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| Title | Date | Author | Time | Event | Body | Research Area | Topics | File attachments | Image |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| In Pursuit of a Shield:US, Missile Defence and the Iran Imperative | April 20, 2012 | S. Samuel C. Rajiv | Fellows' Seminar |
Chairman: Professor Satish Kumar The paper dealt with US efforts to counter Iran’s missile ‘threat’ and ensure security of its allies like Israel and Turkey and safeguard its interests and the regional repercussions of such measures. The paper began by discussing the Iran threat as flagged in key US policy documents including the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), 2006 National Military Strategy to Combat WMD and the February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) Review and the solution articulated (missile defence) to deal/hedge against such a threat. Pertinent among these measures being erected in consort with allies like the NATO and GCC countries at sea as well as on land across the Bush and the Obama administration were examined. The next section examined Iran’s missile inventory and its developing capabilities. The pursuit of such ‘defensive’ measures has led to complications in US-Russia arms control efforts, uncertainties in Iran’s relations with its neighbours like Turkey and has generated regional strategic tensions (NATO-Russia) as well. Russian contentions that the real focus of such measures is to constrain its strategic capabilities despite US officials insisting that it was directed against Iran were pointed out. NATO’s November 2010 Lisbon Summit explicitly avoided naming Iran as the intended target of Obama’s Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) at the instance of Turkey, which agreed to host a X-band radar at Kurecik 700 kms from the Iranian border in September 2011 on the condition that data would not be shared with Israel. The strong US-Israel missile defence cooperation was noted, with Arrow Block 4 version tested in February 2012. It was pointed out that the Arrow – first inducted into the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) in 2000 – was the first operational theatre missile defence system in the world. The paper noted that there was the distinct possibility of Obama’s PAA being extended to the Gulf region, with senior US policy makers expressing such a desire publicly in recent times. The UAE became the first international partner to buy the THAAD missiles from the US in December 2011. The paper ended by flagging possible implications for Indian security given that these efforts relate to developments in what Indian policy makers have called its ‘proximate neighbourhood’. Among these included greater regional strategic uncertainties coupled with rising military expenditures, energy security complications as a result of a possible incident at sea, and possible deterrence complications given that American BMD systems provides the justification for both Russia and China to continue their nuclear modernization efforts. Prof. Kumar noted that the issues examined in the paper have a fundamental bearing on regional and global security. He added that the ‘reset’ in US-Russia relations has been affected by the US missile defence policy with regard to Iran. Dr. Ghosh began his comments by noting that the paper was ‘well-crafted’ but with certain loopholes which can be plugged to make it better. His comments dealt with the BMD architecture, Russia-US imbroglio and Iran’s capabilities. He wanted the author to examine some of the US programmes that had been mothballed as well as programmes like the Hypersonic Glide Kill Vehicle, which could be the future of BMD. Dr. Ghosh reminded the audience that Obama’s PAA was in many ways similar to the 1996 document Capstone Requirements Document (CRD) specifying NMD operational requirements which was scrapped because the capabilities could not mature. Dr. Ghosh noted that the Bush-era system did not cover Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, and parts of Romania. He also noted that the US had rejected the Russian suggestion to host US radars at Gabaladarya, Azerbaijan directly overlooking Iran instead of in Poland and Czech Republic. On Russian contentions specifically, Dr. Ghosh stated that they were a bit overblown given that Russia could potentially overwhelm US interceptors by sheer numbers at its disposal. He concluded his remarks by noting that an Iranian ICBM capability ‘was still some distance away’. Cdr. Singh commended the effort to bring out a coherent paper by the author despite not having a military background. He gave a geo-strategic context to the issue in the light of declining Russian influence over ‘buffer’ states after the break-up of the Soviet Union, and the genuine apprehensions of countries like Poland and Georgia over the resurgent Russia. He pointed to intra-NATO divisions over the issue, which are being played up by Russia. In his opinion, the technological basis of the US system was sound. He however termed the ‘threat’ from Iran as ‘over-stated’ given that Iranian IRBM capabilities have prominent North Korean/Chinese links and an Iranian ICBM capability was far away. Iranian cruise missile capabilities though are potent and are being still further developed. Cdr. Singh pointed out that Iranian threats to close the Straits of Hormuz were real, even though it could be for a limited period. He stated that as a concept, BMD was a ‘brilliant, strategic idea’ equivalent to a ‘strategic tent’ rather than a ‘strategic fortress’. Internal Discussant Cdr. S.S. Parmar noted that in the event of clashes, it will not involve missile defences per se but conventional capabilities. He also noted that Iran could swarm US ships with shore-based batteries making defences against short-range missiles ineffective. Cdr. Parmar pointed to the importance of maps and tables to more clearly convey information. The other Discussant Kapil Dharaj Patil pointed out that Iranian perceptions of the US missile defence system was absent in the paper. He added that it was important to note the ‘threat construction’ by US and NATO vis-à-vis Iran’s capabilities. DG, IDSA Dr. Arvind Gupta noted that though the paper is an important update, it could do with more analysis. He pointed out that implications for Indian security if any have to be more clearly brought out and the author’s own assessment of the US efforts has to be included in the concluding section. The paper could also benefit by incorporating maps/tables. Chinese reactions to the issue could also be pointed out. On issues like budgetary pressures being faced by the Obama administration that the paper flags, a more focussed effort can be made to go into the pertinent details. Other points of discussion that were flagged from the floor included regional responses to US BMD efforts, specifically from countries like Saudi Arabia and the GCC, assessment of Iranian capabilities or lack of it, and the efficacy of the BMD systems being pursued by the US, among others. Report prepared by Shri Kiran Jai Prakash, Research Intern, Nuclear and Arms Control Centre, and Sam Rajiv. |
Eurasia & West Asia | ||||
| The Growing Chinese Maritime Influence: Implications for Regional Security | April 13, 2012 | Sarabjeet Singh Parmar | Fellows' Seminar |
Chairperson: Vice Admiral P S Das (Retd) In order to understand the strategy adopted by China in spreading its maritime influence and implications for regional security, the tenets espoused by Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett have been studied in this paper. The two great strategists differed from each other; whereas Mahan emphasised establishing Command of Sea, Corbett focused more on denial of command of sea. Mahan advocated the Big Battle theory (requiring big Ships and Weapons); but Corbett believed in advance indicators before big battles will occur. Whilst Mahan looked at the sea as means to an end, Corbett looked at a skilful combination of maritime and continental strategies. On comparing the two strategists it was observed that the Chinese maritime thought process was heavily influenced by Mahan, but there are also shades of Corbett’s ideas. China, in order to gain power, has consolidated the strategies of Mahan and Corbett in the present era and its strategy is now based on three conjoined aspects—economics, diplomacy and military expansion. The importance of maritime strategy for China emerges in three ways: first, breakaway from the coastal defence syndrome; second, consolidation in the immediate area in the face of the Soviet threat and the presence of the US in Japan; and thirdly, break away from the immediate area and enter into the outer areas. Comparisons were drawn between China’s wish to absorb Taiwan and the US annexation of Hawaii Islands and expansion in US maritime influence post the world wars, as these aspects hold important geostrategic indicators for China. It was brought out that in order to expand its influence China must first gain the advantage of sea denial tactics through Submarines and Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBM), second, gain sea control through establishment of working control and control in dispute, third, China’s naval operations outside the first and second island chains would fall more into the category of presence and trade protection and finally, the strategy of overseas bases which is followed by China in a subtle way in Myanmar, Maldives, Sri Lanka, eastern coast of Africa, etc. Conclusion:
Suggestions for the Paper:
Report Prepared by Soumya Tiwari, Research Intern, Centre for Military Affairs |
Military Affairs | ||||
| Understanding Africa’s position on UN Security Council Reforms | April 13, 2012 | Ruchita Beri | Fellows' Seminar |
Chairperson: Lt Gen Satish Nambiar (Retd) Reform and democratisation of the United Nations, particularly the Security Council, has been the focus of global attention in recent years. However, progress on UNSC reforms has proven to be quite elusive, mainly due to multiple and competing proposals by various groups like G-4, Uniting for Consensus, L-69 and S-5. Separately, within the UN process, through the Africa Group the African countries have tried to project their common position for permanent representation from the African continent at the Security Council. In this context, Ms. Ruchita Beri analysed the African position on UNSC reforms and provided some historical and political context necessary to situate the Africa’s debate over Security Council reforms. She argued that the continent’s inflexibility and failure to reach a compromise on the common position while negotiating with other like-minded groups is the single most significant roadblock in the African countries’ plans to acquire permanent position on the high table. Further, while India’s quest for African support for its UNSC candidature may have been one of the factors fuelling India’s engagement of African countries in recent years, doubts remain on India and Africa convergence at the negotiations on UNSC reforms in future. Highlighting the anachronistic structure of the UNSC, Ms. Beri mentioned that there has been an engaging debate on the need for UNSC reforms since the end of the Cold War. Many countries, especially from the developing world, have expressed their dissatisfaction with the unrepresentative character of the UNSC and presented various formulae and proposals addressing three issues:
However, the new permanent membership has proven to be the most contentious issue in the debate on Security Council reforms. Among different groups formed across the world to put forward the cases for permanent membership to the Security Council, the Africa group remains the only geographical group to have reached a common position when, after considerable deliberations, the African countries agreed to a common position on the UNSC reforms called the Ezulwini Consensus (2005). Further, the Sirte Summit of the African Union in July 2005 set up a follow up mechanism on the reform process and mandated to negotiate with other regions of the world and stakeholders to attain Africa’s aspiration with reference to the UNSC. However, there was a lot of criticism of the African common position:
On their part, the G-4 and the Africa group opened negotiations in London in 2005 in order to reach a consensus as they would be unable to muster the required support independently. Nevertheless, negotiations revealed fissures in the unity of the Africa group and the leading African countries failed to convince other member states that it was practically impossible for Africa to attain a permanent representation at the UNSC without support from other players. Several factors influenced these events:
On India-Africa convergence, Ms. Beri mentioned that in recent years, India has been engaging African countries in a big way, at bilateral, regional as well as pan-African levels. The need for a new paradigm encompassing diverse areas such as political, economic, science and technology, human resource development, social, cultural and strategic was highlighted during the India-Africa Summit held in April 2008. Also, India’s increasing engagement of Africa coupled with its involvement in UN peacekeeping in Africa can be viewed as a strategy to win support of the African countries for its candidature to the UNSC. In turn, on various occasions, individually or as part of a regional grouping, African countries have gone on record to support India’s candidature to the reformed UNSC. In conclusion, she opined that currently it seems the Africa group cannot agree on suitable candidates to fill the permanent seats allocated to the region. It is also doubtful whether other groups will negotiate with African countries without identification of the possible African candidates. At the same time, without African support it is inconceivable that any proposal or reform package could succeed in the General Assembly. Therefore, at the moment, Africa seems to be holding the key to further progress on the UNSC reforms debate. Major Points from Discussion and Suggestions to the Author:
Report prepared by Babjee Pothuraju, Research Assistant, IDSA. |
Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN | ||||
| Threat of Islamist Terrorism in Southeast Asia-2012 | March 01, 2012 | Bilveer Singh | 1100 hrs | Other |
Venue: Room No. 005, IDSA Dr Bilveer Singh, a Singapore citizen, currently teaches at the Dept of Political Science, National University of Singapore and is an Adjunct Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. He specialises on regional security issues with his latest books being The Talibanization of Southeast (2007); The Geopolitics of Papua (2008); indonesia Under the Shadow of an Islamic State (2011) and The Challenge of Terrorism and Suicide Bombings in Indonesia (2012). |
South East Asia and Oceania | |||
| Private Sector Participation in Defence Production: Issues of Industrial Licensing and FDI | February 28, 2012 | 1000 hrs | Round Table |
Venue: Room No 005, IDSA Concept Note
It is more than decade now since the Government of India in a major policy initiative liberalised the defence industry in 2001, by allowing 100 per cent participation by the private sector with foreign direct investment (FDI) permissible up to 26 per cent, both subject to licensing and security clearance. The initiative was taken to harness the expertise of the private sector, and facilitate its participation through infusion of foreign capital and technology for enhancing self-reliance in India’s defence production. By October 2011, the DIPP has given 200 Letters of Intent/Industrial Licenses (LoI/IL) to various private entities, with proposed investment totaling Rs. 11,773 crore and employment opportunities for 38,579 people. And by November 2011, a cumulative FDI of Rs 17.68 crore ($3.72 million) has flown into Indian defence industry. The above developments notwithstanding, there are certain grey areas in both industrial licensing and FDI policy, which need further improvement to facilitate private sector’s participation in defence industry in a more meaningful manner. As regards industrial license, the first major issue that intrigues the domestic private industry is the definition of defence items. Unlike some other countries and international arms control organisations, which define defence item through a comprehensive list (e.g., the Munitions List of the Wassenaar Arrangement), in India there is no such list to give clarity of what constitute a defence product. The lack of clarity becomes an issue when industry is required to provide the ‘item code’ and ‘item description’ while filling up the application form for industrial license. As per the current practice, the industry is required to provide the ‘item code’ from the National Industrial Classification (NIC) Code list of 1987, which has only one code ( 359.4: ‘manufacture of arms and armaments’) for entire defence manufacturing. The NIC code does not tell about what constitutes arms and armaments and if dual-use items are also covered by it. It also does not tell about if parts and components that go into arms and ammunition but may or may not have dual-use application, fall under this head. The issue with ‘item description’ is more nuanced. There is not a single dedicated list on which the Industry can rely on to describe the defence nature of its production. Rather, they have to depend on at least three different lists, depending on which list best describes their production. Apart from NIC list (which is most generic among the three), two others are Indian Trade Classification (Harmonised System) ITC (HS) Code, as maintained by the Director General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) of Ministry of Commerce for the purpose of India’s external trade; and the ‘Product List’ as articulated in the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD’s) Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP), for discharge of offset obligations by the foreign vendors. The DGFT list, gives some broad sub-details of the items which can be covered under the defence industry. For instance, under the broad HS Code 93 (arms and ammunition; parts and accessories thereof), there are 16 sub-categories. The MoD list similarly provides some broad details of items in 27 categories under three broad headings: Defence Products, Products for Internal Security, and Civil Aerospace Products. Although more elaborate in comparison to NIC list, the lists of DGFT and MoD are still not defence specific. They cater to items of defence, dual-use and even commercially off-the-shelf in nature. For instance, under HS Code 88 (aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof) there are sub-categories such as ‘gliders’, ‘balloons’, and ‘under carriages and parts thereof’, which are commercially available products or at best dual-use items. But a company producing any of the above items is at freedom to apply for a defence license and once it gets becomes a part of the defence industry, even though the item in question may not be defence in nature. Given the above lack of clarity, the Indian defence industry in the private sector comprises of companies having a defence industrial license. Even this loosely defined industry is not free from other issues. It is noteworthy that as per the guidelines of the DIPP, defence falls under the ‘Manufacturing’ sector. So the companies in manufacturing business can apply for license and get it (subject to approval) and be formally part of the defence industry. However this is not the case for companies in the services sector (such as engineering, design and software, etc) which do not come under the purview of ‘Manufacturing’, and hence do not require a license for their services. Consequently they are not formally part of the defence industry, even though their services have direct application in defence products. The only way companies in the services sector become, in a way, part of the defence industry is by becoming Indian Offset Partner (IOP) – an Indian company partnering with a foreign company for discharge of latter’s offset obligation. However the path toward becoming IOP is not very clear in the existing policy framework. It is because the term ‘Indian’ in IOP in the context of a company in the services sector is interpreted differently from the one in the manufacturing sector. The difference is because of the foreign equity that is allowed in these two sectors. For defence manufacturing, FDI is allowed upto 26 per cent where as it is upto 100 per cent in case of services sector. In other words, in defence manufacturing sector a company will be called an Indian company only when it owns minimum 74 per cent of total equity share of that company. For the services sector, the equivalent minimum equity share (with the Indian shareholder) is 51 per cent to be called an Indian company. However it is believed that the Defence Offset Facilitation Agency (DOFA) – the single window agency under the Department of Defence Production of MoD responsible for facilitating offsets in defence contracts – does not buy this argument and insists that companies in the services sector must have minimum 74 per cent domestic equity share so as to participate as an IOP. Apart from the above ambiguity caused by the FDI policy, the way foreign investment in a company in India is calculated also creates confusion in the industry. As per the current guidelines issued by the DIPP, foreign investment in an Indian company is calculated by taking into account both the direct and indirect investments (the direct investment is the one that comes directly from a foreign source where as the indirect investment is one that comes through another company in India having a foreign equity). The tricky part is that technically and as per DIPP rules, if an indirect investment comes from a company in Indian in which the foreign partner has a minority share, the said investment is not considered as foreign investment. As an illustration, if a company X in India with a foreign equity holding of 49 per cent invests 70 per cent in the equity of another company Y (which is ‘owned and controlled’ by resident Indians), the resultant foreign equity share in Y (49%*70=34.3) is not technically considered foreign investment. The said rules notwithstanding, the MoD has a different view, which is based on actual equity owned by the foreign partner. In the above illustration, the MoD views 34.3 per cent equity share in Y as foreign investment. At least on one case, the MoD has prevailed over the DIPP’ stipulated technical rules, giving a message that when it comes to defence industry, it is the actual foreign holding that matters rather than the technical calculation as suggested by the DIPP. However given the different approach adopted by two ministries of the government, it is ideal to clarify once and for all which approach is correct. Keeping the above in view, the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) is organising a round table discussion. Senior officials from the MoD, DIPP, armed forces, industry representatives, and consultancy firms are invited to discuss and debate the following issues.
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Defence Economics & Industry | ||||
| India's Regional Role and Relations to Afghanistan, Pakistan, China and Burma | March 02, 2012 | 1620 hrs | Round Table |
Venue: Board Room, IDSA A five member delegation headed by the Swedish State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Frank Belfrage is visiting IDSA for a roundtable on, “India's Regional Role and Relations to Afghanistan, Pakistan, China and Burma”, in the Board Room on 2nd March 2012, at 1620hrs. |
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| India's 'Asymmetric Responsibility': SAARC as an instrument of Neighbourhood Policy | March 02, 2012 | Smruti S. Pattanaik | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar |
Chair: Ambassador I P Khosla |
South Asia | |||
| 45th Annual General Body Meeting | February 25, 2012 | 1100 hrs | Other |
(ADVERTISEMENT NO: IDSA/054/2012)
The 45th Annual General Body Meeting of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses is being held on 25th February 2012 at 1100 hrs. in the IDSA Auditorium. Individual invitations to the Life members and Members have already been dispatched. However, any Life members and Member who may not have received the same due to change in address etc. may treat this as notice for the meeting or contact the undersigned for the agenda etc. Wg Cdr Hemlata Lohani (Retd)
Assistant Director Tele: 2671 7983, Extn. 7303 Fax: 26154192(DG) 26154191 (DDG) |
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| The European Union and its main Asian Partners: Perspectives on the Dynamics of the EU-India and EU-China Strategic Partnerships | February 17, 2012 | Raphaëlle Khan | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Fellows' Seminar | Eurasia & West Asia | ||||
| Security and Development Challenges in Assam | February 17, 2012 | Jishnu Barua | Other |
Bringing out the geographical position of Assam, the speaker highlighted the composition of Assam of colonial times which comprised of entire North East India except for the states of Manipur and Tripura which were separate entities. He emphasised that while Assam had wholeheartedly participated in the country’s freedom struggle along with rest of India, there has always been an undercurrent of regionalism and sub-regionalism in the state. While bringing in the history of Assam to the forefront, Nehru’s visit to Assam in 1937 was described as an eventful occasion as it conveyed to him, the fears of the people of being swamped by migrants. The constant refrain of the Assamese during Nehru’s visit was that Assam was ‘invaded’ by migrants from East Bengal, which had given rise to the feeling of insecurity among the Assamese. Mr. Barua pointed out that, in the pages of history, North East as a concept remained as an ‘artificial construct’. He also stressed on the impact of colonial administration on Assam since the British had a prolonged presence in Assam. In the development context, the socio-economic trend and indicators over the years have showed stagnation of development process in the North-East region as a whole, which is highlighted by the fact that in 1951, the state of Assam, which then included the states of Nagaland, Mizoram and Meghalaya, had per capita income which was more than the national average and ranked fifth highest in the country. Touching upon the aspects of social and cultural trends, the Vaishnavite cult spread in Assam in an immense manner. The Assamese caste system was quite fluid before the arrival of the British when there was mobility within castes and ethnic inclusion. In comparison, the speaker notes, the current trends seem to broadcast the prevalence of ethnic assertion, ‘retribalization’ and ethnic groups taking recourse to ‘myth making’. The composite culture of Assam is narrated as showing signs of disintegration. At the same time, however, people of Assam are seen to be increasingly observing some pan-Indian social and religious practices, influenced, no doubt, by mass media, better communication and connectivity with rest of India. Economically, Assam has shown significant trends in terms of positive economic pointers. The per capita income in terms of GDP growth rate has also increased. Both agriculture and service sector have increased to a certain extent and its economy is moving on a higher growth trajectory. Mr. Baruah stressed on the challenges Assam faces in various areas, primarily in security and development sectors which includes the immigration and demographic transformations undergoing in the state. The speaker also pointed out the manner in which other neighbouring states, especially Arunachal Pradesh and Nagaland, are claiming parts of Assam. In this aspect, he emphasised on the perceived sense of neglect and the geographical isolation of Assam. On the security front, militancy and low intensity conflicts have occurred due to ethno-nationalism, tribal irredentism and exclusionary politics, and internal displacements of population residing in the state. Highlighting the issue of the policies vis-à-vis the numerous insurgent groups in Assam, the speaker discussed the relentless counterinsurgency operations and argued that these are aided by openness for dialogue and rehabilitation of surrendered militants. Proper rehabilitation program of former militants was mentioned with relevance to the Surrendered United Liberation Front of Asom (SULFA) experience. Recommending an alternative for improvement of prevailing environment in the Northeast India, Mr. Jishnu Baruah urged for the prevalence of the 3 tier Panchayati Raj system in the tribal areas covered by the 6th schedule and further forging ties with Southeast Asia. For instance, the Kaladan Multi Modal Project was cited as a perfect example. He said that there was a need for discouraging the demands of ethnic homelands and new states; more national projects by 2015; extra nuanced approach to CI ops and subtle encouragement of the growing cosmopolitan middle class in the task of national integration and nation building. Seeking more clarity on the issues pertaining to security and development in Assam, many points were raised during discussion. In response, Mr. Baruah stressed on the emergence of more ethnic groups; the emergence or increasing influence of Maoist in establishing a hold (increasing influence) in Assam; nexus of Maoist with NSCN (IM) and ULFA; and arms smuggling or gun running becoming more prevalent in the neighbouring Dimapur district in Nagaland, which is the hub for arms trade. The involvement of NSCN (IM) in channelising arms supply in Northeast India from different routes rather than the traditional route to Cox Bazaar in Bangladesh was emphasised. Further, Mr. Baruah clarified on the aspect of AFSPA by stressing that the act can be made humane. He also stressed on the requirement of army as an institution to be improved with more accountability and proper training. Concluding the talk, the speaker cited the set examples of surrendered militants seeking to be employed in organic farming as offering them alternative means of livelihood and called attention to engage the surrendered militants in productive activities based on skill development. Report by Ms. Shristi Pukhrem, Research Assistant, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi |
Terrorism & Internal Security |
