The outcome of the meeting between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Pervez Musharraf at Havana has evoked mixed reactions from various quarters within both India and Pakistan. It has also raised a number of questions to which there are no easy answers. The meeting, which took place on September 16 on the sidelines of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Summit, was obviously successful as it resulted in the resumption of the dialogue process, which had stalled in the aftermath of the Mumbai train blasts in July 2006. This forward movement assumes significance in the face of deteriorating bilateral relations as a fallout of the terrorist strikes in Mumbai. Worsening relations were evident in the maltreatment meted out to an Indian diplomat based in Islamabad in response to which India asked one of the staffers of the Pakistan High Commission to leave New Delhi. Questions also arose over the way Asma Jehangir, a well-known Pakistani lawyer and human rights activist, was treated while she was in India to attend a seminar. She felt affronted as the police frisked her hotel room, and Manmohan Singh subsequently tendered an apology to her. Such events in the last few months aggravated tensions and keeping in mind past precedent, the meeting between the two leaders was viewed with cautious optimism by analysts.

The Joint Statement issued by the two leaders includes a reiteration of earlier commitments to take the dialogue process forward and an agreement that their Foreign Secretaries would resume the composite dialogue soon. On the Jammu and Kashmir issue there was concurrence about the "need to build on convergences and narrow down divergences." While these elements of the Joint Statement have caused no surprise and seem to emphasise recourse to traditional positions taken by the two sides, one aspect that has caused consternation among certain sections in India is the decision to "put in place an India-Pakistan anti-terrorism institutional mechanism to identify and implement counter-terrorism initiatives and investigations." Added to this is the statement by India's foreign secretary designate, Shiv Shankar Menon, that "Terror is a threat to Pakistan. It has been a threat to India for a long time now. Both of us need to deal with it." This statement is clearly a marked departure from the earlier stance consistently maintained by India. A statement of this kind, which would otherwise have been unpalatable in India by any standard measure, connotes a few pointers. First, it seems to have created some space for India to include symbolic or soft gestures in its diplomatic negotiating strategy. Second, it is perhaps an attempt at mood gauging by the Indian side to see what kind of reaction it begets from Pakistan. Third, it tries to convince the international community about India's sincere commitments and attempts to not only address the issue of terrorism but also solve outstanding issues with Pakistan.

Reactions among some sections of the Pakistani intelligentsia have been positive. An editorial in a leading Pakistani newspaper Dawn has referred to the meeting between the two leaders as a "Breakthrough" and expressed the hope that the joint mechanism would "help avoid misunderstandings" between the two countries. Pakistan's Foreign Office spokesperson Tasnim Aslam, while speaking to the media in Islamabad about the mechanism, stated that, "The purpose is to help the two countries prevent acts of terrorism."

However, it is difficult to believe that the joint mechanism will be successful, given the linkages of the Pakistani establishment, including the Army and the ISI, with Islamic extremist groups. While Musharraf has been careful to project his increasing disdain for jihadi organisations, this is not commensurate with actions taken on the ground with respect to organisations pursuing an anti-India agenda. Soft targets like civilians within India continued to face the brunt of terrorist attacks through 2005-2006. While external pressures may force Musharraf to adopt a moderate posture, any forward movement towards counter-terrorism would be hamstrung due to the internal compulsions inherent in the nature of the Pakistani state. Musharraf's ability to deliver would depend on whether he is able to take his main constituency, the Army, along with him. But as of now the intentions of this dominant player in Pakistani politics, of which the President himself is a significant component, is suspect. The doubt persists as to whether the military's strategy of aggregating power by using jihadi organisations as a means of achieving foreign policy goals will be dumped. In fact, this qualm is evident in the opinion in India, which has been divided post-Havana. Former Intelligence personnel like B Raman and Ajit Doval and former diplomat G Parthasarathy have been critical of the Indian government's change in stance.

On the other hand, noted strategic analyst K Subrahmanyam is of the view that the joint mechanism is "a step forward" as "Pakistan has accepted that terrorism is a problem between the two countries" and would have to "answer specific allegations and charges." While the Indian government continues to work towards eliminating the scourge of terrorism, only time will reveal the efficacy of the joint mechanism, the modalities of which are not fully identified. Questions arise about whether Pakistan would be more willing than it has been till now, to accept or act on terrorism related information supplied by India. It is more than apparent that Pakistan's leadership has increasingly been worried about internal security and has been undertaking efforts to clamp down on terrorist elements fomenting trouble within the country. Yet, it has continued to use terrorism as an instrument of strategic objectives vis-à-vis India, either by directly promoting terrorism within India, or through third countries like Bangladesh or Nepal. What is common knowledge now, and what was reported in the Pakistani media at the time, is that anti-India terrorist organisations were allowed to carry out relief activities in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) after the October 8 earthquake last year. Recent reports in the Pakistani newsmagazine Herald (August 2006) attest to the fact that organisations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad have registered as relief organisations adopting different names. By ordinary logic such activities would be in contravention of the most significant aspect of the joint statement issued by then Prime Minister Vajpayee and Musharraf on January 6, 2004, wherein the Pakistani president gave the assurance that "he would not permit any territory under Pakistan's control to be used to support terrorism in any manner." The Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesman, articulating the government's position after the Mumbai blasts, had stated that, "India remains committed to the dialogue process with Pakistan but this can be sustained and can yield results only if Pakistan acts against groups operating from territory under its control, in accordance with its solemn commitments enshrined in the Joint Press Statement of January 6, 2004."

While the agreement to create a joint mechanism for fighting terrorism can provide shape and substance to the declared willingness of Pakistan to co-operate with India in countering terrorism in the region, there is considerable scepticism in India whether the key players in the game of terrorism in the Pakistani establishment will allow this to happen.

The meeting between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Musharraf on the sidelines of the Havana non-aligned summit is being projected as an important breakthrough on the issue of terrorism as well as with regard to the broad contours of Indo-Pak relations. The meeting was significant as it was held in the aftermath of the Mumbai blasts, which had led to some tough talk by India. This Indian outburst underlined the frustration and limits of its tolerance to Pakistan's continued support to terrorism. As New Delhi suspended the peace process, it demanded that Pakistan demonstrate its commitment to the various assurances it has given to India since January 2004.

The January 6, 2004, agreement between President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee on the sidelines of the SAARC summit had initiated a new beginning in India-Pakistan relations. Musharraf gave a personal assurance that he will not permit any territory under Pakistan's control to be used to support terrorism in any manner against India. Both countries underlined the fact that constructive dialogue would promote progress towards the common objective of peace, security and economic development for both peoples and for future generations. The peace process was renewed with fresh vigour and various bus and rail linkages were announced to promote people-to-people contacts. At the same time, while Pakistan insisted on a resolution of the Kashmir issue within a time-frame so as to foster meaningful relations and enhance regional stability, India wanted to move on the charted path of composite dialogue on the eight identified issues. Subsequently, meetings have taken place between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Musharraf on the sidelines of the UNGA as well as at the summit level in New Delhi in April 2005. And on each of these occasions, they reiterated their commitment to bilateral dialogue and peaceful resolution of the Kashmir issue - an oft-repeated statement that emanates after every Indo-Pak meeting.

Though both countries are committed to bilateral dialogue, incidents of terrorist violence have not only continued in Kashmir but have also occurred elsewhere in India. All these incidents have the imprint of the involvement of Pakistan-based jihadi groups. It is in this context that the latest joint statement becomes important. The question that needs to be asked is whether it addresses the issue of terrorism that India has been facing for the past decade and a half? The joint statement issued in Havana reiterated Pakistan's commitments towards addressing the issue of terrorism and India's assurance to move forward with the peace process and resume the mechanism of the Secretary-level composite dialogue. One can thus discern a clear linkage between the issue of Pakistan's support for terrorism and the Indo-Pak peace process. The irony of the situation is that soon after the Havana joint statement Indian investigating agencies confirmed the involvement of the Lashkar-e-Taiba in the Mumbai blasts.

The joint statement issued at Havana also speaks of a joint institutional mechanism to identify and implement counter-terrorism initiatives and investigations. Instead of merely accusing Pakistan, India can now take its complaints to the anti-terror institution, the modalities of which are to be agreed by the two countries. In the past, however, Pakistan has been reluctant to co-operate with India on the issue of terrorism. It has denied that Dawood Ibrahim resides in its territory even though its own media has acknowledged his presence. The Pakistan High Commissioner's interview to CNN-IBN on September 20, 2006 makes it clear that it is not within the purview of this mechanism to deal with terror masterminds like Dawood. In the early nineties Pakistan had also denied the existence of Kashmiri militant camps in its soil. Intelligence sharing on terrorist activities with India has never been looked at with favour by the ISI. It has nurtured and sponsored terrorist outfits and has a stake in their sustenance, since they constitute a vital component of Pakistan's strategy against India. Many Pakistani analysts have argued that the only way to get India to the negotiating table is through terror. Pakistan's repeated assurances to India on this issue have not resulted in anything concrete. In fact, it was the realization that Pakistan had not done enough that led India to stall the peace process in the aftermath of the Mumbai blasts.

Pakistan not addressing the issue of terrorism can imply two things. First it is not willing to address the issue; and second, it is incapable of controlling the terrorists. Pakistan has taken the stand that it does not control all the extremist elements operating from its territory. This may be true to some extent. However, it is also true that Pakistan's actions against some of these terrorist elements have been cosmetic at best, while some of its actions against the Jaish-i-Mohammad, for example, arose out of domestic compulsions. Pakistan's ban on the Lashkar has not been effective in controlling its activities. The Lashkar simply changed its name to Jamaat-ud-Dawa and its Chief, Hafeez Saeed, was provided with all the comforts during his house arrest. Not surprisingly, in the above-mentioned interview, the Pakistan High Commissioner opined that the Jamaat-ud-Dawa is a charitable organization, when it is an acknowledged fact that it is a front organization of the LeT. This view clearly underlines the fact that for the agreed joint mechanism to work, both countries need to harmonise their definition of terrorism and terrorist groups. Banning terrorist organizations does not resolve the issue since these outfits resurface in another name. The terrorist infrastructure within Pakistan is still intact and it is difficult to imagine that the precision with which they have carried out various terrorist acts in India is accomplished without the knowledge of the ISI.

Now what does the Joint Mechanism imply in terms of actually addressing the issue. It is merely another mechanism for India to lodge complaints about the activities of Pakistan- based and -sponsored terrorists in India. Since the issue is to be addressed by the representative of both countries, it is likely to result only in a war of words, given that Pakistan has used a studied policy of terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy against India. Secondly, it is doubtful that the terrorist activities in Jammu and Kashmir will be brought within the ambit of this joint mechanism. Pakistan does not consider jihadi violence in Jammu and Kashmir as terrorism and has generally portrayed these terrorists as 'freedom fighters'. As has been the case in the past, it is more than likely that Pakistan will continue to play semantic games.

With or without the joint mechanism, the fight against terrorism is India's own war. It is not for the first time that India has withdrawn its demand to stop cross border terrorism as a precondition for the initiation of dialogue. Earlier, India had insisted on the same conditions for resumption of dialogue in 1993, in the aftermath of the Kargil conflict in 1999, and again after the 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament, only to resume talks without Pakistan moving an inch on the Indian preconditions. And now we see the same trend being repeated in the aftermath of the Mumbai blasts! Suspension of dialogue has limited success in putting pressure on Pakistan. It has never complied with Indian demands and has taken only cosmetic steps with token political symbolism. From Kashmir, terrorist activities have now expanded to other parts of India.

Though the continuation of bilateral dialogue is important for both countries to move forward, the joint mechanism to fight terrorism would not help India in any substantive manner. Both countries are already engaged in addressing the issue as part of the composite dialogue at the Home Secretaries level. And at the multilateral level, the countries of SAARC have signed a protocol on terrorism. In fact, the Kathmandu SAARC summit clearly brought out the differences on the definition of terrorism. The issue of terrorism has not been addressed not because there is a dearth of institutional mechanisms, but because Pakistan's commitment to the issue is lacking. Given the nature of Indo-Pak relations and the functioning of other institutional mechanisms that have been in place for some time, the latest mechanism is yet another forum for India to communicate its grievances and for Pakistan to dole out its false assurances.

Thailand is once again at the crossroads of political uncertainty and the entry of the military in the affairs of the state has created a sense of instability. On September 19, 2006, the Thai armed forces dismissed the Thai Rat Thai Party government and revoked the country's 1997 constitution even though acting Prime Minster Thaksin Shinawatra has announced a state of emergency in Thailand. General Sondhi Boonyaratkalin, the army chief, has assumed prime ministerial powers till alternate political arrangements are made.

The last couple of months saw a seesaw battle between Thaksin Shinawatra and the Opposition over the issue of free and fair elections, which were scheduled for October 15 but were indefinitely postponed by the ousted prime minister. This created a sense of political uncertainty and seems to have provided an opportunity for the Army to take over the reins of power. The Thaksin government, which came to power in 2001 in the aftermath of the financial crisis, instituted populist measures like cheap loans and government handouts. The resultant popularity enabled it to retain power in the 2005 elections. It seemed that Thailand would slowly regain its pre-crisis economic growth, which was 6.1 per cent in 2004 though it slumped to 4.5 per cent in 2005.

But the Thaksin administration came under fire over his handling of several issues. The first of these related to his administration's ineffective handling of the Muslim insurgency in the southern provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala provinces since January 2004. Thaksin took a hard-line stance against the problem in southern Thailand, going to the extent of declaring a sizeable number of villages in the three provinces as a "Red Zone". This meant that they would not be able to obtain developmental funds from the government while at the same time empowering the Army to undertake strong measures to curb the rebellion. Thaksin's reputation was also severely damaged when 78 Muslims who were protesting against government apathy died in police custody in October 2004 in Southern Thailand.

At the same time, he faced strong criticism and opposition on the issue of the sale of shares in his family owned Shin Corp (one of the biggest telecom companies of Thailand) to Singapore's government owned investment company Temasek Holdings. The sale of 49.6 per cent stake in Shin Corp for US $ 1.9 billion on January 23 came under fire since it was on the same day that Thaksin had raised the limitation on foreign ownership in Shin Corp to 49 per cent from the previous 25 per cent. He also evaded taxes on the capital gained through this sale. This incensed the opposition Democrat Party, which launched an intense move to upstage his government.

Thaksin also antagonized the labour unions by privatizing the country's Electricity Generating Authority and by conducting negotiations with the United States for a free trade agreement. He added to the forces ranged against him by curbing press freedom and by granting favours to close business associates and relatives.

The first attempt to impeach Thaksin was started in February 2006 by 28 senators through an appeal in the Constitutional Court. But this was rejected by the Court. The mass rallies that followed were led by the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), a conglomeration of opposition parties and NGOs. PAD was led by Sondhi Limthongkul, General Chamlong Srimuang (both former allies of Thaksin) and Thaksin's political rivals. Thaksin reacted by dissolving the parliament on February 24 and announcing general elections for April 2. The April 2 elections and April 23 bye-elections were boycotted by the opposition parties and even though Thaksin's party 'Thai Rat Thai' won a sizeable majority this did not bring legitimacy to his government because of the failure to produce a non-partisan upper house (the Senate), which is considered necessary to ensure checks and balance in the functioning of the government. The Constitutional Court invalidated the results of these elections contested by the Thai Rat Thai alone, in a judgement delivered on May 8, 2006. It even asked the election commissioners to resign and when the latter refused to comply, they were jailed and subsequently removed from their official positions. However, it needs to be mentioned here that a virtual one party election is allowed in the Thai constitution, provided the sole party contesting elections has enough support of the electorate and wins at least 20 per cent of the popular vote.

Though Thaksin had subsequently given assurances that he would not contest the elections scheduled for October 15, he has been nursing the ambition of running again as a prime ministerial candidate. His decision to postpone the October elections created frenzy among the Opposition and the military coup of two days ago is a direct fallout of this crisis. Military leaders have claimed that they have the support of King Bhumibol Adulyadej, who is a revered figure in Thailand, so as to thwart any mass unrest against the coup. Thailand has a history of generals taking over power as well as contesting elections to legitimise their rule.

The coup leaders' dissolution of the 1997 Thai Constitution could be because of two major factors. First, because it allows even a single party to contest elections. Secondly, it does not empower the King to appoint a Prime minister to overcome a political crisis. It was not that the prospects of a military coup did not cross the mind of Thaksin Shinawatra. In fact, back in April 2006, consequent to rumours of a military coup, he had summoned a meeting of military officers to tighten his control over the government. Even at that time, the Deputy Commander of Internal Security Operations, Panlop Pinmanee, had hinted that a military coup was inevitable if political instability continued. He had remarked that political instability would have an adverse impact on the share prices, the Thai currency and even on investment, all of which would snow ball into a larger public grievance. He had warned that in such a situation an intervention by either the King or the military could not be ruled out. These remarks did not find favour with Thaksin and so when a junior army officer was arrested near his house in August with a car laden with explosives, he immediately used this as a pretext to sack General Panlop Pinmanee. This dismissal and the prosecution of some military officers along with the ambivalent stance taken by Thaksin with regard to his candidature for Prime Ministership and his postponement of the elections, provided the spark for the recent coup.

Though it is quite early in the day to arrive at a concrete prognosis, it is clear that the military would seek legitimacy for its actions from the Thai King, as is evident from the fact that the army run radio-station has been playing songs in praise of the king since the coup began. Though there are hints that the Opposition would repose faith in the Army, for his part the King has to come to terms with the changed political scenario in Thailand and assure the country's population that democracy would indeed return. If the political crisis were to continue indefinitely with no signs of a return to normalcy, it would have adverse consequences on the Thai economy and society.

Anxiety and uncertainty are perceptible even as Bangladesh prepares itself for the next elections scheduled for January 2007. As the incumbent BNP government prepares to transfer power to a caretaker government by the end of October 2006, there is a sense of visible unease about Bangladesh's political future, as many issues pertaining to these elections remain unresolved. It appears that a few issues need an amicable settlement before the ruling party hands over power to the caretaker government. The most controversial among these are the voters list, the role of the Election Commission, the next head of the caretaker government and electoral reforms. Unless addressed, these issues could lead to a re-enactment of the 1996 political situation in which the Awami League refused to participate in the elections.

It is important here to detail some vital issues that are likely to impinge upon the outcome of the forthcoming elections. A proactive Chief Election Commissioner, who gave scant regard to judicial guidelines regarding the preparation of electoral rolls, produced a voluminous new list in May 2006 in which the names of some genuine voters were found missing. The Opposition accused the government of enumerating only its supporters and excluding genuine voters, and rejected the voters list. The Supreme Court finally intervened to declare the list as null and void and instructed the EC to prepare a new list as per the earlier guidelines. It was alleged that the controversial voters list excluded members of the minority communities, as it was feared that they would help the electoral prospects of the Awami League. Interestingly, the voters list prepared by the Election Commission in August 2006 has put the number of eligible voters at a staggering 9.30 crores though the 2001 census data prepared by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics shows 8.02 crores as the number of eligible voters. It is important to mention here that the voters list prepared in 2000 listed a total of 7.48 crores as eligible voters.

The role of the Election Commission in this entire affair has been controversial. The Opposition has been demanding the appointment of a new Chief Election Commissioner since they fear that the elections would not be held in a free and fair manner under the current commissioner, retired Justice M. A. Aziz who is a controversial person and a political appointee. To make matters worse, the ruling party has proposed one of its sympathizers, retired Chief Justice K. M. Hasan, as the head of the caretaker government. Hasan was earlier the BNP's international affairs secretary, and this has given rise to concerns about his neutrality in the forthcoming elections. It is important to note here that the last retired Chief Justice takes over as the Head of the Caretaker government. The BNP government's intentions to install Hasan as the next head of the caretaker government became clear when the retirement age of the Supreme Court Chief Justice was increased.

The ruling party has rejected the Opposition's demands for reforms to the caretaker government system. At the same time the future of political reforms is in limbo as the Awami League and its allies have refused to participate in any discussions on electoral reforms as long as the Jamaat is part of the committee that has been constituted to discuss the issue. As the government hardly has any time even to contemplate reforms, it wants to pass on the responsibility to the next caretaker government, which does not have the mandate to introduce such changes. Since the neutrality of the caretaker government itself is questionable, it is doubtful whether the reforms will come through before the elections. The Opposition is also critical of the idea of placing the army under the control of the President, who is also the Supreme Commander of the Army. Instead, it wants the defence portfolio to rest with the caretaker government, since its function is only advisory and confined to the conduct of elections. It is therefore less likely to use the armed forces. The Opposition has also raised the demand that the President should act strictly on the advice of the caretaker government.

Interestingly, in spite of the political impasse, both political parties are gearing for the next elections. If the BNP is obstinate on its political stance in not conceding any of the Opposition's demands, the Awami League is similarly showing no signs of political accommodation. Both parties are gauging the public mood with regard to their respective political positions. They are organizing meetings and public rallies to apprise people on various issues. The civil society in Bangladesh, which has voiced its opinion on the issues of corruption, violence, religious militancy, etc, has now banded together and is organizing meetings and discussion to make people aware of various issues so that they make a rational political decision. This has come under severe criticism from the government, as the ruling party feels that this is giving impetus to the anti-incumbency factors that would adversely affect its political future.

As the Awami League, which is heading a 14 party alliance, has forged a joint front for the next elections, the BNP does not feel confident of contesting the elections without expanding its support base. It has used both carrots and sticks to win over General Ershad to boost its support base in North Bengal. It has exonerated him of various corruption charges to facilitate the alliance. The BNP is also racked by a tussle between the young Turks and the old guards, which has at times led to embarrassing outburst in public. Though the Prime Minister's intervention has saved the party from internal crisis, senior leaders feel sidelined by Tariq Rehman, Senior General Secretary of the BNP who also happens to be the son of Begum Khalida Zia.

Some other issues that are likely to be important in the next elections are the growing religious extremism, spiralling price rise of essential commodities, the BNP's approach to various bomb blasts, political killings, and attacks on media and journalists. There has not been any progress in the investigation into political killings, the various bomb blasts and the attack on the British High Commissioner in Sylhet, as well as the arms haul in Chittagong. Though the government arrested the prime accused in the August 17, 2005 bomb blasts, it has not shown much seriousness in investigating the main organisers and funders behind the co-ordinated bomb blasts that took place in 63 out of the total 64 districts. In spite of a ban, some of these militant organizations are active and function openly. For example, the banned Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami recently held a meeting in the capital's Baitul Mukarram mosque under the banner of Sachetan Islami Janata (Conscious Islamic People) with the knowledge of the government. This raises serious doubts about the government's sincerity in dealing with the issue of religious militancy.

Bangladesh's struggle to strengthen its democratic institutions continues. The judiciary has been demanding separation from the executive for the past few years. The electoral machinery has been politicised. The ruling party has appointed several officers in key positions who can influence the electoral process. This practice of large-scale institutional engineering to influence the elections in favour of the ruling party is not a new phenomenon in Bangladeshi politics. For example, newspaper reports indicate that recent appointments to 700 posts are related to election activities, including the appointment of 300 Upazilla election officers. Appointments are made in such a fashion that if one officer is removed there is every chance that the succeeding officer would most likely be sympathetic to the incumbent government.

Though Bangladesh has witnessed the largest voter turn out among the practicing democracies of South Asia in all its Parliamentary elections, it is the poorest in terms of governance. It is the most violent society and political violence has been an endemic feature. The frequent hartals that paralyse the country, the personal political antagonism between the two main leaders, the use of paramilitary forces and extra judicial killing to bring in a semblance of orderliness, and the attack on Ahmadiyas and minorities have left its imprint on the polity and the economy. The activities of the government have come under severe criticism by international agencies and donors. But the government is in no mood to listen. Unless a level playing field is created and steps taken to ensure free and fair elections, Bangladesh will head towards greater uncertainty instead of a smooth democratic transition.