It may have seemed ironic that Russia, the erstwhile archenemy of western military alliance was hosting, in St Petersburg earlier this year, the summit meeting of G-8, the epitome of western riches and power. But it was truly reflective of the spirit of our times. For India, which was invited along with China and some others as outreach countries, it was an opportunity to share the big stage. A closer look at the dynamics in evidence at the G-8 would suggest that the world strategic landscape is constantly evolving and it would be useful for us to reflect on where exactly are we headed.

With the demise of cold war, we are moving towards multi-polarity even though USA might prolong its unipolar reign somewhat. But how many poles exactly would the emergent world order stabilize with? We are in an extremely dynamic world where an increasing number of countries and regional groupings are capable of seriously impacting on the global affairs. Where do we draw the line? USA and China are obviously two most powerful countries today. European Union, despite its lack of homogeneity and contradictions after the entry of central and eastern European states is a fairly dominant entity particularly if one were to look at its economic leverages. Japan, being the second largest economy, has an obvious place on the high table. Russia's resurgence under President Putin with rising oil revenues already stands confirmed and the west which was seen rushing into writing its obituary just a few years back may have to face some degree of embarrassment on that front. World has also begun to take notice of India because of its sustained high growth rates and leadership role in the human resources area particularly in the IT and other high technology sectors. Is that all: six big powers; six poles? But, do we leave out Brazil, which is the largest country in the South American continent. What about the Arab and the Moslem world, which is even clamouring for a permanent seat in the expanded Security Council? And, are we to remain permanently dismissive towards Africa? South Africa, which along with India and Brazil has already made the South-South cooperation a reality both in political and economic arena, definitely wants to be counted in. To assign a finite number to power centres in the world of tomorrow appears irrational and an attempt to fit the present day complex realities into an anachronistic framework.

Truth is that the classical balance of power theories of the last two centuries appear too simplistic and can no longer adequately explain the current dynamism in inter- state relations. Problem lies in our mindset. We are always seeking to interpret the future trends in terms of frameworks known to us - on the basis of our past experience. We generally relate the balance of power to the cold war context and also the manner in which opposing groups of countries were ranged against each other in the 19th and pre-war 20th century. Cold war was characterized by division of the world into two hostile camps led by USA and Soviet Union competing for ideological supremacy and dominance. The fact that a large number of countries including India were subscribing to the non-aligned movement in rejection of this division did not really disturb that balance since these countries did not enjoy much military significance in the scheme of things. Rising German power had also led to creation of some kind of balance of power in the early twentieth century. However, the first attempt at establishing a balance of power in Europe was the Congress of Vienna in 1814 after the Napoleonic wars had devastated the continent. It represented willingness on the part of major powers to develop an 'equilibrium of forces' amongst them in order to dampen competition. There were two opposing camps: liberal camp comprising of England and France; and, conservative camp consisting of Russia, Prussia and Austria. But there was constant collaboration and 'inter-penetration' between the two camps. This arrangement lasted for nearly four decades.

The present day world hardly appears to be comparable to either of the above two models. It rather seems to be a throwback to the eighteenth century Europe, which was characterized by 'unregulated competition' except that we no longer have the luxury of an ever-expanding pie. The world is also far more dispersed today unlike those days when all the power was concentrated in Europe. Today we have a far bigger stage; far too many players. Indeed, our world is beginning to resemble an amorphous, rounded structure where lines of division into distinct competing groups and areas of influence are getting blurred. In that sense we are far more unstructured today as compared to the situation obtaining during the cold war. Are we headed for a truly non-aligned world?

Communication revolution has dramatically transformed our world. As individuals we are no longer restricted to the confines of our geographical frontiers - the whole world is our stage! The resulting phenomenon of globalisation has led to the growth of political liberalism and transfusion of cultures around the world. There has been manifold increase in the volume of international commerce, which is solely driven by the considerations of profits and growth. The mammoth trans-national corporations whose operations straddle different nooks and corners of the globe are mainly concerned with ensuring adequate returns for their shareholders. They cannot have any narrow national loyalties since the ownership patterns are fairly spread out. Commercial considerations have begun to play an increasingly important role in how countries relate to one another. It is, for instance, not uncommon for Heads of States or Governments to take large business delegations with them on their overseas official trips and to make strong sales pitch at the highest levels on issues of pressing concern. Business interests, on the other hand, have also begun to seriously impact on the making of foreign policies of powerful countries. Thus for example, after the nuclear tests by India in May 1998 there was a sharp negative reaction by the American government causing the Indo-US official relations to hit the rock bottom but, thanks to powerful business lobbies in both the countries, these relations were back to normal in less than two years.

There is also increasing spotlight on the issues of governance, human rights and the quality of life of the general public. In these circumstances, states may be unwilling to accept any self-imposed restraints on relations with one another. All these factors have impelled states to increasingly adopt broad based multi-vectoral approaches in managing their relations with others with the sole aim of optimising the benefits of such engagements. Pragmatic considerations rather than ideological predilections are driving the foreign policies of countries. In these circumstances attempt by any country to apply a rigid 'for or against' construct in defining its relationship with others is obviously somewhat anachronistic.

Opportunities for cooperation amongst states have not only risen manifold but there is also evidence of a growing recognition worldwide that cooperation is indeed imperative to effectively deal with emerging non-traditional security threats in diverse areas ranging from terrorism and organized crime to environmental degradation and spread of diseases. Countries could deal with traditional military threats by augmenting their own defence capabilities and in that sense response tactics had to be mainly developed on the basis of national priorities and resources but the new non-conventional threats can not be effectively tackled without concerted collective action globally or at least on a regional basis, as our experience in the current global war against terrorism shows. Al Qaeda operates a global network of terrorist organizations and no nation, howsoever powerful, can deal with it single-handedly. Maritime security issues are also forcing the countries to come together in a manner not seen earlier. Today if we appear better prepared for safeguarding Malacca Straits, that has only been possible due to conviction amongst littoral states as regards the need to strengthen regional and multi-lateral defence cooperation instrumentalities.

Emergence of powerful non-state actors with extensive global networks has completely altered our security scenario and threat perception. Military threats have retreated into the background yielding space to threats from these non-traditional sources. This has quite obviously impacted on the relevance of military power even though there may still be some inveterate hardliners unwilling to accept this changing reality. Henry Kissinger was quite prophetic when he wrote in his famous book titled Diplomacy many years ago that "power has become more diffuse and the issues to which military force is relevant have diminished." It follows from this that there may not be much point in countries equipping their armies with heavy tanks or for that matter in maintaining large infantry manpower when the possibility of conventional wars itself has declined. Scarce and finite resources should rather be channelled into preparing them better to deal with low intensity campaigns being waged all over the world and the threats which virtually all the countries face from terrorists both within and outside.

It would be naive to dismiss the emerging picture as liberal idealism or mere idle talk. We may perhaps still be in the throes of transition - 'the period of gestation' for the emerging world order, but there is pressing need for us to develop a new construct to fully comprehend the evolving landscape and to synchronize our policies with the changing times.

When we look at the scenario in East Asia, there are China and India both of which are rising powers with high-sustained growth rates. There are other big powers - Japan with its large economic power has considerable military potential, and USA which still has a lot of interest in the region. There are bound to be other players as well. The recent nuclear test by North Korea is bound to give rise to lot of anxiety in the region and could unleash an altogether new security dynamics, resulting in possible new military build up which would have destabilizing impact on the region and beyond. Korean test is also yet another example of the failure of the non-proliferation regime and underscores the need to proceed earnestly with the agreed goal of nuclear disarmament, which is complete elimination of Nuclear Weapons. Nothing short of it would be able to provide international community credible security guarantees on the nuclear front.

In keeping with the emerging construct in international relations, as outlined above, India is seeking to develop close relations with each of the major powers in the East Asian region - in a manner that its relationship with one country does not impinge negatively upon its relationship with the others. Thus, for instance, India has been developing closer relations with the US in the recent months as evidenced by the proposed civil nuclear cooperation deal, significance of which extends far beyond the energy cooperation. While this is generally welcome in India, there is also at the same time , a broad agreement that India should not get drawn into any grand strategy that America might have for containing China. There is recognition that India's interest would be best served by developing strategic partnership with both China and US as well as the other major powers, simultaneously, on an equal footing in a mutually non-exclusively manner with self-confidence becoming of a big power.

As far as China is concerned India is seeking to develop a cooperative framework of bilateral relationship. From India's standpoint, however China is most important. By working together in a cooperative framework, both countries can contribute significantly towards creating a better and more conducive environment for growth of trade and investment leading to better quality of life for the people in the region. Other countries would also benefit from the positive synergies. Tensions on the other hand would impact adversely on the fortunes of both India and China as well as other countries of the region. While it is only natural for India and China to have some competition and even rivalry but care would need to be taken by both of them to ensure that that does not degenerate into conflict and confrontation. India on its part has taken necessary steps to normalize relations with China through initiatives to develop trade, investment and people-to-people linkages, despite unresolved border dispute, which has led to a huge bilateral trade turnover expected to cross US $ 20 billion mark shortly. Incidentally, India has also suggested the same approach to Pakistan, its other neighbour, which requires removing the spotlight from the tricky issues and focusing rather on confidence building exercise through extensive people-to people linkages. But, Pakistan continues to harp on the necessity for a solution of Kashmir before moving forward with normalization of relations with India in any meaningful and sincere manner. That 'all or nothing' approach is hardly practical. India has also shown sensitivity to Chinese concerns on critical issues of Taiwan and Tibet. China on its part also needs to show accommodation to Indian sensitivities in our neighbourhood and to play a supportive role for realization of India's legitimate aspirations to join UNSC as a permanent member. It is important that both countries do everything necessary to build greater trust and cooperation for the sake of prosperity and development in the East Asia region.

The North Korean act of conducting an underground nuclear test has exposed the inherent limitations of various international institutions. It has also posed a challenge for the US as to how to make China behave as a responsible 'stakeholder' in international politics. If Beijing could not restrain Kim Jong-Il's regime from flagrantly conducting a nuclear test in disregard of the combined opposition of the international community, Pyongyang has created a complex political atmosphere, which needs China to deliver considerably to bring the current crisis to an end.

No doubt, North Korea still has more surprises in store for the international community. It already has indicated that it might go for more nuclear tests and Pyongyang has rejected the idea of coming to terms with UN Security Council resolution of October 14, 2006. No matter how scientifically successful the North Korean nuclear test was or whether Pyongyang is capable of mating the weapon with delivery systems, the neighbouring territories in northeast Asia fall well within the range of its already successfully tested missiles. Pyongyang also poses as a dangerous source of nuclear and missile proliferation.

North Korea clandestinely pursued a nuclear weapons programme for many decades. Despite being a member of the NPT since 1985 and a signatory to the IAEA's fullscope safeguards, which allowed for international inspections to detect diversion of nuclear efforts towards military purposes, North Korea could not be tamed in time. Its withdrawal from the NPT and actual conduct of a nuclear test has exposed the inherent weaknesses of the NPT in the face of non-proliferation challenges. The North Korean defiance occurred when the international community was still grappling with the mystery related to the Pakistan based A.Q. Khan proliferation network, which facilitated the illicit nuclear weapon programmes of NPT members like Libya, Iran, and North Korea.

The next immediate worry is whether Iran will follow North Korea and make the NPT implode? In reality, the mishandling of the North Korean case is likely to stiffen Tehran's posture. At the same time, Iran would be carefully watching the unfolding events over North Korea. And unlike in the case of the already isolated North Korean regime, Iran's economic stakes are closely linked with many, including EU countries, Japan, Russia and China.

In the case of North Korea, China holds the largest share of Pyongyang's external trade in terms of both imports and exports, including food and fuel supply. Yet, according to a recent study, China would suffer the least, in comparison with South Korea and Japan, in terms of the direct economic impact of the international fallout of an already impoverished Pyongyang's nuclear test. The instability in the Korean peninsula may well result in capital flight mainly from South Korea and Japan, though this can be effectively regulated. The study, conducted by a Senior Fellow at the Institute for International Economics in July 2006, had rightly pointed out that a North Korean test would likely have a negative, though non-catastrophic, economic impact on the region. Even after two weeks of the October 9 test, no significant adverse impact is visible in the region.

The security implications, however, are immense for North Korea's neighbours, particularly South Korea and Japan. They might review their policy of 'reliance' on the US nuclear security umbrella or being to ponder over an alternative military 'self-reliance' route in the coming years. If Japan opts for developing its own nuclear weapons and delivery systems, it would be the last nail in the coffin of NPT. The US could hardly afford to allow this to happen.

China has shown scant regard in the past for its own NPT commitments though it now gives importance to the NPT regime for political, military and nuclear trade gains flowing from the treaty related international arrangements. China would do its best to join hands with the United States for its own security interest to stop any country in northeast Asia going nuclear, especially Japan.

But how would China handle the North Korean brinkmanship to prevent the deterioration of regional security or a possible arms race in the future? It is difficult to find a readymade reply. China may opt to play cautiously so as not to outrage its worthy strategic partner, Pyongyang, for otherwise the latter could provoke further instability in the Asian security realm.

Till now China has attempted to create nuclear and missile armed regional actors against the wishes of the US to keep it perpetually engaged in strategic adjustments with China. Also, by arming North Korea and Pakistan, China kept its potential regional challengers, Japan and India, contained. Particularly, China has long maintained the status quo in North Korea in the hope of using it as a bargaining chip for its interests in Taiwan. In reality, the Chinese efforts towards denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula have not shown any signs of success so far. China also politically managed not to let North Korea's direct consultations with the US from affecting its leverage over Pyongyang.

Since North Korea has pulled its nuclear trump, little is left for it to hide except unpredictable dictatorial irrationalities. Chinese policy towards Pyongyang has come under international scrutiny, especially its support for the North Korean regime in the past. The international community expects Beijing to play a responsible role and not to let the crisis worsen further. Any miscalculation in matching the expectations of the international community may now cost China dearly in terms of its economic ties and technology trade with Europe and the US, including the approximately US $100 billion worth investments in Iranian oil and gas resources. In addition, Beijing may face difficulties in stopping consequential militarization in the neighbouring countries, including the potential intensification of American military engagement in Taiwan or elsewhere.

China will have to face many risks by delaying to respond to North Korean belligerence. Yet, China will be hesitant to lose a longstanding and dependent ally with which it has cultivated a relationship for over five decades with proven strategic dividends. Beijing is likely to cooperate in implementing the UN Security Council resolution against North Korea, though with controlled moderation.

China and Japan issued a joint communiqué in Beijing on October 8 during the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's first foreign visit, vowing to promote strategic relations between the two countries in the coming years. Both Chinese President Hu Jintao and Japanese Prime Minister Abe hailed the visit as a positive turning point in Sino-Japanese relations. Abe's visit to China is politically important since it is the first meeting between the leaders of the two countries in the past five years. Beijing had earlier refused to hold any summit with the former Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi because of his visits to the Yasukuni War Shrine. In the joint communiqué both countries agreed that improving bilateral relations especially on the economic front including energy, environmental protection and telecommunication sectors are among their most important diplomatic priorities. Though North Korea's nuclear explosion overshadowed the visit, the new phase of Sino-Japanese relations will not only have long-term significance for the region but would also promote energy co-operation in Northeast Asia.

There are two major issues on which Japan and China have squared off against each other in the past and both relate to energy. The first is the issue of China's alleged ongoing gas exploration in Chunxiao gas field in the bordering exclusive economic zones of both countries in the East China Sea. The second is the ongoing competition between the two countries for acquiring Siberian energy resources in Russia's Fareast.

The issue of Chunxiao gas field (Shirakaba gas field in Japanese) exploration in the East China Sea escalated into a dispute between Beijing and Tokyo ever since China unilaterally started natural gas exploration there. Japan fears that China's operations in this gas field could stretch into the Japanese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In early 2005, in response to China's gas exploration, Tokyo decided to grant exploration rights to a Japanese company Teikoku Oil to assert its right over the field. Subsequently, the two countries agreed to settle the issue through bilateral talks. The issue popped up once again when China's state-owned offshore oil company CNOOC started exploration in the field on January 28, 2006, shortly before a bilateral discussion was to be held on the issue. Despite the two governments agreeing to set up a working group of legal experts to work on the demarcation of their respective EEZs, no substantial solution has been worked out yet. Though the Japanese have earlier rejected joint gas explorations, the current joint communiqué might play a role in helping the two sides resume talks to reach some mutually agreeable terms for extraction of hydrocarbon reserves in the field. To many observers, the only pragmatic way to solve the issue is joint exploration given that China is extracting about 81.7 million barrels a day of oil-equivalent, natural gas and oil together.

The second issue concerns competition between the two countries for energy resources in Russia's Siberian region. Apart from their geographical proximity to Eastern Siberia, the huge untapped energy fields there with an estimated reserve of 18.8 billion barrels of oil and about 386 trillion cubic feet of gas, have been a major attraction for Tokyo and Beijing. There were persistent attempts by both Japan and China to woo Moscow to sign energy export contracts. While Beijing was interested in constructing a pipeline carrying about 400,000 barrels of oil (per day) from Angarsk in eastern Siberia to Daqing, the oldest oil field in China, Japan wanted Moscow to opt for a bigger pipeline carrying approximately 1 million barrels of oil (per day) to the Nakhodka Port in the Vladivostok province, from where oil shipments can be transported to Japan overnight.

On May 29, 2003 China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and Russia's Yukos Oil Company signed a deal paving the way for a US $2.5 billion oil pipeline across the border. Under the agreement, CNPC agreed to purchase up to 5.13 billion barrels of Russian oil between 2005 and 2030. Shortly after that, at a July 2003 meeting in Moscow between Japanese and Russian energy officials, the former made a counter offer of $7 billion as initial investment, with a promise to subsequently raise this figure to $15 billion to develop energy fields in Eastern Siberia and to construct a pipeline to Nakhodka port. Since the new offer appeared more lucrative for Moscow, Transneft, a state owned oil company in Russia, backed the Japanese proposal.

Within a few weeks, Russia expropriated Yukos and arrested its chief Mikhail Khodorkovsky on tax evasion charges. Since the expropriation of the company resulted in suspension of many contacts for new projects, Yukos' plans to construct the oil pipeline to China also witnessed a serious setback. Almost a year later, in September 2004, Transneft submitted a feasibility study report to Kremlin for the Nakhodka pipeline construction. With these developments in Russia, it appeared to many observers that the much-discussed trans-Siberian pipeline would be constructed to Nakhodka port and not to China's Daqing. However, a sudden twist in Moscow's energy export plan appeared when the Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Beijing in early 2006 and signed three pacts on energy co-operation with China. Under these, Moscow will not only increase its oil exports but would also supply about 80 billion cubic metres of natural gas per year to China. Although Moscow and Beijing are yet to finalise the details of the pipeline and, most importantly, the price, this new deal seems to indicate Russia's preference for China over Japan. The deal is also expected to give Beijing an important role in energy development in Russia's Fareast.

To Moscow, China offers not only a huge market for its energy output but also an easy supply route. But choosing China as partner in the Siberian energy trade does not mean that Russia would ignore Japan in the long run in its energy trade to Asian markets. There are plans to extend the oil and gas pipelines to Nakhodka port either through Chinese territory or through Russian territory linking the Sakhalin supplies. But developing such networks would require many more years and close co-operation between prospective customers like China and Japan. What Tokyo has lost currently because of the Sino-Russian deal is not only immediate supplies of energy resources from Siberia, but also an upper hand in the production and exploration activities in the region, which would have provided considerable leverage to Japan's energy security activities in the region. Ever since China and Japan found themselves competing for Siberian energy sources, both have time and again tried to woo Moscow with huge financial offers. This had created a certain level of mutual suspicion about each other's lobbying with Moscow. Many observers feared that the China-Japan energy competition might reflect in other issues of bilateral concern such as the Senkaku-Diaoyutai island dispute. However, over the past few years, there has been wide criticism from both sides on the derailing of each other's energy ambitions in Siberia, which has resulted in both countries perceiving each other as rivals in the search for overseas energy.

Often, the Japan-China row over Siberian resources appeared to be more complex for policy makers in Japan as the whole issue largely depended on Moscow's decision about which country its energy exports should reach. While the Siberian energy resources are significant for China in terms of its geographical proximity, for Japan these resources would have made sense in economic terms in combination with its already existing exploration activities in Sakhalin Islands. Moreover, having exploration and developmental rights in the region would have helped Tokyo to gain considerable leverage over other prospective consumers of oil and gas in the region.

Despite the existing competition, there are various factors that necessitate cooperation between Japan and China in the region. First, although Beijing was successful in signing a deal with Russia, it is noticeable that Moscow was more successful in encashing on the China-Japan competition for obtaining higher price for energy exports. Second, Russia's Siberian region is relatively undeveloped compared to other energy fields. Hence, it would require large-scale investments and technological expertise to overcome geographical conditions. Third, given the similarity in China and Japan's energy interests, time is ripe for them to revisit the policy of distancing from each other in important aspects such as energy.

Regional energy cooperation was a hot topic in Japan and China before 2001, with many experts laying plans for a regional energy pipelines network from Russia's Fareast connecting China, Japan and the Koreas. But in the wake of Koizumi's Yasukuni visits, energy co-operation plans showed little progress. This period also saw energy issues escalating into disputes in the East China Sea and the rise of fierce competition over energy resources in the Russian Far East. Hence Abe's recent visit assumes greater importance in resuming top level bilateral relations and also to a certain extent in putting an end to mutual suspicion on issues of economic and territorial importance. According to the People's Daily (October 9, 2006), the visit indicated that the removal of political barriers to Sino-Japanese political relations and the resumption of high-level contact at an early date conform to the fundamental interests of the two countries and the aspirations of their people. An editorial in Japan Times (October 12, 2006) highlighted the point that the recent progress in bilateral relations will serve as a foundation for solving issues such as the disputes over exclusive economic zones with both China and South Korea, including joint development of natural gas resources with China in the East China Sea. It is also important to note that in the 'five-point proposal on developing future bilateral relations' made by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao during his talks with Abe, he suggested that the two countries should strengthen consultation on regional issues, promote regional co-operation in East Asia and contribute to the peace and development of Asia as a whole (Xinhua, October 8, 2006).

Hence, the joint communiqué issued by Japan and China is likely play a pivotal role in not only promoting bilateral relations but also help kick-start a well-developed bilateral co-operation framework to solve existing bilateral energy issues and conduct joint exploration in Eastern Siberia.

The Seventh EU-India Summit will be held on October 13th in Helsinki. The annual summits take place alternately in New Delhi and in the capital of the incumbent European Union presidency - at present held by Finland - under the existing framework of EU-India relationship, which was given the shape of a 'strategic partnership' at the EU-India Summit of 2004 in The Hague. The Joint Action Plan (JAP) adopted at the New Delhi Summit in 2005 was a comprehensive programme of EU-India engagement in the coming years. As the EU-India strategic partnership has started to attract interest in Europe, India and at the international level, it would be pertinent to carry out an overview of this strategic partnership on the eve of the summit.

Before the EU-India strategic partnership came into being, India had been maintaining bilateral strategic partnerships with major European nations like Britain, France and Germany for a few years. Recent events show that major European nations are indeed interested in intensifying their bilateral engagements with India: be it India as the theme of the recently concluded International Book Fair in Frankfurt, the British Strategy Paper for 2015, which earmarks India and China as the focus, or the visit of the Indian Defence Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, to France and Germany in early September 2006. Given this trend of an intensified bilateral relationship with European majors, some pertinent questions need to be posed. Does the EU-India relationship really deserve the attention and toil of the foreign policy makers in India? Is the EU, a 25-member juggernaut which will include two more nations, Bulgaria and Romania, in January 2007, really going somewhere? Moreover as basic notions of a global organisation or a political entity is seen from this part of the world, the most vital question is whether the EU is indeed a power (read militarily) or is it one in the making? The prevailing perception about the above-mentioned questions would be negative as both the referenda in France and in the Netherlands in the summer of 2005 were against a more cohesive EU - in the form of a European Constitution - and the bitter controversy around the EU budget in late 2005. One may describe these negative developments as symptoms of 'Euroschlerosis'.

Developments in the last year and the unresolved issues may also add to the fuzziness of the future of the union. Issues worth mentioning in this context include: the long and prolonged debate on Turkey's membership; German Chancellor Angela Merkel's support to a reference to 'Christianity' in a revised European Constitution; Britain's restriction of access to skilled workers from Romania and Bulgaria, despite the two countries being full members of the EU. The British decision to control migration from those two new members actually emanates from the statistics that the number of immigrants from these new member states has increased more than twenty times in the last year alone. This is a reflection of the anxiety over 'Polish plumbers' which partially contributed towards the rejection of a European Constitution in France last year. Therefore, strategic experts influenced by these cross-purposeful developments, may come to the conclusion that the EU has indeed reached a rudderless situation.

Nevertheless, those who observe the sophistication of the EU's working procedures would be overwhelmed by the daily volume of business completed by the basic EU institutions, namely the European Commission in Brussels, the European Parliament in Strasbourg, Brussels and Luxembourg, and the incumbent EU presidencies. At a more practical level, there is also criticism against the expensive translations of basic EU documents from English to Slovenian or from French to Latvian and travelling allowances for EU officialdom as a burden on the European taxpayers. Differences of vision also prevail amongst the major European political groups who want to see the EU to be developed in accordance with their respective ideological moorings - red, green, Christian or liberal. However, the distinctiveness of the EU lies in the flexibility to arrive at a decision mostly based on consensus amongst its member nations. For observers from other parts of the globe it is undeniably an experience where continuous compromise is achieved amongst 25-plus member nations on a daily basis in almost all aspects of European lives. Therefore, without being aware of the complexities of the EU and its nitty-gritty, sweeping comments and juxtaposing EU with the US, in order to prove the former's non-viability as a military bloc, are only indicative of the observers' unwillingness to get into pain-staking details of the EU and thus superficially following Robert Kagan's hypothesis that the United States is from Mars while Europe is from Venus.

However, as far as India's engagement with the EU is concerned, it has shown willingness to go beyond the 'traditional trajectories' in its foreign policy and thus engage almost all parts of the world. Economic diplomacy has become the major component in this endeavour. As the election manifestos in 2004 of both the major electoral combines in India, the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) and the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA), were unambiguous in giving due importance to the EU, it is obvious that at the political level there exists a consensus in considering the EU as a global power to be reckoned with. Not only there exists political consensus, there is also an increasing interest about the EU among the public and media, which could not be imagined even five years ago. The EU today, with a population of more than 450 million, a strong common currency in the Euro, a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of US $13 trillion (in 2006), economically and technologically competitive production regions throughout the continent and growing irrelevance of national borders, does in fact offer enormous opportunities for Indian trade and industry. On the other hand, the EU has also been observing the economic and technological growth of India and its expanding middle class over the last decade and major European brands are keen to enter the Indian consumer market.

In fact, trade is found to be the main driving force of the present Indo-EU relationship. Indian trade and industry have not only invested in Western Europe but also made their presence felt in Central and East European countries (CEEC), which so far remain unexplored as an investment destination. Indian majors like Kirolskar, TCS, and Dabur have already started their operations in East European nations like Hungary and Romania. However, there are also problem areas in this arena. For instance, the EU has complained about high Indian duties on European wines. For its part, India complains about visa restrictions faced by Indian businessmen and discrimination against Indian professionals in Europe. This issue can be addressed through the mechanism of the proposed Comprehensive Economic Co-operation Agreement (CECA), the signing of which would provide a boost to India-EU ties.

Technological cooperation remains one of the main pillars of the Indo-EU strategic partnership. Be it Indian participation in the EU global navigation system, Galileo, or membership in International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor [ITER] project, both India and EU have been engaging each other with greater vigour. Not only at the EU level, but also individual member nations and European defence industry in the last year have started their businesses in India or have shown willingness to participate in defence co-production. A EU-India Aviation Summit, which follows the Helsinki Summit, would address the new challenges in civilian aircraft technology.

However, the most important and interesting thing would be the outcome of the coming summit in the area of EU-India co-operation to combat terror. As India has been experiencing both home-grown and cross-border terrorist attacks - the latest manifestations being Mumbai and Malegaon - Europe is also facing the scourge. In fact both the two previous EU-India summits were held in the background of terrorist attacks. The EU-India Joint Action Plan of 2005 has therefore resolved to establish contacts between the Indian and EU Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinators. In this regard, it must be mentioned that the EU Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator is a new post that came into existence after the Madrid terrorist attacks on March 11, 2004. Gijs de Vries, the EU Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator, does not have the power or the enormous mandate that his counterparts in other countries have. Therefore in the coming months it would be interesting to observe whether EU member nations take it as a priority to strengthen the institution of EU Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator, which would definitely reinforce European co-operation with other governments in the campaign against terror. It is therefore expected that till the institution of EU Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator gets a full-fledged mandate, India would follow the existing bilateral frameworks with European nations in the form of Joint Working Groups on Terrorism.

In conclusion, it must be reiterated that the EU-India relationship is a rather innovative one in comparison to India's time-tested relationships with major European nations. However, in a short span of time, the EU-India relationship has shown tremendous potential in various areas. Given the multicultural nature of both the EU and India they share common concerns and have already decided to learn from each other's experiences. Similarly, India and the EU are also devoted to multilateral approaches towards current global challenges. It must therefore be remembered that any analysis of the challenges in the EU-India strategic partnership should be undertaken giving due consideration to the complex but dynamic EU integration process, the interlinking of different EU institutions in a specific decision and the daily challenges the EU faces as a unique organisation.