Non-Nuclear Missile: The New US Tool Against Terrorism!
Ajey Lele
June 22, 2006
The 'spirit' of the US global nuclear policies can be easily described in two words - 'nuclear ambiguity'. From NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) to CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), and from START I/II to the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty, the US has mostly taken a selfish position. Till recently, even as American nuclear ayatollahs were debating various global disarmament measures, the Pentagon was working on concepts like 'usable nukes' and was also projecting a need to undertake nuclear testing for the purposes of weaponisation.
The 'spirit' of the US global nuclear policies can be easily described in two words - 'nuclear ambiguity'. From NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) to CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), and from START I/II to the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty, the US has mostly taken a selfish position. Till recently, even as American nuclear ayatollahs were debating various global disarmament measures, the Pentagon was working on concepts like 'usable nukes' and was also projecting a need to undertake nuclear testing for the purposes of weaponisation.
A recent New York Times report suggests that the Pentagon is pressing Congress to approve the development of a new weapon that would enable the United States to carry out non-nuclear missile strikes against distant targets within an hour. What the Pentagon intends is to deploy a new non-nuclear warhead to be placed atop the submarine-launched Trident II missile. It proposes to use these warheads to attack terrorist camps, enemy missile sites, suspected caches of biological, chemical or nuclear weapons and other potentially urgent threats. The natural conclusion one can arrive at is that in all likelihood these weapons are expected to enhance the US' pre-emptive capabilities.
The Trident II (D-5) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) system was introduced in the US Navy around 1990 as a replacement for Trident I (C-4). The entire conceptualisation of the Trident II programme including research, development and testing was supposed to be the largest and costliest in the history of US strategic ballistic missiles at that point in time. Its basic purpose was to create a state-of-the-art platform for nuclear warheads. Now the Pentagon is proposing that this be used for delivering non-nuclear warheads.
The downside of such a course, as has been argued by many analysts, is that such a strengthening of the US military's conventional capability could actually increase the risk of an accidental nuclear confrontation. Because the US will end up using the same platform for delivering both conventional and nuclear warheads, it is likely to create confusion in the mind of an enemy state. Any indication of a likely attack with the Trident II system could be mistaken for a possible nuclear attack, and the targeted enemy state may even react by using nuclear weapons.
The Pentagon contends that by using these weapons it can avoid overflight over other countries, which raises political concerns about respect for sovereignty. However, the fact remains that SLBM trajectories are determined by the location of the submarine and the target at which it is fired. Given this, it is difficult to understand how the US could avoid its SLBMs overflying the territories of nuclear weapon states like Russia (the largest country in the world) and China (the third largest country in the world) while attacking targets which in all likelihood are likely to lie in the Middle East region. Experts also contend that the US will find it difficult to avoid debris from these SLBMs falling over Russian territory. Thus, the use of non-nuclear Trident missiles against any rogue target could also appear threatening to nuclear weapon states like Russia or China.
The US Navy, for its part, proposes to modify the D-5 missile to make it 'conventional warhead friendly'. It seems to have two different conventional warheads in mind: a standard 'slug' useful in penetrating buried targets and a 'flechette' designed to attack bigger targets on the surface. To compensate for a possible decrease in energy compared to a nuclear weapon, it would also modify the Trident with a manoeuvring capability to increase accuracy.
Reports suggest that the Pentagon expects Congress to grant it authority to build a US$503 million conventional version of the Trident and that it is demanding $127 million for the effort in fiscal year 2007. But it appears that there is considerable concern about the proposal among US congressmen, especially among prominent Democrats.
This new demand for non-nuclear missiles is based on a 2001 Pentagon study titled "Prompt Global Strike". It is reflective of the thinking of the US Strategic Command, which is looking for a new non-nuclear weapon that could respond to a threat in no more than an hour (including the time needed for getting the president's authorisation) and fly thousands of kilometres to deliver its payload with great accuracy.
Even though the Pentagon claims that this system is intended to fight threats from terrorism, it is apparent that it does not envisage attacking any particular terrorist group with it. The Trident II platform essentially came into being during the Cold War period to mainly address concerns of that era. It now appears that the US may like to use it against so-called rogue states like Iran and North Korea.
Long-range ballistic missiles have never been used in combat in the last fifty years. Over the last few days, the US has repeatedly been expressing concerns about a missile test by North Korea, though the latter has the right to undertake such a test or a satellite launch provided it follows certain international protocols like giving prior notification, etc.). But the US itself is proposing to take a major risk by mating non-nuclear warheads with what has hitherto remained primarily a nuclear delivery system. Weapons systems like these will work effectively only if adequate safeguards are worked out to avoid the risk of unintended nuclear confrontation.
Trident, Arms, United States of America (USA)
North America & Strategic Technologies
IDSA COMMENT
After Zarqawi: An Assessment
Anil Kamboj
June 19, 2006
On June 8, Americans woke up to hear the news of the death of Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the leader of the al-Qaeda in Iraq. This was the first good news out of Iraq for Americans since the capture of former President Saddam Hussain in December 2003. The news came at a time when increasing worries about US losses in Iraq had lowered the popularity ratings of President Bush to a record low of 35 per cent. Zarqawi had waged a campaign of suicide bombings and beheadings of hostages in Iraq.
On June 8, Americans woke up to hear the news of the death of Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the leader of the al-Qaeda in Iraq. This was the first good news out of Iraq for Americans since the capture of former President Saddam Hussain in December 2003. The news came at a time when increasing worries about US losses in Iraq had lowered the popularity ratings of President Bush to a record low of 35 per cent. Zarqawi had waged a campaign of suicide bombings and beheadings of hostages in Iraq. He projected his image by periodically releasing video footages of his most gruesome deeds and establishing a rather nebulous link with Osama bin Laden. For its part, the United States tried to project the image that the insurgency in Iraq was the handiwork of a trans-national terrorist network headed by Zarqawi. All of this made the Jordanian a well-known figure.
Zarqawi had led Arab fighters against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Though he went back to Jordan after the Afghan jihad, he subsequently returned to Afghanistan and set up camp at Heart from where he propagated terrorism and renewed contacts with the al-Qaeda. After the US Air Force bombed his Afghan base, he fled to Shakai in South Waziristan in 2001, where he established links with the Taliban commander Nek Muhammad. Zarqawi left Pakistan via Balochistan and Iran, and reached Iraq in 2002. After the insurgency broke out in Iraq, Zarqawi established linkages with most major and minor Sunni groups in order to co-ordinate attacks against the Iraqi government forces and the US-led coalition forces.
He had also recently established linkages with leaders of the Taliban operating in Afghanistan. There is enough circumstantial evidence to suggest that Zarqawi had been co-ordinating attacks inside both Iraq and Afghanistan. Firstly, there has been a sudden rise in co-ordinated attacks on US forces and Afghan government forces in southern Afghanistan by the Taliban on the pattern of attacks by the insurgents in Iraq. Secondly, there has been a sudden increase in suicide bomb and car bomb attacks on US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. And thirdly, there has been a serious effort to create a rift between Western forces and the Afghans, the incident of May 29 being a good example. His goal seems to have been to pin down US forces in both countries.
The killing of Zarqawi is a big set back for the Iraqi insurgent movement. It could degrade the ability of Zarqawi's group to mount suicide and car bomb attacks. Having said that, it is likely that his lieutenants would launch new attacks to assert their organisation's continued presence in the country. Generally, there is a second rung leadership in such organisations that takes over command when a vacuum is created at the helm. But in this case no one has probably been nominated earlier.
The expected person to take over command of the group was Abu al Masri who had come to Iraq in 2002. Instead Abu Hamza al Muhajer has been named as Zarqawi's successor. His name has neither figured in any of the al Qaeda's websites nor in the US list of terrorists with rewards on their heads. This suggests that he is either a lower-profile figure or a more prominent member who has goes by a pseudonym. Information about the new leader has not been mentioned, so as to reflect a new emphasis on secrecy by the group. This has been done deliberately as US forces have launched a series of raids against the al Qaeda in Iraq based on intelligence found in the safe house where Zarqawi was killed. There could also be fear of infiltration within the group.
In case al Muhajer is a lower profile figure, the probability of which is less, then there could be a bloody internecine struggle within the group till he is able to establish his authority. Eliminations of some suspects, who may have leaked out information about Zarqawi to Jordanian and US forces, can be expected in due course of time. Some active Iraqi Sunni fighters, who were fed up of killing people of their own country, may defect from the group. They may turn against foreign jihadis who have given a sectarian orientation to the resistance. This could lead to selective killings of these leaders so to stanch the flow of defectors. The name of the successor suggests that he is not an Iraqi as, al Muhajer means an immigrant. Therefore the group is likely to continue the foreign operations. Zarqawi was the prime mover and encouraged inter-community conflict in Iraq. With his elimination inter-community conflict may wind down, which would be good for the people and the government in Iraq.
The US military in Iraq has claimed that al Masri is indeed al Muhajer and that he has been named as Zarqawi's successor. However, US National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley has asserted that this claim is not yet certain and that more time is needed to confirm such speculation.
Though the various terrorist groups had been operating independently in Iraq, Zarqawi had been co-ordinating their operations. Such co-ordination is likely to suffer till such time his successor establishes complete control over the situation. There is also likely to be lack of coordination between the jihadis in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan.
The manner in which Zarqawi was eliminated suggests that both human intelligence and technical intelligence systems have begun to work successfully in Iraq. The electronic surveillance system, which had been tracking Sheikh Abdel Rahman, spiritual advisor to Zarqawi, led the forces to the Baquba safe house. Jordanian intelligence obtained this information from a mole in the Zarqawi group and passed on the information to US forces. Such an intelligence coup could result in infighting within the al Qaeda in Iraq, as surviving leaders would begin to suspect one another and fear for their lives.
Due to the shutting down of some sources of terror financing, the al Qaeda is facing financial problems. The al-Qaeda number two, Aymen al Zawahri, had asked Zarqawi, the fund raising icon, to raise funds through his worldwide fund raising campaigns and to send money. Zarqawi's death is bound to be a setback for these efforts and the group may face a financial crunch.
President Bush's popularity rating dropped to about 35 per cent and the country was badly split in its views on the War in Iraq. Due to the elimination of Zarqawi, President Bush and the Republicans may benefit politically in the November mid-term elections for Congress. His secret visit to Iraq on June 13 sought to cash in on the wave of publicity surrounding the killing of Zarqawi, and boost his crumbling political support.
For Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki, the killing of Zarqawi has brought immediate political gains in the form of parliamentary approval of his nominees for the posts of Defence Minister, Interior Minister and National Security Minister.
Zarqawi's death is not the end of al Qaeda operations in Iraq, but the manner of his death gives hope that it might mark the beginning of its end.
Al Qaeda, Afghanistan, Iraq
South Asia
IDSA COMMENT
Nobel Laureates Pitch In Against the Indo-US Nuclear Deal
A. Vinod Kumar
June 19, 2006
As the Indo-US nuclear deal prepares to enter the US Congress for the final debate after a seemingly successful round of technical talks in New Delhi this month, critics of the deal in Washington have consolidated their efforts to place last-minute hindrances against its safe passage. The latest in the list of naysayers is a group of Nobel laureates, who assembled under the banner of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) in Washington on June 14 to release an open letter cautioning members of the Congress about the consequences of the nuclear deal to US non-proliferation efforts.
As the Indo-US nuclear deal prepares to enter the US Congress for the final debate after a seemingly successful round of technical talks in New Delhi this month, critics of the deal in Washington have consolidated their efforts to place last-minute hindrances against its safe passage. The latest in the list of naysayers is a group of Nobel laureates, who assembled under the banner of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) in Washington on June 14 to release an open letter cautioning members of the Congress about the consequences of the nuclear deal to US non-proliferation efforts.
The letter, signed by 37 Nobel laureates, demands that the pact not be approved in its current form, contending that it would "weaken the existing non-proliferation regime without providing an acceptable substitute." Arguing that bilateral and ad hoc agreements would undercut US and world security, the group gives a clarion call for a new international framework to replace the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Though the non-proliferation lobby has often discoursed on amendments needed in the existing NPT-based non-proliferation regime, this letter has gone a step ahead in endorsing the long-held notion that the NPT is obsolete. However, neither the group nor their backers have expanded on the prospective nature and structure of such a new framework. Instead, they make a submission that "new agreements must preserve the many strengths of the current treaty and increase international participation." Interestingly, despite their opposition to the deal, the group favours developing stronger ties with India.
While advocating the potentials of nuclear energy to meet global energy needs, the group argues that a rapid growth of civilian nuclear power would increase the availability of fissile materials and fuel production facilities worldwide, thereby increasing the scope for building more nuclear weapons. The laureates, therefore, appeal for international efforts to design new proliferation controls with the participation of India and other powers. The most significant remark in the letter is but a subtle aside on unrealised nuclear disarmament goals - a point often ignored by non-proliferation ayatollahs in recent debates. The laureates call upon the nuclear weapon powers to "renounce the legitimacy of nuclear weapons and reduce their number to levels far below the requirements of existing agreements."
The composition of the Nobel laureates' group itself is unique, considering that it is packed with people of eminence revered for their contributions to medicine, economics and chemistry, though accompanied by a handful of physicists. As an Indian commentator rightly pointed out, in the complex politics of non-proliferation in Washington, expertise in one area need not be necessarily credible in another. With such credibility of expertise in question, it should be assumed that this campaign might not get significant weightage in the Congressional debate, and at best would serve the purpose of a devil's advocate at a time when the debate over the deal has shifted to process-related issues. Nonetheless, the timing of the letter demonstrates the desperate attempts by the non-proliferation lobby to pool its energies to influence the US Congress when negotiations on the nuclear deal have reached a critical stage.
In this context, the FAS meeting also became a forum for some known non-proliferation ayatollahs, including Leonard Weiss and Michael Krepon, to sharpen their attacks against the deal. Expressing concerns that the possible creation of a nuclear fuel bank would reduce the incentive for India to continue its moratorium on nuclear testing, Krepon gave an evidently prejudiced warning that India has the 'willpower' to break the global moratorium on testing. At a time when even the Bush administration had endorsed India's commitment to its unilateral moratorium and attributed such issues to future security contexts, the concerted efforts by this lobby to invoke the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into the legislation is an attempt to introduce a clear spoiler. Many in Washington have already questioned any moral right Congressmen would have to raise the CTBT clause when they themselves had refused to ratify the Treaty.
Similarly, both Krepon and Weiss brewed their prosaic concerns on India's commitment to global non-proliferation efforts - a pledge New Delhi has reiterated time and again ever since the deal was announced. Such apprehensions have become commonplace, given that India is yet to fully commit on some counter-proliferation initiatives promoted by Washington. Weiss, on his part, warned that the agreement would encourage Pakistan to obtain a similar deal with China and 'may rev up the use of the Khan network'. However, no such critical remarks followed on the failed US attempts to penalise the protagonists of the clandestine nuclear black market or admonish Pakistan for its role in it. This evokes little surprise, as the non-proliferation lobby is known to be protective of Pakistan while persistently training its guns on the Indian nuclear programme. As an endnote, Weiss even warned of a possible nuclear arms race between India and China!
While the White House might largely ignore this campaign, the meaningful aspect of this event for New Delhi is the statement by Michael Levi at the venue. Some Indian analysts had commended a recent Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) report on the nuclear pact, co-authored by Levi and Charles Ferguson, as being supportive of the deal. Levi used this opportunity to clarify that the CFR report, released earlier this month, was not an endorsement of the nuclear pact, but that it only accepted some diplomatic realities. "This is far from a perfect deal," Levi said, adding that he expected President Bush to toe a harder line in his negotiations with India. However, Levi conceded that the agreement is an opportunity for the Congress to address new non-proliferation challenges.
As both the Indian and US governments work through the nitty-gritties of the 123 agreement and prepare for a debate and vote at the full House of Representatives and the Senate, it would be worthwhile to remember that most of these arguments might reverberate in some form or the other in the Congress for which the Bush administration would need credible responses at hand. Since the nuclear agreement could be signed only after the passage of requisite legislations at the Congress, New Delhi also has to prepare itself for a long haul at the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, where more impediments are likely to be in store.
India, India-US Relations, Nuclear, United States of America (USA)
Nuclear and Arms Control
IDSA COMMENT
India and the Draft US FMCT Text
Rajesh Kumar Mishra
June 15, 2006
On May 18, 2006 the United States presented a draft Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) proposal as well as a draft mandate to establish an Ad Hoc Committee at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) plenary. A week-long thematic debate closed at the 65-member CD Plenary on May 22, 2006, during which member states made statements projecting their respective positions on an FMCT in general.
On May 18, 2006 the United States presented a draft Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) proposal as well as a draft mandate to establish an Ad Hoc Committee at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) plenary. A week-long thematic debate closed at the 65-member CD Plenary on May 22, 2006, during which member states made statements projecting their respective positions on an FMCT in general. It has been reported that if the US is willing to engage in discussions on three key issues of disarmament (prevention of an arms race in outer space, negative security assurances and nuclear disarmament), then perhaps other members may be willing to start negotiations on an FMCT. If this is indeed the case, it is an ambitious agenda to make the US compromise upon its determination to pursue its missile defence deployment plan and new nuclear security strategies. Another issue of criticism that has been directed at the US is its failure to ratify the comprehensive test ban treaty.
The draft FMCT text as proposed by the US also fails to appropriately address many vital issues, especially the establishment of a multilateral verification mechanism to ensure compliance. The US is of a loosely stated view that "the primary responsibility of verification would rest with parties using their own national means and methods." In the absence of agreed verification mechanisms, the treaty would remain open to interpretation on issues like confidence building, information sharing or potential dispute resolutions in future.
The US draft envisages that future questions about the proper implementation of the FMCT be taken up by the UN Security Council. In that sense the proposed US draft essentially seems to be P-5 centric and would therefore remain potentially vulnerable to stalemates, as has been the record of Security Council functioning in the last sixty years. Moreover, the exclusive focus on the P-5 is likely to lead to selective treatment being meted out to other states under the influence of competing national interests.
While the US draft proposes that the treaty shall enter into force as and when all five permanent members of the UN Security Council deposit their instruments of ratification, the pertinent question that remains is whether the others would agree to negotiate on the US draft in the first place. This is especially so given the known differences of opinion among them on other disarmament matters.
As of now, there is no agreement among the member states of the CD on the scope of FMCT negotiations. In that sense, India still has time to manoeuvre and finesse its position on the issue. But its bottom line should be that any future FMCT should prescribe the same obligations and mechanism for all states in an appropriately verifiable manner. And it has to be mindful of any India-centric measure that may be introduced during the course of the negotiations among the P-5.
While tabling the draft, the US representative at the CD stated that "the production of fissile material for non-explosive purposes, such as naval propulsion, would not be prohibited [and] existing stocks of fissile material also would be unaffected." He also suggested that pending the conclusion of a treaty, "all states should declare publicly and observe a moratorium on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons."
The United States, Russia, France and Britain, after conducting hundreds of explosive device tests and stockpiling tonnes of weapon grade fissile material, have announced that they have stopped further production of the same. Though reports of China having similarly stopped production of fissile material cannot be confirmed, its representative at the CD clearly stated on May 17 that his country is of the view that "future FMCT negotiations should not involve the issue of stockpile." At the same time, it is likely that China may not be averse to a moratorium in an attempt to bring India on board and thus end the latter's ability to accumulate more fissile material.
If the momentum towards such a moratorium were to gain widespread support, India would find itself in a tricky situation, given that its stockpile is currently estimated to be only about one-tenth of China's. It is therefore imperative that New Delhi takes adequate measures to ensure that its requirements for credible minimum deterrence are not compromised.
India, Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), United States of America (USA)
Nuclear and Arms Control
IDSA COMMENT
Building Strategic Roadways in Arunachal Pradesh
Namrata Goswami
June 13, 2006
Travelling in Arunachal Pradesh without having to suffer from poorly developed roads is indeed inconceivable. Existing roads by themselves are of the primitive 'potholed' variety, which is made worse by frequent landslides in the rainy season. This state of affairs not only disconnects the state from the rest of India but also proves hazardous for the Indian security apparatus operating along the country's borders with China.
Travelling in Arunachal Pradesh without having to suffer from poorly developed roads is indeed inconceivable. Existing roads by themselves are of the primitive 'potholed' variety, which is made worse by frequent landslides in the rainy season. This state of affairs not only disconnects the state from the rest of India but also proves hazardous for the Indian security apparatus operating along the country's borders with China. Given the presence of the Chinese military on the other side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), Indian policy makers had hypothesized that it was strategically prudent to keep the roadways infrastructure in Arunachal weak. The rationale behind such a policy was that the inhospitable nature of the terrain would deter the Chinese from furthering their strategy of obtaining easy territorial access into a state in which China claims 90,000 square kilometres (34,750 square miles) of territory.
Upending the above logic, India initiated a policy shift in May 2006 when the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA) cleared the construction of strategic roads in Arunachal. This sudden change in Indian policy towards the border areas also reversed the post-1962 mindset, informed primarily by the military "logic" of keeping Arunachal Pradesh weak, in an infrastructural sense. Indeed, by enabling such an important policy shift, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government has set in place the necessary groundwork for building seven strategic roads, including two inter-basin arteries by the Border Roads Organization (BRO). The importance of this policy shift is reflected in the fact that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was to undertake a visit to Arunachal on June 13 to inaugurate the 410 metre long bridge on Lohit river at Brahmakund near Wakkro as well as to receive first hand information on the proposed strategic roads linkage, but had to postpone his visit due to the onset of the monsoons. Significantly, the seven planned roadways in Arunachal are a part of a larger plan of building nearly twenty roads in states along the LAC. The recently published Arunachal Pradesh Human Development Report 2005 also stressed upon the need to improve road linkages within the state for sound implementation of development policies.
This vital Indian policy shift in Arunachal could be seen as a reaction to the Chinese build-up of roads to Aksai Chin in the western sector and to Tibet in the eastern sector. China's road link to Tibet is along the Arunachal border and consequently enables the easy movement of Chinese goods, services and military hardware to the border areas. China also established vital road links with Nepal in 2005 through the Kodari highway, which connects Lhasa and Kathmandu with a bus service, and with Pakistan through the Karakoram highway. In March 2006, China announced duty free access to Nepali goods into Western China. Indeed, China has successfully converted these strategic roadways into vital economic assets by encouraging rapidly growing border trade with Nepal and Pakistan. The growing Chinese economic presence has resulted in expanding Chinese influence in a region that is uncomfortably close to the Indian strategic borderlands. It is crucial to understand that it is within the Chinese grand strategic matrix to rapidly increase economic ties in the subcontinent, an effort in which Beijing has been largely successful. In that context, the strategic significance of China and Pakistan launching new road linkages between Kashgar in China's north-western province of Xinjiang and Gilgit in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir cannot be lost on Indian policy makers. Both sides have agreed to run bus services between Gilgit and Kasghar on a daily basis and from Sust to Tashgurkan thrice a week from June 15, 2006. China has also pledged US$350 million for the rehabilitation of the Karakoram highway. The rationale provided for the upgrade is that it would enable exporters from western China transport goods with ease to the Gwadar port.
The China-Nepal-Pakistan road linkages notwithstanding, the Indian policy of building strategic road links in its borderlands also reflects the growing confidence of the Indian state. It provides insights into the Indian vision of regional economic integration by improving infrastructural facilities in its border areas, an aspect in which the Chinese are far ahead of India. The current Indian policy refreshingly sets aside Indian insecurities arising on account of the 1962 war with China. Defeat in that conflict and Chinese incursions into Indian territory had made New Delhi sensitive to Chinese troop presence along the border. However, growing Sino-Indian ties in the economic, strategic, cultural, and military spheres have brought about a distinct sense of 'trust' in this historically complicated relationship. India and China have been termed as the rising powers of Asia and a positive engagement between the two is seen as benefiting both sides as well as the Asian region as a whole.
Viewed within the context of the "2006 India-China friendship year", and positive current developments, one can safely predict a period of burgeoning relationship between these two rising Asian economic giants. The first ever Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between Indian Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee and his Chinese counterpart General Cao Gangchuan on May 29, 2006 called for an institutionalization of the official and military exchanges between the two sides. Both sides have also agreed to hold joint military exercises and training, and increase confidence-building measures to resolve complex issues. By setting in a process of regular and sustained dialogue on defence and military affairs, the MoU has the potential to initiate a positive tone for engagement on the border issue, till now perceived as the Achilles' heel in Sino-Indian relations.
Analysed in the backdrop of the MoU, New Delhi's decision to develop roadways in Arunachal is an important move, which sets in motion an evolving Indian strategy of greater engagement with China. It is also indicative of the current policy establishment's ability to chalk out new pathways to enhance the economic progress and infrastructural development of peripheral Indian states. The Arunachal case signifies the beginning of a new strategic vision of well-connected borders. Existential difficulties in border states like Arunachal demand better management of resources and infrastructure for efficient trade and transport. Good infrastructure would not only better connect the people of border areas but also ensure greater security. Well-developed roads in peripheral regions would further India's vision of greater economic engagement with neighbouring states and also increase its influence in the neighbourhood. Most importantly, such initiatives are likely to deepen benefits flowing from the "Look East" policy, which seeks to strengthen India's ties with the economically vibrant Southeast Asian region. India's Northeast can provide the crucial transportation link to Southeast Asia on account of its geographic proximity to the region. A burgeoning economic engagement with Southeast Asia through a well-developed transport infrastructure in the Northeast would result in direct economic benefits for the latter. In sum, vibrant trade corridors could uplift standards of living and entrench a feeling of "human security", so far denied to the people of India's northeast.
Northeast India, Arunachal Pradesh, China
Terrorism & Internal Security
IDSA COMMENT
Will the Joint Doctrine Result in Synergy on the Ground?
A. Vinod Kumar
June 08, 2006
The release of India's first joint doctrine on May 17 marks a major step towards military integration and interoperability among the three services. Intended to complement existing individual service doctrines, the joint doctrine outlines the guiding principles for future joint operations by synergising their operational capabilities. It is common knowledge that in contemporary RMA-oriented warfare, joint operations constitute the key to battlefield dominance and military superiority.
The release of India's first joint doctrine on May 17 marks a major step towards military integration and interoperability among the three services. Intended to complement existing individual service doctrines, the joint doctrine outlines the guiding principles for future joint operations by synergising their operational capabilities. It is common knowledge that in contemporary RMA-oriented warfare, joint operations constitute the key to battlefield dominance and military superiority. As for Indian security planning, jointmanship was long overdue given the disparity in force levels and the operational strain caused by inter-services differences on roles definitions and control over command structures.
From the Joint Planning Committee formed after Independence, followed by the Defence Planning Staff in 1986 and Integrated Defence Staff in 2001 to the formation of the first Unified Command at Andaman and Nicobar islands, the path to jointmanship has been a long one. As the first integrated theatre, the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) was the testing ground for joint planning and integrated operations, culminating in the formulation of the joint doctrine. The new doctrine purportedly exhorts the services on the need for joint planning and resource sharing. However, it is not known whether this document elucidates guidelines on the nature and level of integration to be achieved for joint operations, and how such operations need to be organised and executed. For, joint structures have always been an area of intense debate, with the three services known to have differing perceptions on the character of jointmanship. Thereby, the significance and influence of the joint doctrine on Indian military planning could be speculated upon as the services have their individual doctrines well in place.
After the Indian Air Force (IAF) took the lead in publishing its service doctrine in 1995, the Navy followed suit with a 'book of reference' in 2004, which pronounced its objective of becoming a regionally visible maritime force. Lately, the Indian Army has been working on its "Cold Start" doctrine, which focuses on integrated battle groups, notably with naval and air elements, intended to achieve swift mobilisation and instant offensive operations in a limited conventional theatre. Though it highlights integration as its primary component, ambiguity persists on the nature of air and naval elements in the integrated battle groups. For that matter, the recently held Sanghe Shakthi exercises demonstrated the possibilities of superior dominance by land forces in joint operation scenarios thereby potentially minimising the operational and command roles of the other two wings. While the IAF role might be confined to air support and transportation, the naval element would be minimal in most land-based joint operations unless units of marine commandos (Marcos) are deployed in the integrated battle groups alongside the Army's strike corps.
Taking this into consideration, it is difficult to ascertain how far the joint doctrine, devised by the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), would influence a credible military integration process on the ground. Besides the IDS, the ANC and the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) are the only other visible military entities with a joint character. Amidst the clamour for creating more 'joint structures' across the spectrum, it should be noted that the ANC, which validated its raison d'être by achieving rhythm in interoperability among the services, was not sufficiently used as a model platform for raising new joint structures. The ANC has been successful in evolving a set of functional joint procedures and has helped mutual appreciation of different procedures and ethos among the three services. Yet, its mandate is largely confined to the defence of the A&N islands, the security of the eastern approaches of the Indian Ocean and protecting the Exclusive Economic Zone in that periphery. Though carrying out planning and strategic operations in specific contingencies falls within its designated tasks, the failure to nominate the ANC as the nucleus for all such eventualities denotes the undercurrents hindering comprehensive military integration. Similarly, though the ANC could cover strategic and tactical operations in the Eastern Seaboard, the actual role of effecting sea control in this zone rests with the Eastern Naval Command, thus providing immense scope for turf disputes.
Total military integration and application of the joint doctrine could apparently work only after pivotal structural-level issues including defining joint operation scenarios and military objectives are dealt with. While the 'Cold Start' doctrine fits into the Pakistan theatre, future joint operational planning has to go beyond individual case-to-case modelling and should encompass roles ranging from counter-insurgency to counter-proliferation as well as peacetime operations. For the joint doctrine to hold relevance and to ensure that future operations do not become avenues for conflicts over operational space and roles, well-defined joint structures need to be evolved involving a credible synergy, if not parity, among the services. Significant in this context is the notion that complete military integration might be unachievable in the absence of an overarching entity like the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) who could act as the single point command of all integrated planning and operations. Realistic integration would inevitability depend on a hierarchy which has to be methodically structured with equitable participation of the primary actors involved.
Similarly, if the 11th Parliament Standing Committee Report on Defence is to be believed, the Indian military suffers from serious equipment shortfalls, which would prove detrimental to its military preparedness. Functioning of joint structures would be feeble in the event of equipment deficits as the applicability of joint warfare strongly depends on technological edge or asymmetry. Thereby, the country's defence technological proficiency and access to cutting-edge weaponry would have to be evenly accounted for in any joint operations planning. In the long run, it is not just joint structures but all-round military capabilities, including manpower, equipment and technology, which have to be augmented for tangible jointmanship to take shape.
Jointmanship
Military Affairs
IDSA COMMENT
The EU Ban on the LTTE
Alok Rashmi Mukhopadhyay
June 06, 2006
The European Union finally decided to add the LTTE to its list of terrorist organisations on May 29. The Tigers would have seen the ban coming, when on May 17 the European Parliament (EP) adopted a resolution on the situation in Sri Lanka, in which it strongly condemned the LTTE attacks on a Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) vessel a week earlier. The decision was in fact expected for some time, given that the EU had decided to deny official receptions to LTTE delegations earlier on September 26, 2005.
The European Union finally decided to add the LTTE to its list of terrorist organisations on May 29. The Tigers would have seen the ban coming, when on May 17 the European Parliament (EP) adopted a resolution on the situation in Sri Lanka, in which it strongly condemned the LTTE attacks on a Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) vessel a week earlier. The decision was in fact expected for some time, given that the EU had decided to deny official receptions to LTTE delegations earlier on September 26, 2005. The EU went ahead with its decision to term the LTTE a terrorist organisation in spite of the latter's warning that Brussels' prohibition would lead it to go to war. The LTTE had in fact staged protest demonstrations in Nordic capitals against the impending ban.
Though it is still early days to assess the implications of the EU ban on the LTTE, it is useful to consider the eventual consequences of the prohibition order in the twenty five member nations of the bloc. In fact, some European nations had actually been monitoring the activities of the LTTE on their soil for years. The latest Annual Report (2005) of the German internal intelligence agency, the Federal Office for the Protection of Constitution (BfV), has estimated the total strength of the Tigers in Germany at about 800. The maximum strength of the LTTE in Germany is concentrated in one federal state, North Rhine-Westphalia. According to the state security agency of North Rhine-Westphalia, organisations like the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO) and the Tamil Co-ordination Committee (TCC) collect funds for the Tigers by organising various cultural and social events around the year. In its Annual Report for 2005, the North Rhine-Westphalian state security agency has noted that without continuous financial support from abroad, the LTTE would not be able to achieve its goal and keep its military apparatus intact in Sri Lanka.
At the same time, the LTTE's continuing activities among the Tamil diaspora in non-EU European nations, like Norway and Switzerland, have also been a matter of concern. The TRO opened its first foreign office in Switzerland in 1985, even before it did so in London. In Norway, LTTE front organisations have remained major fund providers. It is estimated that given the 10,000-strong Tamil population in Norway, the LTTE has been able to raise US$5 million a year. Moreover, through various companies and business concerns set up in other European countries, the LTTE's leadership in Europe has been sending considerable amounts of money to Sri Lanka. Apart from forcible collection of funds from the diaspora, another matter of concern has been the LTTE's intimidation of Tamil leaders who do not toe its line.
Against this background, it needs to be seen what form EU restrictions are likely to assume. The declaration of the incumbent Austrian presidency specifies three measures: (i) freezing of funds and economic resources of specified persons and entities; (ii) banning the provision of direct and indirect funds; (iii) police and judicial co-operation amongst the member states. These measures are in tune with the European Council's Common Position and Regulation on specific measures to combat terrorism (adopted on December 27, 2001). Importantly, the Regulation is applicable within the EU territory and airspace; to the aircraft and vessels of any member state; and to any national of EU member states elsewhere. Certainly, the EU prohibition would not only restrict the public activities of known LTTE leaders, fund raisers and sympathisers in Europe but also strongly affect the movements of LTTE delegations wishing to visit any EU member nation. Attachment of LTTE assets and funds may not be so substantive as a measure at this juncture, however, because it is very likely that the LTTE, apprehending a ban, has already diverted its resources towards 'safe' and untraceable destinations.
Nevertheless some complications in this prohibition, which may make its implementation problematic, would arise due to the complex and overlapping European governance and political structures. For instance, Norway and Iceland are not members of the EU, though they are members of the common visa system, Schengen. Earlier instances suggest that known terrorists and criminals, who are well aware of the loopholes and privileges under divergent national and European laws, have exploited these. It would therefore be an arduous task for EU and non-EU European nations to co-ordinate their approach in this particular matter. The fact that such co-ordination would prove rather difficult is exemplified by a recent incident in which a Hamas minister obtained a Schengen visa from Sweden and subsequently used it to travel to Germany. Two important legal tools like the European Arrest Warrant and the European Evidence Warrant, which are aimed at better coordination in the area of police and judicial cooperation, may be agreed to at the level of the European Union, though these are likely to face obstacles from time to time from national judiciaries and law-enforcement agencies. Moreover, the sensitivity of member states in the area of Justice and Home Affairs is also likely to pose hindrances on and off for effective prohibition.
At present due to its prohibition and marginalisation at the international level, the LTTE is bound to lose its advantages in terms of overt fund collection, the movement of its leadership and the ability to influence the international media and opinion. Such an increasingly restricted international space would in turn make the LTTE display its earnestness for the peace process. The EU is expected to continuously monitor the situation in Sri Lanka and remain focused not only on the LTTE but also on the break-way faction of Colonel Karuna as well as the Sri Lankan government.
As per the provision in the European Council's Common Position Paper on Terrorism, a half-yearly revision needs to be done to keep any organisation on its list of terrorist organisations. Given that the onus predominantly lies on the LTTE to demonstrate its commitment to the drawn-out peace process, tighter vigil and prohibition on its activities, need to be strictly exercised.
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), European Union
Nuclear and Arms Control
IDSA COMMENT
The Bhutto-Sharif Charter of Democracy
Smruti S. Pattanaik
May 29, 2006
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif signed the Charter of Democracy in London on May 15. This is a politically significant step as it signals the coming together of two important parties that together gained 36.5 per cent of the popular vote and hold 72 seats in the current 342 member National Assembly of Pakistan. All political parties including the MMA have welcomed the Charter. The military government, however, has been critical of the alliance and said in a statement that this is a political gimmick of parties that have failed the people and democracy in Pakistan.
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif signed the Charter of Democracy in London on May 15. This is a politically significant step as it signals the coming together of two important parties that together gained 36.5 per cent of the popular vote and hold 72 seats in the current 342 member National Assembly of Pakistan. All political parties including the MMA have welcomed the Charter. The military government, however, has been critical of the alliance and said in a statement that this is a political gimmick of parties that have failed the people and democracy in Pakistan. Both Bhutto and Sharif have been banned from entering Pakistan and participating in politics. Moreover, the military government had earlier brought about constitutional changes to bar any person from being Prime Minister for more than two terms, which both Bhutto and Sharif have been.
The Charter of Democracy is ambitious in its ambit. Without taking current realities into consideration, it puts forth the proposal that if elected to power an attempt will be made to remove the 'distortion' introduced into the constitution by General Musharraf. The political parties will take steps to abolish the National Security Council and establish a Defence Cabinet Committee. In fact, the 1973 Constitution provides for a Defence Committee of the Cabinet though the latter has hardly been functionalised. Quite ambitiously the Charter also proposes the formation of a committee to 'cut waste and bloat in the armed forces and security agencies'. It also proposes that the defence budget be placed before parliament for approval, something that has not happened in the 59 years of Pakistan's existence. It proposes to bring military land allotment and cantonment jurisdictions into the purview of the Defence Ministry. To cap it all, the political leaders also wish to put nuclear command and control under the Defence Cabinet Committee.
It is important to note here that in the past Pakistan's military has not even allowed civilian Prime Ministers to visit the nuclear research centre at Kahuta, a confession that Benazir Bhutto herself has made. The military has played an important role in Pakistan's foreign policy and defence decision-making and has successfully kept the civilian government out of the loop in decisions pertaining to the military. For most of its political history, Pakistan has been under military rule. Even when it was under brief spells of civilian government, politicians had repeatedly succumbed to military pressure.
In 1971, after the decisive defeat and demoralization of the Pakistan military in the war against India, Zulfiqar Bhutto, wary of the military's penchant for intervening in the country's politics, took the precaution of introducing a constitutional provision that rendered any such intervention a treasonable offence. In addition, Bhutto appointed Zia ul Haq as Army Chief ahead of several more senior officers, thinking that Zia was the least ambitious of the lot. But the subsequent military coup in 1977 underlined the fact that the Army's institutional interests overrode an individual chief's personal ambition. In order to continually retain its prominence in politics, the Pakistan military formulated a troika system in the latter half of the 1980s under which power was shared among the elected Prime Minister, the President, and the Army Chief. Nawaz Sharif made a successful, though short-lived, attempt at restoring the supremacy of the elected government by getting the President's power to dismiss it repealed. This move also provided the Prime Minister the power to appoint the three service chiefs. But Musharraf's 1999 coup overturned this development and reaffirmed the military's central role in politics.
The Charter signed by Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif is yet to be endorsed by the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD). The ARD consists of parties like the PPP, PML (N), Awami National Party, Pakistan Democratic Front and the Jamhoori Watan Party. The other constituent parties of the ARD are of the opinion that the individual party chiefs were not invited for discussion, though the ARD as a conglomerate was invited. Be that as it may, all the political parties have welcomed the Charter as a first step in the fight against the military dictatorship.
The Charter is more an expression of intent of the two most popular political parties whose leaders are in exile and who are barred by existing provisions from holding the office of Prime Ministership again. Musharraf, whose continuation in power appears to depend on his equations with the Corps Commanders as well as his continued relevance to the United States, has given enough indications to suggest that Bhutto and Sharif would not be allowed to come back to Pakistan.
From Ayub's 'basic democracy' to Musharraf's 'sustainable democracy' Pakistan has traversed a long distance in its political evolution as a nation state. It is difficult for real democracy to take root and strengthen itself in Pakistan, given constitutional provisions like Article 58(2b) and the existence of a National Security Council dominated by the military. Yet, the Charter promises significant changes that will establish the primacy of the political parties in governance. Though neither Bhutto nor Sharif have unblemished democratic credentials, the underlying fact remains that in the arena of politics and governance, political parties are the legitimate players, not the General and his military cohorts.
Pakistan Politics, Democracy, Pakistan
South Asia
IDSA COMMENT
Aceh: The Road Ahead
Pankaj K Jha
May 29, 2006
The Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) formally launched its political party on May 23, 2006 at Banda Aceh. It has also appointed two independent candidates for the gubernatorial elections in Aceh, the date for which is likely to be announced after the passage of the Aceh Governing Bill in the Indonesian parliament. The Indonesian government claims that the bill would be passed by the end of May or early June, which would decide the standing of the political party instituted by GAM.
The Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) formally launched its political party on May 23, 2006 at Banda Aceh. It has also appointed two independent candidates for the gubernatorial elections in Aceh, the date for which is likely to be announced after the passage of the Aceh Governing Bill in the Indonesian parliament. The Indonesian government claims that the bill would be passed by the end of May or early June, which would decide the standing of the political party instituted by GAM. The Aceh governing bill was a part of the peace agreement signed between the Indonesian government and GAM in Helsinki in August 2005. The peace agreement envisaged that Aceh be given autonomy in the areas of public affairs, civil and judicial administration, while GAM would drop its demand for independence. The agreement stipulated that parliament must pass the governing law on Aceh to decide about the matters of governance and the division of revenues derived from Aceh's natural resources as well as about the form of the judicial system to be put in place. It also stated that GAM rebels should form a political party within eighteen months so as to be able to contest the legislative elections in 2009. The deadline for the passage of the bill was March 31 and the ensuing elections should have been held in April 2006. But since the Indonesian government has missed the deadlines, the Aceh Monitoring Mission instituted under the peace agreement (comprising of EU and ASEAN monitors) has to extend its stay till September15, 2006.
The handover of arms by GAM rebels and the withdrawal of Indonesian troops from Aceh were concluded by December 2005, which indicates the commitment shown by the two sides for peace. Also, Jakarta facilitated the return of exiled GAM leaders to Aceh, which has contributed to the build up of trust. But the litmus test is the agreement on the extent of self-government and funding for reintegration and employment of former GAM fighters who have formed strongholds in different areas of Aceh. GAM has been insistent that independent candidates be considered eligible to contest in local elections, but the government draft presented in the Indonesian parliament omits any mention of this, implying that only candidates of political parties or coalitions as is the general rule in Indonesia would be allowed to contest. Wide ranging debate on the draft is still going on and the delay is seen as a necessary element to defuse nationalistic fears that the bill would be a precursor to the secession of Aceh from Indonesia. With the announcement about the formation of a political party, GAM has tried to exert pressure on the Indonesian parliament to make necessary amendments to the draft. In order to make its stand clearer, GAM has also decided that it would nominate its independent candidates in the upcoming regional elections and would not form a coalition with other parties. This announcement has put to rest all speculation that GAM might form an alliance with an existing national Muslim party to meet electoral requirements. The country's existing electoral laws require parties in Indonesia to have branches in more than half of Indonesia's 33 provinces to contest elections.
On the other hand, parties like the Indonesia Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P) led by former president Megawati Sukarnoputri claim that the legislative process should not be rushed through because it could prove risky owing to Aceh's volatile history. The PDI-P has also been advocating the division of Aceh into three parts for better governance and protecting the interests of minorities, which has been contested by GAM. Along with the Golkar party (led by Jusuf Kalla, the Indonesian Vice president), the PDI-P is also against the retroactivity clause in the Aceh Governing bill, which stipulates that Indonesian military personnel could be tried in the human rights tribunal of Aceh for atrocities committed during the conflict years. They fear that this would lead to 'unfair trials' and lower the morale of the TNI. The Indonesian vice president, one of the architects of the Aceh peace agreement, is facing opposition from his own party on this issue. These are some of the bottlenecks in the Aceh peace process, which need to be removed through dialogue.
Restraint is essential during the on-going transition phase in the Aceh peace process. Though both parties are bargaining tacitly to protect their respective interests, they are also displaying a willingness to arrive at a reasonable compromise on contentious issues. Hardliners in the Indonesian government are attempting to rake up nationalist sentiments, while some GAM leaders seem to hold illusory ideas about their role in the post-Tsunami reconstruction phase. Under the circumstances, the continued monitoring and mediation of the AMM is necessary to ensure Aceh's peaceful transition from a strife-torn region into a prosperous and partially autonomous province of Indonesia.
Indonesia
East Asia
IDSA COMMENT
Darfur Peace: A Distant Dream
Nivedita Ray
May 25, 2006
After weeks of intense negotiations and international pressure, the Sudanese government and a faction of the main rebel group (SLA) signed a peace deal on May 5, which aims to settle the devastating crisis in Darfur. Although there is a modest hope that it could bring more protection to millions of refugees and result in a significant decline in bloodshed, it is unlikely to end the three-year conflict or bring durable peace to Darfur. Instead, its utility is likely to be limited to paving the way for the UN to replace the African Union peacekeeping force in place now.
After weeks of intense negotiations and international pressure, the Sudanese government and a faction of the main rebel group (SLA) signed a peace deal on May 5, which aims to settle the devastating crisis in Darfur. Although there is a modest hope that it could bring more protection to millions of refugees and result in a significant decline in bloodshed, it is unlikely to end the three-year conflict or bring durable peace to Darfur. Instead, its utility is likely to be limited to paving the way for the UN to replace the African Union peacekeeping force in place now. Sudan had earlier opposed the deployment of the United Nations-led peacekeeping force and had said that it would only consider doing so if the peace deal is signed.
The treaty is also unlikely to bring about any immediate transformation on the ground. It has failed to receive support from the two other main opposition parties - the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the rival faction of the SLA led by Abdul Vahid Muhammad Nur. Their refusal to sign the agreement brokered by the African Union, the United States, the European Union and other Western countries, weakens the chance of the deal working. And it illustrates that neither divisions between the rival ethnic groups nor some of their demands have been addressed The agreement calls for a ceasefire that began on May 12, a compensation fund for victims of the conflict, the disarming and neutralizing of the Janjaweed militias, the absorption of 5000 rebel troops into the Sudanese army and the joining of rebel leaders in the government as advisors to the president. It, however, does not include the rebel's main political demand, viz., occupying a vice presidency in the National Unity Government. For the other two rebel groups it is an incomplete deal and would not lead to real peace given widespread distrust and fear on the ground - a fact acknowledged by US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, Washington's point man on Sudan.
There is even doubt regarding the sincerity of the Khartoum government as far as implementation is concerned, given its past record of undermining agreements. One example is with regard to the 'January 2005' North-South peace agreement, which even after sixteen months has not been implemented fully. It is therefore doubtful that the Sudanese government will pursue the implementation of the latest agreement with much eagerness.
For the African Union and the international community, the challenge lies not only in convincing the opposing rebel leaders to choose peace over conflict but also in ensuring that those who have signed the agreement actually implement it on the ground and that the people of Darfur remain protected. Presently, there is only the 7000-strong African Union Mission (AMIS), which has proved too small and toothless to provide protection and enforce a ceasefire. It effectively has only one soldier for every 72 square kilometres and a limited mandate that often prevents it from engaging the combatants and stopping the bloodshed. The International Crisis Group report released in March has stated that "as the security situation steadily worsens, AMIS's credibility in Darfur as a military and civilian protection force is at an all-time low."
So far, the African Union Mission has demonstrated that it has little power to change the violent dynamics on the ground. Current conditions are intolerable and if they continue humanitarian workers would be forced to withdraw, severing a lifeline that sustains hundreds of thousands of defenceless civilians. All sides - the government, militias, and the rebels - are responsible for the appalling security conditions that threaten the lives of the people of Darfur and make humanitarian efforts increasingly impossible. The conflict has already claimed the lives of more than 200,000 people and displaced some two million. In order to provide real security for the displaced people the priority remains the strengthening of the AU force.
The US administration has played an active role in this regard. It has helped in promoting negotiations and has been urging that the AU mission be transformed into a larger UN force that is better equipped, with a stronger mandate and receives logistic support from NATO. In fact, the US has been consistently exerting pressure on Sudan's President Omar Hassan al-Bashir for inserting a UN mission since January. But it is yet to receive a firm commitment from the Sudanese leader.
As mentioned earlier, Khartoum had previously opposed the deployment of a UN force and had insisted upon a peace deal with the rebels as a precondition. The haste with which the rebel groups and the government were forced by the international community to sign the deal proves that the deal was not aimed at enabling a political settlement but rather to serve as a political cover for changing the AU mission to a UN one. This is evident from the fact that the rebel groups still remain disunited even as their demands remain unfulfilled. What the agreement essentially means is that Sudan has lit the green light for the above-mentioned transition, though there is no clear answer as to when it would be in place given that Khartoum is yet to grant consent for the UN forces to take over the peacekeeping mission.
Though not all rebel groups have signed the agreement, Khartoum will certainly come under immense international pressure to live up to its own pledge. The push in this regard has already started with the UN Security Council pressing Sudan to allow military planners into Darfur to prepare for the deployment of a UN force and to determine what would be needed to effect a quick transfer of control from the AU to the UN. The Council has also threatened "strong and effective measures" against anyone who violates or tries to stand in the way of the agreement. The threat is likely to translate into travel bans and financial restrictions like those imposed last month against four men accused of organizing and carrying out atrocities. The measure is legally binding under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter. Sudan has, however, given conflicting signals about whether it will eventually allow the United Nations to take over and build up the strength of the under-staffed African Union force. The AU Peace and Security Council, for its part, is ready to hand over charge as early as the end of September.
Given the presence of fractured rebel groups and a climate of mistrust and fear, it is unlikely that the recent peace agreement will end the conflict in Darfur. Nevertheless it will likely prove to be the first step for the UN to assume peacekeeping responsibility in Darfur from the AU. This transition will certainly remain a challenge for the UN and will delay the implementation of the peace deal. Peace in the true sense thus remains elusive and a distant dream for the people of Darfur.
The 'spirit' of the US global nuclear policies can be easily described in two words - 'nuclear ambiguity'. From NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) to CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), and from START I/II to the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty, the US has mostly taken a selfish position. Till recently, even as American nuclear ayatollahs were debating various global disarmament measures, the Pentagon was working on concepts like 'usable nukes' and was also projecting a need to undertake nuclear testing for the purposes of weaponisation.
The 'spirit' of the US global nuclear policies can be easily described in two words - 'nuclear ambiguity'. From NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) to CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), and from START I/II to the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty, the US has mostly taken a selfish position. Till recently, even as American nuclear ayatollahs were debating various global disarmament measures, the Pentagon was working on concepts like 'usable nukes' and was also projecting a need to undertake nuclear testing for the purposes of weaponisation.
A recent New York Times report suggests that the Pentagon is pressing Congress to approve the development of a new weapon that would enable the United States to carry out non-nuclear missile strikes against distant targets within an hour. What the Pentagon intends is to deploy a new non-nuclear warhead to be placed atop the submarine-launched Trident II missile. It proposes to use these warheads to attack terrorist camps, enemy missile sites, suspected caches of biological, chemical or nuclear weapons and other potentially urgent threats. The natural conclusion one can arrive at is that in all likelihood these weapons are expected to enhance the US' pre-emptive capabilities.
The Trident II (D-5) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) system was introduced in the US Navy around 1990 as a replacement for Trident I (C-4). The entire conceptualisation of the Trident II programme including research, development and testing was supposed to be the largest and costliest in the history of US strategic ballistic missiles at that point in time. Its basic purpose was to create a state-of-the-art platform for nuclear warheads. Now the Pentagon is proposing that this be used for delivering non-nuclear warheads.
The downside of such a course, as has been argued by many analysts, is that such a strengthening of the US military's conventional capability could actually increase the risk of an accidental nuclear confrontation. Because the US will end up using the same platform for delivering both conventional and nuclear warheads, it is likely to create confusion in the mind of an enemy state. Any indication of a likely attack with the Trident II system could be mistaken for a possible nuclear attack, and the targeted enemy state may even react by using nuclear weapons.
The Pentagon contends that by using these weapons it can avoid overflight over other countries, which raises political concerns about respect for sovereignty. However, the fact remains that SLBM trajectories are determined by the location of the submarine and the target at which it is fired. Given this, it is difficult to understand how the US could avoid its SLBMs overflying the territories of nuclear weapon states like Russia (the largest country in the world) and China (the third largest country in the world) while attacking targets which in all likelihood are likely to lie in the Middle East region. Experts also contend that the US will find it difficult to avoid debris from these SLBMs falling over Russian territory. Thus, the use of non-nuclear Trident missiles against any rogue target could also appear threatening to nuclear weapon states like Russia or China.
The US Navy, for its part, proposes to modify the D-5 missile to make it 'conventional warhead friendly'. It seems to have two different conventional warheads in mind: a standard 'slug' useful in penetrating buried targets and a 'flechette' designed to attack bigger targets on the surface. To compensate for a possible decrease in energy compared to a nuclear weapon, it would also modify the Trident with a manoeuvring capability to increase accuracy.
Reports suggest that the Pentagon expects Congress to grant it authority to build a US$503 million conventional version of the Trident and that it is demanding $127 million for the effort in fiscal year 2007. But it appears that there is considerable concern about the proposal among US congressmen, especially among prominent Democrats.
This new demand for non-nuclear missiles is based on a 2001 Pentagon study titled "Prompt Global Strike". It is reflective of the thinking of the US Strategic Command, which is looking for a new non-nuclear weapon that could respond to a threat in no more than an hour (including the time needed for getting the president's authorisation) and fly thousands of kilometres to deliver its payload with great accuracy.
Even though the Pentagon claims that this system is intended to fight threats from terrorism, it is apparent that it does not envisage attacking any particular terrorist group with it. The Trident II platform essentially came into being during the Cold War period to mainly address concerns of that era. It now appears that the US may like to use it against so-called rogue states like Iran and North Korea.
Long-range ballistic missiles have never been used in combat in the last fifty years. Over the last few days, the US has repeatedly been expressing concerns about a missile test by North Korea, though the latter has the right to undertake such a test or a satellite launch provided it follows certain international protocols like giving prior notification, etc.). But the US itself is proposing to take a major risk by mating non-nuclear warheads with what has hitherto remained primarily a nuclear delivery system. Weapons systems like these will work effectively only if adequate safeguards are worked out to avoid the risk of unintended nuclear confrontation.
On June 8, Americans woke up to hear the news of the death of Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the leader of the al-Qaeda in Iraq. This was the first good news out of Iraq for Americans since the capture of former President Saddam Hussain in December 2003. The news came at a time when increasing worries about US losses in Iraq had lowered the popularity ratings of President Bush to a record low of 35 per cent. Zarqawi had waged a campaign of suicide bombings and beheadings of hostages in Iraq.
On June 8, Americans woke up to hear the news of the death of Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the leader of the al-Qaeda in Iraq. This was the first good news out of Iraq for Americans since the capture of former President Saddam Hussain in December 2003. The news came at a time when increasing worries about US losses in Iraq had lowered the popularity ratings of President Bush to a record low of 35 per cent. Zarqawi had waged a campaign of suicide bombings and beheadings of hostages in Iraq. He projected his image by periodically releasing video footages of his most gruesome deeds and establishing a rather nebulous link with Osama bin Laden. For its part, the United States tried to project the image that the insurgency in Iraq was the handiwork of a trans-national terrorist network headed by Zarqawi. All of this made the Jordanian a well-known figure.
Zarqawi had led Arab fighters against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Though he went back to Jordan after the Afghan jihad, he subsequently returned to Afghanistan and set up camp at Heart from where he propagated terrorism and renewed contacts with the al-Qaeda. After the US Air Force bombed his Afghan base, he fled to Shakai in South Waziristan in 2001, where he established links with the Taliban commander Nek Muhammad. Zarqawi left Pakistan via Balochistan and Iran, and reached Iraq in 2002. After the insurgency broke out in Iraq, Zarqawi established linkages with most major and minor Sunni groups in order to co-ordinate attacks against the Iraqi government forces and the US-led coalition forces.
He had also recently established linkages with leaders of the Taliban operating in Afghanistan. There is enough circumstantial evidence to suggest that Zarqawi had been co-ordinating attacks inside both Iraq and Afghanistan. Firstly, there has been a sudden rise in co-ordinated attacks on US forces and Afghan government forces in southern Afghanistan by the Taliban on the pattern of attacks by the insurgents in Iraq. Secondly, there has been a sudden increase in suicide bomb and car bomb attacks on US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. And thirdly, there has been a serious effort to create a rift between Western forces and the Afghans, the incident of May 29 being a good example. His goal seems to have been to pin down US forces in both countries.
The killing of Zarqawi is a big set back for the Iraqi insurgent movement. It could degrade the ability of Zarqawi's group to mount suicide and car bomb attacks. Having said that, it is likely that his lieutenants would launch new attacks to assert their organisation's continued presence in the country. Generally, there is a second rung leadership in such organisations that takes over command when a vacuum is created at the helm. But in this case no one has probably been nominated earlier.
The expected person to take over command of the group was Abu al Masri who had come to Iraq in 2002. Instead Abu Hamza al Muhajer has been named as Zarqawi's successor. His name has neither figured in any of the al Qaeda's websites nor in the US list of terrorists with rewards on their heads. This suggests that he is either a lower-profile figure or a more prominent member who has goes by a pseudonym. Information about the new leader has not been mentioned, so as to reflect a new emphasis on secrecy by the group. This has been done deliberately as US forces have launched a series of raids against the al Qaeda in Iraq based on intelligence found in the safe house where Zarqawi was killed. There could also be fear of infiltration within the group.
In case al Muhajer is a lower profile figure, the probability of which is less, then there could be a bloody internecine struggle within the group till he is able to establish his authority. Eliminations of some suspects, who may have leaked out information about Zarqawi to Jordanian and US forces, can be expected in due course of time. Some active Iraqi Sunni fighters, who were fed up of killing people of their own country, may defect from the group. They may turn against foreign jihadis who have given a sectarian orientation to the resistance. This could lead to selective killings of these leaders so to stanch the flow of defectors. The name of the successor suggests that he is not an Iraqi as, al Muhajer means an immigrant. Therefore the group is likely to continue the foreign operations. Zarqawi was the prime mover and encouraged inter-community conflict in Iraq. With his elimination inter-community conflict may wind down, which would be good for the people and the government in Iraq.
The US military in Iraq has claimed that al Masri is indeed al Muhajer and that he has been named as Zarqawi's successor. However, US National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley has asserted that this claim is not yet certain and that more time is needed to confirm such speculation.
Though the various terrorist groups had been operating independently in Iraq, Zarqawi had been co-ordinating their operations. Such co-ordination is likely to suffer till such time his successor establishes complete control over the situation. There is also likely to be lack of coordination between the jihadis in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan.
The manner in which Zarqawi was eliminated suggests that both human intelligence and technical intelligence systems have begun to work successfully in Iraq. The electronic surveillance system, which had been tracking Sheikh Abdel Rahman, spiritual advisor to Zarqawi, led the forces to the Baquba safe house. Jordanian intelligence obtained this information from a mole in the Zarqawi group and passed on the information to US forces. Such an intelligence coup could result in infighting within the al Qaeda in Iraq, as surviving leaders would begin to suspect one another and fear for their lives.
Due to the shutting down of some sources of terror financing, the al Qaeda is facing financial problems. The al-Qaeda number two, Aymen al Zawahri, had asked Zarqawi, the fund raising icon, to raise funds through his worldwide fund raising campaigns and to send money. Zarqawi's death is bound to be a setback for these efforts and the group may face a financial crunch.
President Bush's popularity rating dropped to about 35 per cent and the country was badly split in its views on the War in Iraq. Due to the elimination of Zarqawi, President Bush and the Republicans may benefit politically in the November mid-term elections for Congress. His secret visit to Iraq on June 13 sought to cash in on the wave of publicity surrounding the killing of Zarqawi, and boost his crumbling political support.
For Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki, the killing of Zarqawi has brought immediate political gains in the form of parliamentary approval of his nominees for the posts of Defence Minister, Interior Minister and National Security Minister.
Zarqawi's death is not the end of al Qaeda operations in Iraq, but the manner of his death gives hope that it might mark the beginning of its end.
As the Indo-US nuclear deal prepares to enter the US Congress for the final debate after a seemingly successful round of technical talks in New Delhi this month, critics of the deal in Washington have consolidated their efforts to place last-minute hindrances against its safe passage. The latest in the list of naysayers is a group of Nobel laureates, who assembled under the banner of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) in Washington on June 14 to release an open letter cautioning members of the Congress about the consequences of the nuclear deal to US non-proliferation efforts.
As the Indo-US nuclear deal prepares to enter the US Congress for the final debate after a seemingly successful round of technical talks in New Delhi this month, critics of the deal in Washington have consolidated their efforts to place last-minute hindrances against its safe passage. The latest in the list of naysayers is a group of Nobel laureates, who assembled under the banner of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) in Washington on June 14 to release an open letter cautioning members of the Congress about the consequences of the nuclear deal to US non-proliferation efforts.
The letter, signed by 37 Nobel laureates, demands that the pact not be approved in its current form, contending that it would "weaken the existing non-proliferation regime without providing an acceptable substitute." Arguing that bilateral and ad hoc agreements would undercut US and world security, the group gives a clarion call for a new international framework to replace the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Though the non-proliferation lobby has often discoursed on amendments needed in the existing NPT-based non-proliferation regime, this letter has gone a step ahead in endorsing the long-held notion that the NPT is obsolete. However, neither the group nor their backers have expanded on the prospective nature and structure of such a new framework. Instead, they make a submission that "new agreements must preserve the many strengths of the current treaty and increase international participation." Interestingly, despite their opposition to the deal, the group favours developing stronger ties with India.
While advocating the potentials of nuclear energy to meet global energy needs, the group argues that a rapid growth of civilian nuclear power would increase the availability of fissile materials and fuel production facilities worldwide, thereby increasing the scope for building more nuclear weapons. The laureates, therefore, appeal for international efforts to design new proliferation controls with the participation of India and other powers. The most significant remark in the letter is but a subtle aside on unrealised nuclear disarmament goals - a point often ignored by non-proliferation ayatollahs in recent debates. The laureates call upon the nuclear weapon powers to "renounce the legitimacy of nuclear weapons and reduce their number to levels far below the requirements of existing agreements."
The composition of the Nobel laureates' group itself is unique, considering that it is packed with people of eminence revered for their contributions to medicine, economics and chemistry, though accompanied by a handful of physicists. As an Indian commentator rightly pointed out, in the complex politics of non-proliferation in Washington, expertise in one area need not be necessarily credible in another. With such credibility of expertise in question, it should be assumed that this campaign might not get significant weightage in the Congressional debate, and at best would serve the purpose of a devil's advocate at a time when the debate over the deal has shifted to process-related issues. Nonetheless, the timing of the letter demonstrates the desperate attempts by the non-proliferation lobby to pool its energies to influence the US Congress when negotiations on the nuclear deal have reached a critical stage.
In this context, the FAS meeting also became a forum for some known non-proliferation ayatollahs, including Leonard Weiss and Michael Krepon, to sharpen their attacks against the deal. Expressing concerns that the possible creation of a nuclear fuel bank would reduce the incentive for India to continue its moratorium on nuclear testing, Krepon gave an evidently prejudiced warning that India has the 'willpower' to break the global moratorium on testing. At a time when even the Bush administration had endorsed India's commitment to its unilateral moratorium and attributed such issues to future security contexts, the concerted efforts by this lobby to invoke the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into the legislation is an attempt to introduce a clear spoiler. Many in Washington have already questioned any moral right Congressmen would have to raise the CTBT clause when they themselves had refused to ratify the Treaty.
Similarly, both Krepon and Weiss brewed their prosaic concerns on India's commitment to global non-proliferation efforts - a pledge New Delhi has reiterated time and again ever since the deal was announced. Such apprehensions have become commonplace, given that India is yet to fully commit on some counter-proliferation initiatives promoted by Washington. Weiss, on his part, warned that the agreement would encourage Pakistan to obtain a similar deal with China and 'may rev up the use of the Khan network'. However, no such critical remarks followed on the failed US attempts to penalise the protagonists of the clandestine nuclear black market or admonish Pakistan for its role in it. This evokes little surprise, as the non-proliferation lobby is known to be protective of Pakistan while persistently training its guns on the Indian nuclear programme. As an endnote, Weiss even warned of a possible nuclear arms race between India and China!
While the White House might largely ignore this campaign, the meaningful aspect of this event for New Delhi is the statement by Michael Levi at the venue. Some Indian analysts had commended a recent Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) report on the nuclear pact, co-authored by Levi and Charles Ferguson, as being supportive of the deal. Levi used this opportunity to clarify that the CFR report, released earlier this month, was not an endorsement of the nuclear pact, but that it only accepted some diplomatic realities. "This is far from a perfect deal," Levi said, adding that he expected President Bush to toe a harder line in his negotiations with India. However, Levi conceded that the agreement is an opportunity for the Congress to address new non-proliferation challenges.
As both the Indian and US governments work through the nitty-gritties of the 123 agreement and prepare for a debate and vote at the full House of Representatives and the Senate, it would be worthwhile to remember that most of these arguments might reverberate in some form or the other in the Congress for which the Bush administration would need credible responses at hand. Since the nuclear agreement could be signed only after the passage of requisite legislations at the Congress, New Delhi also has to prepare itself for a long haul at the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, where more impediments are likely to be in store.
On May 18, 2006 the United States presented a draft Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) proposal as well as a draft mandate to establish an Ad Hoc Committee at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) plenary. A week-long thematic debate closed at the 65-member CD Plenary on May 22, 2006, during which member states made statements projecting their respective positions on an FMCT in general.
On May 18, 2006 the United States presented a draft Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) proposal as well as a draft mandate to establish an Ad Hoc Committee at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) plenary. A week-long thematic debate closed at the 65-member CD Plenary on May 22, 2006, during which member states made statements projecting their respective positions on an FMCT in general. It has been reported that if the US is willing to engage in discussions on three key issues of disarmament (prevention of an arms race in outer space, negative security assurances and nuclear disarmament), then perhaps other members may be willing to start negotiations on an FMCT. If this is indeed the case, it is an ambitious agenda to make the US compromise upon its determination to pursue its missile defence deployment plan and new nuclear security strategies. Another issue of criticism that has been directed at the US is its failure to ratify the comprehensive test ban treaty.
The draft FMCT text as proposed by the US also fails to appropriately address many vital issues, especially the establishment of a multilateral verification mechanism to ensure compliance. The US is of a loosely stated view that "the primary responsibility of verification would rest with parties using their own national means and methods." In the absence of agreed verification mechanisms, the treaty would remain open to interpretation on issues like confidence building, information sharing or potential dispute resolutions in future.
The US draft envisages that future questions about the proper implementation of the FMCT be taken up by the UN Security Council. In that sense the proposed US draft essentially seems to be P-5 centric and would therefore remain potentially vulnerable to stalemates, as has been the record of Security Council functioning in the last sixty years. Moreover, the exclusive focus on the P-5 is likely to lead to selective treatment being meted out to other states under the influence of competing national interests.
While the US draft proposes that the treaty shall enter into force as and when all five permanent members of the UN Security Council deposit their instruments of ratification, the pertinent question that remains is whether the others would agree to negotiate on the US draft in the first place. This is especially so given the known differences of opinion among them on other disarmament matters.
As of now, there is no agreement among the member states of the CD on the scope of FMCT negotiations. In that sense, India still has time to manoeuvre and finesse its position on the issue. But its bottom line should be that any future FMCT should prescribe the same obligations and mechanism for all states in an appropriately verifiable manner. And it has to be mindful of any India-centric measure that may be introduced during the course of the negotiations among the P-5.
While tabling the draft, the US representative at the CD stated that "the production of fissile material for non-explosive purposes, such as naval propulsion, would not be prohibited [and] existing stocks of fissile material also would be unaffected." He also suggested that pending the conclusion of a treaty, "all states should declare publicly and observe a moratorium on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons."
The United States, Russia, France and Britain, after conducting hundreds of explosive device tests and stockpiling tonnes of weapon grade fissile material, have announced that they have stopped further production of the same. Though reports of China having similarly stopped production of fissile material cannot be confirmed, its representative at the CD clearly stated on May 17 that his country is of the view that "future FMCT negotiations should not involve the issue of stockpile." At the same time, it is likely that China may not be averse to a moratorium in an attempt to bring India on board and thus end the latter's ability to accumulate more fissile material.
If the momentum towards such a moratorium were to gain widespread support, India would find itself in a tricky situation, given that its stockpile is currently estimated to be only about one-tenth of China's. It is therefore imperative that New Delhi takes adequate measures to ensure that its requirements for credible minimum deterrence are not compromised.
Travelling in Arunachal Pradesh without having to suffer from poorly developed roads is indeed inconceivable. Existing roads by themselves are of the primitive 'potholed' variety, which is made worse by frequent landslides in the rainy season. This state of affairs not only disconnects the state from the rest of India but also proves hazardous for the Indian security apparatus operating along the country's borders with China.
Travelling in Arunachal Pradesh without having to suffer from poorly developed roads is indeed inconceivable. Existing roads by themselves are of the primitive 'potholed' variety, which is made worse by frequent landslides in the rainy season. This state of affairs not only disconnects the state from the rest of India but also proves hazardous for the Indian security apparatus operating along the country's borders with China. Given the presence of the Chinese military on the other side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), Indian policy makers had hypothesized that it was strategically prudent to keep the roadways infrastructure in Arunachal weak. The rationale behind such a policy was that the inhospitable nature of the terrain would deter the Chinese from furthering their strategy of obtaining easy territorial access into a state in which China claims 90,000 square kilometres (34,750 square miles) of territory.
Upending the above logic, India initiated a policy shift in May 2006 when the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA) cleared the construction of strategic roads in Arunachal. This sudden change in Indian policy towards the border areas also reversed the post-1962 mindset, informed primarily by the military "logic" of keeping Arunachal Pradesh weak, in an infrastructural sense. Indeed, by enabling such an important policy shift, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government has set in place the necessary groundwork for building seven strategic roads, including two inter-basin arteries by the Border Roads Organization (BRO). The importance of this policy shift is reflected in the fact that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was to undertake a visit to Arunachal on June 13 to inaugurate the 410 metre long bridge on Lohit river at Brahmakund near Wakkro as well as to receive first hand information on the proposed strategic roads linkage, but had to postpone his visit due to the onset of the monsoons. Significantly, the seven planned roadways in Arunachal are a part of a larger plan of building nearly twenty roads in states along the LAC. The recently published Arunachal Pradesh Human Development Report 2005 also stressed upon the need to improve road linkages within the state for sound implementation of development policies.
This vital Indian policy shift in Arunachal could be seen as a reaction to the Chinese build-up of roads to Aksai Chin in the western sector and to Tibet in the eastern sector. China's road link to Tibet is along the Arunachal border and consequently enables the easy movement of Chinese goods, services and military hardware to the border areas. China also established vital road links with Nepal in 2005 through the Kodari highway, which connects Lhasa and Kathmandu with a bus service, and with Pakistan through the Karakoram highway. In March 2006, China announced duty free access to Nepali goods into Western China. Indeed, China has successfully converted these strategic roadways into vital economic assets by encouraging rapidly growing border trade with Nepal and Pakistan. The growing Chinese economic presence has resulted in expanding Chinese influence in a region that is uncomfortably close to the Indian strategic borderlands. It is crucial to understand that it is within the Chinese grand strategic matrix to rapidly increase economic ties in the subcontinent, an effort in which Beijing has been largely successful. In that context, the strategic significance of China and Pakistan launching new road linkages between Kashgar in China's north-western province of Xinjiang and Gilgit in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir cannot be lost on Indian policy makers. Both sides have agreed to run bus services between Gilgit and Kasghar on a daily basis and from Sust to Tashgurkan thrice a week from June 15, 2006. China has also pledged US$350 million for the rehabilitation of the Karakoram highway. The rationale provided for the upgrade is that it would enable exporters from western China transport goods with ease to the Gwadar port.
The China-Nepal-Pakistan road linkages notwithstanding, the Indian policy of building strategic road links in its borderlands also reflects the growing confidence of the Indian state. It provides insights into the Indian vision of regional economic integration by improving infrastructural facilities in its border areas, an aspect in which the Chinese are far ahead of India. The current Indian policy refreshingly sets aside Indian insecurities arising on account of the 1962 war with China. Defeat in that conflict and Chinese incursions into Indian territory had made New Delhi sensitive to Chinese troop presence along the border. However, growing Sino-Indian ties in the economic, strategic, cultural, and military spheres have brought about a distinct sense of 'trust' in this historically complicated relationship. India and China have been termed as the rising powers of Asia and a positive engagement between the two is seen as benefiting both sides as well as the Asian region as a whole.
Viewed within the context of the "2006 India-China friendship year", and positive current developments, one can safely predict a period of burgeoning relationship between these two rising Asian economic giants. The first ever Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between Indian Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee and his Chinese counterpart General Cao Gangchuan on May 29, 2006 called for an institutionalization of the official and military exchanges between the two sides. Both sides have also agreed to hold joint military exercises and training, and increase confidence-building measures to resolve complex issues. By setting in a process of regular and sustained dialogue on defence and military affairs, the MoU has the potential to initiate a positive tone for engagement on the border issue, till now perceived as the Achilles' heel in Sino-Indian relations.
Analysed in the backdrop of the MoU, New Delhi's decision to develop roadways in Arunachal is an important move, which sets in motion an evolving Indian strategy of greater engagement with China. It is also indicative of the current policy establishment's ability to chalk out new pathways to enhance the economic progress and infrastructural development of peripheral Indian states. The Arunachal case signifies the beginning of a new strategic vision of well-connected borders. Existential difficulties in border states like Arunachal demand better management of resources and infrastructure for efficient trade and transport. Good infrastructure would not only better connect the people of border areas but also ensure greater security. Well-developed roads in peripheral regions would further India's vision of greater economic engagement with neighbouring states and also increase its influence in the neighbourhood. Most importantly, such initiatives are likely to deepen benefits flowing from the "Look East" policy, which seeks to strengthen India's ties with the economically vibrant Southeast Asian region. India's Northeast can provide the crucial transportation link to Southeast Asia on account of its geographic proximity to the region. A burgeoning economic engagement with Southeast Asia through a well-developed transport infrastructure in the Northeast would result in direct economic benefits for the latter. In sum, vibrant trade corridors could uplift standards of living and entrench a feeling of "human security", so far denied to the people of India's northeast.
The release of India's first joint doctrine on May 17 marks a major step towards military integration and interoperability among the three services. Intended to complement existing individual service doctrines, the joint doctrine outlines the guiding principles for future joint operations by synergising their operational capabilities. It is common knowledge that in contemporary RMA-oriented warfare, joint operations constitute the key to battlefield dominance and military superiority.
The release of India's first joint doctrine on May 17 marks a major step towards military integration and interoperability among the three services. Intended to complement existing individual service doctrines, the joint doctrine outlines the guiding principles for future joint operations by synergising their operational capabilities. It is common knowledge that in contemporary RMA-oriented warfare, joint operations constitute the key to battlefield dominance and military superiority. As for Indian security planning, jointmanship was long overdue given the disparity in force levels and the operational strain caused by inter-services differences on roles definitions and control over command structures.
From the Joint Planning Committee formed after Independence, followed by the Defence Planning Staff in 1986 and Integrated Defence Staff in 2001 to the formation of the first Unified Command at Andaman and Nicobar islands, the path to jointmanship has been a long one. As the first integrated theatre, the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) was the testing ground for joint planning and integrated operations, culminating in the formulation of the joint doctrine. The new doctrine purportedly exhorts the services on the need for joint planning and resource sharing. However, it is not known whether this document elucidates guidelines on the nature and level of integration to be achieved for joint operations, and how such operations need to be organised and executed. For, joint structures have always been an area of intense debate, with the three services known to have differing perceptions on the character of jointmanship. Thereby, the significance and influence of the joint doctrine on Indian military planning could be speculated upon as the services have their individual doctrines well in place.
After the Indian Air Force (IAF) took the lead in publishing its service doctrine in 1995, the Navy followed suit with a 'book of reference' in 2004, which pronounced its objective of becoming a regionally visible maritime force. Lately, the Indian Army has been working on its "Cold Start" doctrine, which focuses on integrated battle groups, notably with naval and air elements, intended to achieve swift mobilisation and instant offensive operations in a limited conventional theatre. Though it highlights integration as its primary component, ambiguity persists on the nature of air and naval elements in the integrated battle groups. For that matter, the recently held Sanghe Shakthi exercises demonstrated the possibilities of superior dominance by land forces in joint operation scenarios thereby potentially minimising the operational and command roles of the other two wings. While the IAF role might be confined to air support and transportation, the naval element would be minimal in most land-based joint operations unless units of marine commandos (Marcos) are deployed in the integrated battle groups alongside the Army's strike corps.
Taking this into consideration, it is difficult to ascertain how far the joint doctrine, devised by the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), would influence a credible military integration process on the ground. Besides the IDS, the ANC and the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) are the only other visible military entities with a joint character. Amidst the clamour for creating more 'joint structures' across the spectrum, it should be noted that the ANC, which validated its raison d'être by achieving rhythm in interoperability among the services, was not sufficiently used as a model platform for raising new joint structures. The ANC has been successful in evolving a set of functional joint procedures and has helped mutual appreciation of different procedures and ethos among the three services. Yet, its mandate is largely confined to the defence of the A&N islands, the security of the eastern approaches of the Indian Ocean and protecting the Exclusive Economic Zone in that periphery. Though carrying out planning and strategic operations in specific contingencies falls within its designated tasks, the failure to nominate the ANC as the nucleus for all such eventualities denotes the undercurrents hindering comprehensive military integration. Similarly, though the ANC could cover strategic and tactical operations in the Eastern Seaboard, the actual role of effecting sea control in this zone rests with the Eastern Naval Command, thus providing immense scope for turf disputes.
Total military integration and application of the joint doctrine could apparently work only after pivotal structural-level issues including defining joint operation scenarios and military objectives are dealt with. While the 'Cold Start' doctrine fits into the Pakistan theatre, future joint operational planning has to go beyond individual case-to-case modelling and should encompass roles ranging from counter-insurgency to counter-proliferation as well as peacetime operations. For the joint doctrine to hold relevance and to ensure that future operations do not become avenues for conflicts over operational space and roles, well-defined joint structures need to be evolved involving a credible synergy, if not parity, among the services. Significant in this context is the notion that complete military integration might be unachievable in the absence of an overarching entity like the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) who could act as the single point command of all integrated planning and operations. Realistic integration would inevitability depend on a hierarchy which has to be methodically structured with equitable participation of the primary actors involved.
Similarly, if the 11th Parliament Standing Committee Report on Defence is to be believed, the Indian military suffers from serious equipment shortfalls, which would prove detrimental to its military preparedness. Functioning of joint structures would be feeble in the event of equipment deficits as the applicability of joint warfare strongly depends on technological edge or asymmetry. Thereby, the country's defence technological proficiency and access to cutting-edge weaponry would have to be evenly accounted for in any joint operations planning. In the long run, it is not just joint structures but all-round military capabilities, including manpower, equipment and technology, which have to be augmented for tangible jointmanship to take shape.
The European Union finally decided to add the LTTE to its list of terrorist organisations on May 29. The Tigers would have seen the ban coming, when on May 17 the European Parliament (EP) adopted a resolution on the situation in Sri Lanka, in which it strongly condemned the LTTE attacks on a Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) vessel a week earlier. The decision was in fact expected for some time, given that the EU had decided to deny official receptions to LTTE delegations earlier on September 26, 2005.
The European Union finally decided to add the LTTE to its list of terrorist organisations on May 29. The Tigers would have seen the ban coming, when on May 17 the European Parliament (EP) adopted a resolution on the situation in Sri Lanka, in which it strongly condemned the LTTE attacks on a Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) vessel a week earlier. The decision was in fact expected for some time, given that the EU had decided to deny official receptions to LTTE delegations earlier on September 26, 2005. The EU went ahead with its decision to term the LTTE a terrorist organisation in spite of the latter's warning that Brussels' prohibition would lead it to go to war. The LTTE had in fact staged protest demonstrations in Nordic capitals against the impending ban.
Though it is still early days to assess the implications of the EU ban on the LTTE, it is useful to consider the eventual consequences of the prohibition order in the twenty five member nations of the bloc. In fact, some European nations had actually been monitoring the activities of the LTTE on their soil for years. The latest Annual Report (2005) of the German internal intelligence agency, the Federal Office for the Protection of Constitution (BfV), has estimated the total strength of the Tigers in Germany at about 800. The maximum strength of the LTTE in Germany is concentrated in one federal state, North Rhine-Westphalia. According to the state security agency of North Rhine-Westphalia, organisations like the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO) and the Tamil Co-ordination Committee (TCC) collect funds for the Tigers by organising various cultural and social events around the year. In its Annual Report for 2005, the North Rhine-Westphalian state security agency has noted that without continuous financial support from abroad, the LTTE would not be able to achieve its goal and keep its military apparatus intact in Sri Lanka.
At the same time, the LTTE's continuing activities among the Tamil diaspora in non-EU European nations, like Norway and Switzerland, have also been a matter of concern. The TRO opened its first foreign office in Switzerland in 1985, even before it did so in London. In Norway, LTTE front organisations have remained major fund providers. It is estimated that given the 10,000-strong Tamil population in Norway, the LTTE has been able to raise US$5 million a year. Moreover, through various companies and business concerns set up in other European countries, the LTTE's leadership in Europe has been sending considerable amounts of money to Sri Lanka. Apart from forcible collection of funds from the diaspora, another matter of concern has been the LTTE's intimidation of Tamil leaders who do not toe its line.
Against this background, it needs to be seen what form EU restrictions are likely to assume. The declaration of the incumbent Austrian presidency specifies three measures: (i) freezing of funds and economic resources of specified persons and entities; (ii) banning the provision of direct and indirect funds; (iii) police and judicial co-operation amongst the member states. These measures are in tune with the European Council's Common Position and Regulation on specific measures to combat terrorism (adopted on December 27, 2001). Importantly, the Regulation is applicable within the EU territory and airspace; to the aircraft and vessels of any member state; and to any national of EU member states elsewhere. Certainly, the EU prohibition would not only restrict the public activities of known LTTE leaders, fund raisers and sympathisers in Europe but also strongly affect the movements of LTTE delegations wishing to visit any EU member nation. Attachment of LTTE assets and funds may not be so substantive as a measure at this juncture, however, because it is very likely that the LTTE, apprehending a ban, has already diverted its resources towards 'safe' and untraceable destinations.
Nevertheless some complications in this prohibition, which may make its implementation problematic, would arise due to the complex and overlapping European governance and political structures. For instance, Norway and Iceland are not members of the EU, though they are members of the common visa system, Schengen. Earlier instances suggest that known terrorists and criminals, who are well aware of the loopholes and privileges under divergent national and European laws, have exploited these. It would therefore be an arduous task for EU and non-EU European nations to co-ordinate their approach in this particular matter. The fact that such co-ordination would prove rather difficult is exemplified by a recent incident in which a Hamas minister obtained a Schengen visa from Sweden and subsequently used it to travel to Germany. Two important legal tools like the European Arrest Warrant and the European Evidence Warrant, which are aimed at better coordination in the area of police and judicial cooperation, may be agreed to at the level of the European Union, though these are likely to face obstacles from time to time from national judiciaries and law-enforcement agencies. Moreover, the sensitivity of member states in the area of Justice and Home Affairs is also likely to pose hindrances on and off for effective prohibition.
At present due to its prohibition and marginalisation at the international level, the LTTE is bound to lose its advantages in terms of overt fund collection, the movement of its leadership and the ability to influence the international media and opinion. Such an increasingly restricted international space would in turn make the LTTE display its earnestness for the peace process. The EU is expected to continuously monitor the situation in Sri Lanka and remain focused not only on the LTTE but also on the break-way faction of Colonel Karuna as well as the Sri Lankan government.
As per the provision in the European Council's Common Position Paper on Terrorism, a half-yearly revision needs to be done to keep any organisation on its list of terrorist organisations. Given that the onus predominantly lies on the LTTE to demonstrate its commitment to the drawn-out peace process, tighter vigil and prohibition on its activities, need to be strictly exercised.
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif signed the Charter of Democracy in London on May 15. This is a politically significant step as it signals the coming together of two important parties that together gained 36.5 per cent of the popular vote and hold 72 seats in the current 342 member National Assembly of Pakistan. All political parties including the MMA have welcomed the Charter. The military government, however, has been critical of the alliance and said in a statement that this is a political gimmick of parties that have failed the people and democracy in Pakistan.
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif signed the Charter of Democracy in London on May 15. This is a politically significant step as it signals the coming together of two important parties that together gained 36.5 per cent of the popular vote and hold 72 seats in the current 342 member National Assembly of Pakistan. All political parties including the MMA have welcomed the Charter. The military government, however, has been critical of the alliance and said in a statement that this is a political gimmick of parties that have failed the people and democracy in Pakistan. Both Bhutto and Sharif have been banned from entering Pakistan and participating in politics. Moreover, the military government had earlier brought about constitutional changes to bar any person from being Prime Minister for more than two terms, which both Bhutto and Sharif have been.
The Charter of Democracy is ambitious in its ambit. Without taking current realities into consideration, it puts forth the proposal that if elected to power an attempt will be made to remove the 'distortion' introduced into the constitution by General Musharraf. The political parties will take steps to abolish the National Security Council and establish a Defence Cabinet Committee. In fact, the 1973 Constitution provides for a Defence Committee of the Cabinet though the latter has hardly been functionalised. Quite ambitiously the Charter also proposes the formation of a committee to 'cut waste and bloat in the armed forces and security agencies'. It also proposes that the defence budget be placed before parliament for approval, something that has not happened in the 59 years of Pakistan's existence. It proposes to bring military land allotment and cantonment jurisdictions into the purview of the Defence Ministry. To cap it all, the political leaders also wish to put nuclear command and control under the Defence Cabinet Committee.
It is important to note here that in the past Pakistan's military has not even allowed civilian Prime Ministers to visit the nuclear research centre at Kahuta, a confession that Benazir Bhutto herself has made. The military has played an important role in Pakistan's foreign policy and defence decision-making and has successfully kept the civilian government out of the loop in decisions pertaining to the military. For most of its political history, Pakistan has been under military rule. Even when it was under brief spells of civilian government, politicians had repeatedly succumbed to military pressure.
In 1971, after the decisive defeat and demoralization of the Pakistan military in the war against India, Zulfiqar Bhutto, wary of the military's penchant for intervening in the country's politics, took the precaution of introducing a constitutional provision that rendered any such intervention a treasonable offence. In addition, Bhutto appointed Zia ul Haq as Army Chief ahead of several more senior officers, thinking that Zia was the least ambitious of the lot. But the subsequent military coup in 1977 underlined the fact that the Army's institutional interests overrode an individual chief's personal ambition. In order to continually retain its prominence in politics, the Pakistan military formulated a troika system in the latter half of the 1980s under which power was shared among the elected Prime Minister, the President, and the Army Chief. Nawaz Sharif made a successful, though short-lived, attempt at restoring the supremacy of the elected government by getting the President's power to dismiss it repealed. This move also provided the Prime Minister the power to appoint the three service chiefs. But Musharraf's 1999 coup overturned this development and reaffirmed the military's central role in politics.
The Charter signed by Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif is yet to be endorsed by the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD). The ARD consists of parties like the PPP, PML (N), Awami National Party, Pakistan Democratic Front and the Jamhoori Watan Party. The other constituent parties of the ARD are of the opinion that the individual party chiefs were not invited for discussion, though the ARD as a conglomerate was invited. Be that as it may, all the political parties have welcomed the Charter as a first step in the fight against the military dictatorship.
The Charter is more an expression of intent of the two most popular political parties whose leaders are in exile and who are barred by existing provisions from holding the office of Prime Ministership again. Musharraf, whose continuation in power appears to depend on his equations with the Corps Commanders as well as his continued relevance to the United States, has given enough indications to suggest that Bhutto and Sharif would not be allowed to come back to Pakistan.
From Ayub's 'basic democracy' to Musharraf's 'sustainable democracy' Pakistan has traversed a long distance in its political evolution as a nation state. It is difficult for real democracy to take root and strengthen itself in Pakistan, given constitutional provisions like Article 58(2b) and the existence of a National Security Council dominated by the military. Yet, the Charter promises significant changes that will establish the primacy of the political parties in governance. Though neither Bhutto nor Sharif have unblemished democratic credentials, the underlying fact remains that in the arena of politics and governance, political parties are the legitimate players, not the General and his military cohorts.
The Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) formally launched its political party on May 23, 2006 at Banda Aceh. It has also appointed two independent candidates for the gubernatorial elections in Aceh, the date for which is likely to be announced after the passage of the Aceh Governing Bill in the Indonesian parliament. The Indonesian government claims that the bill would be passed by the end of May or early June, which would decide the standing of the political party instituted by GAM.
The Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) formally launched its political party on May 23, 2006 at Banda Aceh. It has also appointed two independent candidates for the gubernatorial elections in Aceh, the date for which is likely to be announced after the passage of the Aceh Governing Bill in the Indonesian parliament. The Indonesian government claims that the bill would be passed by the end of May or early June, which would decide the standing of the political party instituted by GAM. The Aceh governing bill was a part of the peace agreement signed between the Indonesian government and GAM in Helsinki in August 2005. The peace agreement envisaged that Aceh be given autonomy in the areas of public affairs, civil and judicial administration, while GAM would drop its demand for independence. The agreement stipulated that parliament must pass the governing law on Aceh to decide about the matters of governance and the division of revenues derived from Aceh's natural resources as well as about the form of the judicial system to be put in place. It also stated that GAM rebels should form a political party within eighteen months so as to be able to contest the legislative elections in 2009. The deadline for the passage of the bill was March 31 and the ensuing elections should have been held in April 2006. But since the Indonesian government has missed the deadlines, the Aceh Monitoring Mission instituted under the peace agreement (comprising of EU and ASEAN monitors) has to extend its stay till September15, 2006.
The handover of arms by GAM rebels and the withdrawal of Indonesian troops from Aceh were concluded by December 2005, which indicates the commitment shown by the two sides for peace. Also, Jakarta facilitated the return of exiled GAM leaders to Aceh, which has contributed to the build up of trust. But the litmus test is the agreement on the extent of self-government and funding for reintegration and employment of former GAM fighters who have formed strongholds in different areas of Aceh. GAM has been insistent that independent candidates be considered eligible to contest in local elections, but the government draft presented in the Indonesian parliament omits any mention of this, implying that only candidates of political parties or coalitions as is the general rule in Indonesia would be allowed to contest. Wide ranging debate on the draft is still going on and the delay is seen as a necessary element to defuse nationalistic fears that the bill would be a precursor to the secession of Aceh from Indonesia. With the announcement about the formation of a political party, GAM has tried to exert pressure on the Indonesian parliament to make necessary amendments to the draft. In order to make its stand clearer, GAM has also decided that it would nominate its independent candidates in the upcoming regional elections and would not form a coalition with other parties. This announcement has put to rest all speculation that GAM might form an alliance with an existing national Muslim party to meet electoral requirements. The country's existing electoral laws require parties in Indonesia to have branches in more than half of Indonesia's 33 provinces to contest elections.
On the other hand, parties like the Indonesia Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P) led by former president Megawati Sukarnoputri claim that the legislative process should not be rushed through because it could prove risky owing to Aceh's volatile history. The PDI-P has also been advocating the division of Aceh into three parts for better governance and protecting the interests of minorities, which has been contested by GAM. Along with the Golkar party (led by Jusuf Kalla, the Indonesian Vice president), the PDI-P is also against the retroactivity clause in the Aceh Governing bill, which stipulates that Indonesian military personnel could be tried in the human rights tribunal of Aceh for atrocities committed during the conflict years. They fear that this would lead to 'unfair trials' and lower the morale of the TNI. The Indonesian vice president, one of the architects of the Aceh peace agreement, is facing opposition from his own party on this issue. These are some of the bottlenecks in the Aceh peace process, which need to be removed through dialogue.
Restraint is essential during the on-going transition phase in the Aceh peace process. Though both parties are bargaining tacitly to protect their respective interests, they are also displaying a willingness to arrive at a reasonable compromise on contentious issues. Hardliners in the Indonesian government are attempting to rake up nationalist sentiments, while some GAM leaders seem to hold illusory ideas about their role in the post-Tsunami reconstruction phase. Under the circumstances, the continued monitoring and mediation of the AMM is necessary to ensure Aceh's peaceful transition from a strife-torn region into a prosperous and partially autonomous province of Indonesia.
After weeks of intense negotiations and international pressure, the Sudanese government and a faction of the main rebel group (SLA) signed a peace deal on May 5, which aims to settle the devastating crisis in Darfur. Although there is a modest hope that it could bring more protection to millions of refugees and result in a significant decline in bloodshed, it is unlikely to end the three-year conflict or bring durable peace to Darfur. Instead, its utility is likely to be limited to paving the way for the UN to replace the African Union peacekeeping force in place now.
After weeks of intense negotiations and international pressure, the Sudanese government and a faction of the main rebel group (SLA) signed a peace deal on May 5, which aims to settle the devastating crisis in Darfur. Although there is a modest hope that it could bring more protection to millions of refugees and result in a significant decline in bloodshed, it is unlikely to end the three-year conflict or bring durable peace to Darfur. Instead, its utility is likely to be limited to paving the way for the UN to replace the African Union peacekeeping force in place now. Sudan had earlier opposed the deployment of the United Nations-led peacekeeping force and had said that it would only consider doing so if the peace deal is signed.
The treaty is also unlikely to bring about any immediate transformation on the ground. It has failed to receive support from the two other main opposition parties - the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the rival faction of the SLA led by Abdul Vahid Muhammad Nur. Their refusal to sign the agreement brokered by the African Union, the United States, the European Union and other Western countries, weakens the chance of the deal working. And it illustrates that neither divisions between the rival ethnic groups nor some of their demands have been addressed The agreement calls for a ceasefire that began on May 12, a compensation fund for victims of the conflict, the disarming and neutralizing of the Janjaweed militias, the absorption of 5000 rebel troops into the Sudanese army and the joining of rebel leaders in the government as advisors to the president. It, however, does not include the rebel's main political demand, viz., occupying a vice presidency in the National Unity Government. For the other two rebel groups it is an incomplete deal and would not lead to real peace given widespread distrust and fear on the ground - a fact acknowledged by US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, Washington's point man on Sudan.
There is even doubt regarding the sincerity of the Khartoum government as far as implementation is concerned, given its past record of undermining agreements. One example is with regard to the 'January 2005' North-South peace agreement, which even after sixteen months has not been implemented fully. It is therefore doubtful that the Sudanese government will pursue the implementation of the latest agreement with much eagerness.
For the African Union and the international community, the challenge lies not only in convincing the opposing rebel leaders to choose peace over conflict but also in ensuring that those who have signed the agreement actually implement it on the ground and that the people of Darfur remain protected. Presently, there is only the 7000-strong African Union Mission (AMIS), which has proved too small and toothless to provide protection and enforce a ceasefire. It effectively has only one soldier for every 72 square kilometres and a limited mandate that often prevents it from engaging the combatants and stopping the bloodshed. The International Crisis Group report released in March has stated that "as the security situation steadily worsens, AMIS's credibility in Darfur as a military and civilian protection force is at an all-time low."
So far, the African Union Mission has demonstrated that it has little power to change the violent dynamics on the ground. Current conditions are intolerable and if they continue humanitarian workers would be forced to withdraw, severing a lifeline that sustains hundreds of thousands of defenceless civilians. All sides - the government, militias, and the rebels - are responsible for the appalling security conditions that threaten the lives of the people of Darfur and make humanitarian efforts increasingly impossible. The conflict has already claimed the lives of more than 200,000 people and displaced some two million. In order to provide real security for the displaced people the priority remains the strengthening of the AU force.
The US administration has played an active role in this regard. It has helped in promoting negotiations and has been urging that the AU mission be transformed into a larger UN force that is better equipped, with a stronger mandate and receives logistic support from NATO. In fact, the US has been consistently exerting pressure on Sudan's President Omar Hassan al-Bashir for inserting a UN mission since January. But it is yet to receive a firm commitment from the Sudanese leader.
As mentioned earlier, Khartoum had previously opposed the deployment of a UN force and had insisted upon a peace deal with the rebels as a precondition. The haste with which the rebel groups and the government were forced by the international community to sign the deal proves that the deal was not aimed at enabling a political settlement but rather to serve as a political cover for changing the AU mission to a UN one. This is evident from the fact that the rebel groups still remain disunited even as their demands remain unfulfilled. What the agreement essentially means is that Sudan has lit the green light for the above-mentioned transition, though there is no clear answer as to when it would be in place given that Khartoum is yet to grant consent for the UN forces to take over the peacekeeping mission.
Though not all rebel groups have signed the agreement, Khartoum will certainly come under immense international pressure to live up to its own pledge. The push in this regard has already started with the UN Security Council pressing Sudan to allow military planners into Darfur to prepare for the deployment of a UN force and to determine what would be needed to effect a quick transfer of control from the AU to the UN. The Council has also threatened "strong and effective measures" against anyone who violates or tries to stand in the way of the agreement. The threat is likely to translate into travel bans and financial restrictions like those imposed last month against four men accused of organizing and carrying out atrocities. The measure is legally binding under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter. Sudan has, however, given conflicting signals about whether it will eventually allow the United Nations to take over and build up the strength of the under-staffed African Union force. The AU Peace and Security Council, for its part, is ready to hand over charge as early as the end of September.
Given the presence of fractured rebel groups and a climate of mistrust and fear, it is unlikely that the recent peace agreement will end the conflict in Darfur. Nevertheless it will likely prove to be the first step for the UN to assume peacekeeping responsibility in Darfur from the AU. This transition will certainly remain a challenge for the UN and will delay the implementation of the peace deal. Peace in the true sense thus remains elusive and a distant dream for the people of Darfur.
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