Events

Dr. Jatin Kumar, Research Analyst, West Asia Centre at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, spoke on “Deepening Internal Crises in Lebanon” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 31 October 2022. The session was moderated by Dr. Md. Mudassir Quamar, Associate Fellow, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy (Retd.), Director General, MP-IDSA, Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.), Deputy Director General, MP-IDSA and the scholars of the Institute were in attendance.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since 2019, Lebanon has been facing one of the world’s worst economic crisis which is exacerbated by political instability in the country, owing to several factors such as corruption and economic mismanagement. The crisïs has further deepened after the departure of President Michel Naim Aoun, who left office on 30 October 2022. The situation is also influenced by regional (Hezbollah, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel) and international actors. Various countries such as the United States (US), France, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, have come forward to help Lebanon but they have also urged that a new government be formed and structural reforms be introduced so that the international community can extend its support.

DETAILED REPORT

Dr. Md. Mudassir Quamar, the moderator, during his opening remarks introduced the attendees to the crises in Lebanon. He began by explaining the general causes of instability in the region of West Asia along with their repercussions such as violence, terrorism, civil wars etc., and highlighted the impact felt throughout the world. For years, countries such as Syria, Libya, Iraq and Yemen have been facing several challenges. Now, even Lebanon faces severe economic and political crises to the point that the country is on the verge of collapse.

Dr. Jatin Kumar began by discussing Lebanon’s consistent political and economic crises since 2019. He highlighted that the severity of the crises is evident in the difficulty faced by Lebanon in government formation, especially after the election of May 2022. The situation has got further aggravated after the departure of President Michel Aoun from office.

Dr. Jatin began his analysis by first explaining the geographical positioning and strategic importance of Lebanon in the region. He stated that though small, Lebanon has strategically important in the region of West Asia with respect to countries such as Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iran’s relation with Hezbollah, Lebanon’s political and militia group which functions as a state within a state, has always been a rallying point in Lebanon’s internal politics and its relations with other Gulf countries. For Israel, Lebanon is an immediate neighbouring hostile country which has not yet officially signed a peace agreement unlike Jordan and Egypt. Further, the speaker highlighted how Iranian influence in Lebanon is a problem for Israel’s national security as Iran has been training and providing dangerous arms and ammunition to Hezbollah. Similar to Israel, the Iranian influence on Lebanon is also a problem for Saudi Arabia.  The speaker emphasised how the deepening crisis in Lebanon can add to the misery of the region of West Asia and can trigger another refugee crisis.

Dr. Kumar proceeded to describe the current political system of Lebanon and various problems associated with it. He stated that Lebanon follows a Confessional political system, where the key political positions such as President, Prime Minister and Speaker of the Parliament are reserved on the basis of religious and sectarian lines. In order to explain the political system he also provided the details of various religious communities residing in Lebanon. Thereafter, he highlighted the sectarian problems which the country is facing since its independence and that festered during the long civil war that continued between 1975 to 1989. The Ṭāʾif Accord which ended the civil war, did not change aspects related to sectarian divisions which over a period of time has become one of the major issues for Lebanon. The situation in Lebanon has continued to deteriorate on multiple fronts since 2019. Since then, Four Prime Ministers have changed but political instability remains. The parliamentary elections of May 2202, failed to provide a clear winner which made government formation even more difficult.

Dr. Kumar listed several reasons for the delay in government formation. According to him, the first reason is the political system of Lebanon, which does not allow any single political party to secure a majority in the parliament. The people of Lebanon have consistently protested against the system due to the problems associated with it. Second reason is the misplaced priorities of the political elites in the country, usually with respect to securing lucrative portfolios such as the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Interior and Energy etc. which provide profitable contracts. There was also a disagreement between Prime Minister Najib Azmi Mikati and President Aoun regarding the distribution of key ministries.

Dr. Kumar further spoke about the economic crisis that has engulfed Lebanon. Since 2019, Lebanon has seen consistent economic degradation. Lebanon’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell, inflation skyrocketed and unemployment worsened. Corruption in the country has been one of the major reasons for economic crises, which has led to underutilisation of funds provided by countries such as the US and France.

The speaker also discussed the role of regional rivalries in worsening Lebanon’s conditions. Iran’s relation with Hezbollah becomes an obstacle in receiving financial support from the Gulf countries especially Saudi Arabia. He further highlighted the role of other international actors such as the US and Iran in the crisis. The international community has come forward to help Lebanon to deal with the current situation. Countries like France, US, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and European Union (EU) have given financial aid. India provided 70 metric tons of medical, food, and relief supplies to Lebanon.

In his closing statement, Dr. Jatin concluded that the constant political crisis in Lebanon is a result of sectarianism and a confessional political system. He also concluded that assistance from the international community will not be enough to stabilise Lebanon, as the need of the hour is robust economic and political reforms.

DISCUSSION

Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy highlighted the importance of Lebanon in shaping Israel’s threat perceptions, not only with regard to Iranians or Hezbollah but also with regard to Palestinians. He encouraged the speaker to further examine Lebanon from a multifocal lens, in terms of Israel’s assessment of Lebanon, the impact of tumultuous upheavals in the Levant on Lebanon, impact of normalisation of relations between Israel and other West Asian countries in the region etc. He also suggested that the impact of Lebanon's internal crisis on the Lebanese diaspora throughout the world be studied and urged that any changes taking place within this community owing to the crisis, if any, be examined.

Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi stated that apart from corruption and sectarianism, in the last three years, the impact of COVID-19 must also be taken into consideration for contributing to Lebanon’s dire state. He also observed that the rising prices of oil and grains due to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war has exacerbated the crisis. Unemployment has increased, people are raiding the banks at gunpoint for their own rightful money. He emphasised that the effects of the crisis are colossal and that we might be witnessing a major humanitarian crisis looming large, and soon witness regional or multilateral intervention to contain the crisis.

Points Made During Q&A

1. The confessional political system has a role to play in Lebanon’s current crisis but cannot be considered the only cause of the crisis. There were several reasons as to why the system was adopted. However, it is the lack of reforms within the system which has created political unrest in the country.
2. Hezbollah is a major player in the domestic politics of Lebanon. Its relations with Iran have been an obstacle in unlocking the support from the Gulf countries, especially from Saudi Arabia.
3. The maritime boundary agreement signed between Israel and Lebanon is historic in many respects. It is the first maritime agreement signed between two countries having no diplomatic relations. It is an indirect agreement brokered by the US and yet accounts for a treaty under international law.

Dr. R. Vignesh, Research Analyst, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), spoke on "One Year of AUKUS: An Assessment of Progress and Challenges” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 17 October 2022. The session was moderated by Cmde. Abhay K. Singh (Retd.) Research Fellow, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA, Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.), Deputy Director General, MP-IDSA, and scholars of the Institute were in attendance and shared their valuable inputs.

Executive Summary

One year ago, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States announced the AUKUS pact. The key element of the agreement is Australia's creation of a new nuclear-powered submarine fleet. When it is completed, it will greatly enhance Australia's naval capabilities and help the country reach its objective of having a sizable maritime presence in both the Pacific and Indian Oceans. It has been stated that AUKUS will adhere to the highest non-proliferation regulations and enable Australia to acquire nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarines at the earliest. At the same time, it has also become clear that AUKUS certainly goes beyond just SSNs and involves the development of other niche capabilities as well, in areas such as hypersonics, quantum technologies, artificial intelligence (AI), cyber, autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV) and electronic warfare capabilities (EWC). Consequently, a thorough analysis of current trends and projected outcomes in the Indo-Pacific is essential to carefully examine current trends and expected outcomes in the Indo-Pacific region, especially in light of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) dilemma.

Detailed Report

In his opening remarks, Cmde. Abhay K. Singh briefly highlighted the various developments that have taken place since the announcement of AUKUS and underscored certain challenges it faces. He described how the US, UK, and Australia signed this agreement on 15 September 2021 along with the announcement of their strengthened trilateral security alliance. He also emphasised the partnership's potential for further technology cooperation and assistance from the US and UK to help Australia fulfil its own desire for a nuclear strike submarine. He further set the tone by asking some straightforward questions about this arrangement in order for it to become clear. What drove Australia to terminate its French programme and its pursuit for a nuclear submarine? He illustrated the Australian military's commitment to partnerships with the US as moving beyond interoperability to interchangeability. He also lay out the presentation's framework in terms of what transpired during the AUKUS grouping's interim year and the limitations of this relationship. After the brief introduction, the Chair gave the floor to Dr. R.Vignesh. The speaker began by referring to AUKUS as a historic agreement since the last time a sought and ground-breaking military technology, such as naval nuclear propulsion, was shared was in 1958 under the US-UK Mutual Defense Agreement. The speaker also emphasised the enormous strides made so far by these three nations in effectively generating a momentum by developing the necessary legal and policy framework for facilitating the production of nuclear attack submarines, and developing other cutting-edge capabilities.

The first point made by the speaker was with reference to the Agreement on the exchange of naval nuclear propulsion information (ENNPIA). He mentioned the purpose, which is to share critical information on naval nuclear propulsion with Australia. The agreement addresses a number of issues, including how the information will be distributed and how easily it would be accessible. The agreement was signed in Canberra on 22 November 2021, and it became effective on 8 February 2022. Additionally, the speaker brought up the ENNPIA's primary objective, which was to provide the legal framework for the Nuclear Power Submarine Task Force (NPST) which is led by Vice Admiral Jonathan Dallas Mead of the Royal Australian Navy. The Australian Government formed the NPST to determine the best course of action for the Royal Australian Navy's acquisition of conventionally armed nuclear attack submarines within the next 18 months. The NPST is currently engaged in carrying out a thorough examination of the design of the hull, the safety of the nuclear reactors and the establishment of the prerequisite infrastructure.

According to the speaker, it is widely speculated that based on the recommendation given by NPST, Australia would make the choice between two nuclear attack submarines. One, the Virginia class (U.S) and other the Astute class submarine (Royal Navy). He further mentioned the series of meetings held over the year between AUKUS members with regard to the collaboration on the development of niche technologies like hypersonic, cyber capabilities and quantum technology. He went on explain the Chinese opposition to AUKUS at the IAEA and India’s role in persuading member-states to oppose China’s anti-AUKUS resolution in the IAEA. He also discussed the governance structure of AUKUS that has been created. The AUKUS partnership has created a three tier governance framework for better coordination among different stakeholders.

The speaker emphasised that AUKUS goes beyond just the development of nuclear submarines and also involves collaboration in development of certain niche defence technologies. This covers emerging quantum communications technology as well as autonomous underwater vehicles. The speaker mentioned Australia's US$6.8 billion investment in a new initiative called REDSPICE. Australia wants to quadruple its present offensive cyber capabilities through this project. As well as increasing the use of cutting-edge artificial intelligence, machine learning, and cloud technologies, Australia is able to engage in cyber hunt operations and expand the reach of its cyber capabilities globally. He also emphasised the Australian Labour Party's commitment to establishing an Advanced Strategic Research Agency (ASRA) under the Department of Defense that will be modelled after the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). In spite of the numerous changes that have occurred in the year following the announcement, enabling Australia to acquire eight nuclear submarines remains the core objective of AUKUS. He stated that this objective has a long time frame spanning nearly three decades.

The speaker continued by listing the different challenges that AUKUS might face. He cited the 2009 Australian Defence White Paper, which identified the absence of submarine capabilities in the Royal Australian Navy as a serious problem that needed to be addressed right away. Many commentators have since noted that this specific task has only been made more difficult by the termination of the submarine agreement with France and the signing of the AUKUS. The speaker noted that there is currently no nuclear industry in Australia. As a result, he brought out Australia’s attempts to manufacture advanced nuclear submarines under the AUKUS programme. However, it is to be assumed that the US Navy will help Australia during the time when it will essentially have no submarine capabilities before the first nuclear attack submarine is deployed, as Australia has traditionally been under the US's security umbrella. The speaker raised the question about continuing domestic support for AUKUS in Australia. He said that AUKUS has so far had significant political backing from both parties. The Green Party's opposition to AUKUS is merely a small portion of Australians' overall views. Finally, after analysing the developments till date pertaining to AUKUS, the speaker made three points.  

He brought out that there is an argument in the strategic community that by joining the AUKUS, Australia has surrendered its strategic autonomy. He cited Professor Hugh White of the Australian National University who brought forward this notion in his recent article where he stated that by joining AUKUS, Australia has compromised on its independent stance to deal with China’s rise. But the speaker noted that the US and Australian strategic conformity has been a common feature across all Indo-Pacific geostrategic architectures like the QUAD, Five Eyes and ANZUS. Taking this into context he described AUKUS as an indicator of Australia’s conformity with the US strategic perspective on the Indo-Pacific.

The speaker stated that AUKUS is an indicator of the United Kingdom's (UK) return to the Suez region. He quoted Boris Johnson’s speech in 2016 where he described the UK’s decision to withdraw from east of Suez in 1968 as a historic error. He also asserted that the UK is committed to changing its policy, despite not possessing the strongest military, and that it will make use of any opportunities that have arisen as a result of the UK’s exit from the European Union. After more than fifty years, we can see that AUKUS is yet another sign that the UK is making a serious effort to establish its strategic presence in the Indo-Pacific region. The speaker also pointed out the fact that despite Australia being a continent-sized country, its population has long hindered its ability to develop an ideal defence industrial base. The speaker stated that AUKUS illustrates Australia’s attempt to revolutionise its military-industrial base.

The speaker concluded by saying that, despite the numerous announcements and developments that have taken place since the AUKUS’s inception a year ago, it is unlikely that any of these developments will have a significant impact on the larger Indo-Pacific geopolitical discourse or provide strategic stability any time soon.

During the panel discussion Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, mentioned that the AUKUS arrangement is a direct response to China's militarisation and its growing naval power in the oceanic spaces. The transformation of a brown water navy into a blue water navy is forcing the PLA navy to move beyond the first island chain and poses a threat to the existing security situation in the Pacific. He noted that nations like Australia and Japan seeking strategic autonomy with their existing military capability is equivalent to wishing for one's demise. Ambassador Chinoy cited the series of incidents wherein Chinese spy ships have been regularly tracking Australian Navy ships during the Talisman Sabre exercises with the US Navy.  According to him Australia must provide protection to its naval assets, whether it does so independently with its limited capability or by collaboration with the US naval forces. Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi, brought out China’s recent attempts to sign a security agreement with the ten Pacific Island nations to counter the US influence in the region. He described this as an emerging power struggle between the West and China in the Pacific and also brought out that this is bound to increase the significance of AUKUS in the Pacific. .

The session concluded after an insightful exchange of views between scholars during the Q&A session.

Report was prepared by Mr. Om Ranjan, Intern, Military Affairs Centre, MP-IDSA

Dr. Smruti S. Pattanaik, Research Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), spoke on "Sheikh Hasina’s Visit to India and India-Bangladesh Relations” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 12 September 2022. The session was moderated by Dr. Pushpita Das, Research Fellow. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA, Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.), Deputy Director General, MP-IDSA, and scholars of the Institute were in attendance.

Executive Summary

Sheikh Hasina, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh embarked on a four day visit to India, starting September 5. Seven Memorandums of Understanding (MoU’s) were signed and exchanged during the trip. They announced several new connectivity projects, cooperation and capacity-building initiatives. An exhaustive joint statement of 32 points was issued by the end of the visit. Points that were deliberated during the visit were elucidated upon. India-Bangladesh bilateral ties were discussed in light of trade and connectivity, and cooperation on defence.

Detailed Report

Dr. Das introduced the topic of the Monday Morning Meeting, by briefly discussing Sheikh Hasina’s visit to India. She spoke of cooperation on defence border management, trade and connectivity, water resources, power and energy, people to people contact, etc. During this visit, the countries also signed 7 MoU’s, focused on river water sharing, capacity building, and cooperation in space, science and technologies. Both the countries also announced several new connectivity initiatives and produced a 32-point joint statement. She then invited Dr. Pattanaik to make her presentation.

Dr. Pattanaik briefly discussed the issues that were agreed upon during the visit, including the 7 MoU’s signed and exchanged, including withdrawal of water from Kushiyara River, capacity building of railway staff, collaboration in IT application for Bangladesh Railways, cooperation on space technology, and between CSIR (Council for Scientific & Industrial Research) and BCSIR (Bangladesh Council of Scientific & Industrial Research), between Prasar Bharti and Bangladesh Television and on capacity building of Bangladeshi judicial officers in India. She then elucidated on the withdrawal of 153 cusec (cubic feet/ second) water from the Kushiyara River agreed by the two countries. The water was to be used for irrigation of about 5000 hectares of land. India requested Bangladesh to conclude water sharing on the Feni River. Bangladesh in 2019 had agreed to supply 1.83 cusecs of water to Tripura, in recognition of Tripura’s contribution to the Bangladeshi Liberation War.

The Speaker said that Maitree Bridge over Feni, which was inaugurated in 2019, connecting Tripura with Bangladesh, is going to further enhance connectivity between the two countries.  Within the aspect of subregional projects, India asked for a highway from Hili in West Bengal to Mahendraganj in Meghalaya through Bangladesh. This is a subregional project because the two countries are part of the BBIN (Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal) network. While Bhutan is yet to ratify the BBIN, there are expectations it will do so in the future. In the meanwhile, it has asked other member states to go ahead with the provisions while it completes the internal process of ratification.

It was announced that riverine services under the Protocol on Inland Water Transit and Trade (PIWTT) routes 5 & 6 (Dhulian-Rajshahi-Aricha) and 9 & 10 (Sonamura-Daudkhandi) would be expanded. It was argued that railways and waterways are cost-effective compared to road networks. Due to the new connecting routes, 1.5 million metric tons traffic is transported per annum through them, out of which 1.495 million metric tons is the trade between India and Bangladesh, while only 0.005 million metric tons is transit cargo. Not all the points that were deliberated upon found a place in the joint statement. The Speaker stated that Bangladesh has sent an invite through the Minister in charge of DoNER (Development of Northeastern Region) to the Chief Ministers of the Northeast region.

Dr. Pattanaik mentioned there were 5 major railway links prior to partition. Trade using the railways was snapped in 1965 after the Indo-Pak war. Both the countries are cooperating to restore the railway link that existed making the region economically vibrant. The two countries also witnessed the inauguration of the Rupsha Railway Bridge. They agreed to upgrade Khulna-Darshana and Parbatipur-Kaunia railway links for bilateral traffic. India will provide 20 diesel locomotives to Bangladesh Railway on grant. She also discussed the supply of road construction equipment and machinery to the Road and Highways Department of Bangladesh. Bangladesh also expressed is interest in becoming  part of the trilateral highway between India, Myanmar and Thailand.

Dr. Pattanaik mentioned that the second freight gate at Petrapole-Benapole Integrated Check-Post (ICP) would help in reducing the congestion on this route. Very often trucks from both the sides wait for hours for custom clearance. During Sheikh Hasina’s visit, India announced free transit facility for Bangladeshi exports to third countries using Indian ports. Within the Coastal Shipping Agreement of 2015, it is now proposed to include third country EXIM cargo.

Unit 1 of the 1320 MW Maitree power plant in Rampal, Bangladesh was inaugurated, and it is expected the second unit will be inaugurated around December. This will help Bangladesh to overcome its energy needs.

The Speaker mentioned that Bangladesh has requested India to allow the Chilahati-Haldibari rail link where a freight train resumed after 56 years, for trade with Nepal and Bhutan.  The Indian side requested Bangladesh to remove port restrictions at Chilahati-Haldibari and also other non-tariff barriers at the Agartala-Akhaura ICP for easy market access to Northeastern states. She observed the limitation of the variety of products that could be transported through this route, considering that the route allows trade on the positive list, unlike other trading points where trade takes place on the basis of a negative list. India requested Bangladesh to facilitate a high capacity 765KV transmission line from Katihar, Bihar to Bornagar, Assam through Parbotipur in Bangladesh. Indian requests also included the implementation of the 2019 MoU for providing a coastal radar system for greater maritime security.

Bangladesh has requested to expedite water sharing on Teesta River. It also requested India to facilitate import of power from Nepal and Bhutan. The Indian side already has a mechanism for cross border electricity trade in place. Bangladesh also sought assistance from India to get petroleum and petroleum products for its domestic requirements. Dr. Pattanaik referred to this request and said that this will be implemented once Assam’s Numaligarh Refinery that is supposed to provide high speed diesel to Bangladesh is completed. Bangladesh has also allowed India to use its territory to transit oil from Assam to Tripura. India has taken the initiative to provide medical treatment of Bangladesh Muktijoddhas at medical facilities in India. Efforts for convening the Joint Working Group on Sundarbans would also to be started.

The Speaker stated that Indo-Bangladesh trade has received a massive boost. The total trade which was only US$ 2 billion few years back has grown to US$18 billion. Bangladesh’s exports to India nearly amount to US$ 2 billion. Bangladesh often complains about the lopsided trade between the two countries. Interestingly Bangladesh’s trade with China is equally lop sided. However, this issue is rarely raised in public, as trade imbalance with India becomes a part of domestic politics. China, under the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement in which Bangladesh is also a member, announced that 97% of Bangladeshi goods would have duty-free access to the Chinese market. However this action was portrayed in Bangladesh as a demonstration of Chinese generosity. It needs to be noted that much of what Bangladesh imports from India goes to the production of garments which Bangladesh exports to Western countries adding to the country’s forex reserves.

The two countries want to complete negotiation on a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) by 2026, when Bangladesh graduates from being a least developed country (LDC) to a developing country. This is significant as CEPA will include service and investments. Since most of the concessions Bangladesh enjoys as a LDC will go, the way forward could be expanding the export basket in trade and include services. The Speaker argued that having connectivity in place would not suffice unless the two countries address issues of trade barriers, congestion at land ports and move to a digital platform for clearance of goods.

Another major challenge the Speaker noted is the Bangladeshi expectations from India to put pressure on Myanmar for repatriation of Rohingyas. She said that India is facing the problem of refugees. Not just Rohingyas but other ethnic people from Chin state have sought shelter in India. Mizoram’s Chief Minister Zoramthanga has sheltered them despite no formal governmental policy being in place for the same. She also noted that India is building 50,000 houses under a grant project in Rakhine state in Myanmar. Most Rohingyas in Bangladesh, however, have refused to go back to Myanmar until the citizenship laws are changed. This becomes an internal matter for Myanmar, where India has no jurisdiction.

The Speaker briefly mentioned the 54 common rivers that India and Bangladesh share. Yet cooperation on water, including basin management has been sluggish. The 38th Joint River Commission (JRC) held its meeting in August after a gap of 12 years. Currently, most of the debate on water sharing revolves around Teesta. In 2026, the Ganges Water Treaty is going to expire after 30 years of being in existence. It is important that talks on this issue are initiated. Within India it is important to build consensus, as many of the States which share Ganges water are facing water scarcity.  

Lastly, Dr. Pattanaik touched upon the finalisation of initial procurement plans for vehicles for the Bangladeshi armed forces. She touched upon issues related to border crimes. She also mentioned the high-level tri-services meeting, annual defence dialogue, joint anti-terror military exercises, coordinated patrol by coast guards and navies as some steps that have been initiated. A recurrent theme in bilateral relations is the firings at the border which have resulted in deaths. Bangladesh insisted on a zero-death policy. Dr. Pattanaik delinked the killings and illegal migration. She contextualised the information with reference to two points- smuggling at the border, mainly of cattle (illegal in India, but not in Bangladesh), and lack of intense patrol on the Bangladesh side compared to India. She mentioned that the two countries have Home Ministry level talks to address the issue of human trafficking due to the porous border.

The Report was prepared by Ms. Vanrika Satyan, Intern, East Asia Centre, MP-IDSA

Mr. Jason Wahlang, Research Analyst with the Europe and Eurasia Centre at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), spoke on “India and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO): Taking Stock of the Summit in Samarkand” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 19 September 2022. The session was chaired by Dr. Rajorshi Roy, Associate Fellow, Europe and Eurasia Centre. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP- IDSA, Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.), Deputy Director General, MP- IDSA, and scholars of the Institute were in attendance.

Executive Summary

SCO has been dominated by Chinese interests and motives in the region. Founded with the intention to settle territorial disputes in Central Asian region, it has come a long way. The organisation has always found itself in a tight Chinese grip, even in dealing with the terrorist organisations operating around the Chinese borders. It certainly helps India to be a part of the organisation as it provides the former a seat at the high table to discuss crucial security matters pertaining to its adversaries- China and Pakistan. It also helps India further its extended neighbourhood policy and reach out to the Central Asian region. Recent visit of Prime Minister Modi to Samarkand for the 22nd SCO Summit and the commencement of India’s presidency of the organisation could shape its outlook and framework in dealing with various issues of importance.

Detailed Report

Dr. Rajorshi Roy introduced the topic and provided the historical background of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). He identified the organisation as a multilateral grouping of the Eurasian region, dominated initially by Russia and China. Reflecting on India’s role at the organisation, Dr. Roy made it clear that considering the decisions in SCO are made by consensus, India ought to be inside the organisation than out of it. He then invited the speaker to address the attendees.

Mr. Jason Wahlang began his presentation by mentioning the upcoming Indian Presidency of the SCO and the recent visit of the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Samarkand to attend the 22nd summit of the organisation. The Speaker listed out the names of the member states, observer states and dialogue partners of the SCO, while also reminding the audience of Iran’s upcoming permanent membership of the organisation in April 2023.

The Speaker highlighted the significance of SCO in terms of being the biggest organisation of the Eurasian region. Its members make up 40 per cent of the world population and a third of the global Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The region features amongst the top energy producers (Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Iran) and consumers (India and China) of the world.  He further mentioned the aims and objectives of the organisation to maintain peace and security, promote confidence building measures and strengthen political and economic cooperation among the regional powers.

Mr. Wahlang mentioned that SCO was formed in 1995 under the banner ‘Shanghai Five Organisation’, comprising Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In 2001, the name was changed to SCO after the induction of Uzbekistan and later India and Pakistan in 2017. From applying for membership in 2014 to holding its presidency in 2022, India has come a long way in the organisation.

The Speaker believed that being a part of the SCO has provided India with many opportunities, which it was otherwise bereft of. It has provided India with a way to connect with the Central Asian Region (CAR).  India’s ‘Connect Central Asia Policy’ and PM Modi’s visit to the region in 2015 reflects the importance the region holds for India.  Being a part of SCO has made the reach to these resource rich pockets of CAR more accessible. It provides India with a seat at the high table to discuss issues of regional importance and a platform to balance the China-Pakistan nexus.

Before delving into the details of the PM’s visit, the Speaker shared the highlights of the SCO Summit, where Chinese President welcomed India’s presidency. The organisation nominated Varanasi as its first ever cultural capital for the year 2022-2023. Discussing the additions to the organisation, the Speaker mentioned the signing of ‘Memorandum of Obligations’ by Iran and the initiation of procedures to include Belarus as a permanent member.

Mr. Wahlang drew a comparative analysis of the SCO summit held in Tashkent last year with the 2022 Samarkand event. Both took place against the backdrop of conflicts (Afghan conflict in 2021 and Ukraine conflict in 2022). Afghanistan featured in the discussions each time but for different reasons and both times, an expansion of the organisation’s membership was on the agenda. The main difference highlighted was the core focal point of the two summits. In 2021, Afghanistan and regional security were the focus but this year it was replaced by connectivity and cooperation amongst member states.

The Speaker mentioned that prior to PM Modi’s visit to Samarkand, Indian Foreign Minister and Defence Minister had visited the CARs to set the tone for the meeting on 15 September. They covered a range of issues pertaining to Iran and Afghanistan, the organisation’s zero tolerance towards terrorism and its regional anti-terrorist structure (RATS). When PM Modi visited Samarkand on 15 September, he highlighted the need for greater cooperation and trust to build reliable and resilient supply chains in the region. The PM rallied for full transit rights in the region and mentioned the issues of connectivity and food security post the Afghan and Ukraine crisis respectively. To resolve the issue of food supply, PM Modi promoted the cultivation and consumption of millets, of which India is a leader.

The Speaker also mentioned the various bilateral meetings held on the sidelines of the summit. PM Modi met with the Russian President Vladimir Putin and touched upon the Ukraine crisis, free visa exchanges between the two nations and trade in energy and fertilizers. He met with the Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi to discuss Chabahar port and India’s connectivity with Afghanistan. Alongside, PM Modi also met the Turkish President Receip Tayyip Erdogan and deliberated on ways to improve bilateral cooperation. Lastly, the Indian PM met with the Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev to discuss diversification of trade, economic and connectivity concerns.

Highlighting the challenges that India faces in the SCO, Mr. Wahlang mentioned the dominance of Chinese interests in the organisation. Due to its overbearing economic presence in the region, other powers find it difficult to diversify their ties. Another is the lack of direct land connectivity from India to CAR, which hinders the pace of progress of India-CARs relations. The shortest possible land connectivity route from India to Central Asia is through Pakistan, which remains inaccessible to India. The best alternative is the maritime route to Iran and the land route thereafter connecting to Central Asia and Afghanistan. This makes Iran crucial for India to strengthen its outreach towards the CARs.

The Afghanistan conflict and Taliban rule have undermined the security and stability of the region, adding to the many challenges that India faces. The counter terrorism policy framework of SCO takes a tougher stand against the threats faced by its founding members, as compared to those threatening its South Asian members.  This is a crucial challenge that stands in the way of firmly dealing with terror threats emanating from the Af-Pak region which often pose security concerns for India.

Lastly, the Speaker mentioned the Afghan conflict and the role of various terror organisations like the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and others in upsetting the security situation of Central and South Asia. Intelligence sharing could be a vital way to control these groups’ tactics from slipping into the broader South Asian region but there are limitations when neighbours like Pakistan and China are part of such an equation.

Mr. Wahlang concluded by saying that the potential of SCO remains untapped when it comes to cooperation in the fields like environment, climate change, health and disaster relief operations. India has a lot to offer to the organisation.

Discussion

Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, DG, MP-IDSA said that India needs to redefine its neighbourhood first policy to include Central Asia and not South Asia alone. India is currently practicing neighbourhood policy 2.0, which has a central place for the CARs. This makes SCO a very important organisation as it includes the countries of India’s extended neighbourhood.

The Director General then reflected on the role of India’s Presidency and the challenges that lie ahead. How will India deal with the Chinese dominance in prioritising the Central Asian terror threats as compared to the ones emanating from the Af-Pak region? He mentioned how the terror groups are conjoined beyond their geographical areas. ISKP is one such organisation, which is equally present in Central and South Asia. One of the major challenges for India will be to reconcile different views and come up with a uniform definition of terrorism, something even the United Nations (UN) is struggling with till date.

Ambassador Chinoy highlighted the issue of connectivity and questioned how India plans on dealing with issues like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which it cannot walk away from during its presidential tenure. He also mentioned the intra-regional conflicts prevalent in the CAR and questioned their bearing on the functioning of SCO. The Tajik- Krygyz conflict is one such example. He also lay emphasis on the RATS mechanism for intelligence sharing.

Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi, (Retd.), DDG, MP-IDSA highlighted India’s connectivity efforts with the SCO members in  light of the Chabahar port, International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and a potential undersea pipeline connecting Gujarat in India to Iran. He said that as the Indian economy grows, it will require access to markets beyond its current borders and for that SCO is a great channel to get convenient access to Central Asian markets.

He also spoke about the maritime connectivity that SCO members offer, particularly the India to Iran route for further access to the CAR. He questioned the reasons for slow progress at the Chabahar port and if there was a way to connect to Central Asia, via Chabahar, without getting into Afghan territory. In conclusion, he laid emphasis on increased connectivity in the region for improved coordination and cooperation.

MP-IDSA scholars raised questions pertaining to various themes like the ripple effects of the Armenia- Azerbaijan conflict in the region, how has India’s role in SCO benefitted the organisation, current status of CASA-1000, the Afghan contact group, SCO as an organisation vis-à-vis the CSTO, the role played by media in projecting India’s bilateral relations with the Central Asian nations (especially Russia), multi-polarity, potential SCO investors interested in the Indian market and the Russia-Ukraine crisis.

The Speaker provided detailed and insightful responses to the comments and queries received from the attendees.

This report was prepared by Ms. Anandita Bhada, Research Analyst, Europe and Eurasia Centre, MP-IDSA.