The killing of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, popularly known as the "Tiger of Balochistan" in the early hours of August 27 in an army operation has ominous implications for the restive province. The tribal chief of the largest Baloch tribe, the Bugtis, was a strong proponent of Baloch autonomy, and had said that he had been a Baloch for several centuries, a Muslim for 1400 years but a Pakistani for just over fifty.
The killing of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, popularly known as the "Tiger of Balochistan" in the early hours of August 27 in an army operation has ominous implications for the restive province. The tribal chief of the largest Baloch tribe, the Bugtis, was a strong proponent of Baloch autonomy, and had said that he had been a Baloch for several centuries, a Muslim for 1400 years but a Pakistani for just over fifty. Although a government-sponsored council reportedly attended by the Waderas of all subclans of the Bugti tribe had, on August 17, stripped Nawab Bugti from the leadership of the tribe and had announced an end to the Sardari system, the spontaneous popular reaction to his killing indicates that he had lost neither his aura nor his authority. Over six hundred people are reported to have been arrested. There have been riots in Karachi and Quetta. Violence has been reported from across the length and breadth of the province. A shutter-down and wheel-jam strike was observed on August 28 throughout the province and vehicular traffic had come to a grinding halt. Trains to and from Quetta were cancelled, as the railway authorities were reluctant to ply them without adequate security.
The public school educated octogenarian had played a major role in the politics of Balochistan for over five decades, but was a relatively late convert to the cause of Baloch nationalism. Till his recent falling out with the Pakistani establishment, he had been one of its pillars in the region. A former chief minister, he was the first Baloch in the Pakistani cabinet (he held the home and then the defence portfolios) and was the governor of the province during the last major conflagration in Balochistan in 1973. He was accused of operating private jails and running a feudal justice system in his area. His running feud with Kalpar Waderas, the hereditary head of the Kalpar sub-clans, had led to the forced migration of over 10,000 Kalpars from Dera Bugti. At the time of his killing, he was the leader of Jamhoori Watan Party, with representatives in both the provincial assembly and the parliament. His recent attempts to get all Baloch nationalist parties under one roof, however, did not bear fruit since other Baloch Sardars did not trust him due to his role in 1973.
In 2005, Bugti lands were the scene of pitched battles fought between security forces and the Baloch nationalists. In January 2005, the alleged rape of Dr. Shazia Hasan, an employee of Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL), by an army officer in Sui, had led to violent attacks on the gas complex. Gas supplies were disrupted and it took weeks to restore normalcy. The pitched battles at Sui had jolted the Pakistani economy and the Karachi Stock Exchange ended up losing almost half its net worth. The security forces had then tried to eliminate Nawab Bugti by shelling his ancestral house at Dera Bugti in March 2005. Although 17 shells pierced through his residence, he survived in a hair's breadth. However, the day long shelling claimed 67 lives, including 33 members of the minority Hindu community who inhabited the neighbouring Hindu ghetto, and resulted in injury to over 100 people and severe damage to a number of houses and temples. The Nawab had to flee Dera Bugti early this year and take refuge in the mountains, from where he had been co-ordinating the Baloch resistance.
The killing of Nawab Bugti has been criticised by almost all opposition political parties in Pakistan. What is more surprising is that many top leaders of the ruling party, including two former prime ministers, have termed the incident as unfortunate, while the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), which is a key constituent of the federal government as well as of the Sindh government, has squarely criticised the government action. Widespread criticism of its act has forced the government to refute original reports that the tracking of Bugti's satellite phone had helped the security forces to pinpoint his location, which implied that he was indeed the target. According to the government's latest version, the area was targeted after an Army helicopter overflying the area came under heavy fire from the rebels and the resultant battle led to the caving in of the mud bunker where the Bugti along with his men had taken shelter. The fact that the rebels killed over 20 elite commandos indicates that the former gave the security forces a tough fight before capitulating.
Despite the government's attempts to portray him as an autocratic feudal despot, Sardar Akbar Khan Bugti, on account of the circumstances and the manner of his death, is destined to become a martyred hero for Baloch nationalism like 80-year old Nauroz Khan before him, who had taken on the Pakistani Army in 1958. By killing Bugti, General Musharraf has earned the permanent enmity of the Baloch population. He has probably underestimated Baloch nationalism, which has led the Baloch to confront the Pakisani establishment four times since its creation. A spokesman of the Baloch nationalists said that despite the death of Akbar Bugti, their struggle would continue. In his death, Nawab Bugti has probably provided the fractured Baloch polity a rallying point. Ironically, death may help him achieve what he failed to during his lifetime - the unity of all Baloch nationalist groups.
Balochistan, Pakistan
South Asia
IDSA COMMENT
History and Power Shift Fuel Sino-Japanese Rift
Abanti Bhattacharya
August 23, 2006
On August 15, 2006, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement strongly protesting Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's latest visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. Koizumi’s six consecutive visits since he took office in April 2001 have chilled Sino-Japanese relations, making the issue a major stumbling block in the smooth development of relations. The souring of Sino-Japanese relations over the last few years has been a result of the complex enmeshing of two broad issues: history and power shift.
On August 15, 2006, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement strongly protesting Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's latest visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. Koizumi’s six consecutive visits since he took office in April 2001 have chilled Sino-Japanese relations, making the issue a major stumbling block in the smooth development of relations. The souring of Sino-Japanese relations over the last few years has been a result of the complex enmeshing of two broad issues: history and power shift. These have fuelled their competing nationalisms and shaped the present bitter contours of their relationship.
The rise of China is the primary factor creating fears in Japanese minds, for it involves not only the emergence of a new great power in Japan’s neighbourhood, but also a power poised to dominate the region by attracting long-time American allies to its orbit. In fact, as Joseph Nye has rightly pointed out, China in many ways is fast emerging as a soft power that is economically becoming attractive and politically generating a spirit of harmonious co-existence. This is causing the erstwhile allies of Japan and the United States to gradually gravitate towards China’s orbit. The rise of China is thus creating a new balance of power in Asia, and the Japanese are consequently apprehensive of China’s growing military might and rising economic clout.
In response, the Japanese are increasingly defining their state policies on the basis of nationalism and the present Koizumi government is shedding the pacifist approach and pushing Japan towards acquiring a ‘normal’ state status. Japan is today not only strengthening its alliance with Washington, but has also for the first time (in 2005) recognised Taiwan as a common security concern to both itself and the United States. This has indeed alarmed China, since reunification of Taiwan is central to Chinese nationalism. Reunification would remove the stigma of the ‘century of humiliation’ and enable China to once again acquire the great power status it once enjoyed. China’s opposition to Japan’s bid for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is also indicative of the logic of China’s urge to remain the sole great power in the region. In fact, both China and Japan are in the process of redefining their power positions in the international system, and the growth of assertive nationalisms in both countries is partly rooted in this process.
Parallel to this power shift is the vexed issue of ‘history’, which has increasingly come to influence Sino-Japanese relations. Sino-Japanese disagreements have hitherto tended to coincide with an upsurge in Chinese nationalism. Interestingly, while China has relegated its historical animosities with most countries to the backburner and given preference to economics over politics, it regards history as the major issue impinging on political engagement with Japan.
China has a deep sense of history, which flows from its powerful and flourishing civilization till the West ripped it open. Incipient in this notion of history is the Chinese idea of a Sino-centric world order. Till the advent of Western colonialism, China considered itself to be the centre of its civilizational world – the Middle Kingdom, which represented a civilizational state with no definite boundaries and exercised influence over peripheral states that accepted its superior culture and accorded to it the place of the head in the family of nations. In the Chinese sense, the ‘world’ encompassed those areas where Chinese culture spread and was assimilated. China was thus the leader of this Sinic world. This worldview, however, received its first shock during the Opium War of 1842, when the West – with superior military forces, entrepreneurial capabilities and missionary zeal – began to establish its supremacy over China. But the final collapse of the Sino-centric World order came with the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, in which Japan defeated China and took over Taiwan. Chinese animosities towards Japan can be directly traced to this defeat. The war had far reaching implications in the sense that the superior Chinese civilizational state, which had for long treated Japan benevolently as a younger brother within its realm was defeated by the latter, thus fundamentally shattering the Chinese world view. Equally important, the loss of Taiwan to Japan marked an “extraordinary humiliation” for China. Reunification of Taiwan thus became firmly embedded in the Chinese nationalist agenda.
Broadly, the issue of ‘history’ between China and Japan involves three major controversies: history textbooks, apologies and Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni shrine. These controversies are related to Japanese attitudes towards Chinese in the 1930s and 1940s when Japan invaded and occupied more than half of China, and in the process killed more than thirty five million Chinese civilians and military personnel and indulged in rape, looting and arson. The most notorious incident during this occupation was the Nanjing massacre of December 1937, which is estimated to have resulted in the death of 300,000 people. However, the Japanese deny the magnitude of this atrocity.
Rooted in this historical controversy are China’s avowed aspirations of acquiring the leadership role in international politics and recreating the Sino-centric world order, an order in which it would emerge as a superior power vis-à-vis Japan and the US. Thus the Sino-Japanese friction over history has become inextricably linked with the ongoing repositioning of the two countries in the changing global matrix of power. The enmeshing of the two issues – power shift and history – has engendered deep hostility between them, despite the three Joint Communiqués signed by the two governments in 1972, 1978 and 1998.
Also, economic interdependence, which has deepened considerably between the two countries, has failed to curb the deterioration in relations. Over the past thirty-three years, Sino-Japanese trade has grown 160-fold. In 2004, China became Japan's largest trading partner and Japan China's third largest. Reports from China point out that 20 per cent of Japan's overseas companies in terms of numbers are resident in China; 11 per cent of Japan's total output and 10 per cent of total profits are attributed to China. Yet, close economic interdependence has not translated into a close political relationship as underscored by liberal international theory, which claims that deeper economic interdependence creates favourable political ties.
The key to understanding the deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations thus lies in the complex entwining of the issues of history and power shift, which have fanned the flames of suspicion and enmity.
China-Japan Relations, Japan, China
East Asia
IDSA COMMENT
Is Kerala Emerging as India's New Terror Hub?
A. Vinod Kumar
August 22, 2006
Not many in the security establishment would like to believe so. A state known for its religious diversity and secular fibre, Kerala also has a sensitive communal melange with conflicting interests holding stake over its political and social institutions. To an average security analyst in Delhi, the ominous trends of subversive activities in this farthest nook would not be as apparent as similar events in Aurangabad or Meerut.
Not many in the security establishment would like to believe so. A state known for its religious diversity and secular fibre, Kerala also has a sensitive communal melange with conflicting interests holding stake over its political and social institutions. To an average security analyst in Delhi, the ominous trends of subversive activities in this farthest nook would not be as apparent as similar events in Aurangabad or Meerut. In the past half-a-decade, central intelligence agencies and the Kerala police have been on their feet to check the growing influx of pan-Indian and South Asian terror groups across the state. A chain of sporadic events in the past decade and more has disturbed many secular structures and the law and order situation in Kerala, with serious ramifications for national security. While many such events were directly or indirectly connected with national and global terror trends, Kerala's vast coastline and its proximity to international waters have made it a suitable landing point for extremist elements, after the intensified vigil across the Western coast from Goa to Gujarat. This has forced the Coast Guard and the Indian Navy to step up patrol in this region, especially off the Malabar Coast, where groups involved in smuggling and other nefarious operations are traditionally based. Like similar points off the Western coast, the Malabar coastal belt is reportedly used as a corridor for transiting resources and equipment for extremist groups operating in Kerala and Tamil Nadu.
While the western coastline has always been an active subversive corridor, the recent shift of such traffic through the Kerala coast has vitiated the communal atmosphere in the state, especially after the recent terror attacks in Mumbai and elsewhere. Though Kerala itself has not witnessed any major terror attacks, there are indications that many Pakistan-based terror groups have active modules or linkages with some fundamentalist groups in the state. Inspired by pan-Islamic reactionary movements across the country after the 1992 events, fundamentalist elements in this region have gained a firm footing with more groups emerging in different roles in the past few years. After earlier groups like the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and the Islamic Sevak Sangh (ISS) were banned in the 1990s, they re-emerged in new incarnations and have reportedly established linkages with other pan-Indian extremist groups. With the focus shifting back to SIMI after its alleged role in the recent Mumbai blasts, the Kerala Police have in the past few weeks rounded up suspected SIMI activists, especially from Binanipuram in Malabar, and impounded inflammatory literature, including seditious graffiti, showing linkages with Pakistan-based terrorist groups. Besides, fervent investigations are on to trace the possible linkages of many other organizations in Malappuram and Kozhikode with pan-Islamic extremist elements.
The emergence of Islamic fundamentalist groups in Malabar acquired a serious dimension from the mid-1990s after a series of insidious events. The abduction and murder of reformist scholar Maulavi Abul Hassan Chekannur in July 1993 was the first indication of the strong fundamentalist trend gaining ground in this region. Even after years of investigations involving even the Central Bureau of Investigation, the actual culprits could not be nabbed, causing a severe setback to the reformist movement. The seizure of pipe bombs (nitroglycerine charges in iron tubes) concealed in plastic bags under the Kadalundi Bridge in Malappuram in 1996 gave credence to fears of terror groups gaining roots and possible infiltration by Pakistan's ISI among extremist groups in this region. Also, two Tamil Nadu bomb blast suspects, Imam Ali and Hyder Ali, had reportedly revealed during interrogation about their visits to Malappuram and training people in handling explosives during this period. The recent spurt in fundamentalist violence - including intermittent small-scale explosions in Kozhikode early this year, periodic arms seizures across the state, and the burning of Tamil Nadu transport buses by suspected ISS/PDP activists in retribution to the incarceration of Abdul Nasser Madhani in Salem Jail - are all ominous trends pointing to Kerala turning into an extremist flash point.
The Coimbatore bomb blasts in February 1998, allegedly stage-managed by Tamil Nadu-based Al-Umma, was the first instance of a Kerala terror link being established after investigators arrested Abdul Nasser Madhani for conniving with Al Umma. Madhani, incarcerated since then in Salem Jail, floated the Islamic Sevak Sangh (ISS) in the early 1990s and quickly rose as a fire-brand leader inspiring Muslim youth to resist the Hindutva forces. Though ISS was banned after the post-1992 upheaval, he floated a political party called the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), which aligned with the ruling Left Democratic Front in the recent assembly elections. Despite its political identity and limited activism after his arrest, police and intelligence agencies suspect PDP to be maintaining links with other pan-Islamic extremist groups. The occasional violence by PDP activists in recent months has only compounded the vigil over their activities.
On the other hand, newly-formed groups like the National Democratic Front (NDF) have emerged as stronger alternatives to ISS and SIMI and have allegedly masterminded communal violence in recent years. The Kerala Police believes that this outfit, which masquerades as a human rights movement, is another re-incarnation of the ISS. Though the NDF leadership denies any extremist links, it is reportedly operating under different names to save itself from being banned or tracked down. Many of its activists were arrested or detained in connection with recent country-bomb blasts, like in Meppayyur, and other acts of violence in different parts of the state. SIMI, on the other hand, had been working in the shadows ever since the ban in the 1990s. However, a splinter group of SIMI activists, led by C A M Basheer who hails from Ernakulam, is suspected to be involved in the Mumbai blasts. Basheer, a trained aeronautical engineer, is known to have received training in Pakistan, and was already booked for his alleged role in the 2003 Mumbai blasts. The investigation team is also probing the likely role of three Keralite suspects of the Coimbatore blasts - K P Noohu, Ooma Babu and Shamsudheen. The Mumbai Police believes that Noohu was in touch with Dr. Tanvir Ansari, who was recently arrested in connection with the 7/7 blasts. According to reports, while Babu is lodged in Coimbatore jail, Shamsudheen was recently arrested by Coimbatore police for conspiring to undertake explosions in the town.
Despite incriminating evidence of co-operation between Kerala based groups and major pan-Islamic terrorist organisations, there is general lethargy in the state police machinery and intelligence agencies to crack down on such groups owing to the political patronage they enjoy in Kerala. Many of these groups have openly allied with major political Fronts in recent years, thus stymieing a concrete response to their anti-national activities. Government inaction after the communal violence in Marad and Nadapuram, with culprits involved in these incidents still roaming free, demonstrates their leverage with political dispensations in the state. Despite reports by the Union home ministry of ISI-aided groups operating from Kerala, there is great inaction among concerned agencies to curb this dangerous trend. In recent years, central agencies had unearthed Kerala-based Hawala rackets facilitating the passage of funds from Middle East-based groups to the rest of the country through expatriate networks. However, such events have failed to move either the police machinery or the political establishment, which are seemingly wary of disturbing communal equations through proactive action. While bomb-hauls, seditious graffiti, and the murder of moderates have become common occurrences, the day may not be far when such sporadic eruptions coalesce into a major terrorist event.
Coastal Security, Kerala
Terrorism & Internal Security
IDSA COMMENT
Jiang's Postscript!
Raviprasad Narayanan
August 21, 2006
Calling upon party members to study the Selected Works of Jiang Zemin (SWJZ) in line with a decision taken by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), President Hu Jintao termed the publication and issue of the SWJZ "a major event in the political life of the party and state." Earlier, an editorial in the People's Daily trumpeted the publication of the SWJZ as "offering a powerful weapon of ideology for China's construction of socialism with Chinese characteristics and increasing the spiritual strength of Chinese people to build a well-off society in an all-round way." S
Calling upon party members to study the Selected Works of Jiang Zemin (SWJZ) in line with a decision taken by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), President Hu Jintao termed the publication and issue of the SWJZ "a major event in the political life of the party and state." Earlier, an editorial in the People's Daily trumpeted the publication of the SWJZ as "offering a powerful weapon of ideology for China's construction of socialism with Chinese characteristics and increasing the spiritual strength of Chinese people to build a well-off society in an all-round way." Significantly, the Liberation Army Daily carried a circular issued by the General Political Department (GPD) that called for the entire People's Liberation Army (PLA) and People's Armed Police (PAP) to study the SWJZ including the theory of the "Three Represents." The circular praised the SWJZ for "recording the historical process of how the third-generation central leadership with Jiang Zemin as the core led the entire party and the people of all ethnic groups throughout the country to press forward the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics."
The decision to compile the SWJZ was made by the CPC Central Committee in November 2003. The three volumes of SWJZ comprise 203 of Jiang's reports, speeches, articles, letters, inscriptions and decrees from August 1980 to September 2004. The books, compiled by the Party Literature Editing Committee and published by the People's Publishing House, elaborate on the important thoughts of the Three Represents. The Three Represents is one of the guiding theories for the CPC together with Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory.
In the reform era, economic growth and the improvement of living standards, rather than revolutionary ideology or democratic procedures, are the main source of the Party's political legitimacy. Jiang Zemin saw in the Party a vehicle of social, economic and cultural progress. This was reflected in his call for the implementation of the Three Represents. The amended Constitution of the People's Republic of China following the 16th Party Congress in 2002 enshrined the Three Represents as one of the ruling theories of China.
The Three Represents state that the CPC must always represent:
The development trend of China's advanced productive forces.
The orientation of China's advanced culture.
The fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the people.
The Three Represents had been formulated to ensure that the Party expands its membership to include private entrepreneurs, redefine its societal role, modify its core tenets, and institutionalise its rule. Party conservatives introduced the Three Represents, since sections within the CPC felt that economic reforms had actually weakened the legitimacy of the prevailing socialist ideology by introducing and expanding various forms of private ownership, encouraging income disparities, and, in some cases, causing serious corruption.
According to a People's Daily report, the first volume of the SWJZ comprises 81 articles, starting with Jiang's explanation for the establishment of special economic zones in the southern and eastern provinces at the 15th Session of the fifth National People's Congress in August 1980. The second volume comprises 59 articles during the period September 12, 1997 to February 1, 2000. Jiang's report at the 15th CPC National Congress on promoting the socialist course with Chinese characteristics is included in this volume. The third volume, including 63 articles, starts with Jiang's speech on the Three Represents made during his inspection in China's Guangdong Province on February 25, 2000. The volume ends with Jiang's speech at an enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission on September 20, 2004, after he resigned as chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission.
Of interest to Sinologists will be Jiang Zemin's interpretation on the development of Marxism in China and his theoretical contribution in the fields of economy, politics, culture and society, as well as foreign affairs, national defence and administration of CPC, the state and army. Being the first technocrat to head the CPC, Jiang's views on China's 'socialist market' economic system, agriculture, reform of state-owned enterprises, and the development of western China will add to existing literature, although it is a moot point whether Jiang's views would be any different from official statements and interpretations.
Apart from the opaqueness that characterises the Chinese political system and the official encomiums in praise of the SWJZ, the publication of the three volumes reflects the inevitable jockeying and posturing in the run up towards the 17th Party Congress to be held in 2007. Though Hu Jintao wears 'three hats' - President of the People's Republic of China (PRC), General Secretary of the CPC and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) - he is yet to demonstrate a comprehensive power base that will enhance his position as the 'core leader' of the 'fourth generation'. When Jiang Zemin was at the helm, he had assiduously cultivated the PLA to be on his side and was often referred to as the 'core leader' of the 'third generation.' The closest titular acceptance Hu has earned from the PLA is that of 'Chairman Hu' with which he has to be satisfied for the moment. The publication of SWJZ also indicates the strength and loyalty quotient of the 'Shanghai faction', which owes its allegiance to Jiang Zemin. The most visible member of the 'Shanghai faction' and representing it at the very highest levels of the Chinese political system is Vice President Zeng Qinghong who also heads the Central Party School - the cradle for future CPC leaders and party policies.
The publication of the SWJZ reveals two aspects. First, the compilation of Jiang Zemin's speeches and official views on important issues is to be seen as communicating regime values to the Party rank and file and to the whole population. Second, the factional competition for securing high positions in the party and state apparatus has begun with an eye on the 17th Party Congress next year. In the highly nuanced politics that prevails in Beijing, the very release of a book might indicate the onset of political challenges that Hu Jintao may have to contend with even as he tries to establish a strong base for himself.
China
East Asia
IDSA COMMENT
Military Lessons of the Israel-Hezbollah War in Lebanon
P. K. Gautam
August 19, 2006
Since the middle of the 20th century, the Arab-Israeli wars have thrown up a number of military lessons. The most spectacular was a textbook pre-emptive counter air strike in 1967 by the Israeli Air Force (IAF), which destroyed or made non-operational the entire Egyptian Air Force. This demonstrated the need for gaining mastery of the air as a prelude to spectacular ground operations. At sea, a Styx missile fired by an Egyptian missile boat on the Israeli destroyer Eliat validated the idea of anti-ship missiles.
Since the middle of the 20th century, the Arab-Israeli wars have thrown up a number of military lessons. The most spectacular was a textbook pre-emptive counter air strike in 1967 by the Israeli Air Force (IAF), which destroyed or made non-operational the entire Egyptian Air Force. This demonstrated the need for gaining mastery of the air as a prelude to spectacular ground operations. At sea, a Styx missile fired by an Egyptian missile boat on the Israeli destroyer Eliat validated the idea of anti-ship missiles.
The 1973 Arab-Israeli War again demonstrated a few new lessons. The first was that a determined attacker can breach an obstacle. The Egyptian Army surprised the token Israeli defenders on the Bar Lev line, proving that no defensive work can stop a committed attacker. Later, in attempts to link up with troops on the canal, Israelis learnt yet another lesson. They charged with only tanks without accompanying mechanised infantry, neglecting to neutralise the anti-tank screen by artillery firepower, and consequently paid a heavy price in tank losses. This war also proved that artillery firepower and combined arms teams must operate together. Thus was sown the seeds of the Merkava tank with the capacity to carry infantry inside the hull. The Egyptians also ushered in the age of surface-to-air missile (SAM) warfare, and learning from the IAF's pre-emptive use of air power in 1967 were successful in downing about 40 Israeli jets in the first two days of the Yom Kippur War.
The next lesson was the demonstration of how to win a war in the fourth dimension, that is, the electromagnetic spectrum. In the 1982 operations in the Bekka Valley the Israelis were successful in destroying Syrian radars and aircraft through innovative tactics of suppression of air defence (SEAD) by using surface-to-air missiles, ground based fire power, electronic warfare, the use of remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) and drones, and command and control of air space by airborne early warning and control aircraft (AWACS). The Israelis came to be recognised as masters in the technology, art and science of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). All subsequent military operations like the US-led invasion of Afghanistan or Iraq as well as targeted killings have been facilitated by creative use of UAVs.
But the character of warfare has since changed. In force-on-force operations or when two militaries engaged in combat, the break up of the organic cohesion was the aim and this has been sought to be achieved through firepower and manoeuvre. Destruction of the enemy and faster information decision and action cycle determined who the victors were. Now, in asymmetric warfare situations, as witnessed in Lebanon, units and subunits do not exist in the classical sense. No military targets in the conventional mode presented themselves. Foolproof countermeasures to prevent individual suicide bombers or the threats posed by non-state actors do not exist.
So far, in high intensity force-on-force conventional wars, the Israeli Armed Forces showed superior performance compared to the militaries of its Arab adversaries. But as events in Afghanistan and Iraq show, insurgents and terrorists can resort to asymmetric warfare. This new generation of warfare has witnessed more casualties being inflicted on organised militaries such as those of the US-led forces in Iraq or troops in Afghanistan by the use of car bombs, improvised explosive devices, infantry and artillery mortars. Urban combat and the imaginative use of built up areas by insurgents have challenged the casualty aversion concept of the military forces of advanced countries. Wars may no longer be short swift and decisive, but protracted and characterised by attrition.
The War in Lebanon
In this test bed of modern military laboratory, the over a month long operations conducted by Israel in southern Lebanon against the Hezbollah have indicated certain trends in the character of war.
The first is that the break up of the cohesion of a diffuse opponent such as the Hezbollah cannot be achieved by conventional or traditional means like firepower. So far, insurgents or non-state actors were using infantry anti-tank or anti-aircraft weapons and light or heavy mortars. This war has shown how non-state actors can improvise the use of rocket and missile artillery. Artillerymen know the difficulties involved in the laborious and technology intensive means of delivering unobserved predicted fire with accuracy. While the accuracy of the Hezbollah's rocket artillery may be suspect, its aim - retaliatory harassing fire over population centres - appears to have been achieved. As regards counter bombardment by the Israelis, shoot and scoot by Hezbollah artillery may have made their retaliatory fire ineffective in some cases. The land thrust by Israelis in southern Lebanon could also be termed as a massive counter bombardment strategy, aimed at destroying the gun positions by physical assault and denying terrain for deployment.
An important lesson that emerges is the much bandied rhetoric of jointmanship. At certain times and places, core competence is more important. The war showed that air power alone cannot assure victory. The Israeli Military Chief Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz is an air force man and it could be said that being an airman he must have appreciated that air power would suffice. But that did not happen. There has been criticism of the over reliance on air power. Having failed to destroy the Hezbollah by air power, a ground offensive was launched. Here, another lesson emerged, which is fundamental to land warfare: more important and rudimentary than jointmanship is the need to understand the employment of armour and infantry. Tanks are not suited for urban combat. The nature of fighting in this conflict was manpower intensive - the real stuff infantry is capable of dealing with. This realisation of the need for boots on the ground came very late. It was no surprise when Maj. Gen. Udi Adam, the northern army commander from an armoured background, was replaced by Maj. Gen. Moshe Kaplinsky of the infantry on 8 August.
The penultimate lesson is the fighting and martial spirits of the belligerents. Anecdotal accounts of the 1960s and 1970s record how Israeli tourists on holiday in the Himalayas had voluntarily rushed back to their country when war had broken out. Today, however, not all Israeli youth looking for spiritual solace in Dharamshala, for instance, would like to return to fight a war they may not consider as vital as the previous ones. On the other hand, the stereotypical image of Arab soldiers consistently being defeated have changed in public perception. After more than fifty years of war in the region, a breed of guerrillas has emerged with mastery over unconventional stratagems and who are difficult to pin down and defeat.
Finally, according to Edward Luttwak's thesis, it is better for a war to finish to the end with clear cut victors and vanquished. Premature cessation of hostilities would not serve the end purpose. This has not happened in Lebanon and a ceasefire is in place since 14 August 2006. The performance of the Hezbollah did not permit this concept to be tested. War may continue by other means in future.
Militaries need to draw relevant lessons from these operations. One lesson is that urbanisation and a high density of population restrict manoeuvre by mechanised forces. Boots on the ground or infantry operations are essential for victory. And these are also manpower intensive.
The second is that workable technology for urban guerrilla combat cannot be denied to insurgents. Missiles and rockets are now their new arsenal. Even greater sophistication in their arsenals should no longer spring a surprise.
Robert Pape, in his research on suicide terrorism, mentions that religion is rarely the root cause of suicide attacks. The main motivation according to him is resistance to foreign occupation. Countries like Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon under foreign occupation would continue to breed insurgents and terrorists. This is the third important lesson.
Israel, Jointmanship, Lebanon
Military Affairs
IDSA COMMENT
Could Pune be a Future Terrorist Target?
T. Khurshchev Singh
August 17, 2006
Pune, the Oxford of the East and the cultural capital of Maharashtra, is known for its educational institutions and manufacturing industries and as a home for retired service personnel. Lately, it has also become the hub for the automobile and IT sectors in western India. At the same time the city has now emerged as a link in the terrorist chain after the recent 7/11 Mumbai blasts.
Pune, the Oxford of the East and the cultural capital of Maharashtra, is known for its educational institutions and manufacturing industries and as a home for retired service personnel. Lately, it has also become the hub for the automobile and IT sectors in western India. At the same time the city has now emerged as a link in the terrorist chain after the recent 7/11 Mumbai blasts. Given that terrorists have turned their attention on the emerging Indian IT sector, there is a possibility that Pune may become the future target of terrorist attacks perpetrated by foreign terrorists worryingly in collusion with local support.
Over the last few years, India has been witnessing the dangerous trend of Pakistan-based terrorists operating in cities across its territory. Terrorist targets are no more limited to only attacks on the security forces and government establishments but have expanded to include strikes against India's economic and strategic assets. This fact was testified to by the busting of a Delhi based Lashker-e-Taiba (LeT) cell, which with the help of the banned Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) had planned to attack the IT centres of India. In fact, on December 25, 2005 there was an attack by the LeT members on the Indian Institute of Science (IISc) at Bangalore, which led to the arrest of the south Indian commander of the LeT, Abdul Rehman. It was found out that the arrested terrorists were also planning to attack the Indian Military Academy (IMA) in Dehradun.
In a seeming continuation of this trend, National Security Advisor M K Narayanan stated on July 29 that there was a serious threat from the LeT to nuclear installations in the country. Security has consequently been strengthened at the Kaiga nuclear power plant in Karnataka, and in the last few days at Kalpakkam as well. All these indicate an expanding terrorist network in the southern part of the country and the targeting of the symbols of 'emerging India' including the IT sector, scientific establishments and sensitive installations like nuclear power plants.
The question that therefore arises is whether Pune could emerge as a future target for terrorist attacks. Pune, among others is fast emerging as a major IT centre, with sprawling software parks being established all over the city as well as in the suburbs. Over the last two years the city has overtaken Mumbai in software exports and over 110 new units were registered for software products and services in 2005-2006. Software exports from Pune have soared from Rs. 5 crores worth in the late 1990s to about Rs. 9,000 crores today. It has over 200 major software companies (including Infosys Technologies, Wipro, IBM and Hewlett Packard, Tata Consultancy Services, and Cognizant Technologies), four private IT parks and three governmental IT parks.
Pune could be a potential target given that terror networks have developed deep roots in Maharashtra. In the past few months, Maharashtra has seen terrorism-related events in towns such as Nagpur, Nashik, Aurangabad, Beed, Malegaon, and Kolhapur. The increased vigilance exercised by the Maharashtra police and its Anti Terrorism Squad (ATS) led to the arrest of the alleged western India based LeT commander, Faisal Seikh on July 27, 2006. He went to Pakistan in 2004 and 2005 for weapons training and has also been accused of having links with the ISI operative, Azam Chima. Security agencies are now publicly acknowledging the presence of "sleeper cells" in Maharashtra and estimate that as many as 200 youths in the state are undergoing training to carry out terrorist activities. In addition, an LeT spokesmen has declared that at least a dozen Muslim youths from Maharashtra are active in the LeT terror network.
Reports also suggest that a number of terrorists are operating in Pune with the support of local SIMI activists. On March 11, 2001, police arrested Sajid Sundke, the Pune unit chief of SIMI, and four of his associates for suspected involvement in the communal riots in Ganj Peth and Ghorpade Peth areas of the city. SIMI has been accused of playing a key role in several incidents of violence in the country, including the October 2005 bomb blasts in Delhi. This organization, which was formed at Aligarh on April 25, 1977, now has a strong base in Maharashtra (Aurangabad, Malegaon, Jalgaon, Thane and Pune districts), Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and Assam. It has some 400 full-time members and 20,000 ordinary members. SIMI activists became good targets for the LeT's recruitment campaign in the 1990s. An official report has indicated that the organisation has established links with terrorist outfits and is supporting militancy in J&K and other places.
Pune was indeed a target of terrorists' plans as revealed by the arrest of Sohail Shaikh on July 25, 2006 in connection with the 7/11 Mumbai blasts. He is reported to be a resident of Bhimpura near Pune Camp, was trained in explosives at a terror module in Pakistan in 2003 and had close links with Pakistan's ISI. The presence of LeT in the city was established when three youths were arrested from Pune Cantonment and Kondhwa areas in June 2002 in connection with the 1993 Mulund Blasts. There are reports that key LeT operatives are living in the city and are establishing terror modules in the state. A resident of Pulwama district of Jammu and Kashmir, Mujaheed Geelani is suspected to be the key operative in the recent 7/11 Mumbai blasts. He surrendered to Pune police on July 27. It was revealed that he was in Pune on the day of the blast and went underground thereafter. Intelligence sources further claim that both Sohail and Geelani are suspected to have provided 'transit' to people with suspect backgrounds in the past.
Given the above, it would not be surprising if a terrorist strike were to occur in Pune in the foreseeable future.
Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Terrorism
Terrorism & Internal Security
IDSA COMMENT
President Rahmonov's Visit to India
Ramakant Dwivedi
August 17, 2006
Tajik President Emomali Sharifovich Rahmonov visited New Delhi during August 6-10, 2006 on a State visit at the invitation of Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh. The visit was preceded by the meeting of the bilateral Inter-Governmental Commission (July 31- August 1, 2006) and India-Tajikistan joint working group (JWG) meeting on counter-terrorism (August 3-4, 2006), both held in New Delhi.
Tajik President Emomali Sharifovich Rahmonov visited New Delhi during August 6-10, 2006 on a State visit at the invitation of Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh. The visit was preceded by the meeting of the bilateral Inter-Governmental Commission (July 31- August 1, 2006) and India-Tajikistan joint working group (JWG) meeting on counter-terrorism (August 3-4, 2006), both held in New Delhi.
Tajikistan's independence in September 1991 led to the expansion and strengthening of bilateral ties between New Delhi and Dushanbe in the political, economic and cultural spheres. Diplomatic relations was established on August 28, 1992. Since then, Tajik President Rahmonov has paid three State visits to India including the visit last week. He had earlier visited India in 1995 and 2001. Then Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee paid a State visit to Dushanbe during November 13-14, 2003. The political dialogue between India and Tajikistan has been regular and mutually beneficial. High-level exchanges have set the tempo to chart out the scope and direction of cooperation and have also laid the foundation for understanding each other's interests and core concerns. Both countries subscribe to common principles of inter-state conduct, peaceful settlement of all differences, and rejection of extremism of all forms as well as the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
India-Tajik cooperation spans many areas such as economic and commercial, cultural, education and technical training in diverse disciplines, information technology, science & technology and agriculture. The two countries have signed as many as 26 agreements/ protocols/MoU so far to promote cooperation in these diverse fields. One of the most important outcomes of President Rahmonov's visit is the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between New Delhi and Dushanbe on cooperation in the energy sector. Energy security is paramount for a developing country like India, which has begun to grow at an accelerated pace. Central Asian Republics could provide a modicum of energy security to India. Tajikistan is the largest producer of hydroelectricity in Central Asia and the third largest in the world after the US and Russia. Currently, it exports hydroelectricity to Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). There is thus huge potential for cooperation in this sector. But in bringing Tajik hydroelectricity to India, the main hurdle is the issue of the route for laying down hi-tension transmission line. If Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India could agree to build a common electricity grid, this could be a win-win situation for expanding regional economic cooperation. In such a case, the issue of laying down transmission lines could be addressed and it could reach India via Afghanistan-Pakistan. However, given the track record of Pakistan in hampering regional economic cooperation and promoting religious extremist forces that pose a serious threat to security and stability both in Central and South Asia, this does not seem to be a feasible option. Therefore, Indo-Tajik cooperation in energy sector could focus upon having Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) both in hydrocarbon and hydroelectricity sectors. Khatlun region in the south of Tajikistan is said to have large deposits of gas still unexplored. Indo-Tajik joint initiatives could help in exploiting the vast opportunities that exist in the region. Russia and Iran are already cooperating with Tajikistan in building and rehabilitating hydropower plants (Sangtuda I & II and Rogun) at Bakhsh and Piyanj rivers. The Indian offer to assist Tajikistan in rehabilitating Vorzob I is a good step in expanding and strengthening cooperation in the energy sector.
Bilateral trade has been much below the potential that exists between the two countries. The third meeting of the Inter-governmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation between India and Tajikistan held in New Delhi focussed on this issue. The meeting, held from July 31-August 1, 2006, discussed the ways and means to exploit the economic potential that exists between the two countries. The inauguration of the Bedil India-Tajikistan Centre for Information Technology, built with Indian assistance, in Dushanbe on July 18, 2006 is a good sign of enhanced engagement of India in the ongoing economic and educational processes in Tajikistan. Tajik entrepreneurs can make use of the considerable experience of Indian industry in areas such as textiles (both cotton and silk), pharmaceuticals and medical equipment, information technology and processing of agricultural products, to name only a few.
The "Tulip Revolution" of March 2004 in Kyrgyzstan, and the "May 12-14, 2005 Events in Andijon" in Uzbekistan have influenced the nature and direction of Central Asian geopolitics. The summit meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) held in Astana on July 5-6, 2005 (India was admitted to the SCO as Observer) also drew attention to these events. Uzbekistan returned to the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), a Russian led regional security alliance, in July 2006; thus giving it more teeth since it is, militarily, the strongest country in the Central Asian region. Tashkent has also joined the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC), which aims at promoting regional economic cooperation. China has been making coordinated moves in enhancing its economic partnership, both at bilateral and multilateral levels, with the Central Asian Republics. The US is trying to gain lost ground after it was forced to leave the Karshi-Khanabad (K-2) military base in Uzbekistan. Tajikistan is a member of all the important security and economic groupings (CSTO, SCO, EEC and others as well.) active in the Central Asian region. Tajikistan thus occupies an important place in the ongoing "Great Game" in the region. It is against this backdrop that enhanced partnership between Delhi and Dushanbe holds significance.
India and Tajikistan together have been playing a positive role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, which has been the breeding ground for international terrorists and religious extremist forces ably supported by their counterparts in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Religious extremist forces like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Movement of Turkistan (IMT) have declared goals to overthrow the secular and constitutionally elected governments of the Central Asian Republics and establish an Islamic Caliphate in the region. The nexus among the Islamic Revival Parties, the Islamic Movement of Turkistan, Jamat-e-Islami of Pakistan, Taliban and al Qaeda is crystal clear. Delhi and Dushanbe have common concerns over threats from religious fundamentalism, terrorism, extremism and cross-border terrorism. Both countries have underlined the need to further strengthen secular and democratic ideas in international relations. In this regard, they are coordinating their efforts through a Joint Working Group (JWG) on Combating International Terrorism. The 2nd meeting of the JWG on Combating International Terrorism took place in New Delhi August 3-4, 2006 and the next meeting is likely to take place in Dushanbe later next year. Both countries emphasise the need for an early conclusion of the Comprehensive Convention on Combating International Terrorism at the United Nations sponsored by India and supported by Tajikistan. The two countries share common values such as secularism, tolerance and strong opposition to the forces of fundamentalism and terrorism. Tajikistan has condemned the recent terrorist attacks in Mumbai and Srinagar. In this regard, the important step is to cut the financial and ideological supply lines of terrorist and extremist forces. Deputy Foreign affairs Minister of Tajikistan, Abdullo Uldoshev said, "Tajikistan and India are facing common threats from terrorists and it would be our efforts to evolve common responses".
Cultural ties constitute an important pillar of the India-Tajikistan relationship. The Indian Cultural Centre in Dushanbe is very active and works closely with many Tajik organizations. It also organises regular Indian film shows, very popular all over Tajikistan. The Cultural Exchange Programme for 2006-2009 signed during the Tajik President's visit would help in further expanding and strengthening cultural exchanges between Delhi and Dushanbe.
In the final analysis, Indo-Tajik cooperation would be an important part of the international coalition against religious extremism and international terrorism. The real threats to Central and South Asian security and stability come from such forces. Tajikistan has been an active supporter of India's constructive initiatives in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Dushanbe has supported the Indian point of view on various regional and global issues and extends full support to India's permanent membership at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and for the resolution of Jammu & Kashmir issue through bilateral talks between New Delhi and Islamabad. Energy, information technology, deepening of bilateral cooperation in the area of small and medium scale business and tourism appear to be candidate areas in Indo-Tajik economic cooperation with high potential for success.
Tajikistan, India-Tajikistan Relations
IDSA COMMENT
The Indo-US Civil Nuclear Co-operation Agreement in the House of Representatives
Rajiv Nayan
August 05, 2006
On July 27, 2006, the US House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed the bill HR 5682 for United States and India Nuclear Co-operation Promotion Act of 2006. This bill was submitted to the House by its International Relations Committee, after modifying the bill HR 4974 which was referred to the House by the US Administration. The House in an "up-or-down vote" passed this bill by a wide margin, with 359 members voting for and 58 opposing it. A number of amendments seen as killers were defeated on the floor of the House.
On July 27, 2006, the US House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed the bill HR 5682 for United States and India Nuclear Co-operation Promotion Act of 2006. This bill was submitted to the House by its International Relations Committee, after modifying the bill HR 4974 which was referred to the House by the US Administration. The House in an "up-or-down vote" passed this bill by a wide margin, with 359 members voting for and 58 opposing it. A number of amendments seen as killers were defeated on the floor of the House. One of these proposed to allow exports of uranium and other nuclear reactor fuel to India only after the president certified that India has stopped producing fissile material for its nuclear weapons. Another wanted a presidential certification that India had stopped producing fissile material during the preceding 365 days to obtain any item under the nuclear co-operation agreement.
The US Congress is passing the bill to implement the joint statement issued on July 18, 2005 by Manmohan Singh and George Bush. Some American analysts testified before the Congress that the US President could have facilitated nuclear commerce even without asking for amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. But the Bush administration argued that there are several advantages in amending the act to supply nuclear technology and materials to India.
The House repeated the pattern of voting on HR 5682 witnessed earlier at the Committee level. After holding five hearings between 2005 and 2006, the International Relations Committee had recommended its report to the House of Representatives. The report saw division among committee members, with 37 voting in favour and five opposing it. A few proposals, regarded as `killer amendments', were defeated by the House Committee as well. In the House as in its committee, the bill was India-specific. Some non-proliferationists opposed any India-specific amendment and instead offered criteria-based changes.
The margin with which the bill was passed shocked its opponents in Washington. The New York Times editorialised that despite the changes made by the Committee in the bill, it is "still a bad deal" allegedly passed with the help of "money sloshing around up there". The non-proliferation lobby, which has been opposing the deal, has generally fallen silent after the bill was passed in the House.
Supporters of the deal naturally appear jubilant. Describing the passage an extra-ordinary event and "the first key step to create the statutory authority," they call it a landmark legislation ending the Cold War paradigm. They have also described the voting as "a non-proliferation victory for the US" and a "tidal shift" that heralds a new era of mutual respect and co-operation.
However, in India, in general, the passage of the bill was welcomed on a subdued note and the enthusiasm witnessed after the July 18, 2005 statement was definitely missing. Although the Indian Ministry of External Affairs welcomed the political consensus for the promotion of multi-dimensional Indo-US relationship, which includes civil nuclear energy co-operation, it still preferred to wait for the final outcome - " the finalized text of the legislation which will emerge after a Senate vote and the reconciliation of the two Bills". The spokesman of the Ministry wanted 'parameters' of the July 18, 2005 joint statement and the Separation Plan to be maintained intact. The Indian Prime Minister by and large echoed the same sentiments and ideas.
This raises the question: what are the provisions of the House bill that have disappointed people in India? The answer is: the oft-mentioned shifting of the goal post. What does it mean in the context of the nuclear deal? It means that the House bill has certain provisions, which mark a departure from the joint statement issued by Manmohan Singh and George Bush in July 2005. Earlier, the Indian Prime Minister and the government had conveyed to the United States that any departure from this joint statement would not be acceptable to India. When the House passed the bill, it defeated some killer amendments. It also removed some Nuclear Supplier Group related provisions for technical reasons, though some killer amendments remained in the text of the bill that was finally passed.
Some of the contentious issues are currently non-binding in nature, but others are. Non-binding provisions such as the Sense of Congress and the Statements of Policy have been continuously figuring in the Indian media and have been the subject of criticisms in the writings of a section of the Indian strategic community. Indian analysts are also frowning upon certain reporting requirements of the President to the US Congress. These provisions were incorporated in the bill to appease the US non-proliferation lobby opposing the nuclear deal. It is clear that Congressmen were aware that if these requirements were made binding, the deal would die immediately. Although non-binding provisions seem innocuous, still in the long-term they may act as irritants.
Many, who otherwise supported the July 18 joint statement, do not see certain binding provisions in the bill positively. Importantly, even the US administration in a policy statement explicitly mentioned section 4 (d) of the bill as an obstacle to Indo-US nuclear co-operation. This part imposes certain restrictions on nuclear transfers to India. The US Administration maintains that Section 4 (d) "would codify political guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) for future supply to India, with the result that the US would be the only NSG country legally bound by these requirements."
Section 4 (b) (2) of the House bill demands a determination from the President that "India and IAEA have concluded an agreement requiring the application of IAEA safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with IAEA standards, principles, and practices (including IAEA Board of Governors Document GOV/1621 (1973) to India's civil nuclear facilities, materials, and programs..." We would thus find a shift in US policy, if this provision were not modified in the final version. The separation plan of the government of India already saw a shift in policy when it agreed to the idea of safeguards in perpetuity. At least that plan had balancing or neutralizing provisions: a) India-specific safeguards in perpetuity, and b) uninterrupted supply of fuel to the safeguarded reactors, c) a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India's reactors, and d) facilitation of supply through a group of friendly supplier countries such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom. It is a well-known fact that a section of the non-proliferation community wanted perpetual safeguards against Indian civil facilities without any backup fuel supply arrangement and strongly opposed the fuel backup assurance given by President Bush after his India visit. It seems that at the Committee hearings even supporters of the deal caved in to the pressure of this section in this regard. More interestingly, when the US Administration expressed concerns over a few provisions of the bill after the House had passed it, it did not refer to the absence of fuel supply backup mechanism to be accompanied with safeguards in perpetuity in the text of the bill.
Yet another controversial provision in the bill is 4 (c) 2 (I) iii, which bans transfer of nuclear fuel that may contribute to the increased production of highly enriched uranium or plutonium in unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. This is generally seen as a shift from the full civil nuclear energy co-operation enunciated in the July 2005 joint statement. Curiously, even the US State Department supports the stand of no transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technology. The US government argues that the US does not transfer reprocessing and enrichment technology to any country.
The Indian political class and the strategic community also appeared unhappy about transforming India's unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing into a legally binding obligation under the bill. Admittedly, the Indian political class currently does not need to test; but no one is sure of the future strategic environment and circumstances. Already the US Administration is putting pressure on Congress to get approval for the bunker buster and reliable replacement warhead programmes. Russia and China may resume nuclear tests afterwards.
Any divergence of course could jeopardize the delicate balance of rights and obligations accepted by both countries in the July 2005 joint statement. Ultimately, it could have an adverse impact on the very objective for which India and the United States walked that extra mile. The Indian establishment would find it rather difficult to accept an arrangement that will increase unnecessary uncertainty about the nuclear business. And the Indian security and strategic communities would resist any attempt to increase insecurity through such new conditions. The solution lies in adding a killer amendment to kill all the deal-breaking provisions in the bills being considered by the US Congress.
India, Nuclear, United States of America (USA)
Nuclear and Arms Control
IDSA COMMENT
Verification and the BTWC
Monalisa Joshi
August 01, 2006
In the post Cold War world, the term Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) emerged as a usable tool. This usage reached a crescendo with the 2002 Iraq disarmament crisis and the alleged existence of WMD in Iraq, which became the primary justification for the 2003 invasion of that country. The fear of WMD proliferation has generated grave concerns, given the increasing number and greater intensity of terrorist activities and their attempts to acquire WMD. Efforts to restrain the development and further spread of WMD have received greater focus in this environment of insecurity.
In the post Cold War world, the term Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) emerged as a usable tool. This usage reached a crescendo with the 2002 Iraq disarmament crisis and the alleged existence of WMD in Iraq, which became the primary justification for the 2003 invasion of that country. The fear of WMD proliferation has generated grave concerns, given the increasing number and greater intensity of terrorist activities and their attempts to acquire WMD. Efforts to restrain the development and further spread of WMD have received greater focus in this environment of insecurity.
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), prohibiting the production and storage of biological toxins and calling for the destruction of biological weapons (one of the three categories of WMD) stocks, was signed in 1972. The basic prohibition of biological weapons is enshrined in Article I of the BTWC. The need to co-operate in the "development and application of scientific discoveries" is the main focus of Article X. Article XII stipulates that any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention should be taken into account while evolving verification measures.
To consider the inextricable link of dual use technology with biological weapons, the BTWC provisions for a Review Conference to be held every five years. These Conferences ensure the evolution of verification measures by strengthening the convention itself in the wake of new threats resulting from scientific and technological developments. Since its inception in 1972, five Review Conferences have been held so far. Unlike the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), BTWC has no organisational set-up to cater for verification and related problems.
The issue of verification was addressed at the First Review Conference held in 1980. This Conference classified terms and specified a consultative procedure. The Declaration of the Conference noted the confidence-building value of voluntary declaration by parties concerning past biological weapons and steps to eliminate such programmes. US accusations of Soviet violation preceded the Second Review Conference held in 1986. Once again verification was the main concern of the conference. The lack of institutional mechanisms for resolving accusations by a state party was the main issue in the Final Declaration of this review conference. Compliance related elements of the regime were extended in the Third Review Conference held in 1991. The final declaration expressed the view "to establish an Ad Hoc Group (AHG) of Governmental Experts open to all states parties to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint."
The AHG was established in 1995 and started work to conclude a verification protocol. But given the complexity of a verification regime it failed to complete its task before the Fourth Review Conference held in 1996. Its efforts to prepare a verification protocol in time for the Fifth Review Conference in November 2001 received a serious blow, when the US rejected the draft protocol text and terminated its mandate. A plenary session of the States Parties to the Fifth Review Conference was reconvened in November 2002 and an agreement for annual meetings, "both of experts and of state parties" in the run up to the Sixth Review Conference to be held in 2006 was concluded.
The BTWC Preparatory Commission Meetings were held at Geneva from April 26 to 28, 2006. These meeting were a run up to the 6th BTWC Review Conference scheduled for the end of this year. A Discussion Paper prepared by Canada and presented at the Preparatory Committee suggested a general recognition that States Parties should focus on the full implementation and continued strengthening of the Convention. The paper put forth a comprehensive approach to this objective in the following areas: accountability framework, focus on national implementation, confidence building measures, implementation support and annual meetings.
There is speculation whether the 6th Review Conference would fulfil the role that has been set for it. At the same time, there is also anxiety, given the earlier memory of the US rejecting the draft protocol text and terminating the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) established to evolve verification measures.
The various Review Conferences of the BTWC held so far have taken into account scientific and technological developments. However, the progress to evolve parallel verification and compliance measures has been dismal, even after thirty years of the Convention. The complexity of these two issues arises from technological difficulties as well as the number and the interests of the parties involved. Any successful conclusion of an agreement pertaining to the verification and compliance mechanisms for biological weapons disarmament will involve the convergence of the interests of various biotechnology research and associated laboratories, the willingness of the scientific and research community to share information and most importantly the commitment of states. The 6th BTWC Review Conference provides another opportunity to member states to resolve differences and evolve a consensual agreement.
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
North America & Strategic Technologies
IDSA COMMENT
Renewed Conflagration in West Asia
Rushda Siddiqui
July 26, 2006
The conflict involving the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) on two of its borders shows all signs of drawing the entire region into a new round of crisis. Though the current conflict may have been set off by years of hostilities between Israel and its regional adversaries, it is not a simple replay of the previous clashes.
The conflict involving the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) on two of its borders shows all signs of drawing the entire region into a new round of crisis. Though the current conflict may have been set off by years of hostilities between Israel and its regional adversaries, it is not a simple replay of the previous clashes. With new governments in place in the three key nodes of the crisis - Israel, Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority - and fighters within the radical Islamist groups, Hamas and Hezbollah, eager to assert their agendas, the region is going through a period of dramatic and radical change.
Technically, the ongoing conflict in the region, involving Israel, Hamas and Hezbollah, is part of Israel's counter-terrorism policy, which aims to wipe out the infrastructure of the terrorist groups and to neutralise all threats to Israel. With this aim, the Israeli government has been stalling all efforts of Hamas to form a government by refusing to negotiate with the elected government, imposing an economic blockade on Palestine, and implementing the policy of targeted killings of the leaders of Hamas and the Hezbollah, among other measures. The current aerial bombings are aimed at destroying the infrastructure of the Hezbollah leadership in Lebanon and creating a buffer zone in the south of Lebanon. Armed skirmishes between the IDF and the military wing of the Hamas and Hezbollah have been on the rise since the election of Ehud Olmert in March 2006, who had threatened to take unilateral steps to set borders for Israel if peacemaking remains frozen. Though Fatah has been trying to get Hamas to give up on its hard line approach towards Israel and work towards averting the humanitarian crisis being caused by the blockade, it failed to stop a confrontation between the armed wing of the Hamas and the IDF. The Hamas-Fatah agreement of June 2006 could never be signed due to the eruption of the conflict plaguing the region now.
As far as the Hezbollah's renewed hostilities with Israel is concerned, it is important to remember that the Hezbollah in Syria and Lebanon is a state and an entity unto itself. The governments are aware of Hezbollah's activities - social, political and military - and its popularity. They are consequently wary of touching them. It is because of the Hezbollah that Israel's counter-terrorism policy is two pronged: one to deal with the military challenge of an armed assault, and the second of fighting a psychological war.
The Hezbollah has had extremely close relations with the Hamas particularly from 2000, and has been trying to teach political and military techniques to Hamas. While there is no direct evidence of co-ordinated attacks, analysts believe that the two kidnappings were part of a larger plan reflecting a trend that began several years ago. Though they have very different ideologies, they have but one common enemy - Israel.
Hezbollah's entry into the fray has been termed as adventurism by the Saudis and other Arab leaders, something that even Sheikh Nasrallah admitted to in his July 16 speech. Hezbollah seems to have calculated that it could take advantage of the Gaza crisis. It is not that it was unaware of the ferocity of an Israeli backlash, but it is this very backlash that has given it immense ground both inside and outside of Lebanon. For the international community today, the disarming the Hezbollah has become a secondary issue compared to limiting the scale of Israeli retaliation. Kofi Annan, in his meeting with Condolezza Rice, while criticising the Hezbollah also sought a halt to the Israeli assaults.
It is also widely believed and advocated by the US and Israel that the governments of Syria and Iran have been funding and providing military and logistic support to Hamas and Hezbollah, despite Damascus and Tehran denying the link and distancing themselves from the current situation. The approach of the West and Israel has been to get the governments of Syria, Palestine and Lebanon to act against the Hamas and the Hezbollah. Israel's current exercise aims to destroy the military capability of the two organisations, and then ask the states concerned to step in with their own troops, something that these governments are averse to doing. Moreover, it is due to the presence of international troops in Lebanon that Hezbollah is supposed to have grown in popularity and strength.
Israel's assault on Lebanon is intended to send a broader message too, at a time when it has largely given up on trying to negotiate for peace and security and is instead trying to establish these on its own. It is being widely argued that interference in another country's sovereign territory in such a blatant manner would cause fledgling democracies, particularly Lebanon's, to fail. This and other reasons are making regional governments press the United Nations or ask the US to step in and staunch the spread of violence.
Significant from the point of view of religious fundamentalists and the governments of the region is the validation of the fundamentalist propaganda, that it is not only Israel but the entire Western world that is hostile to Islam and the Arab population. As Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa said on July 15, "Certain powers have given Israel every capacity to do whatever it wishes," and that this had hit hopes for peace. It is expected that with time it is this very bias of the West that will be encashed by the militant organizations in the region. The governments of the region, though not very supportive of the actions of the Hezbollah or Hamas, are wary of the continued violence as it would swing popular opinion in their own countries in favour of these organizations, which would make it difficult for them to counter or even control their activities.
The armies in Lebanon and Syria, their governments fear, might get drawn into the conflict. On July 22, the Lebanese government warned that it would officially join the war if Syria were attacked. If Iran or Syria get drawn into the conflict by the actions of either Israel or the US, it will become very difficult to stop the rest of the region from getting involved. The state armies, and not just the militia organizations, are likely to get involved. By pressuring the Arabs into taking action, the US and Israel might just be unleashing a major conflict in the region. For the governments to survive, they would need either external support or might just end up backing the militias in the region. With the US allowing the IDF another three-odd weeks to complete its task, and negotiations not making much of headway, instability in the region is expected to rise.
It is a typical catch-22 situation for the governments. If like Iran and Syria they have a strong military, then they become terrorist states, and if like Lebanon they have a weak army, and Israel moves in to "correct" the situation, either the militias get strengthened or Israel ends up occupying the place. Already, by July 23, the IDF has moved into Maroun al-Ras in South Lebanon, and is asking residents of South Lebanon to flee. It is expected to stay there till either international forces or the Lebanese army moves into the area. This move has already displaced and rendered over 800,000 Lebanese citizens homeless. As the humanitarian crisis keeps growing in Lebanon, the hostility towards Israel is growing in the region.
How effective the United Nations' proffered solution or US negotiations would be is also debatable, as both Israel and the Hezbollah are not ready to stop or even halt their actions temporarily. There are three possible inferences to the scenario. The first is the gross failure of the IDF counter-terrorism policy of targeted killing. It is due to the failure of intelligence gathering for targeted killings that entire villages, town and cities are being bombed. Only after 12 days of constant shelling of Lebanon were the Israelis able to capture two Hezbollah activists. The second is the assertion by Olmert that he is an independent leader in his own right, capable of taking his own decisions and leading the country into a protracted war to counter its enemies. Finally, Israel's occupation of parts of southern Lebanon in Arab eyes is tantamount to fulfilling the right wing Israeli rhetoric of 'Eretz Israel' or 'Greater Israel.'
The crisis indicates that it is not the UN or any other international body, but the US that can effectively intervene in the region. The US is the key player and if its biases lie with Israel, it would just make for more violence, no solutions and end in a dead Middle East peace process.
The killing of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, popularly known as the "Tiger of Balochistan" in the early hours of August 27 in an army operation has ominous implications for the restive province. The tribal chief of the largest Baloch tribe, the Bugtis, was a strong proponent of Baloch autonomy, and had said that he had been a Baloch for several centuries, a Muslim for 1400 years but a Pakistani for just over fifty.
The killing of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, popularly known as the "Tiger of Balochistan" in the early hours of August 27 in an army operation has ominous implications for the restive province. The tribal chief of the largest Baloch tribe, the Bugtis, was a strong proponent of Baloch autonomy, and had said that he had been a Baloch for several centuries, a Muslim for 1400 years but a Pakistani for just over fifty. Although a government-sponsored council reportedly attended by the Waderas of all subclans of the Bugti tribe had, on August 17, stripped Nawab Bugti from the leadership of the tribe and had announced an end to the Sardari system, the spontaneous popular reaction to his killing indicates that he had lost neither his aura nor his authority. Over six hundred people are reported to have been arrested. There have been riots in Karachi and Quetta. Violence has been reported from across the length and breadth of the province. A shutter-down and wheel-jam strike was observed on August 28 throughout the province and vehicular traffic had come to a grinding halt. Trains to and from Quetta were cancelled, as the railway authorities were reluctant to ply them without adequate security.
The public school educated octogenarian had played a major role in the politics of Balochistan for over five decades, but was a relatively late convert to the cause of Baloch nationalism. Till his recent falling out with the Pakistani establishment, he had been one of its pillars in the region. A former chief minister, he was the first Baloch in the Pakistani cabinet (he held the home and then the defence portfolios) and was the governor of the province during the last major conflagration in Balochistan in 1973. He was accused of operating private jails and running a feudal justice system in his area. His running feud with Kalpar Waderas, the hereditary head of the Kalpar sub-clans, had led to the forced migration of over 10,000 Kalpars from Dera Bugti. At the time of his killing, he was the leader of Jamhoori Watan Party, with representatives in both the provincial assembly and the parliament. His recent attempts to get all Baloch nationalist parties under one roof, however, did not bear fruit since other Baloch Sardars did not trust him due to his role in 1973.
In 2005, Bugti lands were the scene of pitched battles fought between security forces and the Baloch nationalists. In January 2005, the alleged rape of Dr. Shazia Hasan, an employee of Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL), by an army officer in Sui, had led to violent attacks on the gas complex. Gas supplies were disrupted and it took weeks to restore normalcy. The pitched battles at Sui had jolted the Pakistani economy and the Karachi Stock Exchange ended up losing almost half its net worth. The security forces had then tried to eliminate Nawab Bugti by shelling his ancestral house at Dera Bugti in March 2005. Although 17 shells pierced through his residence, he survived in a hair's breadth. However, the day long shelling claimed 67 lives, including 33 members of the minority Hindu community who inhabited the neighbouring Hindu ghetto, and resulted in injury to over 100 people and severe damage to a number of houses and temples. The Nawab had to flee Dera Bugti early this year and take refuge in the mountains, from where he had been co-ordinating the Baloch resistance.
The killing of Nawab Bugti has been criticised by almost all opposition political parties in Pakistan. What is more surprising is that many top leaders of the ruling party, including two former prime ministers, have termed the incident as unfortunate, while the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), which is a key constituent of the federal government as well as of the Sindh government, has squarely criticised the government action. Widespread criticism of its act has forced the government to refute original reports that the tracking of Bugti's satellite phone had helped the security forces to pinpoint his location, which implied that he was indeed the target. According to the government's latest version, the area was targeted after an Army helicopter overflying the area came under heavy fire from the rebels and the resultant battle led to the caving in of the mud bunker where the Bugti along with his men had taken shelter. The fact that the rebels killed over 20 elite commandos indicates that the former gave the security forces a tough fight before capitulating.
Despite the government's attempts to portray him as an autocratic feudal despot, Sardar Akbar Khan Bugti, on account of the circumstances and the manner of his death, is destined to become a martyred hero for Baloch nationalism like 80-year old Nauroz Khan before him, who had taken on the Pakistani Army in 1958. By killing Bugti, General Musharraf has earned the permanent enmity of the Baloch population. He has probably underestimated Baloch nationalism, which has led the Baloch to confront the Pakisani establishment four times since its creation. A spokesman of the Baloch nationalists said that despite the death of Akbar Bugti, their struggle would continue. In his death, Nawab Bugti has probably provided the fractured Baloch polity a rallying point. Ironically, death may help him achieve what he failed to during his lifetime - the unity of all Baloch nationalist groups.
On August 15, 2006, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement strongly protesting Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's latest visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. Koizumi’s six consecutive visits since he took office in April 2001 have chilled Sino-Japanese relations, making the issue a major stumbling block in the smooth development of relations. The souring of Sino-Japanese relations over the last few years has been a result of the complex enmeshing of two broad issues: history and power shift.
On August 15, 2006, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement strongly protesting Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's latest visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. Koizumi’s six consecutive visits since he took office in April 2001 have chilled Sino-Japanese relations, making the issue a major stumbling block in the smooth development of relations. The souring of Sino-Japanese relations over the last few years has been a result of the complex enmeshing of two broad issues: history and power shift. These have fuelled their competing nationalisms and shaped the present bitter contours of their relationship.
The rise of China is the primary factor creating fears in Japanese minds, for it involves not only the emergence of a new great power in Japan’s neighbourhood, but also a power poised to dominate the region by attracting long-time American allies to its orbit. In fact, as Joseph Nye has rightly pointed out, China in many ways is fast emerging as a soft power that is economically becoming attractive and politically generating a spirit of harmonious co-existence. This is causing the erstwhile allies of Japan and the United States to gradually gravitate towards China’s orbit. The rise of China is thus creating a new balance of power in Asia, and the Japanese are consequently apprehensive of China’s growing military might and rising economic clout.
In response, the Japanese are increasingly defining their state policies on the basis of nationalism and the present Koizumi government is shedding the pacifist approach and pushing Japan towards acquiring a ‘normal’ state status. Japan is today not only strengthening its alliance with Washington, but has also for the first time (in 2005) recognised Taiwan as a common security concern to both itself and the United States. This has indeed alarmed China, since reunification of Taiwan is central to Chinese nationalism. Reunification would remove the stigma of the ‘century of humiliation’ and enable China to once again acquire the great power status it once enjoyed. China’s opposition to Japan’s bid for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is also indicative of the logic of China’s urge to remain the sole great power in the region. In fact, both China and Japan are in the process of redefining their power positions in the international system, and the growth of assertive nationalisms in both countries is partly rooted in this process.
Parallel to this power shift is the vexed issue of ‘history’, which has increasingly come to influence Sino-Japanese relations. Sino-Japanese disagreements have hitherto tended to coincide with an upsurge in Chinese nationalism. Interestingly, while China has relegated its historical animosities with most countries to the backburner and given preference to economics over politics, it regards history as the major issue impinging on political engagement with Japan.
China has a deep sense of history, which flows from its powerful and flourishing civilization till the West ripped it open. Incipient in this notion of history is the Chinese idea of a Sino-centric world order. Till the advent of Western colonialism, China considered itself to be the centre of its civilizational world – the Middle Kingdom, which represented a civilizational state with no definite boundaries and exercised influence over peripheral states that accepted its superior culture and accorded to it the place of the head in the family of nations. In the Chinese sense, the ‘world’ encompassed those areas where Chinese culture spread and was assimilated. China was thus the leader of this Sinic world. This worldview, however, received its first shock during the Opium War of 1842, when the West – with superior military forces, entrepreneurial capabilities and missionary zeal – began to establish its supremacy over China. But the final collapse of the Sino-centric World order came with the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, in which Japan defeated China and took over Taiwan. Chinese animosities towards Japan can be directly traced to this defeat. The war had far reaching implications in the sense that the superior Chinese civilizational state, which had for long treated Japan benevolently as a younger brother within its realm was defeated by the latter, thus fundamentally shattering the Chinese world view. Equally important, the loss of Taiwan to Japan marked an “extraordinary humiliation” for China. Reunification of Taiwan thus became firmly embedded in the Chinese nationalist agenda.
Broadly, the issue of ‘history’ between China and Japan involves three major controversies: history textbooks, apologies and Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni shrine. These controversies are related to Japanese attitudes towards Chinese in the 1930s and 1940s when Japan invaded and occupied more than half of China, and in the process killed more than thirty five million Chinese civilians and military personnel and indulged in rape, looting and arson. The most notorious incident during this occupation was the Nanjing massacre of December 1937, which is estimated to have resulted in the death of 300,000 people. However, the Japanese deny the magnitude of this atrocity.
Rooted in this historical controversy are China’s avowed aspirations of acquiring the leadership role in international politics and recreating the Sino-centric world order, an order in which it would emerge as a superior power vis-à-vis Japan and the US. Thus the Sino-Japanese friction over history has become inextricably linked with the ongoing repositioning of the two countries in the changing global matrix of power. The enmeshing of the two issues – power shift and history – has engendered deep hostility between them, despite the three Joint Communiqués signed by the two governments in 1972, 1978 and 1998.
Also, economic interdependence, which has deepened considerably between the two countries, has failed to curb the deterioration in relations. Over the past thirty-three years, Sino-Japanese trade has grown 160-fold. In 2004, China became Japan's largest trading partner and Japan China's third largest. Reports from China point out that 20 per cent of Japan's overseas companies in terms of numbers are resident in China; 11 per cent of Japan's total output and 10 per cent of total profits are attributed to China. Yet, close economic interdependence has not translated into a close political relationship as underscored by liberal international theory, which claims that deeper economic interdependence creates favourable political ties.
The key to understanding the deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations thus lies in the complex entwining of the issues of history and power shift, which have fanned the flames of suspicion and enmity.
Not many in the security establishment would like to believe so. A state known for its religious diversity and secular fibre, Kerala also has a sensitive communal melange with conflicting interests holding stake over its political and social institutions. To an average security analyst in Delhi, the ominous trends of subversive activities in this farthest nook would not be as apparent as similar events in Aurangabad or Meerut.
Not many in the security establishment would like to believe so. A state known for its religious diversity and secular fibre, Kerala also has a sensitive communal melange with conflicting interests holding stake over its political and social institutions. To an average security analyst in Delhi, the ominous trends of subversive activities in this farthest nook would not be as apparent as similar events in Aurangabad or Meerut. In the past half-a-decade, central intelligence agencies and the Kerala police have been on their feet to check the growing influx of pan-Indian and South Asian terror groups across the state. A chain of sporadic events in the past decade and more has disturbed many secular structures and the law and order situation in Kerala, with serious ramifications for national security. While many such events were directly or indirectly connected with national and global terror trends, Kerala's vast coastline and its proximity to international waters have made it a suitable landing point for extremist elements, after the intensified vigil across the Western coast from Goa to Gujarat. This has forced the Coast Guard and the Indian Navy to step up patrol in this region, especially off the Malabar Coast, where groups involved in smuggling and other nefarious operations are traditionally based. Like similar points off the Western coast, the Malabar coastal belt is reportedly used as a corridor for transiting resources and equipment for extremist groups operating in Kerala and Tamil Nadu.
While the western coastline has always been an active subversive corridor, the recent shift of such traffic through the Kerala coast has vitiated the communal atmosphere in the state, especially after the recent terror attacks in Mumbai and elsewhere. Though Kerala itself has not witnessed any major terror attacks, there are indications that many Pakistan-based terror groups have active modules or linkages with some fundamentalist groups in the state. Inspired by pan-Islamic reactionary movements across the country after the 1992 events, fundamentalist elements in this region have gained a firm footing with more groups emerging in different roles in the past few years. After earlier groups like the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and the Islamic Sevak Sangh (ISS) were banned in the 1990s, they re-emerged in new incarnations and have reportedly established linkages with other pan-Indian extremist groups. With the focus shifting back to SIMI after its alleged role in the recent Mumbai blasts, the Kerala Police have in the past few weeks rounded up suspected SIMI activists, especially from Binanipuram in Malabar, and impounded inflammatory literature, including seditious graffiti, showing linkages with Pakistan-based terrorist groups. Besides, fervent investigations are on to trace the possible linkages of many other organizations in Malappuram and Kozhikode with pan-Islamic extremist elements.
The emergence of Islamic fundamentalist groups in Malabar acquired a serious dimension from the mid-1990s after a series of insidious events. The abduction and murder of reformist scholar Maulavi Abul Hassan Chekannur in July 1993 was the first indication of the strong fundamentalist trend gaining ground in this region. Even after years of investigations involving even the Central Bureau of Investigation, the actual culprits could not be nabbed, causing a severe setback to the reformist movement. The seizure of pipe bombs (nitroglycerine charges in iron tubes) concealed in plastic bags under the Kadalundi Bridge in Malappuram in 1996 gave credence to fears of terror groups gaining roots and possible infiltration by Pakistan's ISI among extremist groups in this region. Also, two Tamil Nadu bomb blast suspects, Imam Ali and Hyder Ali, had reportedly revealed during interrogation about their visits to Malappuram and training people in handling explosives during this period. The recent spurt in fundamentalist violence - including intermittent small-scale explosions in Kozhikode early this year, periodic arms seizures across the state, and the burning of Tamil Nadu transport buses by suspected ISS/PDP activists in retribution to the incarceration of Abdul Nasser Madhani in Salem Jail - are all ominous trends pointing to Kerala turning into an extremist flash point.
The Coimbatore bomb blasts in February 1998, allegedly stage-managed by Tamil Nadu-based Al-Umma, was the first instance of a Kerala terror link being established after investigators arrested Abdul Nasser Madhani for conniving with Al Umma. Madhani, incarcerated since then in Salem Jail, floated the Islamic Sevak Sangh (ISS) in the early 1990s and quickly rose as a fire-brand leader inspiring Muslim youth to resist the Hindutva forces. Though ISS was banned after the post-1992 upheaval, he floated a political party called the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), which aligned with the ruling Left Democratic Front in the recent assembly elections. Despite its political identity and limited activism after his arrest, police and intelligence agencies suspect PDP to be maintaining links with other pan-Islamic extremist groups. The occasional violence by PDP activists in recent months has only compounded the vigil over their activities.
On the other hand, newly-formed groups like the National Democratic Front (NDF) have emerged as stronger alternatives to ISS and SIMI and have allegedly masterminded communal violence in recent years. The Kerala Police believes that this outfit, which masquerades as a human rights movement, is another re-incarnation of the ISS. Though the NDF leadership denies any extremist links, it is reportedly operating under different names to save itself from being banned or tracked down. Many of its activists were arrested or detained in connection with recent country-bomb blasts, like in Meppayyur, and other acts of violence in different parts of the state. SIMI, on the other hand, had been working in the shadows ever since the ban in the 1990s. However, a splinter group of SIMI activists, led by C A M Basheer who hails from Ernakulam, is suspected to be involved in the Mumbai blasts. Basheer, a trained aeronautical engineer, is known to have received training in Pakistan, and was already booked for his alleged role in the 2003 Mumbai blasts. The investigation team is also probing the likely role of three Keralite suspects of the Coimbatore blasts - K P Noohu, Ooma Babu and Shamsudheen. The Mumbai Police believes that Noohu was in touch with Dr. Tanvir Ansari, who was recently arrested in connection with the 7/7 blasts. According to reports, while Babu is lodged in Coimbatore jail, Shamsudheen was recently arrested by Coimbatore police for conspiring to undertake explosions in the town.
Despite incriminating evidence of co-operation between Kerala based groups and major pan-Islamic terrorist organisations, there is general lethargy in the state police machinery and intelligence agencies to crack down on such groups owing to the political patronage they enjoy in Kerala. Many of these groups have openly allied with major political Fronts in recent years, thus stymieing a concrete response to their anti-national activities. Government inaction after the communal violence in Marad and Nadapuram, with culprits involved in these incidents still roaming free, demonstrates their leverage with political dispensations in the state. Despite reports by the Union home ministry of ISI-aided groups operating from Kerala, there is great inaction among concerned agencies to curb this dangerous trend. In recent years, central agencies had unearthed Kerala-based Hawala rackets facilitating the passage of funds from Middle East-based groups to the rest of the country through expatriate networks. However, such events have failed to move either the police machinery or the political establishment, which are seemingly wary of disturbing communal equations through proactive action. While bomb-hauls, seditious graffiti, and the murder of moderates have become common occurrences, the day may not be far when such sporadic eruptions coalesce into a major terrorist event.
Calling upon party members to study the Selected Works of Jiang Zemin (SWJZ) in line with a decision taken by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), President Hu Jintao termed the publication and issue of the SWJZ "a major event in the political life of the party and state." Earlier, an editorial in the People's Daily trumpeted the publication of the SWJZ as "offering a powerful weapon of ideology for China's construction of socialism with Chinese characteristics and increasing the spiritual strength of Chinese people to build a well-off society in an all-round way." S
Calling upon party members to study the Selected Works of Jiang Zemin (SWJZ) in line with a decision taken by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), President Hu Jintao termed the publication and issue of the SWJZ "a major event in the political life of the party and state." Earlier, an editorial in the People's Daily trumpeted the publication of the SWJZ as "offering a powerful weapon of ideology for China's construction of socialism with Chinese characteristics and increasing the spiritual strength of Chinese people to build a well-off society in an all-round way." Significantly, the Liberation Army Daily carried a circular issued by the General Political Department (GPD) that called for the entire People's Liberation Army (PLA) and People's Armed Police (PAP) to study the SWJZ including the theory of the "Three Represents." The circular praised the SWJZ for "recording the historical process of how the third-generation central leadership with Jiang Zemin as the core led the entire party and the people of all ethnic groups throughout the country to press forward the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics."
The decision to compile the SWJZ was made by the CPC Central Committee in November 2003. The three volumes of SWJZ comprise 203 of Jiang's reports, speeches, articles, letters, inscriptions and decrees from August 1980 to September 2004. The books, compiled by the Party Literature Editing Committee and published by the People's Publishing House, elaborate on the important thoughts of the Three Represents. The Three Represents is one of the guiding theories for the CPC together with Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory.
In the reform era, economic growth and the improvement of living standards, rather than revolutionary ideology or democratic procedures, are the main source of the Party's political legitimacy. Jiang Zemin saw in the Party a vehicle of social, economic and cultural progress. This was reflected in his call for the implementation of the Three Represents. The amended Constitution of the People's Republic of China following the 16th Party Congress in 2002 enshrined the Three Represents as one of the ruling theories of China.
The Three Represents state that the CPC must always represent:
The Three Represents had been formulated to ensure that the Party expands its membership to include private entrepreneurs, redefine its societal role, modify its core tenets, and institutionalise its rule. Party conservatives introduced the Three Represents, since sections within the CPC felt that economic reforms had actually weakened the legitimacy of the prevailing socialist ideology by introducing and expanding various forms of private ownership, encouraging income disparities, and, in some cases, causing serious corruption.
According to a People's Daily report, the first volume of the SWJZ comprises 81 articles, starting with Jiang's explanation for the establishment of special economic zones in the southern and eastern provinces at the 15th Session of the fifth National People's Congress in August 1980. The second volume comprises 59 articles during the period September 12, 1997 to February 1, 2000. Jiang's report at the 15th CPC National Congress on promoting the socialist course with Chinese characteristics is included in this volume. The third volume, including 63 articles, starts with Jiang's speech on the Three Represents made during his inspection in China's Guangdong Province on February 25, 2000. The volume ends with Jiang's speech at an enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission on September 20, 2004, after he resigned as chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission.
Of interest to Sinologists will be Jiang Zemin's interpretation on the development of Marxism in China and his theoretical contribution in the fields of economy, politics, culture and society, as well as foreign affairs, national defence and administration of CPC, the state and army. Being the first technocrat to head the CPC, Jiang's views on China's 'socialist market' economic system, agriculture, reform of state-owned enterprises, and the development of western China will add to existing literature, although it is a moot point whether Jiang's views would be any different from official statements and interpretations.
Apart from the opaqueness that characterises the Chinese political system and the official encomiums in praise of the SWJZ, the publication of the three volumes reflects the inevitable jockeying and posturing in the run up towards the 17th Party Congress to be held in 2007. Though Hu Jintao wears 'three hats' - President of the People's Republic of China (PRC), General Secretary of the CPC and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) - he is yet to demonstrate a comprehensive power base that will enhance his position as the 'core leader' of the 'fourth generation'. When Jiang Zemin was at the helm, he had assiduously cultivated the PLA to be on his side and was often referred to as the 'core leader' of the 'third generation.' The closest titular acceptance Hu has earned from the PLA is that of 'Chairman Hu' with which he has to be satisfied for the moment. The publication of SWJZ also indicates the strength and loyalty quotient of the 'Shanghai faction', which owes its allegiance to Jiang Zemin. The most visible member of the 'Shanghai faction' and representing it at the very highest levels of the Chinese political system is Vice President Zeng Qinghong who also heads the Central Party School - the cradle for future CPC leaders and party policies.
The publication of the SWJZ reveals two aspects. First, the compilation of Jiang Zemin's speeches and official views on important issues is to be seen as communicating regime values to the Party rank and file and to the whole population. Second, the factional competition for securing high positions in the party and state apparatus has begun with an eye on the 17th Party Congress next year. In the highly nuanced politics that prevails in Beijing, the very release of a book might indicate the onset of political challenges that Hu Jintao may have to contend with even as he tries to establish a strong base for himself.
Since the middle of the 20th century, the Arab-Israeli wars have thrown up a number of military lessons. The most spectacular was a textbook pre-emptive counter air strike in 1967 by the Israeli Air Force (IAF), which destroyed or made non-operational the entire Egyptian Air Force. This demonstrated the need for gaining mastery of the air as a prelude to spectacular ground operations. At sea, a Styx missile fired by an Egyptian missile boat on the Israeli destroyer Eliat validated the idea of anti-ship missiles.
Since the middle of the 20th century, the Arab-Israeli wars have thrown up a number of military lessons. The most spectacular was a textbook pre-emptive counter air strike in 1967 by the Israeli Air Force (IAF), which destroyed or made non-operational the entire Egyptian Air Force. This demonstrated the need for gaining mastery of the air as a prelude to spectacular ground operations. At sea, a Styx missile fired by an Egyptian missile boat on the Israeli destroyer Eliat validated the idea of anti-ship missiles.
The 1973 Arab-Israeli War again demonstrated a few new lessons. The first was that a determined attacker can breach an obstacle. The Egyptian Army surprised the token Israeli defenders on the Bar Lev line, proving that no defensive work can stop a committed attacker. Later, in attempts to link up with troops on the canal, Israelis learnt yet another lesson. They charged with only tanks without accompanying mechanised infantry, neglecting to neutralise the anti-tank screen by artillery firepower, and consequently paid a heavy price in tank losses. This war also proved that artillery firepower and combined arms teams must operate together. Thus was sown the seeds of the Merkava tank with the capacity to carry infantry inside the hull. The Egyptians also ushered in the age of surface-to-air missile (SAM) warfare, and learning from the IAF's pre-emptive use of air power in 1967 were successful in downing about 40 Israeli jets in the first two days of the Yom Kippur War.
The next lesson was the demonstration of how to win a war in the fourth dimension, that is, the electromagnetic spectrum. In the 1982 operations in the Bekka Valley the Israelis were successful in destroying Syrian radars and aircraft through innovative tactics of suppression of air defence (SEAD) by using surface-to-air missiles, ground based fire power, electronic warfare, the use of remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) and drones, and command and control of air space by airborne early warning and control aircraft (AWACS). The Israelis came to be recognised as masters in the technology, art and science of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). All subsequent military operations like the US-led invasion of Afghanistan or Iraq as well as targeted killings have been facilitated by creative use of UAVs.
But the character of warfare has since changed. In force-on-force operations or when two militaries engaged in combat, the break up of the organic cohesion was the aim and this has been sought to be achieved through firepower and manoeuvre. Destruction of the enemy and faster information decision and action cycle determined who the victors were. Now, in asymmetric warfare situations, as witnessed in Lebanon, units and subunits do not exist in the classical sense. No military targets in the conventional mode presented themselves. Foolproof countermeasures to prevent individual suicide bombers or the threats posed by non-state actors do not exist.
So far, in high intensity force-on-force conventional wars, the Israeli Armed Forces showed superior performance compared to the militaries of its Arab adversaries. But as events in Afghanistan and Iraq show, insurgents and terrorists can resort to asymmetric warfare. This new generation of warfare has witnessed more casualties being inflicted on organised militaries such as those of the US-led forces in Iraq or troops in Afghanistan by the use of car bombs, improvised explosive devices, infantry and artillery mortars. Urban combat and the imaginative use of built up areas by insurgents have challenged the casualty aversion concept of the military forces of advanced countries. Wars may no longer be short swift and decisive, but protracted and characterised by attrition.
The War in Lebanon
In this test bed of modern military laboratory, the over a month long operations conducted by Israel in southern Lebanon against the Hezbollah have indicated certain trends in the character of war.
The first is that the break up of the cohesion of a diffuse opponent such as the Hezbollah cannot be achieved by conventional or traditional means like firepower. So far, insurgents or non-state actors were using infantry anti-tank or anti-aircraft weapons and light or heavy mortars. This war has shown how non-state actors can improvise the use of rocket and missile artillery. Artillerymen know the difficulties involved in the laborious and technology intensive means of delivering unobserved predicted fire with accuracy. While the accuracy of the Hezbollah's rocket artillery may be suspect, its aim - retaliatory harassing fire over population centres - appears to have been achieved. As regards counter bombardment by the Israelis, shoot and scoot by Hezbollah artillery may have made their retaliatory fire ineffective in some cases. The land thrust by Israelis in southern Lebanon could also be termed as a massive counter bombardment strategy, aimed at destroying the gun positions by physical assault and denying terrain for deployment.
An important lesson that emerges is the much bandied rhetoric of jointmanship. At certain times and places, core competence is more important. The war showed that air power alone cannot assure victory. The Israeli Military Chief Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz is an air force man and it could be said that being an airman he must have appreciated that air power would suffice. But that did not happen. There has been criticism of the over reliance on air power. Having failed to destroy the Hezbollah by air power, a ground offensive was launched. Here, another lesson emerged, which is fundamental to land warfare: more important and rudimentary than jointmanship is the need to understand the employment of armour and infantry. Tanks are not suited for urban combat. The nature of fighting in this conflict was manpower intensive - the real stuff infantry is capable of dealing with. This realisation of the need for boots on the ground came very late. It was no surprise when Maj. Gen. Udi Adam, the northern army commander from an armoured background, was replaced by Maj. Gen. Moshe Kaplinsky of the infantry on 8 August.
The penultimate lesson is the fighting and martial spirits of the belligerents. Anecdotal accounts of the 1960s and 1970s record how Israeli tourists on holiday in the Himalayas had voluntarily rushed back to their country when war had broken out. Today, however, not all Israeli youth looking for spiritual solace in Dharamshala, for instance, would like to return to fight a war they may not consider as vital as the previous ones. On the other hand, the stereotypical image of Arab soldiers consistently being defeated have changed in public perception. After more than fifty years of war in the region, a breed of guerrillas has emerged with mastery over unconventional stratagems and who are difficult to pin down and defeat.
Finally, according to Edward Luttwak's thesis, it is better for a war to finish to the end with clear cut victors and vanquished. Premature cessation of hostilities would not serve the end purpose. This has not happened in Lebanon and a ceasefire is in place since 14 August 2006. The performance of the Hezbollah did not permit this concept to be tested. War may continue by other means in future.
Militaries need to draw relevant lessons from these operations. One lesson is that urbanisation and a high density of population restrict manoeuvre by mechanised forces. Boots on the ground or infantry operations are essential for victory. And these are also manpower intensive.
The second is that workable technology for urban guerrilla combat cannot be denied to insurgents. Missiles and rockets are now their new arsenal. Even greater sophistication in their arsenals should no longer spring a surprise.
Robert Pape, in his research on suicide terrorism, mentions that religion is rarely the root cause of suicide attacks. The main motivation according to him is resistance to foreign occupation. Countries like Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon under foreign occupation would continue to breed insurgents and terrorists. This is the third important lesson.
Pune, the Oxford of the East and the cultural capital of Maharashtra, is known for its educational institutions and manufacturing industries and as a home for retired service personnel. Lately, it has also become the hub for the automobile and IT sectors in western India. At the same time the city has now emerged as a link in the terrorist chain after the recent 7/11 Mumbai blasts.
Pune, the Oxford of the East and the cultural capital of Maharashtra, is known for its educational institutions and manufacturing industries and as a home for retired service personnel. Lately, it has also become the hub for the automobile and IT sectors in western India. At the same time the city has now emerged as a link in the terrorist chain after the recent 7/11 Mumbai blasts. Given that terrorists have turned their attention on the emerging Indian IT sector, there is a possibility that Pune may become the future target of terrorist attacks perpetrated by foreign terrorists worryingly in collusion with local support.
Over the last few years, India has been witnessing the dangerous trend of Pakistan-based terrorists operating in cities across its territory. Terrorist targets are no more limited to only attacks on the security forces and government establishments but have expanded to include strikes against India's economic and strategic assets. This fact was testified to by the busting of a Delhi based Lashker-e-Taiba (LeT) cell, which with the help of the banned Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) had planned to attack the IT centres of India. In fact, on December 25, 2005 there was an attack by the LeT members on the Indian Institute of Science (IISc) at Bangalore, which led to the arrest of the south Indian commander of the LeT, Abdul Rehman. It was found out that the arrested terrorists were also planning to attack the Indian Military Academy (IMA) in Dehradun.
In a seeming continuation of this trend, National Security Advisor M K Narayanan stated on July 29 that there was a serious threat from the LeT to nuclear installations in the country. Security has consequently been strengthened at the Kaiga nuclear power plant in Karnataka, and in the last few days at Kalpakkam as well. All these indicate an expanding terrorist network in the southern part of the country and the targeting of the symbols of 'emerging India' including the IT sector, scientific establishments and sensitive installations like nuclear power plants.
The question that therefore arises is whether Pune could emerge as a future target for terrorist attacks. Pune, among others is fast emerging as a major IT centre, with sprawling software parks being established all over the city as well as in the suburbs. Over the last two years the city has overtaken Mumbai in software exports and over 110 new units were registered for software products and services in 2005-2006. Software exports from Pune have soared from Rs. 5 crores worth in the late 1990s to about Rs. 9,000 crores today. It has over 200 major software companies (including Infosys Technologies, Wipro, IBM and Hewlett Packard, Tata Consultancy Services, and Cognizant Technologies), four private IT parks and three governmental IT parks.
Pune could be a potential target given that terror networks have developed deep roots in Maharashtra. In the past few months, Maharashtra has seen terrorism-related events in towns such as Nagpur, Nashik, Aurangabad, Beed, Malegaon, and Kolhapur. The increased vigilance exercised by the Maharashtra police and its Anti Terrorism Squad (ATS) led to the arrest of the alleged western India based LeT commander, Faisal Seikh on July 27, 2006. He went to Pakistan in 2004 and 2005 for weapons training and has also been accused of having links with the ISI operative, Azam Chima. Security agencies are now publicly acknowledging the presence of "sleeper cells" in Maharashtra and estimate that as many as 200 youths in the state are undergoing training to carry out terrorist activities. In addition, an LeT spokesmen has declared that at least a dozen Muslim youths from Maharashtra are active in the LeT terror network.
Reports also suggest that a number of terrorists are operating in Pune with the support of local SIMI activists. On March 11, 2001, police arrested Sajid Sundke, the Pune unit chief of SIMI, and four of his associates for suspected involvement in the communal riots in Ganj Peth and Ghorpade Peth areas of the city. SIMI has been accused of playing a key role in several incidents of violence in the country, including the October 2005 bomb blasts in Delhi. This organization, which was formed at Aligarh on April 25, 1977, now has a strong base in Maharashtra (Aurangabad, Malegaon, Jalgaon, Thane and Pune districts), Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and Assam. It has some 400 full-time members and 20,000 ordinary members. SIMI activists became good targets for the LeT's recruitment campaign in the 1990s. An official report has indicated that the organisation has established links with terrorist outfits and is supporting militancy in J&K and other places.
Pune was indeed a target of terrorists' plans as revealed by the arrest of Sohail Shaikh on July 25, 2006 in connection with the 7/11 Mumbai blasts. He is reported to be a resident of Bhimpura near Pune Camp, was trained in explosives at a terror module in Pakistan in 2003 and had close links with Pakistan's ISI. The presence of LeT in the city was established when three youths were arrested from Pune Cantonment and Kondhwa areas in June 2002 in connection with the 1993 Mulund Blasts. There are reports that key LeT operatives are living in the city and are establishing terror modules in the state. A resident of Pulwama district of Jammu and Kashmir, Mujaheed Geelani is suspected to be the key operative in the recent 7/11 Mumbai blasts. He surrendered to Pune police on July 27. It was revealed that he was in Pune on the day of the blast and went underground thereafter. Intelligence sources further claim that both Sohail and Geelani are suspected to have provided 'transit' to people with suspect backgrounds in the past.
Given the above, it would not be surprising if a terrorist strike were to occur in Pune in the foreseeable future.
Tajik President Emomali Sharifovich Rahmonov visited New Delhi during August 6-10, 2006 on a State visit at the invitation of Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh. The visit was preceded by the meeting of the bilateral Inter-Governmental Commission (July 31- August 1, 2006) and India-Tajikistan joint working group (JWG) meeting on counter-terrorism (August 3-4, 2006), both held in New Delhi.
Tajik President Emomali Sharifovich Rahmonov visited New Delhi during August 6-10, 2006 on a State visit at the invitation of Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh. The visit was preceded by the meeting of the bilateral Inter-Governmental Commission (July 31- August 1, 2006) and India-Tajikistan joint working group (JWG) meeting on counter-terrorism (August 3-4, 2006), both held in New Delhi.
Tajikistan's independence in September 1991 led to the expansion and strengthening of bilateral ties between New Delhi and Dushanbe in the political, economic and cultural spheres. Diplomatic relations was established on August 28, 1992. Since then, Tajik President Rahmonov has paid three State visits to India including the visit last week. He had earlier visited India in 1995 and 2001. Then Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee paid a State visit to Dushanbe during November 13-14, 2003. The political dialogue between India and Tajikistan has been regular and mutually beneficial. High-level exchanges have set the tempo to chart out the scope and direction of cooperation and have also laid the foundation for understanding each other's interests and core concerns. Both countries subscribe to common principles of inter-state conduct, peaceful settlement of all differences, and rejection of extremism of all forms as well as the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
India-Tajik cooperation spans many areas such as economic and commercial, cultural, education and technical training in diverse disciplines, information technology, science & technology and agriculture. The two countries have signed as many as 26 agreements/ protocols/MoU so far to promote cooperation in these diverse fields. One of the most important outcomes of President Rahmonov's visit is the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between New Delhi and Dushanbe on cooperation in the energy sector. Energy security is paramount for a developing country like India, which has begun to grow at an accelerated pace. Central Asian Republics could provide a modicum of energy security to India. Tajikistan is the largest producer of hydroelectricity in Central Asia and the third largest in the world after the US and Russia. Currently, it exports hydroelectricity to Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). There is thus huge potential for cooperation in this sector. But in bringing Tajik hydroelectricity to India, the main hurdle is the issue of the route for laying down hi-tension transmission line. If Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India could agree to build a common electricity grid, this could be a win-win situation for expanding regional economic cooperation. In such a case, the issue of laying down transmission lines could be addressed and it could reach India via Afghanistan-Pakistan. However, given the track record of Pakistan in hampering regional economic cooperation and promoting religious extremist forces that pose a serious threat to security and stability both in Central and South Asia, this does not seem to be a feasible option. Therefore, Indo-Tajik cooperation in energy sector could focus upon having Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) both in hydrocarbon and hydroelectricity sectors. Khatlun region in the south of Tajikistan is said to have large deposits of gas still unexplored. Indo-Tajik joint initiatives could help in exploiting the vast opportunities that exist in the region. Russia and Iran are already cooperating with Tajikistan in building and rehabilitating hydropower plants (Sangtuda I & II and Rogun) at Bakhsh and Piyanj rivers. The Indian offer to assist Tajikistan in rehabilitating Vorzob I is a good step in expanding and strengthening cooperation in the energy sector.
Bilateral trade has been much below the potential that exists between the two countries. The third meeting of the Inter-governmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation between India and Tajikistan held in New Delhi focussed on this issue. The meeting, held from July 31-August 1, 2006, discussed the ways and means to exploit the economic potential that exists between the two countries. The inauguration of the Bedil India-Tajikistan Centre for Information Technology, built with Indian assistance, in Dushanbe on July 18, 2006 is a good sign of enhanced engagement of India in the ongoing economic and educational processes in Tajikistan. Tajik entrepreneurs can make use of the considerable experience of Indian industry in areas such as textiles (both cotton and silk), pharmaceuticals and medical equipment, information technology and processing of agricultural products, to name only a few.
The "Tulip Revolution" of March 2004 in Kyrgyzstan, and the "May 12-14, 2005 Events in Andijon" in Uzbekistan have influenced the nature and direction of Central Asian geopolitics. The summit meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) held in Astana on July 5-6, 2005 (India was admitted to the SCO as Observer) also drew attention to these events. Uzbekistan returned to the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), a Russian led regional security alliance, in July 2006; thus giving it more teeth since it is, militarily, the strongest country in the Central Asian region. Tashkent has also joined the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC), which aims at promoting regional economic cooperation. China has been making coordinated moves in enhancing its economic partnership, both at bilateral and multilateral levels, with the Central Asian Republics. The US is trying to gain lost ground after it was forced to leave the Karshi-Khanabad (K-2) military base in Uzbekistan. Tajikistan is a member of all the important security and economic groupings (CSTO, SCO, EEC and others as well.) active in the Central Asian region. Tajikistan thus occupies an important place in the ongoing "Great Game" in the region. It is against this backdrop that enhanced partnership between Delhi and Dushanbe holds significance.
India and Tajikistan together have been playing a positive role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, which has been the breeding ground for international terrorists and religious extremist forces ably supported by their counterparts in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Religious extremist forces like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Movement of Turkistan (IMT) have declared goals to overthrow the secular and constitutionally elected governments of the Central Asian Republics and establish an Islamic Caliphate in the region. The nexus among the Islamic Revival Parties, the Islamic Movement of Turkistan, Jamat-e-Islami of Pakistan, Taliban and al Qaeda is crystal clear. Delhi and Dushanbe have common concerns over threats from religious fundamentalism, terrorism, extremism and cross-border terrorism. Both countries have underlined the need to further strengthen secular and democratic ideas in international relations. In this regard, they are coordinating their efforts through a Joint Working Group (JWG) on Combating International Terrorism. The 2nd meeting of the JWG on Combating International Terrorism took place in New Delhi August 3-4, 2006 and the next meeting is likely to take place in Dushanbe later next year. Both countries emphasise the need for an early conclusion of the Comprehensive Convention on Combating International Terrorism at the United Nations sponsored by India and supported by Tajikistan. The two countries share common values such as secularism, tolerance and strong opposition to the forces of fundamentalism and terrorism. Tajikistan has condemned the recent terrorist attacks in Mumbai and Srinagar. In this regard, the important step is to cut the financial and ideological supply lines of terrorist and extremist forces. Deputy Foreign affairs Minister of Tajikistan, Abdullo Uldoshev said, "Tajikistan and India are facing common threats from terrorists and it would be our efforts to evolve common responses".
Cultural ties constitute an important pillar of the India-Tajikistan relationship. The Indian Cultural Centre in Dushanbe is very active and works closely with many Tajik organizations. It also organises regular Indian film shows, very popular all over Tajikistan. The Cultural Exchange Programme for 2006-2009 signed during the Tajik President's visit would help in further expanding and strengthening cultural exchanges between Delhi and Dushanbe.
In the final analysis, Indo-Tajik cooperation would be an important part of the international coalition against religious extremism and international terrorism. The real threats to Central and South Asian security and stability come from such forces. Tajikistan has been an active supporter of India's constructive initiatives in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Dushanbe has supported the Indian point of view on various regional and global issues and extends full support to India's permanent membership at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and for the resolution of Jammu & Kashmir issue through bilateral talks between New Delhi and Islamabad. Energy, information technology, deepening of bilateral cooperation in the area of small and medium scale business and tourism appear to be candidate areas in Indo-Tajik economic cooperation with high potential for success.
On July 27, 2006, the US House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed the bill HR 5682 for United States and India Nuclear Co-operation Promotion Act of 2006. This bill was submitted to the House by its International Relations Committee, after modifying the bill HR 4974 which was referred to the House by the US Administration. The House in an "up-or-down vote" passed this bill by a wide margin, with 359 members voting for and 58 opposing it. A number of amendments seen as killers were defeated on the floor of the House.
On July 27, 2006, the US House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed the bill HR 5682 for United States and India Nuclear Co-operation Promotion Act of 2006. This bill was submitted to the House by its International Relations Committee, after modifying the bill HR 4974 which was referred to the House by the US Administration. The House in an "up-or-down vote" passed this bill by a wide margin, with 359 members voting for and 58 opposing it. A number of amendments seen as killers were defeated on the floor of the House. One of these proposed to allow exports of uranium and other nuclear reactor fuel to India only after the president certified that India has stopped producing fissile material for its nuclear weapons. Another wanted a presidential certification that India had stopped producing fissile material during the preceding 365 days to obtain any item under the nuclear co-operation agreement.
The US Congress is passing the bill to implement the joint statement issued on July 18, 2005 by Manmohan Singh and George Bush. Some American analysts testified before the Congress that the US President could have facilitated nuclear commerce even without asking for amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. But the Bush administration argued that there are several advantages in amending the act to supply nuclear technology and materials to India.
The House repeated the pattern of voting on HR 5682 witnessed earlier at the Committee level. After holding five hearings between 2005 and 2006, the International Relations Committee had recommended its report to the House of Representatives. The report saw division among committee members, with 37 voting in favour and five opposing it. A few proposals, regarded as `killer amendments', were defeated by the House Committee as well. In the House as in its committee, the bill was India-specific. Some non-proliferationists opposed any India-specific amendment and instead offered criteria-based changes.
The margin with which the bill was passed shocked its opponents in Washington. The New York Times editorialised that despite the changes made by the Committee in the bill, it is "still a bad deal" allegedly passed with the help of "money sloshing around up there". The non-proliferation lobby, which has been opposing the deal, has generally fallen silent after the bill was passed in the House.
Supporters of the deal naturally appear jubilant. Describing the passage an extra-ordinary event and "the first key step to create the statutory authority," they call it a landmark legislation ending the Cold War paradigm. They have also described the voting as "a non-proliferation victory for the US" and a "tidal shift" that heralds a new era of mutual respect and co-operation.
However, in India, in general, the passage of the bill was welcomed on a subdued note and the enthusiasm witnessed after the July 18, 2005 statement was definitely missing. Although the Indian Ministry of External Affairs welcomed the political consensus for the promotion of multi-dimensional Indo-US relationship, which includes civil nuclear energy co-operation, it still preferred to wait for the final outcome - " the finalized text of the legislation which will emerge after a Senate vote and the reconciliation of the two Bills". The spokesman of the Ministry wanted 'parameters' of the July 18, 2005 joint statement and the Separation Plan to be maintained intact. The Indian Prime Minister by and large echoed the same sentiments and ideas.
This raises the question: what are the provisions of the House bill that have disappointed people in India? The answer is: the oft-mentioned shifting of the goal post. What does it mean in the context of the nuclear deal? It means that the House bill has certain provisions, which mark a departure from the joint statement issued by Manmohan Singh and George Bush in July 2005. Earlier, the Indian Prime Minister and the government had conveyed to the United States that any departure from this joint statement would not be acceptable to India. When the House passed the bill, it defeated some killer amendments. It also removed some Nuclear Supplier Group related provisions for technical reasons, though some killer amendments remained in the text of the bill that was finally passed.
Some of the contentious issues are currently non-binding in nature, but others are. Non-binding provisions such as the Sense of Congress and the Statements of Policy have been continuously figuring in the Indian media and have been the subject of criticisms in the writings of a section of the Indian strategic community. Indian analysts are also frowning upon certain reporting requirements of the President to the US Congress. These provisions were incorporated in the bill to appease the US non-proliferation lobby opposing the nuclear deal. It is clear that Congressmen were aware that if these requirements were made binding, the deal would die immediately. Although non-binding provisions seem innocuous, still in the long-term they may act as irritants.
Many, who otherwise supported the July 18 joint statement, do not see certain binding provisions in the bill positively. Importantly, even the US administration in a policy statement explicitly mentioned section 4 (d) of the bill as an obstacle to Indo-US nuclear co-operation. This part imposes certain restrictions on nuclear transfers to India. The US Administration maintains that Section 4 (d) "would codify political guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) for future supply to India, with the result that the US would be the only NSG country legally bound by these requirements."
Section 4 (b) (2) of the House bill demands a determination from the President that "India and IAEA have concluded an agreement requiring the application of IAEA safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with IAEA standards, principles, and practices (including IAEA Board of Governors Document GOV/1621 (1973) to India's civil nuclear facilities, materials, and programs..." We would thus find a shift in US policy, if this provision were not modified in the final version. The separation plan of the government of India already saw a shift in policy when it agreed to the idea of safeguards in perpetuity. At least that plan had balancing or neutralizing provisions: a) India-specific safeguards in perpetuity, and b) uninterrupted supply of fuel to the safeguarded reactors, c) a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India's reactors, and d) facilitation of supply through a group of friendly supplier countries such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom. It is a well-known fact that a section of the non-proliferation community wanted perpetual safeguards against Indian civil facilities without any backup fuel supply arrangement and strongly opposed the fuel backup assurance given by President Bush after his India visit. It seems that at the Committee hearings even supporters of the deal caved in to the pressure of this section in this regard. More interestingly, when the US Administration expressed concerns over a few provisions of the bill after the House had passed it, it did not refer to the absence of fuel supply backup mechanism to be accompanied with safeguards in perpetuity in the text of the bill.
Yet another controversial provision in the bill is 4 (c) 2 (I) iii, which bans transfer of nuclear fuel that may contribute to the increased production of highly enriched uranium or plutonium in unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. This is generally seen as a shift from the full civil nuclear energy co-operation enunciated in the July 2005 joint statement. Curiously, even the US State Department supports the stand of no transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technology. The US government argues that the US does not transfer reprocessing and enrichment technology to any country.
The Indian political class and the strategic community also appeared unhappy about transforming India's unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing into a legally binding obligation under the bill. Admittedly, the Indian political class currently does not need to test; but no one is sure of the future strategic environment and circumstances. Already the US Administration is putting pressure on Congress to get approval for the bunker buster and reliable replacement warhead programmes. Russia and China may resume nuclear tests afterwards.
Any divergence of course could jeopardize the delicate balance of rights and obligations accepted by both countries in the July 2005 joint statement. Ultimately, it could have an adverse impact on the very objective for which India and the United States walked that extra mile. The Indian establishment would find it rather difficult to accept an arrangement that will increase unnecessary uncertainty about the nuclear business. And the Indian security and strategic communities would resist any attempt to increase insecurity through such new conditions. The solution lies in adding a killer amendment to kill all the deal-breaking provisions in the bills being considered by the US Congress.
In the post Cold War world, the term Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) emerged as a usable tool. This usage reached a crescendo with the 2002 Iraq disarmament crisis and the alleged existence of WMD in Iraq, which became the primary justification for the 2003 invasion of that country. The fear of WMD proliferation has generated grave concerns, given the increasing number and greater intensity of terrorist activities and their attempts to acquire WMD. Efforts to restrain the development and further spread of WMD have received greater focus in this environment of insecurity.
In the post Cold War world, the term Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) emerged as a usable tool. This usage reached a crescendo with the 2002 Iraq disarmament crisis and the alleged existence of WMD in Iraq, which became the primary justification for the 2003 invasion of that country. The fear of WMD proliferation has generated grave concerns, given the increasing number and greater intensity of terrorist activities and their attempts to acquire WMD. Efforts to restrain the development and further spread of WMD have received greater focus in this environment of insecurity.
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), prohibiting the production and storage of biological toxins and calling for the destruction of biological weapons (one of the three categories of WMD) stocks, was signed in 1972. The basic prohibition of biological weapons is enshrined in Article I of the BTWC. The need to co-operate in the "development and application of scientific discoveries" is the main focus of Article X. Article XII stipulates that any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention should be taken into account while evolving verification measures.
To consider the inextricable link of dual use technology with biological weapons, the BTWC provisions for a Review Conference to be held every five years. These Conferences ensure the evolution of verification measures by strengthening the convention itself in the wake of new threats resulting from scientific and technological developments. Since its inception in 1972, five Review Conferences have been held so far. Unlike the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), BTWC has no organisational set-up to cater for verification and related problems.
The issue of verification was addressed at the First Review Conference held in 1980. This Conference classified terms and specified a consultative procedure. The Declaration of the Conference noted the confidence-building value of voluntary declaration by parties concerning past biological weapons and steps to eliminate such programmes. US accusations of Soviet violation preceded the Second Review Conference held in 1986. Once again verification was the main concern of the conference. The lack of institutional mechanisms for resolving accusations by a state party was the main issue in the Final Declaration of this review conference. Compliance related elements of the regime were extended in the Third Review Conference held in 1991. The final declaration expressed the view "to establish an Ad Hoc Group (AHG) of Governmental Experts open to all states parties to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint."
The AHG was established in 1995 and started work to conclude a verification protocol. But given the complexity of a verification regime it failed to complete its task before the Fourth Review Conference held in 1996. Its efforts to prepare a verification protocol in time for the Fifth Review Conference in November 2001 received a serious blow, when the US rejected the draft protocol text and terminated its mandate. A plenary session of the States Parties to the Fifth Review Conference was reconvened in November 2002 and an agreement for annual meetings, "both of experts and of state parties" in the run up to the Sixth Review Conference to be held in 2006 was concluded.
The BTWC Preparatory Commission Meetings were held at Geneva from April 26 to 28, 2006. These meeting were a run up to the 6th BTWC Review Conference scheduled for the end of this year. A Discussion Paper prepared by Canada and presented at the Preparatory Committee suggested a general recognition that States Parties should focus on the full implementation and continued strengthening of the Convention. The paper put forth a comprehensive approach to this objective in the following areas: accountability framework, focus on national implementation, confidence building measures, implementation support and annual meetings.
There is speculation whether the 6th Review Conference would fulfil the role that has been set for it. At the same time, there is also anxiety, given the earlier memory of the US rejecting the draft protocol text and terminating the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) established to evolve verification measures.
The various Review Conferences of the BTWC held so far have taken into account scientific and technological developments. However, the progress to evolve parallel verification and compliance measures has been dismal, even after thirty years of the Convention. The complexity of these two issues arises from technological difficulties as well as the number and the interests of the parties involved. Any successful conclusion of an agreement pertaining to the verification and compliance mechanisms for biological weapons disarmament will involve the convergence of the interests of various biotechnology research and associated laboratories, the willingness of the scientific and research community to share information and most importantly the commitment of states. The 6th BTWC Review Conference provides another opportunity to member states to resolve differences and evolve a consensual agreement.
The conflict involving the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) on two of its borders shows all signs of drawing the entire region into a new round of crisis. Though the current conflict may have been set off by years of hostilities between Israel and its regional adversaries, it is not a simple replay of the previous clashes.
The conflict involving the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) on two of its borders shows all signs of drawing the entire region into a new round of crisis. Though the current conflict may have been set off by years of hostilities between Israel and its regional adversaries, it is not a simple replay of the previous clashes. With new governments in place in the three key nodes of the crisis - Israel, Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority - and fighters within the radical Islamist groups, Hamas and Hezbollah, eager to assert their agendas, the region is going through a period of dramatic and radical change.
Technically, the ongoing conflict in the region, involving Israel, Hamas and Hezbollah, is part of Israel's counter-terrorism policy, which aims to wipe out the infrastructure of the terrorist groups and to neutralise all threats to Israel. With this aim, the Israeli government has been stalling all efforts of Hamas to form a government by refusing to negotiate with the elected government, imposing an economic blockade on Palestine, and implementing the policy of targeted killings of the leaders of Hamas and the Hezbollah, among other measures. The current aerial bombings are aimed at destroying the infrastructure of the Hezbollah leadership in Lebanon and creating a buffer zone in the south of Lebanon. Armed skirmishes between the IDF and the military wing of the Hamas and Hezbollah have been on the rise since the election of Ehud Olmert in March 2006, who had threatened to take unilateral steps to set borders for Israel if peacemaking remains frozen. Though Fatah has been trying to get Hamas to give up on its hard line approach towards Israel and work towards averting the humanitarian crisis being caused by the blockade, it failed to stop a confrontation between the armed wing of the Hamas and the IDF. The Hamas-Fatah agreement of June 2006 could never be signed due to the eruption of the conflict plaguing the region now.
As far as the Hezbollah's renewed hostilities with Israel is concerned, it is important to remember that the Hezbollah in Syria and Lebanon is a state and an entity unto itself. The governments are aware of Hezbollah's activities - social, political and military - and its popularity. They are consequently wary of touching them. It is because of the Hezbollah that Israel's counter-terrorism policy is two pronged: one to deal with the military challenge of an armed assault, and the second of fighting a psychological war.
The Hezbollah has had extremely close relations with the Hamas particularly from 2000, and has been trying to teach political and military techniques to Hamas. While there is no direct evidence of co-ordinated attacks, analysts believe that the two kidnappings were part of a larger plan reflecting a trend that began several years ago. Though they have very different ideologies, they have but one common enemy - Israel.
Hezbollah's entry into the fray has been termed as adventurism by the Saudis and other Arab leaders, something that even Sheikh Nasrallah admitted to in his July 16 speech. Hezbollah seems to have calculated that it could take advantage of the Gaza crisis. It is not that it was unaware of the ferocity of an Israeli backlash, but it is this very backlash that has given it immense ground both inside and outside of Lebanon. For the international community today, the disarming the Hezbollah has become a secondary issue compared to limiting the scale of Israeli retaliation. Kofi Annan, in his meeting with Condolezza Rice, while criticising the Hezbollah also sought a halt to the Israeli assaults.
It is also widely believed and advocated by the US and Israel that the governments of Syria and Iran have been funding and providing military and logistic support to Hamas and Hezbollah, despite Damascus and Tehran denying the link and distancing themselves from the current situation. The approach of the West and Israel has been to get the governments of Syria, Palestine and Lebanon to act against the Hamas and the Hezbollah. Israel's current exercise aims to destroy the military capability of the two organisations, and then ask the states concerned to step in with their own troops, something that these governments are averse to doing. Moreover, it is due to the presence of international troops in Lebanon that Hezbollah is supposed to have grown in popularity and strength.
Israel's assault on Lebanon is intended to send a broader message too, at a time when it has largely given up on trying to negotiate for peace and security and is instead trying to establish these on its own. It is being widely argued that interference in another country's sovereign territory in such a blatant manner would cause fledgling democracies, particularly Lebanon's, to fail. This and other reasons are making regional governments press the United Nations or ask the US to step in and staunch the spread of violence.
Significant from the point of view of religious fundamentalists and the governments of the region is the validation of the fundamentalist propaganda, that it is not only Israel but the entire Western world that is hostile to Islam and the Arab population. As Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa said on July 15, "Certain powers have given Israel every capacity to do whatever it wishes," and that this had hit hopes for peace. It is expected that with time it is this very bias of the West that will be encashed by the militant organizations in the region. The governments of the region, though not very supportive of the actions of the Hezbollah or Hamas, are wary of the continued violence as it would swing popular opinion in their own countries in favour of these organizations, which would make it difficult for them to counter or even control their activities.
The armies in Lebanon and Syria, their governments fear, might get drawn into the conflict. On July 22, the Lebanese government warned that it would officially join the war if Syria were attacked. If Iran or Syria get drawn into the conflict by the actions of either Israel or the US, it will become very difficult to stop the rest of the region from getting involved. The state armies, and not just the militia organizations, are likely to get involved. By pressuring the Arabs into taking action, the US and Israel might just be unleashing a major conflict in the region. For the governments to survive, they would need either external support or might just end up backing the militias in the region. With the US allowing the IDF another three-odd weeks to complete its task, and negotiations not making much of headway, instability in the region is expected to rise.
It is a typical catch-22 situation for the governments. If like Iran and Syria they have a strong military, then they become terrorist states, and if like Lebanon they have a weak army, and Israel moves in to "correct" the situation, either the militias get strengthened or Israel ends up occupying the place. Already, by July 23, the IDF has moved into Maroun al-Ras in South Lebanon, and is asking residents of South Lebanon to flee. It is expected to stay there till either international forces or the Lebanese army moves into the area. This move has already displaced and rendered over 800,000 Lebanese citizens homeless. As the humanitarian crisis keeps growing in Lebanon, the hostility towards Israel is growing in the region.
How effective the United Nations' proffered solution or US negotiations would be is also debatable, as both Israel and the Hezbollah are not ready to stop or even halt their actions temporarily. There are three possible inferences to the scenario. The first is the gross failure of the IDF counter-terrorism policy of targeted killing. It is due to the failure of intelligence gathering for targeted killings that entire villages, town and cities are being bombed. Only after 12 days of constant shelling of Lebanon were the Israelis able to capture two Hezbollah activists. The second is the assertion by Olmert that he is an independent leader in his own right, capable of taking his own decisions and leading the country into a protracted war to counter its enemies. Finally, Israel's occupation of parts of southern Lebanon in Arab eyes is tantamount to fulfilling the right wing Israeli rhetoric of 'Eretz Israel' or 'Greater Israel.'
The crisis indicates that it is not the UN or any other international body, but the US that can effectively intervene in the region. The US is the key player and if its biases lie with Israel, it would just make for more violence, no solutions and end in a dead Middle East peace process.
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