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Events
| Title | Date | Author | Time | Event | Body | Research Area | Topics | File attachments | Image |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Training module for IFS probationers | February 12, 2008 to February 22, 2008 | Training Capsules | |||||||
| 11th Asian Security Conference: The Changing Face of Conflict and Strategy in Asia | February 03, 2009 to February 04, 2009 | Conference | Asian Security Conference | ||||||
| Bioterrorism led by Professor Dean Wilkening | February 06, 2009 | Round Table |
IDSA organized a round table on the subject of bioterrorism on February 6, 2009. The main speaker at the event was Prof. Dean Wilkening, Director, Science Programme at Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University. In his presentation Prof. Dean pointed out that biological weapons would be suitable for the new brand of terrorism, which comprises mostly of religious, nihilist, and millenarian groups. These groups were less constrained than their predecessors in terms of means and ends. Certain biological agents could be more lethal than chemical agents. The use of highly effective aerial methods of disseminating biological agents results in a high psychological impact. Some of the factors influencing the consequences of air- borne release of biological agents were delineated -- deposition in lower respiratory tract, atmospheric transport, agent characteristics and protection measures. Past incidents of bioterrorism, in particular the case of Aum Shinrikiyo, were discussed at length. It was also mentioned that while non-state actors might encounter hurdles in acquiring and using biological agents, state sponsored acts of biological terrorism are more possible. Prof. Wilkening shared the information gathered after a simulation exercise that was conducted to ascertain the number of people who would be affected by exposure to biological agents. It was found out that the spectrum of biological threat is very broad. With a band of possibility of attacks, the number of people affected might range from 100 to one million (contingent on the infectious dosage and the agent characteristics, etc). One of the important findings of this study was that uncertainty with regards to biological agents, their use, and effects is far greater than that of any other weapon. This makes them most suitable weapons of terror. While discussing the various strategies of coping with bioterrorism, four major elements were brought out. These were diplomacy, deterrence, pre-emption/counterforce, and defence. The element of defence was further divided into active and passive components, with elements of safety for covert delivery of biological agents forming part of active defence and measures for civil defence a part of passive defense. The various stages of biodefense that were outlined included pre-attack vaccination, agent detection and identification, post-attack medical response and post-attack decontamination. It was brought out that the guiding philosophy for US biodefence is to focus on programmes and activities with public health benefits. The biodefence timeline in US policy comprises of various stages. Detection and identification within 24 hours of the outbreak of disease, providing medical logistics in the first 48 hours, prophylaxis campaign spread over the next 2 days and finally the last stage of decontamination comprising of 4 to 6 days. The problem of differentiating between deliberate and natural outbreak of disease was discussed in detail. Prof. Wilkening talked about bioforensics. This is an upcoming science, used extensively by centres like NBACC's National Bioforensic Analysis Center (NBFAC). Bioforensic analysis of evidence is conducted from a biocrime or terrorist attack to attain a “biological fingerprint” to help investigators identify perpetrators and determine the origin and method of attack. Towards the end of the meeting the need to develop simulation models that pertains to the Indian context was articulated. For institutes that focus on security and strategic studies, there would be significant interest in exploring the non-public health aspects related to bioterrorism. In addition, the necessity to enhance inter-agency cooperation in India and tap existing talent in the field of biological weaponry and related issues to develop a better understanding of the subject was highlighted. Prepared by Dr. Monalisa Joshi, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
North America & Strategic Technologies | Bio-terrorism | ||||
| Training for BSF Officers (DIG level) | February 02, 2009 to February 06, 2009 | Training Capsules |
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| National Seminar on Defence Industry | January 23, 2009 to January 24, 2009 | Conference |
 Concept NoteIndia has a large defence industrial base, mainly under state control, with limited but a growing private sector contribution. The public sector enterprises consist of 39 Ordnance Factories and eight Defence Public Sector Undertakings. These enterprises some of which date back to pre-colonial period, form the backbone of the India’s defence industry. They produce a variety of variety of items, mostly from technologies developed by the DRDO or obtained through licenses from foreign countries, ranging from small arms to heavy vehicles, tanks, fighter aircrafts, missiles, defence electronics and naval ships among others. Besides, they also provide repair, maintenance and overhaul facilities for both indigenous and imported systems. In 2007-08 these enterprises together produced items worth Rs. 27,479 crores, of which over 80 per cent were sold to the defence forces. Unlike the established public sector enterprises, until recently the private sector had a very limited role in the field of defence production, by way of supplying raw materials, components and spare parts. Since 2001, role of the private sector has been expanded in a growing acknowledgment to its contribution in the civilian sector, especially in the field of engineering, manufacturing, project management, IT and software. To integrate the private sector in defence industry the government has allowed 100 per cent participation with FDI, permissible up to 26 per cent, though both are subject to prior licensing. Apart from this, to provide a level-playing field to private sector vis-à-vis government controlled enterprises, the MoD, besides revising the Defence Procurement Procedure from time to time, has introduced the concept of Raksha Udyog Ratnas which when operationalised would treat the selected private companies at par with the public sector enterprise. The recently introduced defence offset policy also provides an equal status to the private sector to benefit from increased business opportunities, possible inflows of investment and technologies from overseas and tie-up with major domestic and foreign defence companies. Despite the existence of the public sector enterprises for a fair amount of time and the entry of private sector since 2001, there still exists a void in India’s core defence industrial capability. This is significant given the country’s arms imports, both in the form of new systems as well as upgrades of old systems, running into US $ 5-6 billion per year. This in turn raises many questions as to how to energise domestic industrial base so as to make India increasingly self-reliant in defence production and maintenance. The National Seminar on Defence Industry will focus on the larger issues that confront the Indian defence industry. It will bring together the policy makers, Armed Forces, Industry captains, both in public and private sectors and also from abroad, to discuss and debate issues pertaining India’s defence industry and how India can learn and benefit from the experiences of the major developed countries in building up a comprehensive defence manufacturing capabilities. Besides, the seminar will address issues such as creating and sustaining long range defence R&D capabilities in critical defence technologies; challenges of developing comprehensive ancillary supply chain of defence manufacturers: and the strategies required for optimising opportunities in export/offsets/services/outsourcing. ProgrammeDAY – ONE (January 23, 2009)Inauguration: 9.30-10.00 hrs Tea: 10.00-10.30 hrs Session I: 10.30-12.00 hrsHistorical Survey of Policies and Practices concerning Defence Industrialization in Major Developed Countries Chair: Shri Pradeep Kumar Secretary, Defence Production, Ministry of Defence Speakers:
Session II: 12.00-13.30 hrsThe Contours and Content of Comprehensive Defence Manufacturing Capabilities Chair: Shri Shri VK Misra, Distinguished Fellow, IDSA Speakers:
Lunch: 13.30-14.30 hrs Session III: 14.30-16.00 hrsCreating and Sustaining Long Range Defence R&D Capabilities in Critical Defence Technologies Chair: Dr Prahladha, CCR&D, Defence Research and Development Organization Speakers:
DAY – TWO (January 24, 2009)Session IV: 9.30-11.30 hrsThe Challenges of Creating a Comprehensive Ancillary Supply Chain of Defence Manufacturers Speakers:
Tea: 11.30-12.00 hrs Session V: 12.00-13.45Short/Medium/Long Term Strategies for Optimizing Opportunities in Exports/Offsets/ Services/Outsourcing Speakers:
Lunch: 13.45-14.45 hrs |
Defence Economics & Industry | |||||
| An Exploratory Framework for India’s relationship with ‘New Nepal’ | January 16, 2009 | Nihar R. Nayak | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: P. Stobdan The paper, An Exploratory Framework for India’s Relationship with New Nepal, was presented by Dr. Nihar Nayak. Professor P. Stobdan was the Chair. Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Ashok Mehta and Prof. Sangeeta Thapliyal were the external discussants; and Dr Smruti Pattanaik and Dr. Pushpita Das were the internal discussants. The paper brought out the complexities associated with the Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed on July 31, 1950. It identified some key elements which should be incorporated to make the Treaty more acceptable to both sides. At the outset, the presentation briefly focused on the important Articles of the Treaty, highlighting that the key objective of the agreement was to promote peace and friendship between the two states. Mutual politico-economic, socio-cultural linkages and security requirements were underlined as common concerns. Highlighting the element of reciprocity, the paper argued that one key element of the treaty was that it offered economic opportunities in India for Nepalese nationals against Nepalese assurances that India’s security concerns would be respected. The external political environment in the form of the shadow of the Cold War was one of the overwhelming factors shaping concerns and perceptions on both sides. Chinese adventurism in Tibet and apprehensions over Communist influence in Nepal were some of the factors that drove the two countries towards a settlement of issues. Dr. Nayak argued that over the years, the treaty has emerged as a nationalistic issue and is considered a major constraint on Nepal’s independent foreign policy. In fact, during his official visit to India in 2008, the Nepalese Premier emphasized that there should be a “clear revision” of the treaty. Highlighting the Nepalese and Indian perspectives, the paper brought out the key irritants associated with the treaty. While Nepal was overwhelmingly concerned with issues relating to security and the unilateral imposition of restrictions on the free movement of people across the border; India was conversely concerned with the number of Nepali immigrants and the presence of ISI in Nepal, who could be working in tandem with Chinese intelligence. Dr. Nihar Nayak pointed out that despite irritants and opposition from both sides, especially Nepal, the treaty has not been abrogated by either side, an issue which he considered curiously serious, because Clause 10 provides for abrogation as a viable option. The paper also highlighted the mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries. On trade, Dr. Nayak argued that India is Nepal’s largest trading partner. Seventy per cent of total Nepalese trade is with India. Also, bilateral trade and investments have greatly improved between the two countries. India’s share in Nepal’s total trade made a quantum jump form 26 per cent in 1996-97 to almost 41 per cent in 2000-01. In fact amongst the SAARC countries, India’s trade growth has been the fastest with Nepal and total trade stands at half a billion dollars accounting for around 25 per cent of total India-SAARC trade. However, hydro-projects, transit and employment benefits to Nepalese migrants in India are possible areas of cooperation between the two countries. Notwithstanding the mutual benefits, the relationship between the two countries remains strained. New Nepal, Dr. Nayak argued, provides an opportunity towards strengthening bilateral ties between the two countries. He suggested that the treaty needs adjustment, review and updating, keeping in view changing security and economic realities. Both governments, he emphasized, also need to agree not to allow the use of their respective territories for activities harmful to the national security interests of the other. Also, both countries should not enter into any kind of military alliance with third countries. Maj. Gen. Ashok Mehta argued that the concept of New Nepal is questionable, as it is an ongoing process. He pointed out that the fact that there was no earlier call for abrogation of the treaty was incorrect as the call for change had come from Manmohan Adhikari. He noted that the main problem with the 1950 treaty was that all provisions of the treaty were in breach in themselves and none of them were operational. He also pointed out that one of the main problems with the 1950 treaty was that the implications of the treaty had not been studied in detail, engendering parochial politics for vested interests. Gen. Mehta underlined the importance of identifying new concerns in Nepal, pointing out that Nepal and Pakistan were two factors which ought to be taken into account while discussing India-Nepal relations. Prof. Sangeeta Thapliyal noted that the paper needs to revisit the underlying context of its title. She argued that it was important to identify the groups and political actors in Nepal opposed to the treaty. She also noted that Nepal’s fears need to be taken into account and consequent ramifications for the treaty. It was also important to discuss what kind of a relationship India wanted with Nepal. Dr. Smruti Pattanaik pointed out that the issue of abrogation is directly linked with political posturing. The 1950 treaty needed to be seen in the context of identity politics. She pointed out that domestic politics in Nepal was primarily responsible for the failure of the 1950 treaty and that there was a need to bring out the Indian perspective on the treaty more clearly. Dr Pushpita Das pointed out that it was important to argue why India should opt for a revision of the treaty. Some of the points raised during the discussion were:
Prepared by Medha Bisht, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
South Asia | India-Nepal Relations, Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Nepal | ||
| Interaction with a Delegation of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of Swedish Parliament | January 12, 2009 | Round Table |
A delegation of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Swedish Parliament visited IDSA on January 12, 2009. Ms. Carina Hägg of the Social Democratic Party of Sweden led the delegation. The focus of the interactive session was regional security in South Asia. Dr. Arvind Gupta, the Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair at the institute, chaired the interactive session. Members of the South Asia cluster at IDSA as well as the members of the other clusters participated in the discussion. Dr. Arvind Gupta gave an overview of the political and economic situation in the South Asia region including Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Maldives. He said that while there is democratic change in the region and the environment for regional cooperation was good, the recent terror attacks in Mumbai represent a setback for India- Pakistan relations and regional peace. He noted that Pakistan was in a denial-mode about the Mumbai attacks. Islamabad’s reluctance to come to terms with the fact that Pakistan’s soil was being used for terrorist attacks was not helping matters. In India there was deep anguish and despair about Pakistan’s denial and its diversionary tactics. The Indian government has acted with great restraint and relied on diplomacy. The international community must appreciate the gravity of the terror threat emanating from Pakistan and take effective steps curb to it. Captain Alok Bansal, Research Fellow at IDSA, gave a brief overview of the security situation in Pakistan. He indicated that the Pakistan government’s control over its territory was rather tenuous. Besides the economic crisis, the state was beset with a resurgence of ethnic aspirations and various ethnic groups are seeking a greater share of Pakistan’s economic resources. However, the gravest threat to Pakistan is the progressive Talibanisation of its North-Western territories. Taliban had established firm control over North and South Waziristan and Orakzai agency and they are active in Mohmand agency. Large parts of North West Frontier Province (NWFP) including Swat valley had come under the influence of the Taliban. Talibanisation has also led to sectarianism. Sectarian violence has become endemic to Kurram agency and parts of NWFP. Currently Pakistani forces are not undertaking any operations against the Taliban. They are instead pursuing isolated and limited action in Mohmand and Khyber agencies. In the past six months major operations have only been confined to Bajaur agency and Swat valley. The Swedish delegation raised a number of issues during the interaction. They wanted to know about Sino-Indian relations, India’s role in UN peacekeeping missions, and the security implications of climate change. Suitable briefings were given to the visitors on these issues. It was emphasized that although India faces a number of security challenges, India’s approach in dealing with these problems was rooted in its democratic and multi-cultural ethos. The visiting delegation was also briefed on various issues relating to Sino-Indian relations. They were informed that though Sino-Indian engagement increased considerably in recent years such as in trade, tourism and students’ exchange programme, but there are still unresolved issues like the border dispute and Tibetan refugees. The capability and future aspirations of the Chinese Navy, its manoeuvrings in the Indian Ocean, bases in neighbouring countries of India and the strategic implications of its naval expansion for the region were also discussed. Prepared by Alok Mukhopadhyay, Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
Nuclear and Arms Control | |||||
| Tibet: Connectivity, Capabilities and Consequences | January 09, 2009 | P. Stobdan | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: Arvind Gupta Since 1951, China had fueled massive economic investment in Tibet. In recent decades, infrastructure assumed the salience in China’s Tibet strategy, especially under its ‘Go West’ policy, launched by Jiang Zemin in 2000. The stated goal was to usher Tibet into an era of modernity and prosperity. The policy gained more urgent priority since 2003 when Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao showed greater commitment to make Tibet a part of China’s economic miracle. The 1,100 kilometer railway to Lhasa that cost $4.2 billion has symbolized China’s success in Tibet. Even the Indian Defence Minister Mr. A K Antony accepted the fact that there was no comparison of such development on the Indian side, when he visited a forward location in December 2007. In 2007, China’s State Council had approved 180 projects for Tibet that would cost over 770 billion yuan ($10.2) during the Eleventh Five Year Plan. Reports suggest that more than 77 percent projects have already commenced. According to the Tibet Autonomous Regional Development and Reform Commission, over 200 billion Yuan were spent during the year 2008. On October 14, 2008, Chinese military engineers and workers began digging a tunnel in Tibet’s Galung La Mountain in Nyingchi Prefecture to build the most difficult highway to China’s last road-less Medog County that borders Arunachal Pradesh. China’s state media prominently highlighted the significance of the 141 km long road connecting Medog with Tibet’s main East-West highway. The project will be completed by 2010. The great concern for India is the South-North Water Transfer Project (SNWTP), also known as the ‘Great Western Line’. The project is worth China’s $60 billion that aims to divert more than 40 billion cubic meters of water annually from China’s longest river, the Yangtze, and its tributaries through a tunnel under the Yellow River to northern China. The initial phase is expected to be ready by 2010. But a section of the route has already been used for meeting the water requirements during the Beijing Olympics. The initial two routes of the project will take water from the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze basin through the Yellow River to Beijing, Tianjin, and other booming cities in the north. The third route plans to divert waters from Tibet’s Yalong, Dadu and Jinsha rivers to the northern plains. The Brahmaputra project forms the second phase of the third route. The project was envisaged on the assumption that by 2030 the Yangtze basin will not have sufficient water for transfer to the north. The major concern here is: why is China going ahead with the SNWTP if there is inadequate water available for rerouting? The project’s aim is to divert the Tsangpo at the Shoumatan Point (the ‘Big U-turn’) for constructing the world’s largest hydroelectric plant at the knick-zone to generate 40,000 Megawatts of electricity, and for diverting 200 billion cubic meters of water annually to the arid north. The project will involve enormous engineering complexity on the scale of the Tibet railway system and the Three Gorges dam. Media reports also suggest China’s proposal to use nuclear explosives to blast a 15 kilometer tunnel at the U-turn. The great challenge for India regarding the project is that India has no water sharing treaty with China. China has rarely bothered to share information prior to flood situations. As a result India often becomes vulnerable to environmental threats. Also, there is no record of China consulting the lower riparian states before undertaking construction of dams upstream. As the economies of India and China grow, both are going to compete not only for oil and gas but also for water resources. One can conclude that China as the upstream state would treat water as a strategic commodity. Points raised during the Discussion
Prepared by Dr. M.Mahtab Alam Rizvi, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN | Tibet, India-China Relations, China | ||
| Spreading Tentacles of Left-Wing Extremism: Are we Failing in Police Training: A case study of Chhattisgarh | January 09, 2009 | Om Shankar Jha | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: Ved Marwah Various case studies of Naxalite-related incidents have revealed that one of the prime reasons for recurring security forces casualties has been the inadequacy in training imparted to them. While the Central Paramilitary Forces (CPMF) have well developed integral infrastructure and resources for training, the police forces in most of the States are generally lagging behind. Police forces are generally capacity-deficient to fight the Naxalites effectively and need to be transformed into a combat-oriented force in Naxal-affected States. However, police training has been less than satisfactory. An adequate and efficient police training system, infrastructure and resources are required to be built up in the States to meet current training requirements. The vital question is whether the present police training facilities, resources and infrastructure available in the States are adequate to train personnel, including new recruits, within a short span of time. This paper attempts to assess the present police training system, infrastructure and resources in Naxal-affected States, discusses the role of the Central Government in general, and examines Chhattisgarh in particular. The paper also identifies corrective measures and makes relevant policy recommendations. Law and order being a state subject, the primary responsibility of building police training system, infrastructure and resources lies with State governments. However, the Central Government has been rendering support to States in the formulation of training policy, research, improving law enforcement, standardisation and modernisation through exchange of knowledge, coordination and budgetary allocation. The Centre as part of the Seventh Plan has recently taken the initiative and decided to set up 20 Counter insurgency and Anti-Terrorism training Centres in Bihar, Jharkhand, Assam, Orissa and Chhattisgarh. Also adequate funds have been allocated to Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D) in the 7th plan for development of the police training system throughout the country. Modernisation of police forces has not brought about any visible improvement in the police training system so far in most of the States. A few States like Andhra Pradesh have however taken the lead. Presently, a huge gap exists between requirements and availability of police training infrastructure and resources in most of the States. Select numbers of police personnel are being trained in Army and CPMF training establishments. However, these establishments have their own commitments and cannot afford to regularly train State police personnel unless their infrastructure and resources are enhanced. Chhattisgarh State police personnel lack adequate training to effectively fight the Naxalites. The police training infrastructure and resources in this State are not commensurate with ground requirements. Also, the lack of coordination between CPMF and state police forces is evident given the absence of an operational ethos and gap in training. Chhattisgarh inherited a depleted police force and infrastructure when it was formed in the year 2001. A large number of reluctant officers and men from Madhya Pradesh were allotted Chhattisgarh State. Besides, many personnel, trained in instructional duties, managed to remain in Madhya Pradesh. The state inherited the worst Naxalite-hit areas, and the Chhattisgarh Police, at its inception, was capacity deficient. Given the state’s limited infrastructure, it also suffers from deficiency in training. Finances are a major constraint faced by the State police and are far below what is necessary to meet the requirements of manpower, mobility, infrastructure, communication, land, residential accommodation, etc. The state police has identified some key areas and steps are being taken to improve police training. These include: commando training; intelligence training; basic induction training; specialist training; improvement of training infrastructure and facilities; joint training with CPMF; joint/collective training with CPMF; and redressing resource deficiency. Also, the State has taken an initiative to establish a Counter Insurgency and Jungle warfare Training College which can train 3,600 police personnel each year. With limited training infrastructure, Chattisgarh will take at least 10 years to train its entire police manpower in counter-insurgency and jungle warfare. A positive environment and culture is lacking in the police set up in most of the States. Posting to a training institution is considered as punishment. Also there is little interest in undergoing training. There is no motivation and incentive for the trainers. Hence police forces lack good quality of instructors. Training is also not strictly linked with promotion. Training is therefore a neglected activity in the police. Excess commitment of police personnel is another reason for training to be neglected. Holistic development of the training system is required in the police set-up. The essence of police human resource development lies in training, and it cannot be neglected any longer. There is an urgent need to prioritise training at all levels including special pilot projects like dedicated allocation of budget for development of training infrastructure and resources to States. The Army and the CPMF have a large number of well-trained instructors whose services can be utilised in the police training academies of naxal-affected States. The paper’s recommendations were:
Points raised during the Discussion:
Prepared by Dr. Amarjeet Singh, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
Terrorism & Internal Security | Left-Wing Extremism, Naxal, Maoist, Chhattisgarh | ||
| India’s Economic Engagement of Africa: Partnering Africa | January 02, 2009 | Ruchita Beri | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: Arvind Gupta Historically, the principal tenet of India’s policy towards Africa has been support for the struggle for decolonization and racial discrimination in South Africa. Economic engagement between India and Africa is increasing like never before though it is not new. During the colonial period, India played a significant role in terms of supplying personnel for middle level services such as duka. At present the scale and swiftness of India’s economic engagement with Africa is expanding. This has been facilitated by the changing African outlook in recent years. On the political side there has been an end in sight for some of the debilitating conflicts that have ravaged the continent. At the same time there is a move by Africans to take charge of their own destiny. For its part, the Indian government laid out its broad economic cooperation frame work during the India-Africa Forum Summit in April 2008. This conference gained significance because of an attempt to forge a closer partnership between India and African countries and address the common goals and challenges they face. An important element of India’s approach towards Africa is the growing presence of the private sector in African countries. India does not have the financial capacity to match the grants in aid by China and the West to Africa. However, India recognizes the African countries’ focus on capacity building and human resources development. As a result, Africa today is the largest recipient of India’s technical cooperation programme. India’s growing synergy with Africa is quite visible in the recent trade trends. Bilateral trade has increased from US $967 million in 1990-91 to $25 billion in 2006-07. India has institutionalized its relationship with African countries by launching the India-Africa Forum in April 2008. During the summit, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced a number of initiatives including a duty-free trade preference scheme for 34 African countries. India has also enhanced its relations with African countries in the energy sector. Currently around 24 per cent of India’s crude oil imports are sourced from Africa. Indian national oil companies like the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Videsh Limited (OVL) has invested in equity assets in African countries. However, China’s booming investment in Africa has provoked a heated debate on the continent and around the world. One of the challenges that India faces is the penchant among the Western media and intellectual to mention in the same breath both the Indian model of engagement with Africa and the very different Chinese economic approach to Africa. African countries have acknowledged the growth of Indian economy and have expressed a desire to emulate the Indian model. Points raised during the Discussion
Prepared by Dr. M.Mahtab Alam Rizvi, Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. |
Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN | Africa, India-Africa Relations, Economic Relations |
