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Monday Morning Meeting on “15th BRICS Summit” August 21, 2023 Monday Morning Meeting

Dr. Rajeesh Kumar, Associate Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, made a presentation on the “15th BRICS Summit” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 21 August 2023. The session was moderated by Mr. Mohanasakthivel J, Research Analyst, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, the Director General of MP-IDSA, and scholars of the Institute were in attendance.

Executive Summary

The presentation by Dr. Rajeesh Kumar on BRICS highlighted its evolution from BRIC to BRICS, the group's focus on global governance inequalities, and its potential to challenge the established world order. BRICS supports a rule-based international order while fostering a non-Western identity. The 15th BRICS Summit's significance lies in partnerships with Africa, addressing green transition, education, trade, recovery, and multilateralism. The possibilities of BRICS expansion and a common currency were explored. India's participation in BRICS aligns with pursuing strategic autonomy and geopolitical equilibrium. The group acts as a platform for India to advocate Global South solidarity, multipolarity, and reformed multilateralism.

Detailed Report

The discussion was initiated by Mr. Mohanasakthivel J, who emphasised the commencement of the inaugural BRICS Summit in 2009. According to him, throughout the last 14 years, each leader has taken an active part in the BRICS Summits, even amid the pandemic. BRICS represents 41% of the global population, 31% of the world's GDP, and 16% of worldwide trade, allowing for a comparison of its performance with that of other institutions. Over 40 countries are expressing interest in becoming part of BRICS.

Dr. Rajeesh Kumar began his presentation by highlighting that the term "BRIC" was coined by economist Jim O'Neill in 2001, reflecting the growth potential of emerging economies. The acronym initially included Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC), which evolved to BRICS with South Africa's inclusion in 2010. Annual Summits of the group started in 2011.

The presentation underscored that BRICS functions as a forum aimed at addressing global governance inequalities and encompasses an ambitious agenda that mirrors the increasing influence and interests of emerging powers. Dr. Kumar said that over time, BRICS demonstrated superiority over G7 economies in terms of GDP (PPP), and the grouping endorses an alternative, multipolar world order.

Dr. Kumar highlighted that BRICS takes a stance that supports a rule-based liberal international order (LIO) while emphasizing sovereignty and non-intervention. This positions BRICS to foster a non- western identity and solidarity. The group's interactions with the United States influences its negotiations, indicating its aspiration for an alternative, multipolar world order within the existing LIO.

The 15th BRICS Summit holds significant importance, focusing on "BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Growth, Development, and Inclusive Multilateralism." The Summit's priorities encompass equitable transitions, education, the African Continental Free Trade Area, post-pandemic recovery, and strengthening of multilateralism. Topics of discussion range from expansion and local currency fundraising to economic cooperation and Africa-centric issues.

Notably, the 15th BRICS Summit is the first in-person meeting post-COVID. The absence of Russian President Putin poses diplomatic and legal challenges for South Africa. However, this absence offers BRICS the opportunity to concentrate on key issues, thereby showing the group's maturity.

Regarding expansion, with over 40 countries expressing interest and 23 formally applying for membership, Dr. Kumar noted that the possibility of expansion is high. The idea of expansion can be traced back to South Africa's outreach in 2013 and China's introduction of the BRICS Plus concept in 2017. While all five members support expansion, challenges involve accession criteria, internal contradictions, and differing African positions.

Dr. Kumar also highlighted the limited potential for a common BRICS currency, focusing on reducing US dollar reliance due to historical sanctions. This involves boosting local currency transactions to decrease dependency. Reduced USD usage in trade settlements is noted, supported by tools like BRICS Pay for bilateral local currency transactions. This shift reflects BRICS' strategic response to enhance economic autonomy in the face of external pressures.

Dr. Kumar further explored India's strategic stance within BRICS, highlighting its pursuit of strategic autonomy, geopolitical balancing, and roles in combating terrorism and addressing climate change. India's positive response to BRICS, despite growing friendship with the West underscores its commitment to cooperation within the group and the multipolar world order.

In conclusion, Dr. Kumar said that despite potential weakening, BRICS remains a functional entity driven by common economic interests. Its unity originates from shared economic goals rather than a uniform political vision. The enduring objectives of representing developing countries, reforming global governance, and fostering economic growth remain fundamental. While expansion prospects remain on the card and the creation of a BRICS-specific currency seems improbable, the core values and missions of BRICS continue to guide its path in the intricate landscape of international cooperation.

Q&A Session

Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA, commended the presentation and raised a query about the current relevance of BRICS. He also remarked on the proliferation of various global alliances, noting that creating groups solely for the purpose of formation diminishes their significance. He highlighted that groups like G77 do not necessarily represent shared common objectives. He cautioned against BRICS leaning towards an anti-western stance rather than a non-western one, necessitating careful consideration. Regarding expansion, he pointed out that the countries aspiring for BRICS membership often align with China on various international resolutions, counter to Western interests. In response, Dr. Kumar concurred with the Director General's remark and expressed that the enlargement of BRICS is detrimental to India's interests.

Dr. Rajiv Nayan, Senior Research Associate, asked how BRICS differs from SCO as a non-western multilateral grouping.

Group Captain (Dr.) Rajiv Kumar Narang, Senior Fellow, raised queries about BRICS expansion, particularly India's relationship with the countries which officially applied for the membership. He also asked about the scope of India-Brazil collaboration in the aeronautics sector.

Dr. Anand Kumar, Associate Fellow, inquired about any forthcoming developments as Modi and Xi reconnect during this Summit after years.

Mr Niranjan Oak, Research Analyst, inquired whether the expansion of BRICS could contribute to bipolarity in the global world order.

Capt. Anurag Bisen, Research Fellow, explored the possibility of India utilising the IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa) trilateral framework within BRICS to counter China.

Dr. Rajeesh Kumar gave a detailed explanation to the queries and comments raised by the participants.

The report has been prepared by Mr. Mohan Singh Dhangar, Research Intern, East Asia Centre, MP-IDSA, New Delhi.

Monday Morning Meeting on “India’s Moon Program” August 28, 2023 Monday Morning Meeting

Gp. Capt. (Dr.) Ajey Lele (Retd), Consultant, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, spoke on “India’s Moon Program” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 28 August 2023. The session was moderated by Dr. Cherian Samuel, Research Fellow, MP-IDSA. The scholars of MP-IDSA were in attendance.

Executive Summary

India's space journey began on 21 November 1963, with the launch of a US Nike Apache sounding rocket from Thumba near Thiruvananthapuram. Following this, the Indian Space Program went through various phases, the latest being the moon program. The discussion also highlighted the differences between Chandrayaan 1, Chandrayaan 2, and Chandrayaan 3 Missions, and shed light on India's commitment to using space technology for societal betterment and knowledge advancement rather than merely competing with more technologically advanced nations. This approach aligns with Sarabhai's original vision and emphasizes India's unique and innovative contributions to global challenges through space technology.

Detailed Report

In his opening remarks, Dr. Lele elaborated on the beginning of the Indian Space Program. The nation embarked on its celestial journey on 21 November 1963, when the US Nike Apache sounding rocket took off from Thumba, near Thiruvananthapuram. This maiden step epitomised the visionary aspirations of Dr. Vikram Sarabhai, who prioritised the quest for solutions to societal issues over any desire to outpace advanced nations in the space race. Dr. Lele also elucidated how humanity has always been fixated on the moon and other celestial bodies, often exemplified through artistic and poetic expressions. With scientific advancement and the incessant quest for exploring Space, humanity reached the lunar surface when Neil Armstrong became the first human to reach the Moon.

Dr. Lele also emphasised the significant role played by the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) in the development of India’s rural areas by investing in and leveraging remote sensing to supply relevant information to stakeholders. In fact, ISRO's substantial budget goes to projects to address broader societal problems. Furthermore, for India, the Moon became an agenda in the 2000s when the Government of India approved ISRO's proposal for the first Indian Moon Mission, called Chandrayaan-1 in November 2003. Later the Space Law and Planetary Exploration Conference was organized in Bangalore from 26- 29 June 2005.

Furthermore, he provided more detailed explanations of the prevailing theories concerning the Moon's evolution, encompassing concepts such as the Capture Theory, Fission Theory, and various others. Capture Theory suggests that the Moon was a wandering celestial body like a asteroid and was captured by Earth’s gravity as it passed nearby. The Fission Theory suggests that Moon was once part of Earth that broke away and began to orbit the planet. The other prevailing explanation about the existence of Moon is that a planet called Theia interacted with Earth with some of the resulting debris gathering to form the Moon. The Moon's topography presents a significant challenge due to its extreme temperature. The temperatures at the Moon can plummet to as low as -130 degrees Celsius.

Dr. Lele delved into the distinctions between the Chandrayaan 1, Chandrayaan 2, and Chandrayaan 3 Missions, shedding light on the rationale behind humanity's lunar endeavors. Dr. Lele explained that the Chandrayaan 1 Mission, initially designed for a two-year duration, ultimately remained operational for only one year. It entered lunar orbit at an altitude of 100 kilometers to capture images of the Moon's surface. Additionally, Chandrayaan 1 was equipped with 11 scientific instruments from various international partners and successfully detected the presence of water on the Moon. The data provided by Chandrayaan's 11 payloads were used by the scientific community to study the Moon and its environment and played a significant role in bettering our understanding of the Moon.

At the outset, Chandrayaan 2 was conceived as a collaborative endeavor between ISRO and Russia's Roscosmos. In this arrangement, ISRO was responsible for supplying the orbiter, and rover, and overseeing the launch, while Russia's role was to furnish the lander. Subsequently, ISRO decided to proceed independently and assumed the responsibility of developing the lander on its own. The Chandrayaan 2 Mission's failure can be attributed to two primary factors. One of these factors was a software glitch, and the other was a deviation in the trajectory when the spacecraft was at an altitude ranging from 2.1 to 0.2 kilometers above the intended landing zone. Despite these setbacks, the mission yielded a wealth of valuable data about the Moon's terrain, including insights into its craters and other features.

Chandrayan 3 was a solo mission, featuring only one NASA sensor. ISRO capitalised on the lessons learned from the setbacks encountered during the Chandrayaan 2 Mission. The mission design employed a failure-based approach, with extensive simulations conducted to address potential challenges. To ensure the mission's success, significant enhancements were made to the algorithms. Hardware modifications included reinforcing the lander's legs, and equipping it with four engines.

Expanding on the mission payloads and objectives, Dr. Lele provided some additional details. The lander is equipped with three payloads, and the rover also carried two payloads of its own. These payloads are specifically designed for tasks such as analysing the chemical and elemental composition of lunar soil and measuring its thermophysical properties.

In a more detailed discussion on the global lunar exploration agenda, Dr. Lele highlighted key milestones and initiatives. The Soviets were the pioneers in achieving a robotic lunar landing. Several decades ago, Japan articulated ambitious lunar plans, although progress has been relatively slow. More recently, countries like the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia have shown significant interest in developing their Space Programs.

South Korea successfully launched the Danuri, also known as the Korean Pathfinder Lunar Orbiter (KPLO), to the Moon. Israel, with its limited Space Program mandate, made history with Beresheet, its first lunar mission.

The United States introduced the Artemis program, encompassing both robotic and human lunar exploration efforts. NASA leads this program, with support from the European Space Agency (ESA) and Space agencies in Japan and Canada.

China embarked on its lunar journey with the launch of Chang'e 1, an orbiter, in October 2007. The first successful Chinese lunar landing occurred during the Chang'e 3 Mission, which included a lander and rover system. Presently, China operates the Chang'e 4 and Chang'e 5 systems, with the latter achieving a successful sample return mission from the Moon.

Dr. Lele went on to emphasise the significance of Moon missions, underscoring their primary objectives. One of the key aims of these missions is to locate sources of water that can be used to support human activities during future lunar missions. Additionally, the Moon is known to have valuable mineral resources, including rare earth metals (RREs), which are essential for various technological applications. Furthermore, the lunar surface also has an abundance of non-radioactive helium-3, a resource scarcely found on Earth. According to theoretical calculations, helium-3 holds great potential for powering nuclear fusion reactors, offering a promising avenue for clean and efficient energy generation. Moreover, Moon missions carry geopolitical advantages, as they enable participating nations to establish a presence and influence in space exploration, which can have broader implications for international relations and cooperation.

The successful outcome of the Chandrayaan 3 Mission holds several positive implications for India. Firstly, it can pave the way for increased collaboration on international Space projects involving India, fostering stronger ties in the field of Space exploration. Additionally, such missions have the potential to popularize STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) education in India, inspiring and educating the next generation of scientists and engineers. Successful lunar missions can also lead to the emergence of technology spin-off companies, capitalising on the innovations and expertise developed during these missions to fuel entrepreneurship and innovation in various sectors.

Questions and Comments

The floor was opened for questions and comments. When asked about how India's Chandrayaan 3 Mission fits into the Artemis Accord, Dr. Lele expressed some skepticism regarding the Accord but found it to be an interestingly designed document. He mentioned that India has been steadily building its heavy lift capacity domestically and has been working on semi-cryogenic technology, which has the potential to transport heavy payloads in the future.

Dr. Lele also emphasised that using terms like 'Space race' is unnecessary when discussing India's Space endeavors due to the country's limitations. Instead, he suggested that it is more productive to consider how such missions can benefit humanity as a whole.

Regarding the role of private players in India's Space programs, he acknowledged that ISRO depends on private players to a certain extent, but he noted that in the United States, private companies play a more prominent role, particularly in the forefront of Space exploration. He also mentioned ISRO's commitment to avoiding the militarisation of Space missions. Furthermore, he encouraged the strategic community to focus on the technological advancements and spinoff technologies that can be derived from such missions.

The Report has been prepared by Mr. Rohit K. Sharma, Research Analyst, Strategic Technologies Centre, MP-IDSA.

Monday Morning Meeting on India-Nepal Hydro Energy Cooperation: Challenges and Prospects September 04, 2023 1030 to 1300 hrs Monday Morning Meeting

Dr. Nihar R. Nayak, Research Fellow, Manohar Parrikar IDSA, will speak on “India-Nepal Hydro Energy Cooperation: Challenges and Prospects” at the Monday Morning Meeting which will be held on 04 September 2023 at 10 AM. The venue is Seminar Hall I, Second Floor.

Dr. Opangmeren Jamir, Research Analyst, Manohar Parrikar IDSA, will be the moderator.

Mr. Bipandeep Sharma, Research Analyst, will be the rapporteur.

Monday Morning Meeting on The Road to War Termination: Navigating Strategies and Conflict Resolution Efforts in the Russia-Ukraine War August 07, 2023 Monday Morning Meeting

Col. (Dr.) Rajneesh Singh (Retd.), Research Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), spoke on “The Road to War Termination: Navigating Strategies and Conflict Resolution Efforts in the Russia-Ukraine War” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 07 August 2023. The session was moderated by Dr. Jason Wahlang, Research Analyst, Manohar Parrikar IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, the Director General of MP-IDSA and scholars of the Institute were in attendance.

Executive Summary

The Russo-Ukrainian war has defied expectations of a swift resolution, characterised by continued attrition from both sides. Despite increasing violence, international peace proposals from various countries have failed to gain traction due to a lack of willingness from both sides. The complexity of the conflict was highlighted through differing interpretations of agreements, NATO discussions, and Putin’s miscalculations as key factors leading to the outbreak of the war. Efforts for peace before and during the war illustrated the difficulty in resolving the conflict amidst varying stances and tensions. The war’s conclusion might entail victory, armistice, or political settlement, with negotiation likely playing a pivotal role.

Detailed Report

In his opening remarks, Dr. Jason Wahlang briefly highlighted how the unfolding of the Russo-Ukrainian war has broken the commonly understood expectation that Russia’s special operation in Ukraine would be short and swift. However, with the strong nuclear posturing and continued attrition from both sides, there is no end in sight. Amidst the escalating levels of violence and destruction on both sides there have been several peace proposals internationally that have attempted to bring to close this prolonged conflict. Israeli Prime Minister’s and Turkey’s early interventions for the peace and grain deal and China and Ukraine's peace proposals are some of the more significant ones. However, the world is yet to see any strong will from both sides to agree upon a solution.

Col. (Dr.) Rajneesh Singh initiated his presentation by discussing the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War which started on 24 February 2022, has entered its 17th month and is nowhere nearing culmination. The ‘special military operation’ was initiated to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO and preventing NATO from exerting influence over its territory. The objectives of the war have evolved, and both sides have faced challenges in achieving their goals. Additionally, the conflict has also led to the formation of several new alliances and realignments globally and regionally.

Col. Singh explained that Ukraine has launched a three-pronged counter-offensive in June 2023, with the main thrust towards the south while focusing on Zaporozhe. The Ukrainian offensive aimed to breach gaps in Russian defences to threaten the land bridge connecting Ukraine's occupied territories to Crimea. However, as the Russian defences are in layers covered with anti-tanks and anti-personnel devices, this offensive has been cost-intensive in terms of human and material damages. Historically it has been witnessed that defensive formations are difficult to breach by an offensive formation unless there is an asymmetry in tactical and strategic capabilities. Some examples of this are the Gulf War I and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict of 2010.

Col. Singh, stated that the circumstances of victory and war termination maybe be conditional to certain objective criteria for each party, however, the ultimate analysis of victory in war is an assessment of the political conditions for war termination. He also stressed on the distinction to be made between victory and war termination as both are two distinct and antagonistic ideas. However, victory is subjective and doesn’t always lead to a preferred outcome; conflicts can end without a clear winner. It is with this understanding the war objectives of all the stakeholders have to be assessed to understand the future trajectory of the war and the shape of the end situation.

Col. Singh delved into the reasons for the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian War and attributed it mostly to three important reasons. Firstly, in 2015, the second Minsk Agreement, facilitated by France and Germany, aimed to address the conflict arising from Russian-backed separatists seizing territory in Donetsk and Lugansk in 2014. The agreement was interpreted differently by Russia and Ukraine and remained partially unimplemented. Russia denied involvement, while Ukraine sees it as a path to reclaim rebel-held regions, each with distinct objectives concerning the status of Donbas. In 2021, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin expressed concern and hinted at a strategic approach regarding the future of Ukraine. Russia was concerned regarding the prospect of Ukraine’s NATO membership, which was discussed during the 2008 NATO summit. Secondly, President Yanukovych’s removal in 2014 was assessed as a step forward in the West’s attempt at the eastward expansion of NATO. This led to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and Donbas. In 2021, a US-Ukraine Strategic Partnership supporting NATO membership drew Putin’s opposition. In December 2021 Russia proposed treaties opposing NATO expansion and military presence in Ukraine, but these demands were rejected. Thirdly, Putin’s underestimation of Western resilience to support Ukraine led him to initiate his ‘special military operations.’ 

The speaker then highlighted the war objectives of the multiple parties interested in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict who happen to have their distinct national interests, resulting in diverse war objectives. Russia’s objectives have changed with the progress of war and presently consist of preventing Ukraine’s NATO membership, recognizing Donetsk and Lugansk sovereignty, demilitarisation, and decommunization. Ukraine’s objectives have also evolved. Initially Ukraine was amenable to the idea of abandoning NATO membership in return for Russian withdrawal from occupied areas. President Volodymyr Zelensky sought Western security guarantees. However, as Ukrainian forces gained ground against Russia, goals shifted to the cease of hostilities, withdrawal of Russian troops, and restoration of territorial integrity. The US, which is a key Western actor, leads in providing military and economic aid to Ukraine.  The US aims to ‘win and weaken’ Russia and the present war is considered incredibly cost-effective, however, defining victory is challenging. President Biden and members of his administration have asserted their support to bolster Ukraine’s negotiating position and strengthen Ukraine militarily and diplomatically. The war’s complexity stems from the varying interests of Russia, Ukraine, and Western nations, leading to shifting goals and an evolving conflict landscape.

Col. Singh then spoke on how the Ukrainian conflict in Donbas has now taken an unpredictable path, making it difficult to predict the outcome. A successful Ukrainian counter-offensive in August 2022 forced Russian forces to withdraw from occupied areas like Kherson and Kharkiv. However, this success has created a paradox: the stronger Ukraine performs on the battlefield, the harder it becomes to negotiate a settlement, despite Ukraine’s advantage in negotiating from a position of strength. Ukrainian interests don’t perfectly align with those of Western allies. Kyiv can take risks in continuing the war, while the Western alliance faces economic costs and the direct threat of escalation or nuclear exchange.

Despite Ukraine’s battlefield victories, the US Department of Defense (DoD) isn’t very optimistic about Ukraine’s chances of ending the war favourably. General Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, believes neither Ukraine nor Russia can achieve a military victory. The DoD believes that Ukraine will struggle to fully expel Russian forces from all occupied areas, which is Kyiv’s stated goal. The US recommends that Ukraine should take any opportunity for a negotiated settlement. This perspective aligns with leaked US documents (“Discord Leaks”), which express deep concerns about the war’s direction and Ukraine’s ability to successfully combat Russian forces. This pessimistic assessment is also reflected in the US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s suggestion that Ukraine should reconsider its objectives, including the aspiration to regain Crimea, annexed by Russia in 2014.

Col. Singh talked about the fact that the delay in providing military aid to Ukraine enabled Russia to strengthen its position and provides an insight regarding Western interests and Ukrainian military capabilities. Additionally, there are concerns about the long-term commitment of the West to fund the war. Despite public statements by Western leaders pledging ongoing aid to Ukraine, recent developments suggest a shift. Attachments of caveats to aid packages from Congress and allied nations indicate that these aid packages are seen as Kyiv’s best opportunity to significantly alter the war’s course. This situation raises doubts about the sustained willingness of the West to financially support the war effort.

Col. Singh then spoke about the war termination efforts which were put forth in the pre-war period before 24 February 2022. Before the conflict escalated, the US made efforts to dissuade Russia from invading Ukraine and diplomatic talks continued between Presidents Biden and Putin from June 2021 till the outbreak of the conflict. Post 24 February 2022 Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett attempted a mediation in March 2022, leading to concessions from both Zelensky and Putin. The list of other peace plans which were discussed included - Turkish President Erdogan’s mediation in March 2022, G-7’s Just Peace Plan on 11 October 2022, the Ukrainian President Zelensky’s 10-point peace plan on 15 November 2022, China’s 12-point peace proposal in February 2023 that called for a ceasefire and lifting of certain sanctions, and the Indonesian Defence Minister’s proposed peace plan of 3 June 2023. In June 2023, an African delegation visited Moscow to talk about the African Peace Mission. Despite a number of peace initiatives, achieving a resolution has proven challenging due to shifting positions and differing national interests of stakeholders.

Despite the uncertainties associated with wars and battles, in all probability, the Russia-Ukraine War is likely to conclude through a negotiated settlement which may take the form of either, armistice or political settlement. Over last seven weeks, Ukrainian forces have engaged in a counteroffensive, focusing on Zaporizhzhia and attempting to breach Russian defences. However, they have faced challenges like Russian minefields. Russia’s objectives, including regime change and demilitarization, have not been met, and their control over seized territories is under threat. Ukraine’s counteroffensive might result in a frozen frontline, which may then lead to war termination through negotiations. Negotiating an end to the war is likely, encompassing discussion on issues such as NATO and EU membership for Ukraine and security guarantees. Russia may insist on removal of sanctions imposed by the West.

Questions and Comments

After the presentation, Dr. Wahlang opened the floor for comments and questions. The Director General, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy reflected on the Russia-Ukraine War and its implications for war termination and peace. He emphasised that ending war doesn’t guarantee true peace, and drew comparisons to Crimea's situation and historical conflicts, suggesting potential unresolved issues. Ambassador Chinoy highlighted the various peace resolutions that various countries India, China, and South Africa, are attempting to negotiate for the Ukraine conflict. He addressed the concept of investigating war crimes, highlighting the intricacies, the UN Security Council’s role, and the limitations of the International Criminal Court (ICC) due to the actions of countries like the US, China, and Russia. The complexities of demanding trials and the reluctance of superpowers to partake in such processes was discussed.

Acknowledging President Zelensky’s demands, Ambassador Chinoy underscored that these are often initial negotiation positions and might not all be fully realized. Overall, he highlighted war termination challenges, the intricacies of war crime investigations, the influence of powerful nations on international justice, and the evolving nature of negotiation demands.

Dr. Rajorshi Roy enquired whether communication channels should be established between Russia and the West, as well as between Russia, Ukraine, and other nations. He questioned how recent geopolitical developments, like the US considering Ukraine’s NATO membership, are examined in terms of their influence on Russia's interests and actions in the conflict.

Col. Vivek Chadda (Retd.) asked about the role of domestic constituencies in Russia and Ukraine in shaping ongoing war efforts and their potential influence on international relations. He commented on the significance of external support from countries like China for both Russia and Ukraine, considering how this support could potentially impact the outcome of the conflict. Dr. Rajiv Nayan enquired about how the objectives of war for domestic constituents are framed how does one ensure they are aligned with political objectives.

Dr. Vishal Chandra asked the speaker to comment on the evolution of NATO’s unity and strength over the last year. He also emphasised on how economic factors shape the dynamics of the conflict and its potential long-term implications.

Col. (Dr.) Rajneesh Singh then responded to the comments and questions.

The report has been prepared by Ms. Shayesta Nishat Ahmed, Research Analyst, Defence Economics and Industry Centre, MP-IDSA.

Military Affairs
Monday Morning Meeting on India-Bangladesh Trade Settlement in Indian Rupee August 14, 2023 Monday Morning Meeting

Dr. Anand Kumar, Associate Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, spoke on “India-Bangladesh Trade Settlement in Indian Rupee” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 14 August 2023. The session was moderated by Dr. Ashish Shukla, Associate Fellow, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, the Director General of MP-IDSA and scholars of the Institute were in attendance.

Executive Summary

India's push to promote the use of the Indian Rupee (INR) in Bangladesh comes in response to Bangladesh's declining foreign exchange reserves. This shift aims to strengthen bilateral trade, reduce reliance on the US dollar, and enhance competitiveness by lowering trade costs. While the immediate impact on Bangladesh's dependence on the dollar might be limited given its substantial imports, the strategic move highlights the INR's rising importance in trade between the two nations, with both countries considering the introduction of a currency card to further facilitate transactions and cooperation.

Detailed Report

In his opening remarks, Dr. Ashish Shukla offered a brief overview of India’s initiative to conduct international trade in rupees. He quoted RBI’s annual report on “Currency and Finance,” which stated internationalisation of the rupee is inevitable. In July 2022, a deliberate effort to internationalise the rupee was also advised in the State Bank of India's ECOWRAP report in light of capital flight from emerging market nations, including India. He emphasised that India’s decision to promote INR as a global reserve witnessed a notable upsurge in the aftermath of the economic consequences resulting from the Russia-Ukraine conflict. At present, more than 19 countries have showed interest in opening Rupee Vostro accounts, essential for international trade settlement in INR. Finally, with the inclusion of Bangladesh into this new setting, he remarked how it has also sparked a de-dollarisation debate in South Asia.

Dr. Anand Kumar began his presentation by stating that Sheikh Hasina's appointment as Prime Minister in 2009 sparked a number of constructive developments between India and Bangladesh. Economically, Bangladesh's exports to India are valued at USD 2 billion, while its imports from India are USD 13.69 billion. Both countries have implemented innovative strategies to increase their bilateral trade in times of crisis. For example, during COVID-19, they investigated trading through railroads, which cut shipping costs and expedited commercial processes. They were able to maintain access to essential necessities thanks to this technique. In a similar vein, India has once again stepped in to save Bangladesh from a dollar shortage by offering to facilitate trade in Indian Rupees.

Dr. Kumar emphasised that there is no question about the US Dollar's dominance in world trade rapidly decreasing. He claimed that although 70 per cent of world trade was conducted in USD in 2001, by 2023, that percentage has fallen to 58 per cent. He added that when powerful economies like the US increase their interest rates, it triggers a chain reaction; wherein investors withdraw funds from developing nations, leading to currency depreciation across these countries. This depreciation fuels inflation due to elevated import costs for essentials like food and energy.

The speaker underscored how the situation becomes intricate as the affected countries struggle to balance their current accounts and afford crucial imports. The issue also extends to servicing external debts, exemplified by the challenges nations like Sri Lanka and Bangladesh face. As a response to these challenges, he analysed how there is a growing inclination among various countries to diminish their reliance on the US Dollar.

He gave the example of the members of the Asian Clearing Union having collectively agreed to reduce their dollar dependence and instead settle trade using local currencies. This sentiment is echoed by Asian Finance Ministers and policymakers, who are exploring ways to reduce their reliance on currencies like the Japanese Yen. China has taken advantage of this trend, aiming to position its currency as a global reserve.

He stated that at the same time, India is also trying to improve the global status of its currency. This strategic shift, implemented in July 2022, involved the inclusion of the Indian Rupee (INR) in a segment of international trade transactions.

Dr. Kumar mentioned that India has also authorised the use of INR for settling foreign trade deals. In a subsequent development, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has provided authorisation to banks from 18 different countries. Three banks from Bangladesh have also been permitted to establish Nostro accounts. This strategic move strengthens economic ties between India and Bangladesh and contributes to India's pursuit of greater global economic influence by establishing its currency's credibility.

The speaker talked about how over the past year, Bangladesh has experienced a significant decline in its foreign exchange reserves, dropping from US$48.41 billion to US$29.97 billion, marking a decrease of around 28%. This decline is primarily attributed to increased import spending, with moderate remittances and export earnings. The country is grappling with challenges in financing essential imports, particularly fuel, which is crucial for its operations. Hence, the switch to INR trade and commerce. The benefits for Bangladesh are manifold. The move is expected to foster closer diplomatic ties and relationships between the two nations. For businesses engaged in cross-border trade, significant advantages are anticipated. Lower trade costs will likely enhance competitiveness, opening doors to a broader customer base and potentially boosting exports from Bangladesh to India. Additionally, conducting transactions in Rupees can streamline trade processes, eliminating the need for currency conversion when opening Letters of Credit.

In conclusion, he underscored that the initiative might not lead to an immediate reduction in Bangladesh's reliance on the US Dollar, considering the substantial magnitude of its imports, which aggregated to approximately US$75.6 billion in the fiscal year 2021. Hence, Rupee transaction may not instantly augment the declining forex reserves in Bangladesh, however, it is an important step forward. Furthermore, both India and Bangladesh are currently deliberating on introducing a currency card to further streamline transactions, with plans for its launch scheduled for September 2023 or shortly thereafter.

Questions and Comments

The floor was opened for questions and comments. The Director General, MP-IDSA, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy congratulated the speaker and made a few comments. He underlined several key points regarding India's role in the global economy. He emphasised the significance of neighbouring countries accepting India's economic influence for better regional growth. Despite the inevitable rise of India's economy, he stressed that this growth should involve accommodating neighbouring countries and integrating them into the economic framework.

Amb. Chinoy remarked that the recent initiative of trading in Indian Rupees is seen as a positive step toward regional economic collaboration, potentially benefiting nations like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal.  He advised caution in expecting the Indian Rupee to replace the US Dollar internationally, pointing out the US Dollar's dominant role in global commodities and transactions. In sum, he suggested focusing on consolidating the Rupee's influence within the region rather than aiming for immediate global dominance.

The researchers from the Institute made valuable comments. The remarks underscored the potential for India to enhance the momentum of INR's trade settlement by advocating its use within multilateral institutions like BRICS. The discussion also touched upon Russia's reservations regarding the revival of Rupee-Rouble trade, concerns raised by both Indian and Bangladeshi traders, and the limitations observed in the SAFTA Agreements.

Report prepared by Ms. Sneha M., Research Analyst, South Asia Centre, MP-IDSA.

South Asia India-Bangladesh Relations
Interaction with U.S. Congressional Delegation August 11, 2023 1200-1315 hrs Other

Chair: Amb. Sujan R Chinoy

U.S. delegation comprises:

1. Rep. Michael Waltz (R-FL), Republican Co-Chair

2. Rep. Ro Khanna (D-CA), Democratic Co-Chair

3. Rep. Deborah Ross (D-NC)

4. Rep. Kat Cammack (R-FL)

5. Rep. Shri Thanedar (D-MI)

6. Rep. Jasmine Crocket (D-TX)

Report of Monday Morning Meeting on State of Sino-US Relations July 31, 2023 Monday Morning Meeting

Ms. Mayuri Banerjee, Research Analyst, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, made a presentation on “The Status of Sino-US Relations: Assessing the Contemporary Trends of Sino-US Rivalry” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 31 July 2023. The session was moderated by Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh, Research Fellow, MP-IDSA. Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.), Deputy Director General, MP-IDSA, and scholars of the Institute were in attendance.

Executive Summary

Ms. Mayuri Banerjee's presentation highlighted the escalating rivalry between China and the US, marked by strained relations across economic, technological, geopolitical, and military domains. The trade war featured tariff battles and technology restrictions. The tech competition extended to AI and semiconductor exports. Geopolitical issues included tensions over Taiwan and power struggles over regional influence. Both nations employed initiatives to bolster their sway. The rivalry, reminiscent of Thucydidean dynamics, stems from a decline in cooperation, treating issues as security matters. The future looks uncertain, with both sides unlikely to ease stances, resulting in a conflicted coexistence.

Detailed Report

Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh initiated the discussion by highlighting the genesis of the Sino-US rivalry and then provided an overall overview of the Sino-US relationship. Additionally, he discussed the ongoing dynamics between the two nations, encompassing matters such as high-tech trade and concerns surrounding the Taiwan Strait.

Ms. Mayuri Banerjee began her presentation by giving a broad overview of the current situation of the Sino-US relationship. Ms. Banerjee explained that rivalry arises when two nations have hostile ties and there is potential for armed conflict. Recent events and behaviors indicate a shift towards major power rivalry. Sino-US relations are strained and historically low, marked by heightened economic, political, technological, and military competition. Further, disputes, disagreements and threats to use force persist, leading to frozen bilateral ties. Recent high-level meetings have failed to yield significant breakthroughs.

The speaker highlighted the fault lines of the Sino-US relationship in four different domains: trade war, geopolitical competition, high-tech war, and Taiwan.

In the trade war section, Ms. Banerjee highlighted that in 2018, the Trump administration launched the trade war. Thereafter, both US and China imposed tariffs on various goods sourced from each other. She explained that China's Huawei was restricted, and cotton imports from Xinjiang were banned by the US. During Trump's term, tariffs increased significantly across four rounds, reaching 21% from 3.1% in 2018. The following Biden administration maintained tariffs but with a more focused approach. By August 2022, about 660 Chinese companies faced US trade restrictions, and the sale of communication equipment from Chinese telecom firms was prohibited. In response, China created its Entity List in 2020 and introduced the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law in June 2021. In 2023, China excluded US chipmaker Micron from critical projects and passed the Foreign Relations Law in July, as a counter-measure to the US restrictions.

In addition to the trade war, she highlighted the Sino-US clash over high technology and artificial intelligence. She pointed out that Trump restricted semiconductor exports to China, putting key chip makers like Huawei and SMIC on the "Entity List." In September 2022, Nvidia and Advanced Micron Devices halted AI computing chip exports to China. The Biden administration then introduced comprehensive export controls, including limiting China's access to certain chips made with US equipment. By December 2022, the US had blacklisted China's YMTC (Yangtze Memory Technologies Corp) and other firms. In retaliation, China banned mergers between Chinese companies in the US market and their US counterparts. Recently, China announced export controls on critical minerals like germanium and gallium.

The tech rivalry between the US and China is closely linked to Taiwan. Ms. Banerjee explained that Sino-US bilateral relations took a major hit after Nancy Pelosi's visit in August 2022. China canceled and suspended eight bilateral dialogue mechanisms. Dangerous military encounters between the US and Chinese Navy in the Taiwan Straits were reported in June 2023.  With regard to Taiwan, both sides accuse each other of trying to change the status quo. The US claims that Chinese economic and military pressure on Taiwan, imposition of diplomatic isolation, and interference in Taiwan‘s election are aimed to coerce Taipei into China’s fold. On the other hand, Beijing asserts that US diplomatic and military support is aimed to strengthen Taiwan’s aspiration for independence.

Elaborating on the geopolitical competition, Ms. Banerjee highlighted that China and the US are locked in a competitive struggle, vying for control over political, military, and economic influence across different regions like Africa, Latin America, and South-East Asia. They're competing in sectors like infrastructure, healthcare management, technology, training, and capacity development. Both countries are trying to shape rules and institutions to enhance their sway over regional security and economic patterns. China is utilizing initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), AIIB, SCO, GSI, GCI, and GDI, among others. Meanwhile, the US has sought to counter through initiatives like Free and Open Indo-Pacific, Build Back Better World, Quad, IPEF, Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Development, AUKUS, Five-Eyes alliance, and NATO Plus Five.

She also highlighted that the current dynamics of rivalry between China and the United States can be interpreted through four frameworks; Thucydidean rivalry, power-maximisation and security competition, securitization, and erosion of pro-cooperation lobby in both countries.

Concluding her presentation, Ms. Banerjee highlighted the future of Sino-US Relations remains uncertain as neither side has shown signs of easing their foreign policy approach toward the other. The US is likely to focus on strengthening partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region to enhance deterrence. China, on the other hand, will further collaborate with Russia, enhance its military capabilities, and increase diplomatic engagement in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. For the foreseeable future, both countries are expected to continue a conflictual coexistence.  

Q&A Session

Deputy Director General, Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.) in his remarks emphasised the significance of the US Defense Secretary’s visit to Papua New Guinea. He highlighted the US’ endeavor to enhance relations and establish a dual-use base, catering to both civilian and military purposes in the central Pacific region. In her reply, Ms. Banerjee mentioned the recent summit held in the US between US President Joe Biden and the leaders of the Pacific Island nations. She noted that independent research is required to understand the smaller nations' efforts to navigate the Sino-US rivalry.

Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh, Research Fellow, addressed the origins of the Sino-US rivalry, pointing out its roots in politics, history, geo-strategy, and China's commitment to the one-China policy. He made a query about the perspective of the US business lobby towards China within this rivalry's context.

Capt. Anurag Bisen, Research Fellow, posed a query regarding India's stance on the Sino-US rivalry.

J. Mohansakthivel, Research Analyst, brought up the use of the term "Cold War 2.0" to describe the current rivalry and questioned its appropriateness.

Mr. Anit Kumar, Research Intern, asked whether a similar competition existed between the two nations in Space.

Dr. Adil Rashid, Research Fellow, expressed concerns about the impact of Chinese currency devaluation on the US.

Mr. Harshit Sharma, Research Intern, posed a question about China's potential to reshape the world order.

Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh and Ms. Mayuri Banerjee gave a detailed explanation on the comments and questions raised by the participants.

Report prepared by Mr. Mohan Singh Dhangar, Research Intern, East Asia Centre, MP-IDSA, New Delhi.

East Asia
Talk on Internal Publications of MP-IDSA June 02, 2023 Other

Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) organised talks on 2 June 2023 by Dr. Uttam K. Sinha, Senior Fellow & Managing Editor, Strategic Analysis, Mr. Vivek Kaushik, Associate Editor, Strategic Analysis, Ms. Madhavi Ratnaparkhi, Associate Editor, Journal of Defence Studies & website, Ms. Sindhu Dinesh and Ms. Mayuri Banerjee, Research Analysts on "Internal Publications of MP-IDSA” as a part of the ongoing “Orientation Programme for Young Scholars”. The research staff, including Associate Fellows, Research Analysts and Interns attended the Session.

Executive Summary

The MP-IDSA is India's foremost think-tank on defense, strategic, and security issues. The Institute has several quality journals and different platforms to present analyses and research findings. The panelists shared their views on how to develop writing skills, enhance the quality of research, and on the publication process.

Detailed Report

“We are in the business of pushing the frontiers of knowledge forward and it is a privilege to be in the scholarly space that gives us the opportunity to write and share our views and findings”, Dr. Uttam Sinha thus began his talk. He further stated that the scholarly space is competitive with ideas being competed and narratives built and challenged. As scholars, we have to keep pace and be competitive. Writing is an important part of research activity and while it might seem easy it ends up as troublesome. The basic principle of writing is how effectively you are communicating. As he further explained, writing is not done in isolation. It is a process that comes about through reading, learning, and comprehending. He cautioned not to jump to writing but to build substantial knowledge on the subject before attempting to write. As a writer, “you have to understand the audience”. As MP-IDSA scholars there are essentially three levels of engagement with the audience: the public, the stakeholders, and the peer group.  Different formats can be used to address the audience: peer-reviewed journals, web commentary, policy/issue briefs, monographs, and books.

Mr. Vivek Kaushik talked about the institute’s flagship journal, Strategic Analysis, its history, and the process of publication. He informed the audience that Strategic Analysis is one of the oldest journals on security and strategic studies in India and was first published in 1968. It was a monthly journal till 2001 and later changed to a quarterly. In 2007 it began to publish with Routledge, the imprint of Taylor and Francis, UK and its periodicity changed to bimonthly. It now has a robust database. He then talked about the journal’s content, policies, peer review process, and the editorial committee.

Dr. Sinha informed the audience of an interesting debate. When Strategic Analysis was introduced, the idea was to bring out-of-the-box thinking and policy suggestions. The peer-review system that was introduced in 2001, it was argued, constrained such thinking. However, to make it international, credible, and acceptable, the peer review won the day.  He advised the audience to read other well-known peer reviewed journals and for brevity, structure, and expression to read editorials. He suggested reading The Economist in particular.  

Ms. Madhavi Ratnaparkhi talked about the Journal of Defence Studies (JDS) and writing for the website. The JDS with its focus on niche defense studies was an alternative to Strategic Analysis. It encourages research on core issues of defense and provides a platform for debate and critical thinking. For a wider outreach, it is available easily on the MP-IDSA website. The speaker briefed about how the journal articles get approved and published and advised the audience to carefully read the norms of submission available on the website. She then focused on web commentaries, issue briefs, and backgrounders, their essence, style, and format, and explained other writing activities that research analysts and interns are encouraged to do, particularly making notes/summaries of Monday Morning Meetings, round-table talks, and seminars.

Ms. Sindhu Dinesh, Research Analyst, talked about the citation format for web commentaries, issue briefs, and backgrounders. She stated the references and proper sources are critically important as authors are responsible for factual accuracy.

Stressing on referencing and sources, Dr. Sinha suggested using Press Information Bureau (PIB) reports for authenticity. He also warned against plagiarism. Honesty in research, he added, is valuable as is modesty and humility. Noting down references as one is writing is a good practice rather than leaving it to the end. That can often lead to inadvertent mistakes, he said.

Ms. Mayuri Banerjee, Research Analyst, briefed the audience about rapporteuring. She shared her experience and pointed out that a report should not be a transcript of the event but should be systemic, structured, and highlight the relevant information. She emphasised that report writing helps sharpen writing skills.

Q&A Session

Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.) appreciated the speakers for their views and presentations. He stated that such an exercise, recently introduced, to familiarise the new entrants to MP-IDSA is useful and needed.

The report was prepared by Mr. Karan Phular, Intern, Centre of Europe and Eurasia, MP-IDSA.

MP-IDSA Fellows Seminar : Influence Operations: Winning Without Waging Wars in the 21st Century July 20, 2023 Adil Rasheed Fellows' Seminar

An MP-IDSA Fellows Seminar presentation by Dr. Adil Rasheed, Research Fellow, on “Influence Operations: Winning Without Waging Wars in the 21st Century” was held on 20 July 2023. It was chaired by Lt. Gen. (Dr.) Rakesh Sharma (Retd.), Member, Executive Council, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA). The External Discussants were Maj. Gen. Roopesh Mehta, ADG CD (B) IHQ, and Mr. Vinit Goenka, Secretary, Centre for Knowledge Sovereignty (CKS). Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.), Deputy Director General, MP-IDSA; Lt. Gen. Akshat Upadhyay, Research Fellow, MP-IDSA; and Ms. Shruti Pandalai, Associate Fellow, MP-IDSA were Internal Discussants.

Executive Summary

Influence Operations (IO), a battle of narratives, is considered a new and rapidly-evolving field of study. Russia, China, the US, and Pakistan have been at the forefront of using their strategy. It pertains to clandestine operations that can manipulate and influence individuals’ and governments’ perceptions, decisions, and cognition of individuals and governments. IO includes active measures carried out by the erstwhile Soviet Union and is a non-kinetic form of warfare. It also gives each country relying on this strategy plausible deniability while conducting its activities. Social media, big tech, and artificial intelligence are crucial in this regard.

Detailed Report

In his opening remarks, the Chair, Lt. Gen. (Dr.) Rakesh Sharma (Retd.) stated that Information Warfare (IW) is the future warfare strategy. He further stated that besides India’s victory in 1971, no wars have genuinely been won in the 21st century.

Dr. Adil Rasheed began by introducing the topic of his paper, Influence Operations (IO), a form of high-tech and hybrid warfare. One of the key definitions provided by the speaker was borrowed from Facebook, according to which IO refers to coordinated efforts to manipulate or corrupt public debate for a strategic goal. It was initially defined by RAND Corporation in 2009. IO could also be divided into three categories, i.e., political and economic, information, and psychological.

Dr. Rasheed clarified that his study encompasses the assessment of IO carried out by Russia, China, the United States (US), and Pakistan. He added that wars are now fought in the virtual space and cognitive domain. These operations include offline and online measures to infiltrate political institutions and processes of other countries, making them incapable of going to war. He elaborated on IO benefits, such as being highly adaptive and effective, low-cost, and sustainable in peacetime. Today, it is associated with a foreign and maligned sharp power technique, including subversive public diplomacy, crowd manipulations, engineering colour revolutions and agitations, and election meddling. In addition, social media has amplified IO’s impact through trolling, flaming, doxing, posting dark advertisements, presenting Potemkin villages of evidence, and participating in cognitive hacking.

He said that countries like China have relied on their diaspora based in foreign countries, such as the US, to act as spies and carry out industrial espionage. As per the Mueller Report, Russia was involved in elected meddling in the US in 2016, resulting in President Trump’s victory. 

At the same time, the US, despite referring to IO as a threat to democracy, has intervened in approximately 81 foreign elections, often accused by Russia and China of instigating colour revolutions and the Arab Spring. The speaker delved into ISI and ISPR’s (PR wing of ISI) role in spearheading and sustaining Pakistan’s IO, articulating that ISI engages in Soviet-styled active measures. Simultaneously, the role of diaspora and radicalisation through madrassas based in Jammu and Kashmir, Bangladesh, and Nepal have been essential to Pakistan’s IO strategy.

The speaker suggested that therefore, some key counter-measures India can adopt to address such threats include censorship of programmes aired on online streaming platforms, formulating a coherent and regulated social media policy and guidelines for protests and agitations, and reforming madrassas. 

Dr. Rasheed stated that digital and online tactics and techniques are associated with IO strategy, and some of the counter-measures involve capacity building, implementing effective and regulatory legal frameworks, and deterrence.

Maj. Gen. Roopesh Mehta spoke about the need to simplify IO as a term to counter these operations effectively. He also explained that Information Warfare (IW)/IO timeline is immaterial, regardless of whether it occurs in peacetime or war.

IO is a long-term strategy involving a battle of narratives. IO has two fundamental aims: turning a rival power into a modern vassal state or weakening it sufficiently to ensure it is neutralised as a threat. There are multiple layers of intervention concerning IO, which is not amenable to positive control. He also underscored how high-quality and appealing content must be disseminated swiftly in the IO/IW space as an antidote to misinformation and disinformation.

Furthermore, he presented his perspective on the Indian Army’s role in Kashmir and how ISI has been exploiting social media since 2014. Between 2015 and 2017, i.e., when Burhan Wani was active, there was immense synergy between the local media in the Kashmir Valley and developments in Pakistan. Therefore, India must draw lessons from this example. As far as China is concerned, its IO has proven more effective internally, while its impact externally remains debatable. Nevertheless, Indian leaders cannot rely on examples of authoritarian states such as Pakistan and China to establish IO-related institutions in the country. The US, however, has struggled to be effective in this domain and is a soft target since it has mainly relied on brute force to implement its agendas.

He talked about some key issues to be considered while discussing IO/OW. Firstly, ISIS successfully exploited social media to convince people worldwide to join its caliphate since 2014. Secondly, social media is an unfair terrain. Thirdly, India’s geography and diversity make the establishment of centralised control a challenging task. Fourthly, developments in IO are multiplying faster than legislative actions can be introduced to address them. Fifthly, information space is a reality. He said that therefore, these trends require a robust Indian response, an improved fact check and tech ban eco-system, collaboration with agencies such as Tech Against Terror, and sensitising the citizens towards challenges such as fake news and propaganda.

Mr. Vinit Goenka explained how colonisation by might in the erstwhile times has transformed into colonisation by big data today. Additionally, IO, a non-kinetic form of warfare, is not a time-bound strategy. He further presented three cases about IO potency. As per one of them, India’s western neighbour had used the local Marathi dialect online to stir up agitation against the development of a metro station near the Aarey colony in Mumbai. One of the other examples was a BBC documentary (1998) aired over 83 times in one year about AIDS-afflicted Indian truck drivers as a form of psychological warfare.

He recommended that the speaker examine the role of lone wolves who seek to gain notoriety through IO and are not beholden to an ideology or a country.

Maj. Gen (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.) expounded on the multiple terminologies being used in this context, which he felt, need to be simplified, to make the paper more comprehensible. He went on to trace the terminology’s evolution over the past decades.

In the World War era, he explained that the only terms in use were psychological warfare and deception. With the advent of electronic and digital media, he mentioned the evolving terminologies of perception management, cyber warfare, information operations, and strategic communication. He further delved into the linkages between Arthashastra and IW and how the latter has always been a part of Chinese military strategy in Sun Tzu's writings, therefore the concepts are actually age-old. Moreover, he explained that information operations had been broadly segregated by the US military into two components, i.e., information technical operations and information and influence operations, an error according to him, given the Russian and Chinese integrated approach in this domain.

The discussant also spoke about how, in recent times, unverified bulk transmissions have been occurring with no editorial oversight, while assessing the differing components of perception management (PM) and the correlation between IW and PM. Additionally, the US Military Cyber Command Team’s role in training Ukrainians since 2014 against Russian IO, the inauguration of Singapore’s fourth military branch – Digital and Intelligence Service –, Chinese and Russian IO, the need to secure information space, India’s 2010 IW doctrine, and the November 2020 regulation about monitoring online streaming platforms was also discussed. In addition, he underlined the need for states to flood the information space with timely, credible data to avoid conjecture by uncontrolled media in an information vacuum. 

Regarding the disclaimer in the the paper wherein Non- State actors and terrorist organisations were not being covered, he suggested a greater focus on state response to this challenge, with particular reference to India. He outlined the various organisations working in this space in India and recommended the establishment of an HR vertical in IO/ IW domain.  He also underlined the need to synergise organisations working separately in Cyber, Cognitive and Physical dimensions, with a nominated lead agency to better coordinate the state response in the Information domain. He further recommended that we must generate an All of Nation response to this challenge, and integrate at two levels; Firstly the physical, cyber, and technical dimensions, and Secondly, Government, Military, Industry, Academia, and Civil Society.

Finally he suggested that the speaker may review if IO is actually a new constituent of hybrid warfare, and whether the cognitive domain is the sixth domain of warfare, as mentioned in the paper, or actually a part of the fifth domain- Information Domain, the first four being land, sea, air and space.

Lt. Col. Akshat Upadhyay stated that the speaker must introduce more clarity into his paper, modify its title and scope, and provide contextualisation for various terminologies mentioned. He also emphasised the need to expand the IO ambit as part of his research and expound on relevant statistical and anecdotal examples. There is also a need to examine the relationship between IO and truth, list sharp techniques associated with IO, and provide a more nuanced understanding of cognitive warfare.

At the same time, the speaker must account for how IO is not inherently malicious or positive and is merely a tool that state and non-state actors can use. It is also a battle of narratives. The discussant presented examples from the Gulf of Tonkin incident (Vietnam War) and humane treatment meted out by Indian officers to dead Pakistani soldiers during the Kargil War to support his argument. Lt. Col. Upadhyay delved into how the paper presented must re-orient from a West-centric approach and assess how Western countries have carried out IO elsewhere. Moreover, concrete examples are required to support assertions regarding US’ involvement in IO abroad.

He also suggested that Dr. Rasheed analyse how the Soviet Union (now Russia) earlier used active measures to weaken NATO and establish continuity between its cold war strategies and contemporary tactics in Ukraine. Furthermore, India must institutionalise IO instead of relying on reactive counter-measures since the recommendations suggested in the paper will increase countries’ vulnerabilities instead of reducing them.

Ms. Shruti Pandalai lauded that Dr. Rasheed has attempted to simplify a complex and evolving field, and it is improbable that one can distinguish between IW and IO. She said that there are divergences, convergences, and collaboration between Russian and Chinese IO, as visible in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Ukraine. An assertive China has increasingly adopted Russian tactics, which have ranged from controlling the diaspora and external and internal narratives in China’s favour.

According to her, the events in Ukraine demonstrate big tech and the West’s role in controlling and strengthening the narrative in Ukraine’s favour. She also pointed out that US’s Global Engagement Council, run by the US State Department, a grouping focused on combating disinformation, is inward-looking in its outlook.  

She pointed out that Dr. Rasheed needs to examine contemporary debates about IO, including artificial intelligence and big data, while being more cognisant of Western IO. At the same time, she emphasised that censorship of online streaming platforms, as suggested by the speaker, will be an ineffective deterrent in India. Finally, she believes it is necessary to focus on lessons learned.

Lt. Gen. Rakesh Sharma (Retd.) suggested modifications to the paper’s title to adequately capture the core arguments and for Dr. Rasheed to account for how states use non-state actors in the IO/IW domain and refrain from using disclaimers. At the same time, he urged caution in using terms such as hybrid warfare while he elaborated on Chinese IO in the US, the United Nations Human Rights Council and India, and Russia’s IO in the United Kingdom during the Brexit vote and differing interpretations about war. Furthermore, he emphasised the need to establish a national cognitive agency in India.

He also recommended that the speaker provide clarification about actors in India empowered to conduct cognitive warfare, India’s endgame regarding IO against China, and simplify terminologies used in the paper.

Q/A Session

Director General, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy affirmed the need to examine all narratives concerning IO, including the insidious attempts by the West or current adversaries like Pakistan and China to prepare for the future adequately. He suggested that the paper look deeper into the role of IO/IW within India and the transboundary civil society actors’ involvement in these domains since their potency rivals big tech. At the same time, there is a requirement to assess if proposed Indian narratives are based on consensus and where challenges lie. Finally, an agnostic approach to values in IO/IW domain must be practiced.

Some of the other themes discussed in the Q/A session included strategic relevance behind IO/IW in fields of health and disease, for example, the anti-vaccine campaign in the West, the scope of visibility of Indian IO, the need to analyse vulnerabilities in each segment of the population for antidotes to be forged, lack of domestic consensus on responding to IO threats against India, the synergy between state and non-state actors, and quantification of influence.

Dr. Rasheed responded to the comments and questions raised.

This report was prepared by Ms. Saman Ayesha Kidwai, Research Analyst, Counter-Terrorism Centre, MP-IDSA.

MP-IDSA Fellows Seminar: Defence Public Sector Units and Exports May 31, 2023 S. Samuel C. Rajiv Fellows' Seminar

MP-IDSA Fellows Seminar by Dr. S. Samuel C. Rajiv, Associate Fellow, on ‘Defence Public Sector Units and Exports’ was held on 31 May 2023. It was chaired by Mr. Amit Cowshish, Former Financial Advisor (Acquisition) Ministry of Defence, and Former Distinguished Fellow, MP-IDSA. The external discussants for the paper were Dr. Manisha Mathur, Sr. Dy. GM, International Marketing, Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) and Dr. Sameer Patil, Senior Fellow, ORF, Mumbai. Gp. Capt. (Dr.) Rajiv Kumar Narang (Retd.), Senior Fellow, MP-IDSA, and Col. (Dr.) Rajneesh Singh, Research Fellow & Centre Coordinator, Defence Industry and Economics Centre, MP-IDSA, were the internal discussants.

Executive Summary

In recent years, India has experienced a significant surge in defence exports. The paper explored the primary issues faced by DPSU’s in research and development, marketing, and competition from international aerospace businesses. The DPSUs’ future success in the fiercely competitive defence export market would be essential for India’s military manufacturing and indigenisation aims.

Detailed Report

The Chair, Mr. Amit Cowshish opened the session by highlighting the 23 per cent growth in India’s defence exports from Rs. 686 Crore in Financial Year (FY) 2013-2014 to Rs. 16,000 Crore in FY 2022-2023. This denotes the advancement in the design and development of the Indian defence industry in the global defence manufacturing sector.

Dr. Rajiv in his paper ‘Defence Public Sector Units and Exports’ noted that during the ten-year period 2012-23, India exported defence equipment worth about Rs. 67,500 cr. Exports surged from Rs. 446.77 crores in 2012-13 to Rs. 15,918.16 cr in 2022-23. The paper examined issues related to exports by DPSUs and the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB).

Dr. Rajiv stated that ships overwhelmingly comprise the quantity of defence exports from India, followed by helicopters/aircraft and sensors (radars etc). This is as against major global defence exporters, like the US, Russia, France, China and the UK, for whom aircrafts constitute the major chunk of exports. The share of DPSU defence exports was over 56 per cent during 2013-14 and was about 9 per cent in 2021-22. The OFB share in the defence exports pie has reduced from nearly 3 per cent in 2013-14 to less than 1 per cent in 2021-22.

During the ten-year period from 2012-22, around Rs. 9600 crores is the value of exports (both defence and civil) executed by eight DPSUs. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has accounted for more than 37 per cent of all exports by DPSUs, followed by Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) at over 30 per cent and Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL) at nearly 13 per cent. As for exports by the OFB during 2012-22, about Rs. 688 crore worth of items/equipment have been exported. The OFB has exported various items like brake parachutes and ammunition to many countries over the years.

Dr. Rajiv gave certain examples of some significant export items by DPSUs. These included Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) and helicopters to countries like Mauritius, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Afghanistan, Seychelles, Namibia, Ecuador and Suriname. Some of the significant contracts that the DPSUs did not succeed in securing have included the $300 mn contract for Frigates by Philippines in 2016 (which went to a South Korean firm) and $900 mn contract for Trainer Aircraft by Malaysia (which was again bagged by a South Korean competitor in 2023).

Dr. Rajiv then highlighted issues relating to DPSUs and R&D, their marketing and strategic partnership efforts and use of Lines of Credit. He noted that most DPSUs have tie-ups with academic and research institutions like IITs. BEL has more than 300 collaborative R&D partners, including with more than 150 MSMEs.  BEL has also been granted a total of 24 patents, Mishra Dhatu Nigam Limited (MIDHANI) - five and Bharat Earth Movers Limited (BEML) - 12 patents respectively, while shipyards like Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE) have filed over 100 IPRs out of which more than 60 have been granted. BEL has the highest R&D spending among DPSUs while average R&D spending of Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL) over the five-year period from 2017-22 has been less than 2 per cent. DPSUs have also been making efforts to increase their marketing footprint overseas, with BEL, HAL and GRSE at the forefront of such efforts. Dr. Rajiv noted that countries like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Mauritius, and Surinam have used LoCs to source Indian defence equipment.

DPSUs are actively participating in Request for Information (RFIs) and Request for Proposal (RFPs), to enhance their export profiles. Mazagon Dock Limited (MDL), for instance, as of December 2021, had responded to over 30 RFIs and RFPs, involving nearly 200 vessels. The last vessel that was exported by MDL though was way back in 2014. DPSU shipyards point out that highly competitive markets and low pricing of the products from North–East Asian countries were some of the challenges. DPSU’s like HAL will continue to have stiff competition from global aerospace majors with their T-50 (Korea Aerospace Industries and Lockheed Martin), T-7A (Boeing and SAAB), or M 346 (Leonardo) Trainer Aircrafts. HAL though unveiled a new Hindustan Lead in Fighter (HLFT-42) Trainer Aircraft at the Aero India 2023.

Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL) expects export order book of Rs. 1200 crore during 2021-25, including OPVs and Corvettes to the Philippines Navy, Fast Interceptor Boats (FIBs) to Comoros and Floating Docks to Sri Lanka. New DPSU corporate entities like Munitions India Limited (MIL) hope to increase exports from the existing 2 per cent of annual Value of Issue to 8 per cent by next year.

Going forward, Dr. Rajiv noted that DPSU’s face a highly competitive export market for defence products. DPSUs are some of the biggest defence companies in the world in terms of sales. With the government’s stress on Atmanirbhar Bharat and ambitious targets relating to defence production, defence exports and defence indigenisation, the ability of the DPSUs to contribute to the exports pie will continue to be in focus.

Dr. Manisha Mathur

Dr. Mathur began by complimenting the author for the meticulous presentation of data and stated the need to analyse the challenges and various initiatives to increase India’s defence exports. She spoke about the various initiatives which Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) has been making in the expanding global defence market.

Dr. Mathur delved into the challenges in dealing with developing countries in the South Asian region, particularly on the limited flexibility in the operations of the DPSUs compared to Chinese counterparts. In comparison, the private sector might have greater flexibility. She delved into the various initiatives and efforts by the Indian Government, High Commissions, and Embassies to provide support through brand promotion, participation in exhibitions, and financial assistance such as Lines of Credit (LoC) from the Export-Import Bank of India to facilitate exports to these developing countries. Secondly, she flagged that India is not part of the NATO supply chain, which could have added to the exports pie. Thirdly, Dr. Mathur stressed the need to focus on R&D, customised solutions, product support, and leveraging licensed production of Russian platforms. However, she also expressed caution in sharing sensitive defence information and maintaining the confidentiality of partner countries in the public. She was optimistic about the future course of defence exports and spoke on the upward trend in collaboration with foreign and private sectors; she was optimistic about swift clearance regarding defence exports and obtaining NOCs (No Objection Certificates). She added that there is growing interest in India’s defence sector, pushed forward actively by the Raksha Mantri in his visits to countries in India’s extended neighbourhood as well as by a few countries appointing Defence Attaches to explore collaborative partnerships with the Indian defence industry.

Dr. Sameer Patil

Dr. Sameer Patil appreciated the comprehensive research and use of statistics. He stated that the declining share of Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) might be attributed to factors such as the absence of critical technologies, poor design capacities, long gestation periods, weak industry-academia interface, and limited success in the commercial arena. He remarked that the paper would benefit from providing background information on the role of DPSUs and the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) in defence manufacturing and the government’s initiatives to boost defence exports. Dr. Patil further suggested that the author may include an explanation for concepts like legacy liabilities and strategic partnerships and the link between capturing new markets and leveraging partnerships. He indicated that the paper may include a uniform usage of units and currency (USD or INR) throughout for clarity and comparison.

Gp. Capt. (Dr.) Rajeev Narang

Group Captain (Dr) Rajeev Narang emphasised the importance of understanding the factors that contribute to successful defence exports and identifying obstacles that hinder them. The Indian Government has implemented initiatives like Make in India, Strategic Partnerships, Joint Venture, Transfer of Technology (TOT), and Aatmanirbhar Bharat to achieve self-reliance in technology and become a defence export hub. He commented that as the percentage of defence exports has increased, the private sector has shown more significant growth than DPSUs. He stated that it is essential to differentiate between DPSUs to assess their value addition and export potential. Gp. Capt. Narang stated that collaboration with global manufacturers, civil product exports, and adherence to international standards are crucial to improve technology and export quality. Each institution has strengths, challenges, and associated areas influencing their export goals.

Gp. Capt. Narang stated the importance of user feedback from friendly countries, which is crucial to evaluate the perception and quality of Indian defence products. He stressed that understanding limitations, hurdles, and reasons for missed projects helps assess export potential. He discussed the significance of factors like testing facilities, standardisation, accreditation, and quality assurance that contribute to the growth of the export ecosystem. Gp. Capt. Narang elaborated on the challenges in global market entry, user satisfaction, supply lines, and regional variations. Comparison with other countries, such as China, highlights the importance of assessing technology transfer and understanding their approach. Collaboration with global manufacturers, civil product exports, and understanding international standards and testing procedures play a role in improving technology and export quality.

Col. (Dr.) Rajneesh Singh

Col. (Dr.) Rajneesh Singh highlighted the decline in the share of defence exports by DPSUs in recent years from over 56 per cent in 2013-14 to approximately 9 per cent in 2021-22. In contrast, the private sector’s share has surged to over 90 per cent during the same period. He stressed the need to study the reasons behind this substantial shift to understand the underlying factors. The Ordnance Factories turned DPSUs have witnessed a decline in their share of defence exports. He expanded on the potential reasons for this decline, including unattractive product lists, lack of competitive production quality/prices, and marketing issues that should be  analysed. Col. Singh recommended that Ordnance Factories turned DPSUs should focus on establishing joint ventures with foreign Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), producing critical items through technology transfer, and engaging in collaborative innovation for defence research and development in niche technology areas. This strategic approach would optimise capacity utilisation, enhance efficiency, and facilitate modernisation with capability development. Moreover, the assessment of defence export volume should carefully consider aspects like After-Sales Maintenance and Support, overhaul, and training and clarify whether these services are accounted for when receiving/executing the export order or at the time of payment realisation.

Col. Singh suggested that a collaborative approach between various government ministries, including the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of External Affairs, Department of Economic Affairs, and Ministry of Corporate Affairs, is vital to provide diplomatic support for achieving export orders, facilitating technology transfer deals, implementing offsets effectively, producing dual-use technology items, establishing joint ventures with foreign OEMs, and forming strategic market partnerships. Furthermore, DPSUs can be crucial in supporting defence Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) by providing a suitable forum/platform for exports, extending market support, offering technological guidance, and enhancing capability. Lastly, to obtain a realistic assessment of the defence industry, he suggested that a time period longer than a 10 years be considered. Such a timeframe would account for any spikes or irregularities in orders, ensuring that accurate conclusions are drawn.

Mr. Amit Cowshish

The Chair appreciated the suggestions and recommended certain changes to be incorporated into the paper.

Firstly, he suggested including a list of policy measures the government has taken as it pertained to defence exports, including issues like the Open General Export License (OGEL) and other procedural changes.

Secondly, he mentioned that, while the paper focuses on R&D, marketing efforts, and LOCs as facilitators, there is a need for more coverage of the limiting factors.

Thirdly, Mr. Cowshish flagged data points on exports and value of authorisations and noted that countries like France consider both physical exports and authorisation values, to get a better picture of the country’s defence exports.

Fourthly, he clarified that DPSUs also manufacture civilian products and make efforts to segregate defence export figures from civilian products.

Finally, he also highlighted the role of the private sector in defence exports, along with changes in acquisition procedures and offsets. He commented on the limitations of obtaining user inputs and mentioned the limited market in the neighbourhood but expressed hope for success in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and South America. Finally, the significance of Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) in the defence export story and their collaboration with DPSUs was flagged.

Dr .Rajiv expressed gratitude for the constructive comments and suggestions and stated that he intended to incorporate them to the extent possible while revising the paper and also use the suggestions for future research.

Questions and Comments

The Director General Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy began his comments on the paper by suggesting the inclusion of the initiatives for critical and emerging technologies between India and the US, as India was recognised as a major defence partner in 2016 and was given the STA-1 status in 2018 by the US. These steps aim to boost India’s technology and R&D capabilities, which can potentially impact the country’s defence as well as high-technology exports. He cited the example of the GE 414 afterburning turbofan engine, on which India and the US are expected to sign a major deal during the visit of Prime Minister Modi to the US. Amb. Chinoy enquired as to how best we can utlisise such opportunities to enhance the domestic manufacturing base. Secondly, he advised the author to include the contribution of positive indigenisation lists for Atmanirbhar Bharat, on Indian manufacturing capabilities and its effect on exports. Thirdly, he  enquired whether we can categorise long-term lease arrangements as defence exports, like the transfer of the Kilo-class submarine, INS Sindhuvir to Myanmar. Amb. Chinoy also flagged the Chinese example of using a European engine in the C919 commercial aircraft, which they are aggressively marketing for exports. He also asked the author to explore the connection between Indian Armed Forces’ procurement decisions and exports. If the Indian Armed Forces purchase in large quantities significant equipment like the LCA Tejas, given the  Rs 48,000 crore deal, it should naturally translate, sooner or later, into possible export opportunities for the indigenous fighter aircraft powered by the US engine. Lastly, Amb. Chinoy flagged the need for appropriate decision-making vis-à-vis R&D investments, including on aspects relating to when to enter the technology lifecycle and which specific technologies to focus on.

Deputy Director General Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi commented on Dr. Mathur’s statement where she mentioned the importance of entering the NATO supply chain and highlighted the substantial defence budget of the US. Gen. Bakshi flagged the possibility of Indian companies benefiting if and when India and the US sign the Reciprocal Defence Procurement (RDP) Agreement, which seems to be in the works. He flagged business opportunities in terms of Maintenance, Repair and Operations (MRO) of Russian equipment in the inventories of other countries, given the current geo-political scenario. Gen Bakshi suggested that testing and accreditation facilities in the public sector need to be made more accessible to the private sector defence companies as well. The limitations in critical technologies such as chips, engines, and precision guided munitions was flagged.

The Q/A session broadly revolved around the themes of indigenisation, defence exports, joint ventures arrangements, as well as public and private defence industries.

The speaker responded to the comments and questions.

(Report prepared by Ms. Shayesta Nishat Ahmed, Research Analyst, Defence Economics and Industry Centre, MP-IDSA).  

Defence Economics & Industry

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