Chair: Mr. N.S.Sisodia

Professor Bardhan spoke on “China and India in the near future – A Political Economy viewpoint”. His comparative analysis of the two emerging giants had statistical and structural perspectives.

He began by pointing out various indicators that capture the commonalities, and differentiate India and China’s economic growth at the same time.

1. Percentage of world income: In the year 1820, the contribution in share of world income of India and China was 49% (33% for China and 16% for India). A hundred and thirty years later, the share was down to 9%. Nevertheless, by 2025, it is predicted that there would be a partial restoration in the share of India and China to 36%. Professor Bardhan qualified this by stating that China is way ahead of India in terms of per capita income. According to data, over the last quarter century its per capita income growth has been at least twice that of India.

2. Emphasis on demographics: India hopes to reap benefits out of its demographic dividend when compared to an ageing China. The positive externalities of this are

a) The younger population is more productive.
b) The younger people save and the older people dissave.

However in so far as China is concerned, it compensates the quantity by quality of labour force. In terms of savings by the younger population, particularly in India, people start saving at a later stage in life. Hence, saving from the demographic dividend would come later in India. To suffice, in India the population is younger in relatively less economically developed states than in economically well developed states, which the speaker pointed out as another qualification. It was also pointed out that the saving age population will not peak so soon in China and will happen only in the 2030’s. However, both countries are high saving countries even though there are differences in per capita income. This is due to lack of full social security system.

3. Economic Growth: Professor Bardhan said that economic growth of countries in the long run depends on rate of technological progress. In that context, the speaker pointed out that China has surged ahead of India in R&D and education. In the 1990s, India was ahead of China in the number of science and technology articles published in peer reviewed international journals, but now that number is also going down. With regard to higher education, he noted that while two Chinese universities rank in the top 50 universities in the world, there are no Indian Universities.

As far as the composition of growth is concerned, India is predominantly service oriented economy driven by the IT sector doing really well. However, the number of people employed in IT and ITES is less than one half of 1% of the Indian labour force. China on the other hand is considered to be the manufacturing hub of the world. However, from a value added perspective, it is not the leading manufacturer as it accounts for only 15% of the total manufacturing output in the world.

With respect to foreign trade, though many say, the economic growth in China is export driven, but in reality it is domestically driven, largely through domestic investments. In India also the economy is not export dependant, but depends on domestic investment and consumption.

4. Poverty and Inequality: The speaker pointed out to the extent of poverty alleviation in China and India over a time span of 25 years from 1981-2005. The statistics show drastic poverty alleviation in China from 73.5% to 8%, while that of India from 42.1% to 24.3%. The common causal factor for poverty alleviation is considered to be the integration of both the economies with the rest of the world. However the speaker added that in addition to globalization, China’s agrarian reforms have led to a shift from the commune system to household and to an individual, which has impacted poverty alleviation in its own right. This has not been the case in India wherein land reforms have not been successfully implemented. This is attested by the fact that most of the people have either very less land, or are completely landless.

In the context of social indicators, economic growth does not seem to be a comprehensive indicator of development. According to National family Health Survey conducted in China, the percentage of malnourished children (between the age of 0-6) in China is between 0-8% which is much less than that of India, that is 44-45%. After economic reforms, basic health and education system in China became increasingly privatised due to the decline of commune system. Consequently, we can see for example that most of the poor people are not being able to afford to access the facilities even of the public hospitals, because of high costs, leave alone private hospitals. However, inequalities in China are still lesser than in India, as regards, inequality of opportunity in terms of social hierarchy, of land distribution and in education.

The sex ratio in China is worse than in India. In spite of this shortcoming, the level of female participation and female literacy is way ahead in China than in India. There is a huge difference in the physical and social infrastructure of the two countries, which includes health and education. It is because the Indian government has comparatively less monetary resources and also suffers from cost recovery problem. China does not have such a problem, because the system is decentralized, which makes management easier and brings about efficiency in the system.

5. Governance and Nature of Capitalism: Professor Bardhan stated that the corporate sector in India is vigorous than in China but accounts for only 2-3% of the total growth, and hence even a big change in it will not have much of an effect on the potential growth rate of the country. In case of China, many of the success stories are state funded.

According to the speaker, the problem of crony capitalism is more severe in China than in India. He pointed out to the statistics of 2007, where it was found that out of the 3500 millionaires, 3000 were high ranking party officials. Moreover, the composition of the Communist party has also undergone a change. Out of 75 million people in the party, now only 29% are workers and peasants and 71% of them are professionals. Authoritarianism is neither sufficient nor necessary for development. China is ruled by technocrats who take quick decisions, and hence the execution and implementation is quite often more efficient than in the case of India.

According to Prof Bardhan, the Indian political regime derives its legitimacy from democratic pluralism and not from high growth rate as is the case with China. China appears to be strong but actually there is a strong sense of insecurity and brittleness. However there is a flip side to it that as this leads to excesses of capitalism in today’s China in different forms such as environmental pollution, and local inequalities. As regards accountability, the local officials easily get away with capital excesses because they do not have to contest elections and even if they are to do so, it is a one party election. In India, in spite of democracy, the officials especially at the local level lack accountability. In this context, what has to be seen is not the difference between democracy and dictatorship, but the accountability mechanisms, where India has failed. The speaker concluded by pointing out that there are serious accountability failures in both the countries, and cannot be construed and understood with a simplistic analysis of democratic vis-à-vis totalitarian systems.

Event report prepared by Haifa Peerzada, Research Intern at IDSA.

The run-up to the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s visit to India has been an opportunity for IDSA to interact with eminent experts about Russia’s new domestic and foreign policy initiatives and, on this occasion, Mr. Vladimir Skosyrev1 addressed an informed audience on the subject of the current Russian administration’s foreign policy initiatives. His presentation at IDSA primarily focussed on the new Russia-NATO detente, Russia’s role in Afghanistan, the American ‘reset’ policy towards Russia, the emphasis on ‘modernization alliances’, Russia’s strengthening of relationship with China, and finally on the country’s strong traditional relationship with India along with the public perception which favoured continuation of ties with India. Wing Commander V. Krishnappa of IDSA inaugurated the session by welcoming Mr. Skosyrev and lauding his long standing association and journalistic interest in India.

Russia-NATO

At the very outset Mr. Skosyrev proclaimed the improvement of Russia’s ties with NATO at the Lisbon summit as a positive development, an event which could change the very dynamics of Russia’s relationship with the Western world. For the first time Russia and NATO had put down in writing that they no longer posed a mutual threat and called for a ‘fresh start’ to resolve their differences. However, what was of even more significance and probably heralded the beginning of a new era was an agreement to cooperate on a ballistic missile defence system. Mr. Skosyrev also highlighted and praised the tremendous diplomatic effort on both sides to reach an amicable agreement since this was the first time the Russia-NATO council had been convened post the Russia-Georgia conflict of 2008. That conflict had strained Russia’s relationship with NATO and the reconvening of the Council was an indication of both sides viewing each other as potential allies.

Mr. Skosyrev supported the Russian President’s decision to join the alliance’s planned missile defence shield as an equal and full partner. He was of the view that talks should be universal and all encompassing in nature. Any attempt to marginalize or sidestep Russia would automatically result in Russia walking away from cooperating in the development of the missile system.

The historic Lisbon summit was also an indication of Russia’s willingness to find common ground with NATO on issues of mutual concern. Laying the ground work to cooperate on anti-narcotics, piracy, terrorism and Afghanistan highlighted the unprecedented level of convergence of interests and cooperation between the two erstwhile foes.

The fact that major European countries like Germany, France and Italy and also the United States had welcomed the new developments with open hands indicated the possibility of the beginning of a long term strategic partnership. Russia and NATO should aim to create a common space of peace, security and stability in the region. There has also been an improvement in the image of Russia amongst the domestic audience of the European countries (8% improvement in Germany and France, and 12% in Poland). However, Mr. Skosyrev warned that the partnership will have to soon come up with concrete proposals to give credibility to the new bonhomie.

Domestic Audience

With elections due in 2010, the biggest hurdle which the Russian President faces will be his ability to sell the plan to his domestic audience, a significant percentage of whom still look upon NATO with deep scepticism and distrust. There is a strong division in Russia about the course of the foreign policy which the country should follow. One group favours fostering of strong relationship with NATO, since Russia and NATO share more concerns today (Afghanistan, proliferation of WMD, terrorist networks, etc.) than at any other point in their history. The second group advocates a cautious approach towards NATO and an improvement in ties through gradual confidence building measures including joint decision making in critical areas of concern. And then there is a group which critically views NATO as an organization which aims to weaken the power of Russia. In their arguments, they often refer to the remarks of Brezensky (advisor to former American President Carter) who had called for Russia to be dismembered. They look upon NATO as the world’s policemen and from whom Russia will have no option but to take orders.

Recent disclosures through Wiki-leaks have further emboldened this group. The fact that the US and NATO had plans to defend the Baltic States from Russia’s influence in the aftermath of the Georgian crisis is vindication of their belief in NATO’s hidden agenda. It has given them much needed ammunition through which they can stir patriotic feelings of the general public.

Five Key Mechanisms to strengthen the bond:
a) Multilateral and multi-tiered confidence building measures.
b) Emphasis on Conventional Armed Forces treaty.
c) Russia’s full participation in the missile defence development.
d) Russia-US cooperation outside Europe as well.
e) Increased cooperation in Afghanistan and strengthening of regional institutions to fill the vacuum once NATO troops withdraw.

Modernization Alliances

Russia’s influence in global affairs today is restricted on account of its lack of global economic competitiveness. Its economy is still primarily a resource based one and therefore highly dependent on the prices of commodities like oil, gas and metals. Therefore, modernization of the economy is the primary domestic objective of Russia.

President, Dmitri A. Medvedev has chalked out a diversification plan that would enable the economy to ride out future economic crises and has fostered enhanced technological cooperation with the developed world, especially ‘modernization alliances’ with the United States and the European Union. The development of a robust national innovation system and a knowledge based economy with the help of the world’s smartest money has been accorded top priority in economic planning.

Modernization will never see the light of the day unless there is active participation of the technologically developed Western world. The first step in this direction of bringing and accommodating Russia closer to the West was initiated by President Obama in his ‘reset’ policy and it has continued through the START treaty and Russia’s apology to Poland for the Kaytn massacre.2 However, the recent detente is very fragile and a delay in ratifying the START treaty by the United States and reports of re-armament of Georgia by NATO can act as big dampeners in this new found cooperation.

Russia-China

Russia’s growing relationship with China was discussed in detail. Mr. Skosyrev insisted that the relationship between the two giants can be described as cordial and the two states had cooperated with each other in various international organizations. The border issue had been finally resolved and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was gradually being developed into an effective body to combat terrorism in the region. Russia and China had signed massive energy deals and the diversification of Russia’s energy supplies from Europe would only help the two countries to further strengthen their relationship. The opening of the new Daqing pipeline is testimony of the levels of maturity with which Russia and China look at their partnership.

However, there are problems that may act as impediments in the future. There is a perception amongst many in the elite that Russia has become a raw material appendage to China. Many states in Russia’s far eastern region are entirely dependent on China and Chinese influence is much more prominent in these states than Russian influence. Consequently residual fears about China still exist.

Russia-India

Russia and India share a traditional strategic bond and there is convergence and near unanimity of their views on practically all issues of global concern. Shared values and common interests mark the ties between the two states. One of the key driving forces for the relationship to achieve its next level would be enhanced cooperation in high technology. The recent agreements on nuclear power and reactors, cooperation in the development of fifth generation fighter jets, and co-development and production of multi-role transport aircraft and Brahmos missiles was a clear indication that the perceived chill in their relationship was mere hearsay. However, there is a need to diversify the relationship. Given Russia’s energy resources and India’s technological skills, energy is an important sector that the two countries can work closely on. In fact, Mr. Skosyrev went on to declare that India is the only true and real friend of Russia, a friendship that has withstood the test of time.

Wg. Cdr. Krishnappa concluded by commending Mr. Skosyrev’s extremely insightful presentation on the dynamics of the foreign policy of Russia and ended on the note that India was looking forward to President Medvedev’s visit.

Report prepared by Rajorshi Roy, Research Assistant, IDSA

• 1. Mr. Vladimir Skosyrev is the Observer of "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" of Moscow and an Indophile having served as a correspondent of ‘Izvestia’ in India from 1969-74. He has also authored a couple of books on India.
• 2. During the Second World War, in 1940, Soviet troops had invaded Poland. At that time Stalin had ordered the slaying of some of the senior most military officials of Poland. Refusal of Russia to accept culpability had strained relations between Russia and Poland. In April 2010, the Russian Parliament formally apologized for the massacre.

PROGRAMME

Inaugural Session: (9.30-10.00 AM)

• Opening Remarks: Sh NS Sisodia, DG, IDSA
• Address: Sh VK Misra, Distinguished Fellow, IDSA
• Key Note Address: Smt Nita Kapoor, Secretary, Defence Finance, Ministry of Defence

Tea (10.00-10.30 AM)

Session-I: (10.30-12.00)

• Chair: Sh AK Ghosh
• Speaker: Sh. TK Pandey, JS ( Admn./SP) & Adviser(FR), Planning Commission – Conceptual Framework and Experience Sharing on ZBB by Planning Commission
• Speaker: Dr Sanjeev Mishra, Chief Controller of Accounts, Ministry of Home Affairs - Experience sharing & How to go about Formulation of Outcome Budgeting in the Context of Defence

Session-II: (12.00-1.30 PM)

• Chair: Sh Amit Cowshish
• Speaker: Sh SK Jain, Office of DG MAP - Experience Sharing in Outcome Budget Preparation in MAP
• Speaker: Sh R Pandit, Dir (Fin), HQ DG (NCC)- Experience Sharing in Outcome Budget Preparation in NCC
• Speaker: Capt Gaurav Gautam & Lt Cdr KA Sureshan- Experience Sharing in Outcome Budget Preparation in Naval Dockyards

Lunch: 1.30-2.15 PM)

Session-III (2.15-3.15PM)

• Chair: Sh. VK Misra
• Speaker: Gp Capt LK Chawla, Dir (PP), Air HQ - Outcome Budget in the Context of Manpower
• Speaker: Air Cmde SK Mairal, Fin Plan, HQ IDS - Outcome Budget in the Context of Stores/Projects

Session-IV (3.15-4.00 PM)

Panel Discussion: Actionable Points for MoD/Services
Participants: Sh VK Misra, Sh Amit Cowshish, Reps of Fin Plan Dir of Services

Tea: 4.00 PM

CONCEPT NOTE

The present defence budgeting in India largely follows the input/incremental approach, where allocation to various services and departments are made on the basis of previous year’s allocation with minor incremental adjustments. This incremental system is however not an efficient one as it has the potential to lead to unrealistic allocation of resources, without going into cost-benefit analysis of each programme for which resources are made available. It also does not link the allocation of resources with outcome it aims to achieve. Various oversight agencies, particularly the Standing Committee on Defence has emphasised the need for more effective methods of budgeting, especially Zero Based Budgeting (ZBB) and Outcome Budgeting.

Zero Based Budgeting, which was first introduced in early 1960s in the US Department of Agriculture, is a tool which facilitates “identification and sharpening of objectives, examination of various alternative of performing identified tasks, cost-benefit analysis, prioritisation of objectives and activities, identification and elimination of redundant activities and designing and ranking of decision packages.” In other words, the ZBB facilitates elimination of redundant expenditure, removing duplication of expenditure, finds a better way of spending money to achieve the objectives and optimises expenditure by making it productive and efficient. Although the 1960s experiment was not so successful due to the erroneous assumption (that all programmes were necessary) and lack of time for preparation, it later became a successful tool When President Carter introduced it for the whole US Federal Government in the year 1979.

The success of ZBB however lies in adoption of a sound methodology, which focuses on the following four key processes: 1.identification of decision unit; 2. formulation and development of decision packages; 3. evaluation and ranking of decision packages in order of priority; and 4. preparation of budget by allocation of resources to activities or decision packages by utilisation of hierarchical funding cut-off levels.

Recognising the importance of ZBB, the Ministry of Finance introduced it in all the Ministries and Departments via a letter dated 10th July 1986. The said letter required them to adopt ZBB, although a separate document for presentation to Parliament was not envisaged. The intention was to avoid the lengthy process of paper work involved in ZBB. It was envisaged however that the result of the ZBB exercise can be reflected in the Performance Budget so as to increase its usefulness.

To move towards a visible and outcome-oriented budgeting, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) since 2005 has issued guidelines, emphasizing the linkage between financial budgets, and actual and targeted performance of outlays. The guidelines task the central Ministries/Departments to articulate, among others, a list of major programmes/schemes and the goals and policy framework guiding them. The main objective of the exercise is to “establish one-to-one correspondence between (financial) budget … and Outcome Budget…” However, the Ministry of Defence (MoD), along with 30 Ministries/Departments has been exempted from preparing outcome budget. The exempted Ministries/Departments are however advised to prepare outcome budget for internal use and voluntarily decide the extent to which the general public can have access to it.

In the above context, the MoD has taken some initiatives, by way of formulating Defence Services Estimates, Vol. II, and making it mandatory for some of its institutions to prepare the outcome budget. The DSE Vol. II, which at present is meant for “internal use” falls short of the parameters laid down by the MoF, for preparing the outcome budget. It merely expands the item- or head-wise allocations made in DSE and, in addition, provides “Budget holder-wise summary sheets.” It does not link the financial outlays with the intended outcomes.

In the above background, the proposed Workshop on Zero Based Budgeting and Outcome Budgeting proposes to provide a platform to discuss and debate issues pertaining to ZBB and Outcome Budgeting. The Workshop would address the key areas of concern and bridge the knowledge gap on the subject. It will bring together policy makers, practitioners, Armed Forces, and experts for a brainstorming day-long discussion.

Lecture delivered by: Professor Sunil Khilnani

Topic: The Great Power Game: India in the New World

Speakers: Cdr. S.S. Parmar, Mr. R.D. Pradhan, Mr. N.S. Sisodia, Mr. K. Subrahmanyam

IDSA in collaboration with Yashwantrao Chavan Pratishthan (Mumbai) hosted the inaugural lecture in memory of Mr. Y. B. Chavan on 22 November 2010. Professor Sunil Khilnani delivered the special lecture on The Great Power Game: India in the New World. The Institute was privileged on the occasion by the presence of Mr. K. Subrahmanyam, Mr. R. D. Pradhan, and Mr. Ajit Nimbalkar from the Yashwantrao Chavan Pratishthan at the inaugural Y. B. Chavan Memorial Lecture.
The Y.B. Chavan memorial lecture has special significance for the Institute keeping in view that Mr. Chavan was the founding President and patron of IDSA.

Brief Overview

Mr. Y.B. Chavan was born in the state of Maharashtra on March 12, 1913. He spent many years in jail as a freedom fighter and played a major role in the 1942 Quit India movement. Following India’s independence, he was appointed Parliamentary Secretary in 1946 and rose to become Chief Minister of the bi-lingual State of Bombay. In 1960, he became the first Chief Minister of the newly created state of Maharashtra. He was requested by the then Prime Minister Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru to become the Defence Minister in 1962. Subsequently, he held the offices of Union Home Minister from 1966 to 1970, Union Finance Minister from 1970 and Foreign Minister from 1974 to 1977. He was also the Chairman of the 8th Finance Commission. In memory of Mr. Chavan, the Yashwantrao Chavan Pratishtan has given a corpus to the IDSA to hold an annual eminent persons’ lecture series.

Inaugural Remarks by Mr. N.S. Sisodia

Mr. N.S. Sisodia, Director General IDSA, in his opening remarks pointed out that Mr. K. Subrahmanyam’s perseverance to honour Mr. Y. B. Chavan led to the Trust granting an endowment enabling IDSA to institute the eminent persons’ lecture series, with significant support from Mr. R. D. Pradhan and Mr. Ajit Nimbalkar who is on the Trust Board. Mr. Chavan is remembered as a multifaceted personality, who was not only an eminent freedom fighter but also a visionary defence minister and an intellectual of a certain merit and repute. Most importantly, the Director General observed that Mr. Chavan, along with others who were closely associated with the founding of the Institute, was remarkable in his awareness of the value of promoting independent thinking within a government funded institution; the primary objective of the functioning of such an institution should be to provide an alternative or critical view, in order that the government’s policy making process is enriched and informed. A large part of the reputation that the IDSA holds today can be traced back to Mr. Chavan’s championing of the autonomy of the institute in its formative years.

Remarks by Mr. R. D. Pradhan

Mr. R. D. Pradhan shared with the guests his interactions with Mr. Chavan and how the birth of the IDSA was initiated. He expressed his delight at the journey that IDSA has made over the past 45 years. He conveyed his best wishes to all the Trustees, including the Chairman, Mr. Sharad Pawar, and also his gratitude to IDSA for organizing the lecture. He expressed the hope that IDSA would continue the tradition of holding this lecture annually, and his appreciation to Professor Khilnani for delivering the lecture and to all those who were in attendance at this event.

Y.B. Chavan Memorial Lecture: Professor Sunil Khilnani

Professor Sunil Khilnani, Starr Foundation Professor, Director of the South Asia Studies Program at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, the Johns Hopkins University, and author of the widely acclaimed book The Idea of India, delivered the inaugural Y. B. Chavan memorial lecture at the IDSA on The Great Power Game: India in the New World. The primary question that Professor Khilnani proposed to address in the lecture centred on his views on a realistic future for India – Is India likely to become a major power in the next few decades? What kind of role should India aspire to in the changing power game of a globalized world? What would India’s actions mean both for India and the world?

In the last two decades, India has been on a rapid economic rise, with its relative lack of dependence on exports and a highly regulated financial system moderating the effects of the global economic recession. Professor Khilnani noted that although India’s business and political elites see economic performance as forming the core of the country’s global identity, this growth has unevenly affected Indian society, causing widening social and regional inequalities, and creating political tensions. This newfound and growing self-confidence is pursuant to the fact that India’s international ambitions have always been exceptionally immodest, and derived not only from the nation’s vast human scale and civilizational depth, but also from a deeply held political vision that views India’s future as being shaped by the legitimacy of its choices and actions. In his analysis, modern India has viewed itself above all as a political project that struggled to realize itself through human skill and judgment, rather than assuring its future by entrusting itself to economic or military prowess, to an ideology or to historical providentialism. Tagore, Gandhi, and Nehru’s long-term vision for India, Professor Khilnani pointed out, embodied the German historian Reinhart Koselleck’s idea of ‘imagined futures’ – their sense of India’s present, and of the past causalities that had created the present, which in turn was shaped by what they believed India’s future would look like. Even if this vision of India’s future differs from the one imagined today, in Professor Khilnani’s belief, there would still be elements of past conceptions on India’s future that have force and relevance.

The United States, Europe and China as players in the Great Power Game

In analyzing the role of the United States (US) in this power game, Professor Khilnani noted that the increasing US attention to India is reflective more of an American realization of the fragility of Western power rather than American hopes for India. Indeed, much of the US’ current valuation of India relates mostly to the volatility of the issues faced by Pakistan, and to China’s rise to superpower status. India is thus seen as a counter-China; being a democratic, educated, technologically smart and entrepreneurial country with an English speaking elite, India is seen by the US as the more persuadable, more amenable partner. In the larger frame of the power game, America’s stance as a great power is unlike that of, for example, Britain at its imperial eminence – the US is dependent on less powerful states to sustain its economic prosperity; it imports goods, capital and people to maintain economic momentum. Of significance here is that this interdependence (that is increasingly becoming a characteristic of modern forms of power) hinges on mutual confidence, trust and consequently, legitimacy – in Professor Khilnani’s words, the capacity to sustain belief not just within but across borders. The US’ projects in Iraq and Afghanistan have forced it to delve into a damage-repair mode, but, he noted, the projection of great power, and the urge to dominate that it requires, continues to form the core of America’s global identity.

No longer the central arena of the great power game, Europe is seen as confused and uncommitted on questions of security. With its inward-focused, conservative and protectionist stance, Professor Khilnani predicts that, Europe will be hampered from playing as important a role as it could have otherwise. It has been slow in realizing the changing nature of power in the rest of the world, and how the ‘theatre of the great power game’ has moved away from Europe, and into Asia.

This shift has been ensured by China’s economic rise. Professor Khilnani noted that this rise has been based on profound economic integration with the rest of the world, and particularly with the US. Also possessing the largest military in the world, and the second largest defence budget, China poses a deep conundrum for the world, especially for America. But even as the US works to maintain its engagement with China, the American defence establishment has been attempting to coax India into acting as a buffer against China. He pointed out that with Japan’s stagnation and inability to give its enormous wealth any real meaning in the global arena, India has acquired new importance for the US. India shares America’s uncertainty about China on the economic and military fronts; moreover, China is also spreading its influence among India’s neighbours. Dr. Khilnani emphasized that even as India’s relationship with the US strengthens, it is crucial for the country to ensure its capacity for independent political judgment – a feat China has already demonstrated. A possible prescription for Indian policy makers, that Professor Khilnani identified, is that the pattern of aligning temporarily according to shifting global and regional interests rather than forming stable and permanent alliances is likely to persist; his belief is that it would not be in India’s interests to be drafted into US contingency plans against China.

India and its neighbours in the Great Power Game

Professor Khilnani also pointed out that India’s geographical location places it in the middle of the world’s most menacing regional environment. Internal conflicts in countries like Nepal, Sri Lanka, Burma and Bangladesh pervade India’s own domestic security, threatening its political and social peace, in addition to its economic prospects. Most importantly, in imagining its own future, he believes that India needs to consider Pakistan’s future as well. The results of the American response to Pakistan’s instability has been disastrous not just for Pakistan but for India as well. Professor Khilnani proposes that India will need to devise a more creative approach to engaging with Pakistan on its own terms; the alternative for India would be to suffer the vagaries of other powers’ policies.

Afghanistan is the other front on which India needs to adopt independent action. This becomes a pressing need when taken into account that neither the US nor the Europeans have clear or deliverable plans for an exit strategy for Afghanistan. Regional stability is crucial for India to maintain its growth path; a return to the 1990s when Afghanistan became a marshalling ground for violence against India would spell an exacerbation of wider regional insecurity for India. Professor Khilnani suggested that the depth of the crises in these neighbouring societies impedes Indian intervention in resolving the crises, but it will not be able to take a disengaged stance either (as it did, for example, during the power games of the Cold War). India’s mitigation of these battles will determine its own national course.

India’s stakes in the Great Power Game

Professor Khilnani pointed out that India has more options now than it once had to decide what kind of power to pursue. In the years following India’s independence, India devised an alternative definition of power – a negative conception, in Nehru’s words. This definition was a stance of resistance based on Gandhi’s conviction that apparent weakness could transmute into strength. Nehru turned this strategy (with which India fought down the world’s largest empire) into a principle for international policy. Professor Khilnani believes that Nehru’s strategy was not purely idealistic (or ineffective), but was rooted in a realistic assessment of India’s weakness; indeed, it enabled India to achieve a degree of autonomy and of audibility that was considerable relative to both its own meagre resources, and to the constrained circumstances of a polarized world. Although India now has the opportunity to enhance its military power (drawing from its rising economic profile), he suggested that India will not be able to mimic conventional Western power in military or economic terms. India neither can nor should allow the type of military power it will need to secure itself regionally, nor its rising economic profile, to determine the larger power it seeks.

Professor Khilnani takes the view that India will be an unusual, awkwardly shaped global actor – it will have a relatively wealthy state but that state will preside over a predominantly poor citizenry. He noted that in the past, poor populations generally had poor states, whose claims could be dismissed by richer, more powerful states; with the emergence now of China and India, very large populations are becoming significant world actors, through their representatives (although selected in diametrically opposite ways). Professor Khilnani pointed out at least two areas where India can leverage its growing global clout – one is to inject the interests of the poor into international negotiations, and the second, in matters of international trade, access to natural resources, and the environmental effects of economic growth, to attempt to work out a more inclusive globalization. In this respect, India is now well positioned to disrupt the status quo. Professor Khilnani’s emphasis lies on his belief that the old approach – the negative power, of refusal – will no longer do. The global climate change negotiations at Copenhagen was a chance, in his view, to demonstrate India’s ‘most prudent future formulation of power’; though India will not be a superpower very soon in terms of military or economic bulk, its legitimacy in the eyes of the world is a form of power in itself. He stressed that if India desires to have an impact on the international system, it must take advantage of the mixed character of its own power, in order to combine force and legitimacy into a new conception. Does the India of today have to exert to even stay relevant, owing to its search for historical signposts to becoming a global power? In addressing such a question, Professor Khilnani observed that there are no examples of the kind of role India can play, but by drawing on its experiences, India could invent a role for itself; part of what it takes to be a great power is the capacity to redefine what power and greatness are (as Gandhi did for another era), rather than only conforming to existing definitions.

Professor Khilnani’s assessment is that confronting all the challenges facing India will require the country to develop complicated positions and flexible practices. On contemporary issues and debates, India would find itself well placed to be a ‘bridging’ power. For example, its position between the US and China would allow it to play not a balancing-power role but a bridging one. Also, in addressing increasing security issues as a result of multiple terrorist attacks, although this is a concern India shares with Western states, it has refused to see the rhetoric of Islam as an existential threat – this is a significant position to bridge the so-called “clash of civilizations”, helping to connect Muslim and non-Muslim societies. Most significantly, Professor Khilnani noted that India sees democracy not as the ‘providential destiny of all human history’, but as a complicated, fragile experiment, that can possibly act as a bridge through which other societies can figure out their freedom and move towards it. He hoped that the conception he left from this address is a realistic recognition of the persistence of division and conflict, while also adopting a realist assessment of the limits to the utility of force or of economic progress in itself to resolve these; above all, this conception trusts in human political skills, wit and judgment.

Remarks by Mr. K. Subrahmanyam

In his closing remarks, Mr. Subrahmanyam stated that he saw this event as a thanksgiving to Mr. Y.B. Chavan. He pointed out Mr. Chavan’s role in developing the think tank culture in India, in addition to contributing not only to the founding of the institute, but also in defending the autonomy of the IDSA. Mr. Subrahmanyam also elaborated on the significance of Professor Khilnani’s ideas, particularly in their application to issues that contemporary India faces. He emphasized that if India would only eliminate its poverty and its illiteracy, and if the two legislations that are under consideration in India – the right to education and the right to food security – were implemented, he could imagine an India that would be an example of incomparable quality to the world. He also proposed the significance of establishing strategic partnerships with countries that are of importance to India, with Indonesia being a key example - it is the largest Islamic state which is pluralistic and secular. In pointing out that there is a need to think through strategic issues using different paradigms, Mr. Subrahmanyam noted that the threat posed by China’s rise to the United States for example would come not from the Chinese army but from China’s growing science and technology sector. He also noted that the only reservoir of talent that the United States can realistically tap into would be the English-speaking, democratic India; thus, the power that lies in an educated and food-secure population cannot be overemphasized.

Vote of Thanks

Cdr. S.S. Parmar concluded this stimulating discussion by thanking all the speakers for this opportunity to share their ideas and thoughts.

Report prepared by Princy Marin George, Research Assistant at IDSA.