importer for 2015–19, accounted for 25 per cent of US exports. Apart from the Middle East, US arms exports accounted for the lion’s share of imports by Japan (96 per cent), Saudi Arabia (73 per cent), Australia (68 per cent), the UK (67 per cent), Israel (78 per cent) and Norway (77 per cent). Interestingly, Germany was listed as the primary supplier of arms for the US (21 per cent).
Russian arms exports saw a decline, registering a negative growth of 18 per cent. This was primarily due to fall in exports to Syria (87 per cent) and India (47 per cent), with SIPRI analysts noting that ‘Russia lost traction in India …’2 While Russian arms exports to India have indeed seen a decline in percentage terms, this has little relation to the strength of India-Russia relations as India is still Russia’s primary arms importer. Along with China and Algeria, India accounts for 55 per cent of Russian exports. The decline in Russian exports to India may also be attributed to the fact that there has been a reduction in Indian arm imports from 14 per cent of the global arms trade in 2010-14 to 9.2 per cent in 2015-19. The reduction in Russian arms export to Syria, however, did not affect Moscow’s Middle Eastern arms trade which rose by 30 per cent, with Egypt and Iraq being the main recipients of Russian weapons.
While US arms exports increased and Russian exports declined, Chinese arms exports remained relatively stable and did not see a significant jump — growing by only 6.3 per cent. Asia and Oceania accounted for nearly three-fourths of Chinese exports, followed by Africa (16 per cent) and the Middle East (6.7 per cent). China’s share within Asia and Oceania was primarily due to significant arms trade with Pakistan (accounting for 73 per cent of its imports), Bangladesh (72 per cent) and Myanmar (49 per cent). However, as the fifth-largest arms exporter in 2015–19, China significantly increased the number of recipients of its major arms, from 40 in 2010–14 to 53 in 2015–19.
The SIPRI report makes for interesting reading when juxtaposed with the geopolitical flux associated with some of the key regions of the world. The report for instance highlights a reduction in Turkey’s arms imports, even as the country has faced a difficult regional security situation in the recent past. On the other hand, Egypt, without any discernible imminent, external threat, has seen a high jump in its arm imports (of over 200 percent) — making it the third-largest arms importer for 2015–19. In Northeast Asia,at a time when the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK) undertook ballistic missile tests in quick succession, Japan’s arms imports grew substantially (72 percent) but South Korea’s imports remained stable, even as its exports grew substantially, as noted earlier. It is a fact though that South Korea’s domestic arms industry has become stronger in the past decade.3
Arms trade between states can be better regulated through adherence to best practices of informal mechanisms such as the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).4 While the MTCR seeks to limit the proliferation of missiles and missile technology, the WA promotes greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies. Out of the top 10 arms exporters, the US, Russia, France, Germany, the UK, Spain, Italy and South Korea are members of the WA and MTCR; only China and Israel are non-members. On the other hand, of the 25 top arms importers, only nine (Australia, India, Italy, Japan, Norway, South Korea, Turkey, the US, and the UK) are members of the WA and the MTCR. If the other major arms importers become members of such informal groupings, it can help build transparency and also limit the proliferation of dual-use goods.
Dr. Kanica Rakhra is a Consultant with the Disarmament and International Security Affairs division of the Ministry of External Affairs of India. Views expressed by the author do not reflect the views of the Ministry of External Affairs.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The European Union-3 and Iran are indeed up against formidable odds to keep the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) alive going forward.
The July 2015 Iran nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), has been in a precarious position ever since President Donald Trump announced in May 2018 that he was withdrawing from the agreement. The deal’s flaws for Trump included a weak inspections regime overseen by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the agreement’s ‘sunset’ clauses — which did not place sufficient restrictions on Iran’s future nuclear ambitions, and Iran’s continued testing of ballistic missiles.
Trump was obviously not impressed by the then IAEA Director General, Yukiyo Amano’s repeated affirmations that Iran was subject to the world’s most robust verification regime.1 Even Trump’s closest advisors, like then Secretary of Defence Gen. James Mattis, termed IAEA verification of the JCPOA as ‘robust’.2
As for Iran’s ballistic missile tests, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 2231 of July 20, 2015, which recognised the JCPOA and removed UNSC sanctions on Iran, ‘called on’ Iran not to undertake such activities until eight years after JCPOA Adoption Day (October 18, 2023) or until the time that the IAEA gives the ‘broader conclusion’ determination regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.3
The IAEA gives such a certification when it is satisfied about the ‘completeness’ (absence of undeclared activities) as well as the ‘correctness’ (non-diversion from declared nuclear activities) of a country’s nuclear programme. In 2018, the IAEA gave a broader conclusion determination for 70 out of the 129 states that had the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and the Additional Protocols (AP) in force.4 Given Iran’s past concealment activities and lack of transparency, such a determination could have possibly taken longer than eight years but the IAEA was regularly affirming that Iran was living up to its JCPOA commitments when Trump withdrew.
Iran on its part affirms that its ballistic missile activities are an essential feature of its security profile and that there was no binding requirement prohibiting such tests either in the JCPOA (which by the way deals exclusively with its nuclear programme) or in the UNSCR 2231.
The US, France and the UK (unlike Russia and China), however do not accept Iran’s justifications but note that testing of medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) like the Shahab-3 is a serious concern, as it is a Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Category-I system, ‘technically capable of delivering a nuclear weapon’.5 Iran’s regional behaviour has also been cited by Trump as a factor that impinged on his decision to withdraw from the deal.
‘Maximum Pressure’ Campaign
After the Trump withdrawal, unilateral restrictive measures targeting Iran’s oil exports, among others — waived as part of the deal, were re-imposed. US officials assert that these restrictions have led to a massive loss of oil revenue, of up to $50 billion per year.6 Other than China and Syria, no other country is currently importing Iranian oil. The access of Iranian banks to the SWIFT network was cut off by the Belgian-based entity in November 2018. Many other European companies, including automobile manufacturers, have gone back on their plans and agreements entered into in the aftermath of the JCPOA, fearful of the repercussions of US secondary sanctions.
The European Union’s (EU) efforts to put in place alternate payment mechanisms for Iran oil trade have not been successful. The Instrument for Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) was formed in January 2019 and its Iranian counterpart came into being in April 2019. However, reports note that no trade exchanges have taken place as part of the mechanism so far.
Apart from such restrictive economic measures, the other pegs of the administration’s ‘maximum pressure’ policy on Iran include what US officials have described as ‘re-establishing deterrence’ vis-à-vis Iran.7 The killing of Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander Qassem Soleimani on January 3, 2020 is held as an essential element of this policy. Iranian proxies like the Hezbollah meanwhile have been designated as a terrorist organisation by countries like the UK, Argentina, and Guatemala among others in recent months, on account of sustained US diplomatic pressure.
‘Trump Deal’?
UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson, while acknowledging that he recognised Trump’s concerns about the JCPOA, has called for negotiations to begin on a ‘Trump deal’ to replace it.8 However, it is not clear what the contours of such an agreement could be. In January 2018, Trump insisted that his aim is to deny Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon – not just for 10 years but forever.9 Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in May 2018 put forth 12 demands required of Iran. These included a change in Iran’s regional behaviour (ranging from Afghanistan, Yemen, Palestine and Syria) to halting the launch or development of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles to Iran stopping its enrichment activities.10 Former Obama administration officials have called Pompeo’s demands a ‘wish-list based on a pipe dream’.11
The US State Department’s Special Representative on Iran further affirms that the UN standard of no enrichment has to be restored.12 While it is true that the UNSC in its resolutions beginning from 2006 required Iran to stop its uranium enrichment activities, this injunction was always part of a broader bargain ‘to allow for negotiations in good faith, in order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcome’.13
Further, the JCPOA allowed Iran to enrich uranium, though with severe restrictions pertaining to total stockpile, limited to 300 kgs of uranium hexa-flouride (UF6) and enrichment levels (3.67 per cent). Iran breached both these commitments in July 2019, two months after President Hassan Rouhani stated as much on May 8, 2019, a year after the Trump withdrawal. 14
Between May and December 2019, Iran’s uranium stockpile more than doubled from 174 kgs to 372 kgs, out of which about 160 kgs is enriched to 4.5 per cent U-235. While these numbers are far less than the quantities Iran had in its possession at the time the JCPOA came into being (over 8700 kgs of UF6 enriched to five per cent and nearly 450 kgs of UF6 enriched to 20 per cent U-235), Iran’s opponents will surely point to them as posing rising proliferation danger.
Iran has since breached the JCPOA commitments related to its heavy water stockpile and prohibition on enrichment at the Fordow plant (both in November 2019). In January 2020, in the aftermath of Soleimani’s killing, Iran announced that there would be no restrictions on the numbers of centrifuges and that it will not follow any operational restrictions on its nuclear programme.
In response to Iran’s violations, the EU-3 invoked the Dispute Resolution Mechanism (DRM) of the JCPOA on January 14, 2020, as they held that these violations had ‘non-reversible proliferation implications’.15 Iran on its part has been insisting that these steps, taken after a gap of every two months beginning from May 2019 to January 2020, are ‘reversible upon effective implementation of reciprocal obligations’.16
Iran meanwhile not only rejects the possibility of a ‘Trump deal’, and as Foreign Minister Javad Zarif tweeted on January 26, 2020, but also insists that it is Washington which has to return to the negotiating table as well as compensate it for the economic and other damages it has suffered since May 2018.17
Negative Implications
Trump’s unilateral upending of the multi-laterally negotiated agreement has not only negatively impacted regional stability but has worked against the administration’s stated goal of reducing US commitments in the region. An uptick in US-Iran tensions in the past 15 months for instance has led to an increase in US regional force posture and commitments. Israeli analysts meanwhile insist that only a physical destruction of Iranian nuclear installations will prevent an Iranian bomb. 18
It will be hard for Iran to reverse its JCPOA violations unless it gets some economic relief in return. Trump administration officials meanwhile are especially worried about the upcoming deadline of October 18, 2020, when the UNSCR 2231 stipulation of Iran requiring UNSC approval for conventional arms imports will expire.
Prospects of a diplomatic breakthrough between Tehran and Washington, brokered by mediators like Oman or the EU, seem dim at the moment. Iran’s legislative elections on February 21, 2020 are expected to place hardliners in control of the parliament, which could further constrict President Rouhani’s negotiating space. The EU-3 and Iran are indeed up against formidable odds to keep the JCPOA alive till at least the November 2020 US presidential elections, and hope that the American electorate will resolve their deep quandary.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
The political divisions and economic challenges facing the country have complicated the government’s response to the pandemic, putting the population at risk and threatening to undermine the popularity of President Erdogan.
Like other parts of the world, West Asia (or the Middle East) too is hit hard by the spread of COVID-19 and Turkey is no exception. In fact, Turkey is the second worst hit country after Iran in the region. As of April 13, 2020, Turkey reported 56,956 confirmed cases of COVID-19; while 3,446 people recovered, and 1,198 died because of the infection.1 Globally, Turkey has reported the ninth-largest cluster of cases. In comparison to the other global hotspots such as the United States, Italy, Spain and others, Turkey has reported a lower rate of fatalities. However, the prevailing political and economic conditions in the country have complicated its response to the pandemic.
Between the first confirmed case of COVID-19 recorded on March 112 and the first reported death on March 17,3 the number of cases in the country jumped to 191.4 The rapid spread of infection was mainly attributed to the government’s failure to stop the inflow of people, goods and services from abroad including from China and Iran until mid-February, and a slow response in restricting the movement of people, goods and services within the country. It was not until March 27 that Turkey decided to completely stop all international flights and restrict domestic movements.5 By this time, the number of cases had already reached 6,000 and about 90 had perished from COVID-19.6 Despite the curbs coming into effect, and assurances from the government, the number of cases continued to rise rapidly. The partial nature of curbs and the failure of the local administration to take adequate preventive measures further compounded the situation. In the first week of April, Turkey reportedly had “the fastest rising number of confirmed cases in the world.”7
The first set of curbs and restrictions announced on March 27 included a nationwide restriction on movement either by roads, railways or airways and suspension of all international flights. Domestic movement was allowed only in case of emergencies with permission from local governors. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan while announcing the curbs urged people to “voluntarily quarantine” in case they suffer from any illness or symptoms of flu.8 He especially urged the aged population beyond 65 years to remain inside their homes and follow social distancing. Other measures included a complete lockdown in 12 population centres in the Black Sea provinces of Rize and Trabzon.9 Erdogan also announced partial lockdown in 30 metropolitan areas in the country including the capital Ankara and country’s financial hub Istanbul, as well as the two other most populous cities of Kocaeli and Izmir where only limited public transport was allowed and curbs were put on non-essential services.10
As the situation continued to deteriorate due to a combination of policy failure and non-compliance of the precautionary measures, the government announced new measures on April 3 to completely restrict the movement of people above 65 years and below 20 years, as well as the movement of private vehicles in 31 provinces including in major metropolitan areas.11 Turkey announced the formation of pandemic board in all 81 provinces to monitor the situation at the local level and take quicker decisions for lockdown in case of necessity. Schools, universities and other educational institutions, as well as public places including archaeological sites and picnic spots have also been closed though places of worship have only been directed to maintain social distancing. In the meanwhile, Turkey has mandated the use of masks in public and is trying to boost healthcare capacity by building temporary facilities to provide treatment to those affected.12 The Turkish National Assembly is also debating a bill to protect the healthcare workers with increased penalty on any form of violence against them.
The country is facing an uncertain economic situation. The fear of a global recession because of the uncertainties and near halting of economic activities has all the countries preparing for the worst. For Turkey, already facing economic slowdown over the last three years because of the currency and debt crisis and also due to the economic crises in Europe, the economic impact of the pandemic could be even more debilitating. The country had only recently begun to recover from economic problems. After witnessing negative growth in 2018, the Turkish economy showed signs of growth in 2019 riding on fiscal measures introduced by the government and improved foreign trade with countries in Central Asia, Arab Gulf as well as China.13 Though the growth was in decimal numbers, the World Bank had projected that given the signs of recovery the economy will grow by 3 per cent in 2020. Other economic indicators including current account deficit and inflation had also shown improvement in 2019. The banking and finance sectors too were witnessing a recovery.14 However, with challenges arising from the COVID-19 pandemic, the growth projections are likely to remain unmet.
Though Turkey’s central bank has denied that the economy will be severely affected arguing that with “its dynamic structure, the Turkish economy will be one of the economies to see the least damage”.15 However, international rating and economic assessment agencies warn that given its vulnerabilities, the Turkish economy is expected to be “hit hardest” among the G20 nations from the “unprecedented shock to the global economy caused by the corona virus.”16 Moody revised the forecast for economic growth for 2020 from 3 per cent to 1.4 per cent. In a report released recently, it is projected that Turkey’s GDP will undergo “a cumulative contraction” of about 7 per cent in the second and third quarters of 2020.17
In fact, one of the reasons for the slow response of the government was to avoid hampering the economic recovery. On April 5, two days after the second set of restrictions came into force, Turkey relaxed the restrictions for people under 20-years working in farm or agriculture sector or in private enterprises to mitigate the impact on the economy. This has fuelled criticism from the opposition leaders who argue that the government’s move will hamper the fight against the pandemic.
The main opposition leader from the Republican People’s Party (CHP), Kemal Kilicdaroglu, not only criticised the delay in effecting curbs but also underlined that the half-hearted measures might not be enough given the magnitude of the situation.18 Kilicdaroglu said, “At this stage, it is evident that we need a comprehensive, wide and effective stay-at-home and quarantine” against the “voluntary quarantine” being urged by the government.19 He further noted that given the gravity of the situation, “It is not possible to solve this issue with campaigns like ‘Stay Home Turkey’ and by leaving it to the will and initiative of our citizens while not providing any wage or job security and abandoning them to fate.”20 Other opposition parties too have joined CHP in criticising the government for its handling of the situation and also for intensifying the political squabbling within the country.21
Like many other countries in the world, Turkey was caught unprepared to fight the COVID-19 pandemic. The political divisions and economic challenges facing the country have complicated the government’s response, putting the population at risk and threatening to undermine the popularity of President Erdogan.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The present crisis is as much of a challenge as an opportunity to infuse financial realism in defence planning and bring about concomitant reforms in the quickest possible timeframe.
Acknowledging that the cash position of the government may be stressed during the first quarter of the current fiscal due to the slowdown caused by the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic, the Department of Economic Affairs of the Ministry of Finance (MoF) has issued fresh guidelines for cash management on April 8, 2020.1
The New Guidelines
The new guidelines divide the 100-odd demands for grant of various central ministries and departments into three categories. The first category, or category A, comprises 17 grants related to sectors like food and agriculture, health, civil aviation, textiles, railways and rural development. In the current situation, the ministries administering these grants are the vanguard of the fight against the pandemic. No new restrictions have been imposed on grants covered by this category.
This category also includes demands which largely provide for charged or obligatory expenses, such as those related to the President and Supreme Court of India, Central Vigilance Commission, interest payment, transfer to states, and the Union Public Service Commission.
It is the other two categories which would be of interest to the Ministry of Defence (MoD) as three of its four demands for grant – defence services (revenue), capital outlay on defence services and defence pensions - figure in category B which covers 31 grants, while the fourth one – MoD (Civil) - is included in category C which covers as many as 52 grants.
The revenue and capital grants of the defence services, incidentally, also cater to other departments and organisations like the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), ordnance factories, Rashtriya Rifles, and the Ex-Servicemen Contributory Health Scheme (ECHS), to name a few.
The guidelines provide that the monthly expenditure in respect of the grants included in category B may be kept at 8 per cent of the budget estimates (BE) of the FY 2020-21 for the first month, and at 6 per cent for each of the last two months of the first quarter (April to June 2020). The restrictions in respect of the grants in category C are more stringent, with the guidelines prescribing a cap of 5 per cent for each of the three months of the quarter.
Implications for Defence
In so far as the revenue and capital expenditure of the armed forces is concerned, it may not be impossible to adhere to the monthly cap stipulated in the guidelines as, even in the normal circumstances, the pace of expenditure in the first quarter is generally quite slow, except for the expenditure on salaries, as the salary for the month of March is also paid and booked in the account for the month of April.
Containing the expenditure may, however, pose a bit of a challenge if a substantial amount of payments, due towards the end of the previous financial year but held back because of shortage of funds, are to be released in this month. Release of the dearness allowance instalment, due from January 2020, could also add to the pressure.
What is surprising is the inclusion of defence pensions in category B. The demand for grant for defence pensions caters predominantly for the obligatory expenses on payment of pension. Going by averages, the monthly expenditure on pensions would be around 8 per cent of the total allocation.
Considering that, like salaries, pension for the month of March is also paid and booked to the account for the month of April, it is difficult to imagine how the expenditure can be consciously restricted to 8 per cent of the BE in the first month of the quarter.
Defence pension is disbursed by thousands of pension disbursing authorities all over the country. They have no authority to withhold or curtail the pension payable to a pensioner. Nor do they have any means of ensuring that the payments made by them are within the cap on the monthly expenditure.
The defence ministry spokesman did clarify on April 10 that the MoD had taken up the matter with MoF and that “no problem with regards to payment of pensions is envisaged at this stage”.2 This is unlikely to prevent confusion among the pension disbursing authorities and needless anxiety among the pensioners.
The government would do well to formally clarify the position in the next couple of days. A simple solution could be to shift defence pensions from category B to category A and issue a formal press notification, giving it a wide publicity.
For the organisations covered by category C also, such as the Coast Guard and Border Roads Organisation (BRO), it is going to be tough, though not impossible, to keep the expenditure within 5 per cent in each of the three months of the quarter. They, as well as the services and other organisations covered by category B, will have to pull out all the stops to abide by the guidelines stipulating the monthly cap on expenditure.
The situation calls for a two-pronged strategy to deal with the emergency. One, to the extent possible, the priority should be to make contractual payments as the businesses, which are going to be the key to economic recovery, are badly in need of cash at the present juncture. Two, all new proposals for procurement of goods and services and carrying out other activities should be screened and those which can be deferred, even on pain of suffering some consequences which the services and other organisations could live with, should be put off for the time being.
This will inevitably mean being ruthless in shelving all expenditure proposals which do not have immediate relevance, preventing wasteful expenditure, adopting cost-saving methods of working, and making a beginning in enforcing jointness.
Long Term Impact
The economic situation is unlikely to improve any time soon. The government’s resources will remain under stress for a considerable time due to severe constraints on its ability to raise additional resources and pressing demand from other sectors of the economy and the state governments for fiscal packages. This raises the possibility of the current year’s allocation being slashed later this year. In fact, it may take a few years before the situation comes back to the normal.
In the circumstances, all organisations under the administrative control of the MoD, including the services, would do well to draw up emergency expenditure plans for the current year as well as for the next five years or so, which is what it might take for the situation to normalise. These plans must take into account the financial constraints faced by the government and should not be premised upon fanciful assumptions about the availability of funds.
The present crisis is as much of a challenge as an opportunity to infuse financial realism in defence planning and bring about concomitant reforms in the quickest possible timeframe. There has been no dearth of ideas about how this can be done. Several committees have made numerous recommendations in the past. It is time to act upon them.
Syria’s fragile health care system on account of the continuing conflict hinders the country’s effort to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic.
Syria reported its first case of COVID-19 on March 23, 2020, while its first death was confirmed on March 29. As of April 9, the number of confirmed cases in the country stood at 19.1 Some reports do note that the spread of the infection is more widespread than acknowledged by official agencies.2 Syria has imposed a lockdown and a nationwide night curfew to check the spread of COVID-19 since the first case was reported. Businesses, schools, universities, mosques, government offices and public transport have been shut. The movement of people between governorates has been sealed and only army vehicles and essential services are allowed to move. While commercial flights at Damascus Airport have stopped, the government has ordered the closure of main border crossings with neighbouring states.
Speculations are rife that Iranian militias operating inside the country are the primary sources of infection. Iranian pilgrims also visit the Sayeda Zainab shrine in Damascus. Iranian airlines, Mahan Air, still has regular flights from Tehran to Damascus, despite Iran reporting nearly 40,000 cases and over 2,500 deaths due to coronavirus. In addition, the presence of Turkish troops, Russian military, and foreign aid workers increase the chances of COVID-19 transmission.
Unequipped Health Facilities
Syria is not equipped to handle the spread of coronavirus as the health facilities have undergone massive degeneration as a result of the civil war and access to health care is severely restricted. As per the World Health Organisation (WHO), only fifty per cent of public hospitals are fully functional in Syria, with private hospitals mainly confined to the major cities.3 The head of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) noted that given the frequently moving population, along with complexities in acquiring medical supplies and protective equipment and the challenges of practicing social distancing in crowded refugee camps, Syria’s fragile health system poses a grave hurdle in battling the virus.4 70 per cent of the total worldwide attacks on healthcare facilities have taken place in Syria, leading the WHO to create a Surveillance System of Attacks on Health Care (SSA) in January 2018.5 The extent of attacks on health facilities is such that the Red Cross and the Red Crescent have been forced to remove their symbols from health facilities run by them.
The Precarious Case of Idlib
While the situation in the whole country is precarious, the areas under rebel or opposition forces, especially Idlib in the northwest, the three small pockets held by Turkish forces and their Syrian allies in the north (Idlib, Afrin, and Tal Abyad) and the area east of the Euphrates River up to the border with Iraq controlled by the United States (US)-backed and Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces, are at greater risk from the pandemic. For instance, a major regime offensive in Idlib since December 2019, codenamed “Dawn of Idlib 2”, has led to massive displacement of people, forcing the rebel leaders to establish 200 refugee camps with inadequate sanitation facilities.
Lack of adequate aid from the international community, constant air bombardment and the absence of the formal presence of the UN, makes it extremely difficult to handle any health emergency in Idlib. The UN has confirmed that a total of 51 medical facilities have been damaged as a result of attacks since the offensive began in Idlib.6 Attacks on the national hospital of Jisr al-Shughour, south wing of health centre in Maarat al-Numan and the facilities at Saraqeb are the cases in point. The condition of internally displaced people in Idlib has worsened with fears of unimaginable loss of life, as flagged by the UN Special Envoy for Syria, Geir Pedersen, who has called for an immediate nationwide ceasefire in Syria to enable an all-out effort to combat the corona pandemic.7
Regional and International Response
Syria is receiving regional and international support in its fight against coronavirus but it might not be sufficient. The US committed an additional $16.8 million for humanitarian programming for Syria under the US Agency for International Development’s (USAID) $274 million fund for countries affected by the coronavirus.8 The WHO has shipped 300 test kits to Idlib, and promised to supply an additional 2,000 tests, while deploying an additional 1,000 health personnel, 10,000 masks and 500 respirators to the city and the neighbouring areas.9 The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has assured Syrian President Bashar al-Assad that Syria will not be left alone during these critical times.10 China has called for the lifting of sanctions on Syria. While the international support for Syria is a positive development, given its highly deficient healthcare system and the ongoing conflict, the coronavirus situation in the country could take a turn for the worse sooner than later. The COVID-19 pandemic adds another layer to Syria’s continuing misery.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
With a new found celebrity status among the video conferencing applications, Zoom now faces a massive privacy and security threat as the platform’s default settings are not secure enough.
The Covid-19 outbreak has curbed the movement of more than half of the world’s population. This has pushed the working population to become remote workers, many for the first time. The sudden spike in people working from home has led to an increase in demand for videoconferencing apps, chat systems and online collaboration tools. Today, business conferences are being held online, schools and universities are conducting online classes, and even yoga sessions are being held online. Notably, government meetings too have shifted to the online mode. The United Kingdom Government has been holding its daily cabinet meetings online while India has held a video conference with South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) leaders to brainstorm means to curb the spread of Covid-19.1
It will not be an exaggeration to say that it took a global scale disease outbreak to shift people from talking about digitalisation to actually imbibing digital models in their conventional workspaces. What we are, therefore, witnessing today is a truly digitalised world. However, this has also led to the rise of a plethora of opportunities for malicious actors to exploit the existing vulnerabilities.
Dark Side of Video Conferencing Apps
Many of these online tools have been available for a long time even though they were rarely fully employed. However, the sudden surge in usage of different online platforms like Zoom, Classroom, Slack, Cisco WebEx, etc., for taking classes or conducting online meetings has exposed the dark side of several of these applications. There has been a mass adaptation of online platforms without giving much consideration to the security settings of these platforms. This has paved the way for cyber criminals to take advantage of loopholes for malicious purposes.
Educational apps and student online programmes track students’ every response, thereby developing a profile-based understanding of each student. This has forced many users to demand more accountability and transparency from software developers, particularly when many apps sell data to third party data brokers for unspecified uses.2 While the major concern of the educational institutions remains the privacy and security of students’ data, it is the businesses which have a lot more to fear and lose. Last year, Slack listed a litany of cyber security related threats, including the traditional hacking techniques of malware, ransomware, password spraying3, phishing, credential stuffing and Denial of Service Attacks (DoS).4
‘ZOOMING’ Out in Popularity and Vulnerabilities
Zoom Video Communications, a California based company, provides a remote conferencing service that combines online meetings, video conferencing, chats and mobile collaborations.5 With the ongoing endeavour of social distancing and working from home gaining traction, Zoom has seen a considerable uptick in its usage as well as breaching attempts.6 With a new found celebrity status among the video conferencing applications, it now faces a massive privacy and security threat as the platform’s default settings are not secure enough.
Last year, Zoom’s web server was quietly removed from Macs over a serious vulnerability issue that “allowed any website to open up a Zoom conference call on your computer automatically with the webcam on. Even if the Zoom application was uninstalled, the web server persisted on the machine and it could reinstall the application automatically.”7 In 2020, a research published by Checkpoint - a cyber security company - stated that Zoom has witnessed an exponential rise in malicious domain registrations.8 It was also reported that the hackers have discovered a technique to identify and join active Zoom Meetings.9 This phenomenon has been tagged as “Zoombombing”10, wherein nefarious actors may join calls and broadcast porn or prank videos. The Boston office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has warned against Zoom, cautioning individuals from making meetings on the site public or sharing links after it received two reports of anonymous individuals disrupting school sessions.11
Privacy has been another major concern among users. In March 2020, Zoom was sued for illegally disclosing personal data to Facebook and other third parties.12 Zoom clarified in its statements that it has removed the code that sent data to Facebook. However, this was not the end of Zoom’s troubles. The company has had to update its privacy policy which earlier allowed it to collect data and transcripts from users’ meetings via the software’s chat feature in order to target ads at the users.13 The new privacy policy published by the company articulates in detail the kind of data being collected. This includes the user name and phone numbers.14 Nevertheless, the new policy did not provide clarity on whether any kind of facial data or video footage is being stored for artificial intelligence (AI) and object recognition training.
Zoom also claims that it implements end-to-end encryption (E2E) for video and audio content. E2E is understood as the most discreet form of internet communication, protecting conversations from any external interception including the host platform.15 However, the connection between the Zoom app running on a user’s system or phone and Zoom’s server is encrypted similar to the connection between a user’s web browser and this article is encrypted. This form of encryption, called transport encryption, is different from E2E because the Zoom service itself can access the unencrypted video and audio content of the Zoom meetings.16
With the government and businesses holding meetings on the Zoom platform, there has been a constant fear of espionage and violation of privacy. Several organisations and companies like the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and SpaceX have issued advisories to their employees to use more traditional means of communication like email, text or phone to interact with each other.17 In order to allay these fears, Zoom has recently committed to human rights group Access Now’s open letter to publish “a transparency report that details information related to requests for data, records and content.”18
India’s Response
The Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) has warned of the dangers of unprotected use of this digital platform, given its susceptibility to cyberattacks, including pilferage of sensitive data. In a reported incident, Broadcast Audience Research Council (BARC), while hosting a virtual conference of about 600 people via Zoom on television and smartphone consumption trends, was forced to stop the briefing midway because of a hacking incident.19
In this context, India’s national cybersecurity agency has released an advisory to secure communications while using the app. It includes:
Securing the New Normal
Businesses and educational institutions have always preferred time-tested traditional methods of face-to-face meetings, classroom teaching modules, and paper-pencil mechanisms. However, today, the disruptions caused by the pandemic have compelled them to reassess their options and adopt online applications while often overlooking its security aspects. Invariably, this has led to an increase in cybercrimes since the outbreak of Covid-19 and specifically in phishing attacks in most of the leading communication application.
In this context, the adage that “if it is free, you are probably the product” should act as a motivation for individuals to examine the privacy policy of any particular app. This can help one verify the app’s motive of collecting, selling or sharing one’s data and whether it is being used for funding the provision of its ‘free’ service. The examination of the privacy policy should, therefore, be accorded primary importance. Additionally, encryption and password-protection should always be the first line of defence wherever possible.
It is likely that the ongoing churnings will bring about a pervasive change in the way people live and work. Video conferencing apps are a great tool to conduct meetings and conferences online, while saving up significantly on travel time and costs. It may, therefore, become the new normal. However, concerns about security are legitimate and should be given due consideration.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The Hasina Government is in overdrive to meet the Covid-19 challenge head on, and ensure that this unforeseen threat does not snowball into a major national crisis.
Bangladesh economy has been growing at seven per cent for the past five years. The country is supposed to graduate from a least developed country (LDC) to a developing one by 2021. However, the coronavirus pandemic or Covid-19 has emerged as a major challenge for the country’s economy at a moment, when most analysts believe that the economic stability has contributed to political stability, lent legitimacy to the Sheikh Hasina Government and weakened the opposition.
The Hasina Government is now in overdrive to meet the challenge head on, and ensure that this unforeseen threat does not snowball into a major national crisis. It ordered a complete lockdown in the country, starting March 26, for 10 days to begin with, and later extended it till April 10. As of April 8, Bangladesh has reported 218 positive cases of Covid-19, with 33 recoveries and 21 deaths. Besides, 111 people have been kept in isolation and a total of 68,324 people have been quarantined and 58,167 people have been released from quarantine.1 What explains the government’s cautious approach is its realisation that being a densely populated country of more than 160 million people, the health-care system is not adequate to deal with possible escalation in country-wide transmission of the virus.
Government’s Initiatives
The Covid-19 pandemic has demonstrated how ill-prepared most of the countries are, including in South Asia, to deal with such a challenge. Bangladesh, like other countries in the region, reacted slowly to the pandemic even though the first confirmed case was reported on March 8, ordering a lockdown starting as late as March 26, whereby all public and private offices were closed and travel by air, road and waterways were stopped till April 6 which has now been extended to April 10. The Department of Immigration stopped issuing fresh passports until further notice. To further prevent Covid-19 from spreading, the domestic flights too were stopped from March 31.
The government also banned flights originating from Bahrain, India, Kuwait, Malaysia, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), countries where many Bangladeshis are employed. Except for the United Kingdom (UK), it banned flights from other destinations in Europe and declared that after March 30 it would not allow its national carrier to fly to two destinations in the UK. However, the government notified that commercial flights to and from China, Hong Kong, Thailand and UK will continue their operations until further notice. From March 15, the government had also discontinued visa on arrival facility. Though on March 1 it flew back 312 of its citizens from Wuhan, it could not arrange flights to bring back 171 more citizens. An India Air Force special flight that went to Wuhan carrying medical supplies, evacuated 23 Bangladeshis along with Indians and also people from Maldives, Sri Lanka and Nepal.2 According to the Chinese Embassy in Bangladesh, 5,760 Bangladeshis are living in China.
Before government enforced the 10-day lockdown, starting March 26, thousands of people left Dhaka for their villages in other parts of the country in overcrowded buses, railways and ferries that were packed several times over their capacity. In her address to the nation on the eve of Bangladesh’s independence day on March 26, Hasina appraised the people about steps taken by the government and suggested them to follow instructions provided by the health department and not to panic.3 She later addressed the government officials working in 64 districts over video to coordinate Bangladesh’s fight against Covid-19 and extended the lockdown period till April 10. The government has drawn out a national action plan to deal with possible surge in Covid-19 cases. It has set up “committees from the national up to the upazila level with multisectoral involvement representing the relevant ministries and national and international organizations and development partners.”4
Many analysts attribute such low numbers to poor testing facility and believe that many more may have been affected. According to a report, only one suspected case is being tested for approximately 100,499 people in Bangladesh.5 While the Institute of Epidemiology, Disease Control and Research (IEDCR) remain the nodal agency, nine testing facilities are open in Dhaka and five outside of Dhaka.6 According to reports, the government has set up 1,050 isolation beds in the capital and 4,515 in the divisions and districts.7 However, the government’s efforts are well-supported by the Bangladesh Army, which has deployed 399 teams to work with the civil administration in 62 out of 64 districts. More than 5,000 troops have been deployed to help curb the spread of coronavirus across the country.8 The World Bank, to help Bangladesh, has fast tracked the approval of $100 million to prevent, detect, and respond to Covid-19 as per the national action plan of the government. India has provided 30,000 surgical masks and 15,000 head-cover to support the efforts of the Bangladesh Government.9 UK also has announced Tk 2.18 billion in aid.
The most difficult task before the government is how to prevent people from visiting mosques as it is a sensitive issue. The Islamic Foundation of Bangladesh has suggested that muftis must stay away from rumours and allow the continuation of the azan, Friday prayers and fazr prayers with a limited number of people. It has barred those who have returned from virus-affected countries or have symptoms of coronavirus, and those who are old and have serious ailments. However, such guidelines have remained on paper and largely ignored till date. The government, even though it denied permission for popular congregations, did not take any action when nearly 25,000 people gathered at Raipur in Lakshmipur District on March 19, for a mass prayer to contain coronavirus by chanting six Quranic verses of healing.10 On April 6, the Ministry of Religious Affair finally decided to suspend prayers for public at the mosques.
Another real danger for Bangladesh is the extremely congested Rohingya refugee camps. Most of the refugees stay in small huts and work outside the camp, exposing them to Covid-19 infection. Recently, a case was reported from Chittagong where these camps are located. Enforcing social distancing in these camps is practically impossible. What makes the situation more problematic is poor access to health facility and monitoring of suspicious cases in the camps. Refugees, however, are very much part of the government’s National Preparedness and Response Plan.
Impact on Economy
The lockdown is going to affect the country’s garment sector hugely. Already, H&M, a Swedish company and one of the major importers of garments from Bangladesh, has stopped placing orders. The Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA) has informed that around 1,025 readymade garment (RMG) factories have reported postponement and cancellation of export orders worth $2.90 billion, affecting 2.10 million workers as of March 31.11 According to a report “cancellations of planned orders, for April-December, amounted to nearly $1.7 billion.”12 Most of the garment manufacturing units have closed down following the government order.
In financial year 2019, the country’s export earnings from the RMG sector were to the tune of US$ 34.13 billion, 83.52 per cent of the country’s overall export earnings. This sector also imported raw materials worth $12.18 billion.13 Due to the order banning movement of non-essential goods, some of the exporters are fearing congestion at the Chittagong Port. The total storage capacity of the port is 49,018 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs). However, the number of loaded containers has already risen to 40,000 TEUs.14 Therefore, given the lockdown, both import of raw materials, machinery and other products that feeds into the garment industry as well as export is likely to be affected.
It is important to note that the garment industries in Bangladesh employ mostly women and many of them are sole breadwinners for their families. Therefore, the government has not closed down the garment industries, leaving their management to individual manufacturers. According to a report, the industry employs around 3.5 million workers. As per section 16 of the Bangladesh Labour Act, which deals with the rights of laid-off workers for compensation, the companies have to pay half-day salary to the workers.15 In some cases, the garment workers stopped coming to the industry and some owners who were forced to shut down their industries have threatened to invoke section 13/1 of the Bangladesh Labour Act, according to which absence from work means employees are on strike and which would mean no payment.
According to Bangladesh Bank, “Earnings from woven garments and knitwear fell by 5.88 percent and 5.17 percent respectively during July-February 2019-20, as compared to the same period in the previous fiscal year.”16 This sector is already under stress and with Covid-19 the impact on this sector would be serious. The following chart shows the contribution of the garment industry to export earnings of the country.
Source: “Major Economic Indicators: Monthly Update”, Bangladesh Bank, March 2020, p. 14.
To deal with this situation, the government has announced Tk 5,000 crore (US$ 590 million) bailout package to pay salary and wages to the workers employed in the garment industry and has offered loan at two per cent interest. The government has also announced an additional Tk 67,750 crore financial stimulus package. Any protracted lockdown combined with unchecked spread of the contagion would lead to unmitigated economic crisis and complicate the government’s response to it.
Bangladesh is also likely to receive low remittances, which is a major source of its foreign exchange, since most of the West Asian countries, Malaysia and other European countries, where 80 per cent of the Bangladeshi overseas workers are employed, are under lockdown too.17 Due to suspension of flights, many of these are stranded in West Asia without work and some of them who were preparing to leave are unable to return due to cancellation of flights. In many cases, these people pay huge amounts to middlemen and also take help of the Bangladesh Association of International Recruiting Agencies (BAIRA) and thousands of private agencies to find employment in these countries. Between 2009 and 2019, according to the Bureau of Manpower Employment and Training (BMET), 58,13,499 people have migrated out of Bangladesh for work.18 Following pie chart reflects the remittances send by the Bangladeshi workers.
Based on “Wage Earner’s Remittance Inflows: Selected Country Wise (Monthly)”, Bangladesh Bank, July 2019-February 2020.
To conclude, Covid-19 is likely to have a severe impact on the Bangladesh economy. Apart from affecting the garment industry, the mainstay of Bangladesh’s export earnings, the possible reduction in remittances and loss of jobs due to global downturn could contribute to the fiscal deficit, which was 5.1 per cent of the GDP last year – an 11-year high. The government has now announced short, medium and long term programmes to boost the economy by encouraging public spending, providing working capital at reduced rates for small scale industries and facilitating raw material imports under back-to-back LC.
However, the problem is, given the spread of epidemic and lockdown across the world, the import and export markets too have been affected. Amid the lockdown, some garment exporters have announced the opening of their industries, triggering a mad rush to reach Dhaka by walking as the workers fear that they would lose their jobs. This has brought widespread criticism as some of the owners are politicians or have close connection to the ruling party. Whether this could snowball into a political challenge for the government would largely depend on the nature, scope and intensity of the impact of Covid-19 on the economy, and the perception of the people about measures undertaken by the government to deal with the looming crisis.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
There is a need to act quickly on the issue of force majeure to scotch all speculations about how the MoD is going to deal with the inevitable delay in performance of contracts and instil confidence among the vendors.
The COVID-19 pandemic has, among other things, disrupted the manufacturing activities and left the supply-chain in disarray across the globe. Its impact on the ongoing contracts must be agonising the vendors as they may not be able to adhere to the delivery timelines, potentially exposing them to the penal clauses in the contract.
The question in everyone’s mind seems to be whether the Force Majeure Clause (FMC)1 in the contract provides some protection against such penal consequences and, if so, in what way. A big spending department like the Ministry of Defence (MoD) would do well to allay this and other related anxieties. What would it take to do this?
Need for a Comprehensive Clarificatory Order
The Ministry of Finance had issued a clarificationin February 2020 to the effect that the outbreak of coronavirus in China or any other country should be considered as a case of natural calamity and FMC may be invoked, wherever considered necessary, following the due procedure.2
Since this clarification is in the context of that ministry’s Manual for Procurement of Goods, 2017 which does not govern the defence contracts, MoD needs to issue a separate clarificatory order on similar lines covering every conceivable aspect of the problem. This will not require prior consultation with the finance ministry so long as the order does not violate the spirit underlying the clarification issued by that ministry in February.
Applicability of Clarificatory Order
The clarificatory order should be applicable to the contracts and supply orders concluded under any edition of the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP), Defence Procurement Manual (DPM), or the purchase manuals followed by the Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB).
It will be desirable to issue a single order for all contracts/supply orders, irrespective of the manual under which these were concluded/placed. If that is not possible (as these are administered by various departments in MoD), similar orders should be issued by all the departments concerned simultaneously, though the Department of Defence Production may have to issue a separate policy directive to the Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs).
Other Issues Requiring Clarification
There are some other issues that need to be clarified, some of which are illustrated below with reference to the standard FMC in the defence contracts covered by DPP 2016. Article 24 on Force Majeure in DPP 2016 reads as follows:
Communication in Writing
Some vendors may find it difficult to convey to the MoD in writing, as required by the first sub-clause of the FMC, that there is likely to be a delay in achieving the delivery milestones because of the disruption in postal and courier services. It should, therefore, be acceptable if such communication is sent by email at the address(es) to be notified in the clarificatory order. If even that is not possible for a vendor, any communication sent after the period stipulated in the sub-clause should be acceptable. The vendors should not also be required to submit any document or government notification regarding shutdown/closure of units, etc. along with the communication.
Duration of Force Majeure
The standard FMC presumes that there would be a determin able starting and end dates for a force majeure situation. This may not be a valid presumption under the present circumstances.
To ease the difficulty in determination of the duration of force majeure, the clarificatory order could stipulate that the force majeure will be deemed to have commenced from the date the World Health Organisation (WHO) declared the outbreak of Novel COVID-19 as a pandemic, which is March 11, 2020, in the case of foreign vendors, or from March 24, 2020 when the nation-wide lockdown was announced, in the case of Indian vendors. If these dates do not suit a vendor, he could be permitted to request for the date on which his production/supply chain was disrupted to be determined at a later stage after the situation normalises.
It is difficult to say when the situation would normalise. This may differ from one vendor to the other. The clarificatory order could stipulate that the date of cessation of force majeure will be determined in individual cases, based on the information provided by the vendors. This problem could also be discussed with the industry representatives in due course and supplementary orders issued in the next couple of days.
Liquidated Damages
The first sub-clause of the FMC simply says that the contracting parties shall be ‘excused’ for non-fulfilment or delayed fulfilment of any contractual obligation because of the force majeure. There is nothing in the FMC or the standard clause related to liquidated damages (LD) which specifically says that LD, or any other penalty, will not be applicable for delays caused by force majeure. It will be reassuring if the MoD clarifies that the duration of force majeure will be excluded while calculating the delay in delivery of contracted equipment or services and imposition of LD.
Acts of Foreign Governments
The last sub-clause of the FMC provides that the acts of the governments or any state parties of the seller which may affect the discharge of obligation under the contract shall not be treated as force majeure. This sub-clause should be declared as inoperative where the delay is on account of causes attributable to the ongoing crisis, as it was clearly intended as a bulwark against actions taken by a foreign government on geopolitical considerations which threaten to disrupt the performance of an ongoing contract.
Assurance Against Termination of Contract
The standard termination clause in defence contracts gives MoD the right to terminate a contract, partially or in full, if, inter alia, delivery of the goods or services is delayed due to force majeure beyond the period stipulated in the contract. This may be a matter of great concern for the vendors as no one knows when it will be possible to resume normal activities. It is important that MoD assures the vendors that the termination clause will not be invoked where delay is only on account of the present crisis.
Supply Orders Without FMC
Some supply orders, and possibly some contracts, may not contain an FMC. These should be deemed to have been amended to include a standard FMC, whose text can be specified in the clarificatory order. This will go a long way in dousing the anxiety of the vendors who find themselves in the unenviable situation of having to execute a supply order that does not have an FMC.
To conclude, there is a need to act quickly on this time-sensitive issue to scotch all speculations about how the MoD is going to deal with the inevitable delay in performance of contracts and instil confidence in the vendors that the matter will be dealt with equitably and, above all, with compassion which is the need of the hour.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
COVID-19 presents a unique opportunity to the global new-age mega corporations to up their game and showcase their innovativeness and resourcefulness.
COVID-19 as a pandemic has literally taken the world by storm. Never before in recent history has the globe been more physically disconnected and isolated. What started as a trickle in China turned into a flood in that country before spreading to the rest of the world, with the worse yet to be over. Thanks to mega corporations and cyberspace, the global community has been able to take several timely measures and has saved innumerable lives. The instant global communication across a wide variety of formats like text, voice, video and documents has made it extremely easy for a cross-section of society ranging from common individuals to scientific communities and nations to interact and collaborate at an unprecedented scale.
On March 15, 2020, the Prime Minister held a video conference with the leaders /representatives of all member states of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to brainstorm ways and means to tackle the pandemic. This novel way of sharing ideas amongst leaders on combating a common threat was widely appreciated. It also subsequently resulted in the extraordinary virtual summit of G20 leaders on March 26, 2020.
What should be the role of mega global corporations in times of such crisis is the moot question which needs to be deliberated upon. This is the time to have a relook at the role of new-age mega corporations which have deep pockets, operate globally, have access to unprecedented data of common people of different nationalities, and possess the best of human skillsets and new-age tools such as artificial intelligence (AI), big data analytics and blockchain.
Most business schools profess that the only purpose of a business entity is to grow and generate maximum profits for the shareholders. All activities, therefore, need to focus on product, customer and net profit/returns. Politics and governance are best left to the political class and the bureaucracy. By and large, the approach of a business entity towards government is reactive, i.e., act only when asked to by the relevant authority.
Cyberspace as a domain is very unique. Not only does it span the entire globe, but being an artificial resource can rapidly grow or shrink. What is also distinct is that much of it is owned and managed by global mega corporations. In fact, mega global corporations like Facebook and Google have more knowledge about any country’s citizens than their own government. So, in a knowledge-based world where data can provide deep insights which can help prevent the spread of disease and also empower governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), should the mega corporations solely focus on growth and profits or take a more proactive approach in collaborating with the nations in combating common global threats? Role of Facebook in the current COVID-19 pandemic is briefly presented here to offer insight to the readers.
Facebook is the world’s most popular social media company with 2.9 billion people using one or more of its products (including WhatsApp, Instagram and Messenger). India has 260 million active Facebook users and has the largest user base in the world, followed by the United States with a user base of 160 million. In 2019, Facebook had a revenue of US$ 70.7 billion with advertising being the largest contributor towards its revenue. Its average revenue per user in 2019 was US$ 29.25.1 Thus, India contributed revenue worth US$ 7.605 billion to Facebook in 2019. This is approximately Rs. 57,334 Crore.
Spread of fake news and rumour mongering specially on social media platforms has been a major problem in the country during the current pandemic. On March 31, 2020, the Supreme Court of India finally directed the Union government to set up a portal to curb the spread of fake news in the country.2 The Maharashtra cyber police has also filed 36 FIRs recently against rumour mongers and perpetrators of fake and misleading news.3 This leads to the question, how can Facebook help in combating the spread of fake news in the country?
Having a central COVID-19 information centre on the home screen definitely helps the user in getting authentic information and staying away from fake news and rumour mongers. One of the major challenges facing the government and law enforcement agencies (LEAs) is the end-to-end encryption of messages, voice and video chats as well as the non-traceability of messages. The easier problem to solve amongst the two is to ensure traceability of messages. It is possible to maintain end-to-end encryption of messages as well as trace each and every message/post as it gets uploaded on the Facebook platform (Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram and Messenger). By attributing the ownership of each message as it is generated, modified or transmitted, Facebook can promote a sense of responsibility amongst the users which will definitely decrease the spread of fake and malicious messages.
Another problem facing the cyberspace is anonymity. Each user can generate multiple accounts using fictitious unverifiable information. Having more user accounts benefits the social media companies as they have a direct bearing on advertising revenues. The US Joint Publication 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, describes cyberspace as comprising of three layers, i.e., the physical, logical and cyber-persona.4 The physical layer comprises of all the hardware elements like switches, cables, computers, mobiles, routers, etc., while the logical layer comprises of the software portion or various operating systems and applications that are used to store, modify, analyse, move and destroy information. The cyber-persona layer consists of various user accounts which provides access to social media or other platforms and their relations with one another. Facebook is in a unique position to maintain a cyber-persona relationship of its users and is capable to predict the number of multiple accounts being operated by an individual. This sensitive information should be proactively shared with the concerned governments and LEAs, especially cases flagged by the Facebook.
Facebook is also capable of ascertaining the gathering of people in large numbers in real time. This information when proactively shared with the police authorities can help in curbing the spread of disease under current conditions. Similarly, machine learning can be utilised to predict hot spots and future outbreak of infections so that timely mitigating strategies can be adopted. There are innumerable ways and means through which the new-age mega corporations can assist governments and other agencies in tackling pandemics like COVID-19.
Another issue which needs to be flagged is the response of mega corporations to governments and LEAs of countries other than their country of origin. It has been observed that mega corporations generally have a formal and somewhat defensive response when dealing with other countries. It is quite evident that as major players, majority owners of global cyberspace domain and custodians of a large number of citizen’s personal data, these companies are important stakeholders in the nation’s geopolitical and geostrategic landscape.
Most of the measures elucidated above, however, do not come easy and cheap. There is a cost in terms of skilled manpower and resources which mega corporations would need to invest in order to reap the dividends of massive data being generated by account holders in real time. Investments in such collaborative and proactive measures between mega corporations and nations would definitely bring down profits in the short term. However, the goodwill generated and lives saved would more than make up for the minuscule drop in profits.
The steps taken by Facebook, be it the launch of a COVID-19 information centre or using AI for content moderation, in support of the ongoing global effort against the pandemic, are just not enough given the size of the company and its capabilities. Much more is expected and demanded of Facebook, especially in a country like India, which has its largest subscriber base.
COVID-19 thus presents a unique opportunity to the global new-age mega corporations to up their game and showcase their innovativeness and resourcefulness. The world appears ready for new players in the fight against common global threats. The question is: Are the mega corporations ready? The time to act is now.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
While maintaining cyber hygiene in these disruptive times is indeed a challenge, each organisation should work towards putting in place a tailor-made work-from-home cyber defence strategy.
COVID-19 has claimed thousands of lives across the world since its outbreak in Wuhan, China. The temporary lockdowns to mitigate the spread of the virus has resulted in significant negative economic repercussions. Consequently, majority of corporate operations have adopted the work-from-home model, compelling people to operate in less secure environments. Weakened security barriers have opened up avenues for hackers, spammers and scammers to thrive. These nefarious actors are using varied techniques of social engineering, spoofing or phishing to gain access to confidential and sensitive information.
Surge in cyber risks
The pandemic has created a visible surge in cyber exploitations.1Work-for-home might be the safest option for individuals health-wise but the same is not true for the data and services that such individuals have to access remotely. Remote connections make it difficult for most of the threat detection tools to differentiate the genuine from the malicious.
Cybersecurity threats in such an environment are generally higher as unlike the networks of the workplace, which have due security measures like web filtering, required encryption, anomaly detection monitors or firewalls in place, the cyber networks at home usually do not have the same defence mechanisms. Moreover, the Virtual Private Networks (VPN) may not always be secure. Reports note that even some leading corporate VPNs have major vulnerabilities that organisations don’t always take the time to patch.2
Some reports indicate that ‘thousands’ of COVID-19 scams and malware sites have been created.3 Many of these sites are being used to disseminate malware files, host phishing attacks, or commit financial fraud,including tricking individuals into paying for forged Covid-19 cures, kits, vaccines or supplements.
On March 13, one of the Czech Republic’s biggest testing laboratories, Brno University Hospital, was hit by a cyberattack.4 As a result, the hospital had to postpone urgent surgical interventions and transfer patients with acute conditions to a different hospital. Additionally, they also had to shut down their entire IT network. This attack also impacted other branches of the hospital, including the maternity and the children’s wings.
Earlier in that week, Champaign-Urbana Public Health District’s website in the US was attacked by new ransomware called NetWalker.5 Ransomware is a malicious software that locks people out of their own systems. Victims receive a ransom demand for the encryption key to regain access to their data. This ransomware camouflages itself within essential Windows functions to evade anti-virus detection. Health district employees became aware of the ransomware attack on March 10 when they lost access to files.
In India too, an email feigning to be an official notification related to the closure of schools and hall in Delhi has been circulated and those who have clicked it for further information have got their systems and phones compromised.6
Even the World Health Organization (WHO) has stated that it is aware of many ‘suspicious email messages attempting to take advantage of the 2019 novel coronavirus emergency’.7There have been several reports of fabricated emails claiming to be from WHO employees asking the recipients to provide confidential details or click on malignant links.
These attacks have not just been limited to monetary gains, but have also been related to more insidious operations. Android applications positing as a genuine COVID-19 tracking map from the Johns Hopkins University for instance was found to be a spyware linked to a surveillance operation against mobile users in Libya.8
Securing the work-from-home model
Hospitals and banks are common targets as many malicious actors believe that the urgent need to function for these critical entities would push administrators to give in to their demands quickly. A cyberattack on a health care or financial sector entity during these critical times would have severe repercussions. Some cyber security firms like Coveware and Emsisoft have offered free ransomware curative services to healthcare organisations for the duration of the pandemic.9 The CEO of another firm, SafeGuard Cyber, has called for close coordination between cyber-security teams and stakeholders to secure all cloud environments.10
With employees having to operate outside the secured workplace, managing machine sprawl — when the numbers of virtual machines on a network increase, securing hundreds of thousands of endpoints becomes a much bigger challenge. Organisations therefore need to underscore the need to maintain cyber hygiene in these tumultuous times. These could relate to reminding employees about the importance of managing updates and security patches on their individual devices or home systems, circulating an updated list of websites that should be avoided, among others. Additionally, there is a need to follow a zero-trust approach at all levels and perform risk-assessment on a regular basis. Scrupulously adhering to such aspects as multi-factor authentication, whereby a user’s identity is verified by using multiple credentials, is essential. Equal attention should be paid to emergency response planning and disaster recovery,in order to minimize damage post-incidence. Given that the inimical impact of the COVID-19 pandemic will be long-drawn, organisations should work towards putting in place a tailor-made work-from-home cyber defence strategy.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The SIPRI report on the volume of international arms transfers during 2015-19 highlights the strengths of key strategic partnerships such as Russia-India, US-Japan and China-Pakistan, reinforced by arms trade.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) released a report showcasing an increase of 5.5 per cent in the volume of international arms transfers during 2015–19, compared with the previous five-year period.1 The report highlights the strength of key strategic partnerships such as Russia-India, US-Japan and China-Pakistan, reinforced by arms trade. While Russia accounted for 56 per cent of India’s arms imports, 96 per cent of Japan’s arms imports came from the US and Chinese equipment made up 73 per cent of Pakistan’s arms imports. The United States, Russia, France, Germany and China continue to be the world’s largest arms exporters.
The growth of arms trade from Europe, especially France and Germany,is a significant change. French arms exports registered a 72 per cent increase in 2015-19, reaching their highest level for any five-year period since 1990 and accounted for 7.9 per cent of total global arms exports. Similarly, Germany’s arms exports were 17 per cent higher in 2015–19, compared with 2010–14, and accounted for 5.8 per cent of global trade. The United Kingdom however registered a negative growth of 15 per cent. Asia and Oceania became even bigger markets for the US, Russia and China in the past five years, generating 30 per cent of trade for the US, 57 per cent for Russia and 74 per cent for China.
It was also interesting to note the distinct patterns in Africa, Latin America and Northeast Asia. While Brazilian arms imports in 2015–19 were the highest in South America — accounting for 31 per cent of the sub-region’s arms imports, South Africa, the largest arms importer in sub-Saharan Africa in 2005–2009, imported almost no major arms in 2015–19. In Northeast Asia, South Korea’s arms exports rose by 143 per cent during 2015-19, as compared to 2010-14, propelling it to the list of the top 10 largest exporters for the first time.
Countries in the turbulent and conflict-ridden Middle East registered a 61 per cent increase in arms imports, accounting for 35 per cent of the global total over the past five years. United Arab Emirates (UAE) was the eighth-largest arms importer in 2015–19.Egypt’s arms imports tripled in volume in 2015-19 and Saudi Arabia’s imports increased by 130 per cent, accounting for 12 per cent of global arms imports in 2015–19. Nearly three-fourths of Saudi Arabia’s arms imports came from the US and 13 per cent from the UK. The report though flags a decrease in Turkish arms imports, which were 48 per cent lower than in the previous five-year period.
The US has further strengthened its position as the world’s largest arms exporter, with its exports of major arms being 76 per cent higher than those of the second largest arms exporter in the world, the Russian Federation. Between 2010–14 and 2015–19, major arms exports from the US grew by 23 per cent, and it was the primary exporter to 19 of the top 25 arms importers in the world. Overall, the US transferred arms to 96 countries. The Middle East was its biggest market, with 51 per cent share and Saudi Arabia — the world’s largest arms importer for 2015–19, accounted for 25 per cent of US exports. Apart from the Middle East, US arms exports accounted for the lion’s share of imports by Japan (96 per cent), Saudi Arabia (73 per cent), Australia (68 per cent), the UK (67 per cent), Israel (78 per cent) and Norway (77 per cent). Interestingly, Germany was listed as the primary supplier of arms for the US (21 per cent).
Russian arms exports saw a decline, registering a negative growth of 18 per cent. This was primarily due to fall in exports to Syria (87 per cent) and India (47 per cent), with SIPRI analysts noting that ‘Russia lost traction in India …’2 While Russian arms exports to India have indeed seen a decline in percentage terms, this has little relation to the strength of India-Russia relations as India is still Russia’s primary arms importer. Along with China and Algeria, India accounts for 55 per cent of Russian exports. The decline in Russian exports to India may also be attributed to the fact that there has been a reduction in Indian arm imports from 14 per cent of the global arms trade in 2010-14 to 9.2 per cent in 2015-19. The reduction in Russian arms export to Syria, however, did not affect Moscow’s Middle Eastern arms trade which rose by 30 per cent, with Egypt and Iraq being the main recipients of Russian weapons.
While US arms exports increased and Russian exports declined, Chinese arms exports remained relatively stable and did not see a significant jump — growing by only 6.3 per cent. Asia and Oceania accounted for nearly three-fourths of Chinese exports, followed by Africa (16 per cent) and the Middle East (6.7 per cent). China’s share within Asia and Oceania was primarily due to significant arms trade with Pakistan (accounting for 73 per cent of its imports), Bangladesh (72 per cent) and Myanmar (49 per cent). However, as the fifth-largest arms exporter in 2015–19, China significantly increased the number of recipients of its major arms, from 40 in 2010–14 to 53 in 2015–19.
The SIPRI report makes for interesting reading when juxtaposed with the geopolitical flux associated with some of the key regions of the world. The report for instance highlights a reduction in Turkey’s arms imports, even as the country has faced a difficult regional security situation in the recent past. On the other hand, Egypt, without any discernible imminent, external threat, has seen a high jump in its arm imports (of over 200 percent) — making it the third-largest arms importer for 2015–19. In Northeast Asia,at a time when the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK) undertook ballistic missile tests in quick succession, Japan’s arms imports grew substantially (72 percent) but South Korea’s imports remained stable, even as its exports grew substantially, as noted earlier. It is a fact though that South Korea’s domestic arms industry has become stronger in the past decade.3
Arms trade between states can be better regulated through adherence to best practices of informal mechanisms such as the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).4 While the MTCR seeks to limit the proliferation of missiles and missile technology, the WA promotes greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies. Out of the top 10 arms exporters, the US, Russia, France, Germany, the UK, Spain, Italy and South Korea are members of the WA and MTCR; only China and Israel are non-members. On the other hand, of the 25 top arms importers, only nine (Australia, India, Italy, Japan, Norway, South Korea, Turkey, the US, and the UK) are members of the WA and the MTCR. If the other major arms importers become members of such informal groupings, it can help build transparency and also limit the proliferation of dual-use goods.
Dr. Kanica Rakhra is a Consultant with the Disarmament and International Security Affairs division of the Ministry of External Affairs of India. Views expressed by the author do not reflect the views of the Ministry of External Affairs.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
The European Union-3 and Iran are indeed up against formidable odds to keep the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) alive going forward.
The July 2015 Iran nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), has been in a precarious position ever since President Donald Trump announced in May 2018 that he was withdrawing from the agreement. The deal’s flaws for Trump included a weak inspections regime overseen by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the agreement’s ‘sunset’ clauses — which did not place sufficient restrictions on Iran’s future nuclear ambitions, and Iran’s continued testing of ballistic missiles.
Trump was obviously not impressed by the then IAEA Director General, Yukiyo Amano’s repeated affirmations that Iran was subject to the world’s most robust verification regime.1 Even Trump’s closest advisors, like then Secretary of Defence Gen. James Mattis, termed IAEA verification of the JCPOA as ‘robust’.2
As for Iran’s ballistic missile tests, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 2231 of July 20, 2015, which recognised the JCPOA and removed UNSC sanctions on Iran, ‘called on’ Iran not to undertake such activities until eight years after JCPOA Adoption Day (October 18, 2023) or until the time that the IAEA gives the ‘broader conclusion’ determination regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.3
The IAEA gives such a certification when it is satisfied about the ‘completeness’ (absence of undeclared activities) as well as the ‘correctness’ (non-diversion from declared nuclear activities) of a country’s nuclear programme. In 2018, the IAEA gave a broader conclusion determination for 70 out of the 129 states that had the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and the Additional Protocols (AP) in force.4 Given Iran’s past concealment activities and lack of transparency, such a determination could have possibly taken longer than eight years but the IAEA was regularly affirming that Iran was living up to its JCPOA commitments when Trump withdrew.
Iran on its part affirms that its ballistic missile activities are an essential feature of its security profile and that there was no binding requirement prohibiting such tests either in the JCPOA (which by the way deals exclusively with its nuclear programme) or in the UNSCR 2231.
The US, France and the UK (unlike Russia and China), however do not accept Iran’s justifications but note that testing of medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) like the Shahab-3 is a serious concern, as it is a Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Category-I system, ‘technically capable of delivering a nuclear weapon’.5 Iran’s regional behaviour has also been cited by Trump as a factor that impinged on his decision to withdraw from the deal.
‘Maximum Pressure’ Campaign
After the Trump withdrawal, unilateral restrictive measures targeting Iran’s oil exports, among others — waived as part of the deal, were re-imposed. US officials assert that these restrictions have led to a massive loss of oil revenue, of up to $50 billion per year.6 Other than China and Syria, no other country is currently importing Iranian oil. The access of Iranian banks to the SWIFT network was cut off by the Belgian-based entity in November 2018. Many other European companies, including automobile manufacturers, have gone back on their plans and agreements entered into in the aftermath of the JCPOA, fearful of the repercussions of US secondary sanctions.
The European Union’s (EU) efforts to put in place alternate payment mechanisms for Iran oil trade have not been successful. The Instrument for Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) was formed in January 2019 and its Iranian counterpart came into being in April 2019. However, reports note that no trade exchanges have taken place as part of the mechanism so far.
Apart from such restrictive economic measures, the other pegs of the administration’s ‘maximum pressure’ policy on Iran include what US officials have described as ‘re-establishing deterrence’ vis-à-vis Iran.7 The killing of Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander Qassem Soleimani on January 3, 2020 is held as an essential element of this policy. Iranian proxies like the Hezbollah meanwhile have been designated as a terrorist organisation by countries like the UK, Argentina, and Guatemala among others in recent months, on account of sustained US diplomatic pressure.
‘Trump Deal’?
UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson, while acknowledging that he recognised Trump’s concerns about the JCPOA, has called for negotiations to begin on a ‘Trump deal’ to replace it.8 However, it is not clear what the contours of such an agreement could be. In January 2018, Trump insisted that his aim is to deny Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon – not just for 10 years but forever.9 Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in May 2018 put forth 12 demands required of Iran. These included a change in Iran’s regional behaviour (ranging from Afghanistan, Yemen, Palestine and Syria) to halting the launch or development of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles to Iran stopping its enrichment activities.10 Former Obama administration officials have called Pompeo’s demands a ‘wish-list based on a pipe dream’.11
The US State Department’s Special Representative on Iran further affirms that the UN standard of no enrichment has to be restored.12 While it is true that the UNSC in its resolutions beginning from 2006 required Iran to stop its uranium enrichment activities, this injunction was always part of a broader bargain ‘to allow for negotiations in good faith, in order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcome’.13
Further, the JCPOA allowed Iran to enrich uranium, though with severe restrictions pertaining to total stockpile, limited to 300 kgs of uranium hexa-flouride (UF6) and enrichment levels (3.67 per cent). Iran breached both these commitments in July 2019, two months after President Hassan Rouhani stated as much on May 8, 2019, a year after the Trump withdrawal. 14
Between May and December 2019, Iran’s uranium stockpile more than doubled from 174 kgs to 372 kgs, out of which about 160 kgs is enriched to 4.5 per cent U-235. While these numbers are far less than the quantities Iran had in its possession at the time the JCPOA came into being (over 8700 kgs of UF6 enriched to five per cent and nearly 450 kgs of UF6 enriched to 20 per cent U-235), Iran’s opponents will surely point to them as posing rising proliferation danger.
Iran has since breached the JCPOA commitments related to its heavy water stockpile and prohibition on enrichment at the Fordow plant (both in November 2019). In January 2020, in the aftermath of Soleimani’s killing, Iran announced that there would be no restrictions on the numbers of centrifuges and that it will not follow any operational restrictions on its nuclear programme.
In response to Iran’s violations, the EU-3 invoked the Dispute Resolution Mechanism (DRM) of the JCPOA on January 14, 2020, as they held that these violations had ‘non-reversible proliferation implications’.15 Iran on its part has been insisting that these steps, taken after a gap of every two months beginning from May 2019 to January 2020, are ‘reversible upon effective implementation of reciprocal obligations’.16
Iran meanwhile not only rejects the possibility of a ‘Trump deal’, and as Foreign Minister Javad Zarif tweeted on January 26, 2020, but also insists that it is Washington which has to return to the negotiating table as well as compensate it for the economic and other damages it has suffered since May 2018.17
Negative Implications
Trump’s unilateral upending of the multi-laterally negotiated agreement has not only negatively impacted regional stability but has worked against the administration’s stated goal of reducing US commitments in the region. An uptick in US-Iran tensions in the past 15 months for instance has led to an increase in US regional force posture and commitments. Israeli analysts meanwhile insist that only a physical destruction of Iranian nuclear installations will prevent an Iranian bomb. 18
It will be hard for Iran to reverse its JCPOA violations unless it gets some economic relief in return. Trump administration officials meanwhile are especially worried about the upcoming deadline of October 18, 2020, when the UNSCR 2231 stipulation of Iran requiring UNSC approval for conventional arms imports will expire.
Prospects of a diplomatic breakthrough between Tehran and Washington, brokered by mediators like Oman or the EU, seem dim at the moment. Iran’s legislative elections on February 21, 2020 are expected to place hardliners in control of the parliament, which could further constrict President Rouhani’s negotiating space. The EU-3 and Iran are indeed up against formidable odds to keep the JCPOA alive till at least the November 2020 US presidential elections, and hope that the American electorate will resolve their deep quandary.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
Pages