Title | Date | Author | Time | Event | Body | Research Area | Topics | File attachments | Image |
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Significance of Border Trade in India's Border Management | June 20, 2014 | Pushpita Das | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar | Terrorism & Internal Security | ||||
BCIM and India-China Sub-Regional Interaction: Will Economic Interdependence prevail over Security Syndrome? | June 20, 2014 | Jagannath P. Panda | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar | East Asia | ||||
Peacekeeping and Peace-building: Indian Engagements | June 13, 2014 | Arpita Anant | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar | Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN | ||||
US Congress and the Iran Nuclear Issue | June 27, 2014 | S. Samuel C. Rajiv | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: Amb. K.C. Singh The paper examined the role of the US Congress vis-à-vis the Iran nuclear issue during the time period of the Obama administration. The paper began with an overview of the Executive-Congressional measures targeting Iran during the Clinton and the Bush administrations. The author noted that there have been 10 statutes/public laws and 26 Executive Orders (EO) targeting Iran since 1979. A ‘State of Emergency’ was declared by Clinton in March 1995, which has been renewed every year since, most recently on March 12, 2014. The Clinton administration passed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) in 1996, which became the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) in 2006 when Libya was removed from its purview. The ILSA/ISA was a prime example of ‘secondary sanctions’ targeting companies from other countries for their involvement in Iran’s petro-chemical sector. Despite Clinton passing ILSA however, it was the Obama administration which used ILSA/ISA provisions for the first time in September 2010 to sanctions a Swiss-based company. An important reason for US administrations not using such authorities was their reluctance to target energy companies belonging to allies like Japan and Europe. Prior to Obama, no authorities existed that targeted crucial financial institutions like the Central Bank of Iran or to curtail Iran’s oil revenues. The Obama administration’s initial policy approach towards Iran has been characterised as ‘engagement’ or ’persuasion’ given that it included the threat of further sanctions if Iran did not respond to its ‘overtures’. Critics instead termed it ‘free-pass engagement’ as according to them the Iranian response was not encouraging. While following the policy of ‘engagement’, the Obama administration put its weight behind UNSC efforts to pressure Iran. Critics however termed the UNSC measures as being ‘too weak’. There was broad bi-partisan support for Obama’s initial policy framework of ‘engagement’ in the US Congress. Pressure began to build up for a change in policy in the aftermath of the June 2009 electoral violence, the disclosure on the Fordow enrichment facility in September 2009, the failure of the October 2009 offer from the Vienna Group (US, Russia, France, IAEA) and concerns generated by the quarterly reports of the IAEA DG to the Board of Governors detailing the increase in Iran’s enrichment material and infrastructure. The paper then went on to give pertinent aspects relating to key sanctions legislations and EO’s passed by the Obama administration. These included the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions and Divestment Act (CISADA), signed into law by Obama on July 1, 2010. US officials have credited CISADA for major energy traders stopping the sale of refined petroleum products to Iran. Section 1245 of the National Defence Authorisation Act 2012 (NDAA, signed into law on December 31, 2011) mandated sanctions on foreign central banks if they ‘engage in a financial transaction for the sale or purchase of petroleum or petroleum products to or from Iran’. Exemptions were to be provided if these countries ‘significantly reduced’ their crude oil purchases from Iran. 20 countries got such exemptions by June 2012. By November 2013, when the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) was signed, only six countries were importing Iranian oil. These were China, India, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Turkey. Among the significant provisions of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (ITRSHRA), which entered into force on February 6, 2013, was Section 504 expanding sanctions under Section 1245 of NDAA 2012. It led to the creation of ‘escrow’ accounts in countries importing Iranian oil and severely curtailed Iran’s foreign exchange earnings. The Iran Freedom and Counter-proliferation Act (IFCA) of 2012 targeted Iran’s shipping and ship building sectors as well apart from its energy sector. The Obama administration passed 9 EO’s as well as used authorities present in Iran-related EO’s passed by previous administrations (numbering 17 from 1979 to 1997) as well as functional EO’s relating to terrorism (2001) and WMD proliferation (2005) to target Iran. More than 500 entities and individuals have been designated under the terms of these Executive-Congressional authorities. The paper went on to note that the response to the JPOA has clearly been on partisan lines in the US Congress. The paper noted the pending Iran-related legislation as well as Obama administration’s response to these measures while continuing to bring new sanctions designations based on extant sanctions provisions. The paper closed by briefly pointing to the impact on India as a result of US sanctions, including designations under the INA on three chemical companies and two individuals during 2004-2006 (which were subsequently not renewed), the pressure brought on US EXIM Bank by members of the US Congress in late 2008 to stop its provision of loan guarantees to Reliance which resulted in the company stopping the sale of refined petroleum products to Iran as well as the impact of legislations like Section 1245 of NDAA 2012 which led to India reducing its crude oil imports from Iran. Discussants’ ViewProfessor Chintamani Mahapatra congratulated the author and appreciated the commendable effort made to distil various aspects relating to US Executive-Congressional actions on the Iran nuclear issue. He suggested that the content relating to pertinent legislations could be presented in a more reader-friendly manner. He advised the author to examine the linkages between the laws passed and the politics driving the process, specifically the impact of lobby groups in shaping US Congressional actions as well as administration policies. Further, the impact of the sanctions on the Iranians could be explored, as well as the tensions between the US and its allies in the framing and passing of the laws, some aspects of which were covered by the author. He pointed out that the US Congress was not a unitary actor, and that a huge range of factors was at play in how it works, including lobby groups, various committees among other pertinent issues. Dr. G. Balachandran suggested that a list of acronyms could be incorporated as well as a table indicating the significant sanctions provisions and their use to help improve readability. He also suggested that the author could explore issues such as the extent to which the threat of veto by Obama against new sanctions legislations in the post-JPOA period would be effective given that there has been near unanimity in the US Congress in passing strict legislations against Iran, as has been delineated by the author. Further issues that could be explored were the possible policy options for the US and EU if diplomacy failed and possible contours of an agreement between Iran and the P5+1. Shebonti Dadwal suggested that more analytical heft could be added to the paper on aspects relating to the efficacy of sanctions, the possible linkages between issues like US shale gas revolution and Iran-related Congressional actions, the impact on Iran was well as domestic Iranian reactions to US sanctions measures and whether and how the sanctions have varied across administrations. The Chair urged the author to situate the paper in the broader regional context, critically look at the debate and divergence if any between the legislative and executive arms of the US government as well as the dynamics between the Republicans and the Democrats affecting Congressional actions. Discussions from the floor related to the impact of regional dynamics like the advance of the ISIS in Iraq and its effect on the Iran nuclear negotiations, the linkages between the US sanctions and their impact on the trans-Atlantic alliance, and the role of lobby groups in shaping US Congressional actions as well as US foreign policy as it pertained to the region. Report prepared by Aniruddh Mohan, Research Intern, Nuclear and Arms Control Centre, IDSA |
Nuclear and Arms Control | ||||
Sectarianism, Arab Spring and Saudi Foreign Policy | May 30, 2014 | Prasanta Kumar Pradhan | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar | Eurasia & West Asia | ||||
Nanotechnology: Current Global Trends and Future Military Applications for “Soldier as a System” | May 23, 2014 | Sanjiv Tomar | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: Dr W Selvamurthy |
North America & Strategic Technologies | |||
Indian Maritime Strategy: Drivers and Imperatives | May 16, 2014 | Sarabjeet Singh Parmar | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: R Adm (Retd) K Rajamenon The author argues that as the world looks towards Indian Navy to deliver more it is time to take a stock of where India’s maritime strategy stands. The paper traces the evolution of India’s maritime strategy from the pre-natal days of independence and examines if the present day strategy has aided its quest to be seen as a responsible stable provider of security in the IOR and as a reliable partner in its other areas of interest. It also looks at imperatives that require re-examining. The paper also identifies imperatives that require to be included to enable a cogent maritime strategy and place India in its rightful place in the comity of nations as a responsible and stable actor. The paper tries to explain India’s maritime strategy in terms of drivers and imperatives of strategy. It defines driver as an aspect that has a long term effect; is the raison d’etre and has a direct bearing on the strategy. By imperative it means an aspect that could be temporary; impinge on the strategy and would require a solution so that the drivers are not affected. Therefore, the roles envisaged by the doctrines have been broadly acknowledged as the drivers since they have more or less remained permanent especially since 1998. The author concludes that Indian Maritime Strategy which has been based on a consistent thought process since independence could be viewed as a cognitive articulation of India’s maritime outlook limited by funding, lack of an enforceable higher directive and inherent internal dynamics of governance. The advantage bestowed by geography and the relative intra-regional balance of power equation that has weighed in India’s favour since 1947 could be lost due to the ingress of external powers like China and their ability to exert influence directly or indirectly both on land and sea. It could also be affected by reluctance of nations like the US in maintaining a safe and stable maritime environment. Either way, as India is looked upon by most of its neighbours and other IOR nations as a stability and balancing factor with reasonable capacity and capabilities there is a need to:
Major Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author:
Report prepared by Amit Kumar, Research Assistant, IDSA |
Military Affairs | ||||
Indian Army: Evolving to Adapt Military Change in CI Operations | May 09, 2014 | Vivek Chadha | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: Lt Gen Mukesh Sabharwal (Retd.) While presenting the paper the author at the outset made it clear that this paper is part of a project that seeks to explain how the Indian army adapts to change in different arenas. The focus of this paper is to understand military change in the context of Counterinsurgency (CI) operations. The paper argues that military change in conventional wars is brought about when armies adopt an approach which is often revolutionary, driven by cutting edge technology. Its implementation is directed from the highest level, making it essentially top-down. In contrast, in CI operations, this process is evolutionary, with limited influence of technology. More often than not this is based on bottom-up adaptation, even if in some cases it manifests in top-down implementation. The paper argues that change is resisted in every organization, particularly bureaucratic organizations. Moreover, the nature of resistance is almost similar. It stands true for the military set up also. However, the Indian army is faced with a paradoxical situation of resistance to change and the utmost need thereof. In this struggle of the opposites, the later seems to be guiding the army at present and counterinsurgency (CI) operations are a clear manifestation of army’s willingness to change. Major Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author:
Report prepared by Amit Kumar, Research Assistant, IDSA |
Terrorism & Internal Security | ||||
Changing Patterns in Nepal-China Relations | May 09, 2014 | Pushpa Raj Adhikari | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: Maj Gen Ashok K Mehta (Retd) |
South Asia | |||
The ULFA, the PLA, and the UNLF: Will negotiations Work? | May 02, 2014 | Namrata Goswami | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: Shri E N Ram Mohan The paper aims to understand whether the peace negotiations with the armed groups, i.e., the UNLF and the PLA of Manipur, are viable, and also underlines the debates generated in Assam as a result of the peace negotiations with the ULFA. The author argues that within the framework of peace negotiations, it is important to understand the discourse that exists in these societies before negotiating with the armed groups. This is because protracted conflicts play a very significant role in determining the kind of debates that take place in the public sphere. The process of identity formation, for instance, would depend on the conflict that an individual has witnessed over time. Taking the Naga peace process into consideration, a major reason for its efficacy was due to the discourse that existed in the civil society, i.e., one in which the people were demanding that the armed groups should go for peace talks to end the restrictions of the AFSPA in the state. Along with this, the NSCN (IM) felt that the status quo was not in their favour, and for its leaders, projecting the peace process at a high level of visibility was itself an achievement. The situation in Manipur and Assam is very different as compared to this. One reason why the peace process is so problematic is because of existing categorizations of friend and enemy that have been the basis of identity of an individual from the beginning, which consequently are very difficult to counter. The public discourses in these societies are very narrow and full of assumptions that result in the use of a particular kind of language to describe the other. Let us take a few examples of these existing discourses:
Therefore, given these existing discourses it becomes very disorienting for the armed groups to have peace talks with the government. A ceasefire with the state would pose a question to their authenticity and would mean changing their entire frame of reference. In order to deal with this problem, it becomes important to begin by challenging these existing discourses of difference. And to counter these exclusivist categorizations, new frames have to come into existence. Along with these there are other specific challenges that need to be considered. In the ULFA case, the group has been involved in peace talks with the Government of India since 2011. However, the legitimacy of these talks has been questioned as most of the leaders who were brought to the table were arrested, and hence ‘coerced’ into the peace process. Another challenge to the peace talks is the anti-talk faction of Paresh Barua who is not willing to join the negotiations. While looking at the UNLF and PLA’s contention for peace talks, the most important challenge is an embedded belief that the peace negotiation process is not about conflict transformation or about dealing with the root causes of the problem, but only a counter-insurgency strategy. They feel it is to ensure the group gets divided, weakened and militarily dominated. To counter these challenges, it is important to ensure a significant pre-negotiations stage. Such a stage would involve:
It is also important to remember that negotiations are complex and susceptible to transformation. Four things that are important for the success of a negotiation process are – leadership; the right kind of incentive structures and a common vision; institutional structures that enable the negotiations to succeed; and finally the right kind of implementation. Key points that were raised during the discussion:
Report prepared by Ms. Husanjot Chahal |
Terrorism & Internal Security |