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India’s Engagement with Central Asia: Exploring Future Directions - Concept Note July 10, 2012 1500-1730 hrs Round Table

Venue: Room 005, IDSA

IDSA is organizing a roundtable on “India’s Engagement with Central Asia: Exploring Future Directions” to celebrate Twenty Years of Friendship and Cooperation between India and Central Asian Republics.

The roundtable aims to initiate a free flowing discussion amongst the scholars, experts, officials and diplomats in order to explore the possibilities of future engagement with the region.

Dr. Arvind Gupta, Director General, IDSA will chair the proceedings.

Concept Note

Over the past few years, New Delhi has stepped up its engagement with the Central Asian Republics (CARs)—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan—with the aim of building a long-term partnership, both bilaterally and collectively. India has also expressed its desire to play an expanded and more meaningful role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), including its bid for full membership in the organization. India has also been a consistent supporter and active participant of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA). (CICA is the only Central Asian forum of which India is a member.) The high-level visits from both sides—Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s visit to Delhi and President Pratibha Patil’s visit to Tajikistan in 2009; Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Kazakhstan in 2011; Uzbek President Islam Karimov’s visit to India in May 2011; and the two-day visit by SM Krishna to Tajikistan on 2-3 July 2012—reflect the growing political ties between India and the Central Asian region. New Delhi is now looking forward to Tajik President Emomali Rahmon’s visit to India in September 2012.

The first India-Central Asia Dialogue, a Track-II initiative organized on 12-13 June 2012 in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, was yet another step towards building a long-term partnership with the Eurasian region. The objective behind this regional conference is to start a regular annual dialogue forum among academics, scholars, government officials and business representatives from India and the CARs, with the aim of providing inputs to governments on both sides. It was during this regional conference that E. Ahmad, Minister of State for External Affairs, pronounced India’s new “Connect Central Asia” Policy. He said: “India is now looking intently at the region through the framework of its ‘Connect Central Asia’ policy, which is based on pro-active political, economic and people-to-people engagement with Central Asian Countries, both individually and collectively.” The “Connect Central Asia” policy is a broad-based approach, which encompasses political, economic and cultural connections between India and the CARs.

Krishna’s visit to Tajikistan is a continuation of India’s new policy approach towards the CARs and its readiness to play a pro-active, meaningful and sustained role in the Eurasian region. He articulated this very clearly in his address to the Heads of Missions conference in Dushanbe where he stated that as the Eurasian region undergoes rapid transition, the time has come for India to evolve a calibrated and co-ordinated response in its engagement with each of the countries in the region to further secure India’s core national interests. As a part of its “Connect Central Asia” policy, India plans to set up an Indian-Central Asia University in Kyrgyzstan and is looking towards deploying its soft power to consolidate goodwill in all Central Asian countries through IT, culture, networking with young politicians and academia. In addition, New Delhi is talking with Tajikistan to set up a military hospital and also plans to operate up to 14 direct flights to Dushanbe. To begin with, both India and Tajikistan will launch four flights each.

The other important area of the “Connect Central Asia” policy is India’s economic ties with the region. While Krishna asked the 11 Indian heads of mission in the region to work on converting India’s “enormous goodwill” into “tangible and strategic advantages”, the current status of India’s trade with these countries, which is pegged at a mere $500 million, indicates the most unsatisfactory part of an otherwise excellent relationship with the region. Connectivity through land and sea routes to Central Asia is still a big challenge. Related to the issue of economic cooperation is the aspect of the relevance of the energy-rich Eurasian region for energy-deficit India. India views Central Asia as a long-term partner in the energy and natural resources trade.

To improve connectivity to the region, India is working on the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) among other options. India and the CARs share common concerns on terrorism, extremism, and drug–trafficking. The current developments in Afghanistan and the proposed western military pullout by 2014 raise serious questions on the stability of the region as a whole. India plans to further strengthen its strategic and security cooperation with all the CARs with a focus on military training, joint research, counter-terrorism coordination and close consultation on Afghanistan within the framework of its “Connect Central Asia” policy.

As India moves ahead with its “Connect Central Asia” policy to cement its relations with the Eurasian region, it is extremely significant to get the Central Asian perspective on India’s role in the region. Equally important would be to debate how India-Central Asia relations can be further strengthened. This Roundtable proposes to discuss current status of the India-Central Asia relationship, its newly pronounced “Connect Central Asia” policy, analyse problem areas, and pave the way for mutually-beneficial future engagement.

Listed below are themes on which the discussions may focus:

Regional Issues

  • Regional dynamics: Key security challenges for India and CARs
  • Role of the Regional Organisations: SCO,CSTO, CIS
  • Feasibility of joint policy initiatives

Bilateral Issues

  • Central Asian response to “Connect Central Asia” policy
  • Where does India figure in Central Asian Foreign Policy Priorities?
  • What should be the roadmap of cooperation in economic and strategic arenas?

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Eurasia & West Asia
India’s Neighbourhood Challenges in the Next Two Decades July 13, 2012 1000 hrs Book Release

Venue: IDSA Auditorium

Programme Outline

09:30-09:55 hours: Registration/ Tea

10:00-10:10 Welcome Remarks, Director General, IDSA

10:10-10:40 Book Release and address by Foreign Secretary, Shri Ranjan Mathai

10:40-10:45 Vote of Thanks Brig Rumel Dahiya (Retd), DDG, IDSA
10:45-11:00 Tea

11:00- 13:00 Panel Discussion: India’s Neighbourhood Challenges

Mr Asoke Mukerji, Spl. Secretary MEA - Chair
Dr Ashok Behuria, Research Fellow, IDSA
Amb Satish Chandra
Lt Gen Satish Nambiar (Retd)
Amb Rajiv Sikri
Prof Sujit Dutta
Shri C Raja Mohan

13:00 Lunch at IDSA

South Asia
India-Japan-South Korea Trilateral June 29, 2012 Round Table

The First Track II Dialogue among India, Japan and South Korea was held in IDSA on 29 June 2012. This trilateral initiative was conceptualised in a meeting involving the Ambassador of Japan to India, Mr Akitaka Saiki, Ambassador of South Korea Mr. Kim Joong-Keun and Joint Secretary, East Asia in Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) Mr. Gautam Bambawale. It was also mentioned in the joint statement between India and South Korea during the visit of Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh to Seoul in March last year. The core idea behind the trilateral initiative was that the three countries enjoy a strategic partnership based on shared values of democracy, strong economic linkage and common strategic interests. The track-II dialogue was supported by the Ministry of External Affairs and was organized under the aegis of Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, IDSA. Five scholars each from Tokyo Foundation of Japan and Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) of South Korea participated in this dialogue and presented their research.

Setting the tone of the deliberation, Mr. Sanjay Singh, Secretary East, MEA said, “We seek a peaceful and secure Asia free from the threats of terrorism, proliferation, piracy and conflicts between states. There is a common commitment to maintaining freedom of the seas, combating terrorism and promoting inclusive economic growth. India, Japan and ROK depend heavily on the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) for their energy security.” He also added that he expected the trilateral to “generate ideas that would influence the wider relationship existing amongst the partners at governmental level and at the people-to-people level and develop a shared understanding on how we view our region and the emerging Asian architecture. This impact will be good measure of the success of this process.”

Welcoming the delegates, Dr. Arvind Gupta, DG, IDSA, stated that the three countries should come together to stimulate new ideas and thoughts to bring about better coordination and cooperation for peace and development for the region as well as the world at large. He further said that at present, the three countries are facing challenges of rapidly changing geopolitical environment and the emergence of new security threats, both at regional as well as global levels. He added that a sustained dialogue among the three countries is extremely important and the Track II seminar will be instrumental in stimulating some ideas to carry forward such a dialogue. H.E. Mr. Akitaka Saiki, Japanese Ambassador to India said that the three countries, with second, third and fourth highest GDPs in Asia and their active membership of the G-20, have a great responsibility, individually and collectively, towards the region and the world at large. H.E. Mr. Kim Joong-Keun, South Korean Ambassador to India, lauded the initiative to hold dialogue among the states and hoped that the Track II dialogue would soon be transformed into Track I dialogue.

Suggestions

Security Issues

Participants suggested various issues for future deliberation on trilateral cooperation. Maritime security cooperation, especially piracy in Indian Ocean Region can be discussed. Japan, India and South Korea can play a constructive role in creating a consensus on the freedom of navigation in the context of South China Sea.

It was opined that issues related to terrorism and cyber security can be also be discussed in future dialogue. The three countries could also share each other’s strategic view, for example scenario-making process aimed at understanding the future developments on their respective socio-economic-political spheres.

Non-Traditional Security

The general view was that issues such as energy security, transnational crimes including drug trafficking, arms smuggling etc could be explored. Prospects at the signing of a Trilateral Search and Rescue Agreement among India, Japan and South Korea could also be discussed.

Miscellaneous

Social security issues can be an important area of cooperation. Public health can also be an important area of cooperation. Cooperation in the field of Science and Technology including space could be an important issue of discussion.

Global governance issues like reforms of the UN Security Council, IMF and WTO can also be discussed and debated. Future dialogue should come out with some suggestions regarding how to promote trade and investment among the three countries. Conduct of joint research projects among the three institutes representing the three countries.

Report prepared by Dr. Shamshad Khan

Inaugural address: Shri Sanjay, Secretary (East), Ministry of External Affairs

East Asia
The Peacemakers: India and the Quest for One World June 28, 2012 1530 hrs Book Discussion Forum

Speaker: Dr Manu Bhagavan
Venue: Room No 005, IDSA

Chair: Brig Rumel Dahiya
Discussants: Dr Rajesh Rajagopalan, Dr S. Kalyanaraman and Gp Capt. Krishnappa Venkatshamy

About the Author

Manu Bhagavan is associate professor in the Department of History at Hunter College and the Graduate Center, the City University of New York. He is the author or (co-)editor of four other titles, including Heterotopias: Nationalism and the Possibility of History in South Asia andClaiming Power from Below: Dalits and the Subaltern Question in India.

Talk on "The Arab Spring: Present Scenario and Implications for India" July 09, 2012 1500 hrs Other

Venue: Seminar Hall I, IDSA

Speaker: Shri Talmiz Ahmad, India’s Former Ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Eurasia & West Asia
Challenges Expected for IAF till 2030 July 27, 2012 Vivek Kapur 1030 to 1300 hrs Fellows' Seminar Military Affairs
Counter-Insurgency Best Practices and their Applicability in the Northeast July 27, 2012 Namrata Goswami Fellows' Seminar

Chairperson: General Satish Nambiar

Discussants: Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain, Military Secretary, Integrated Headquarters (Army), Ministry of Defence
Prof. Rajesh Rajagopalan, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

Dr. Namrata Goswami’s paper defines insurgencies as violent struggle against the state for legitimacy and influence over relevant populations. In order to win against any insurgency, the first core insight for any counter-insurgency force is to gain the support of the population. Coupled with population support is the criticality of efficient intelligence though these are not the ultimate required measures. Dr. Goswami’s paper discusses counter-insurgency best practices and the means to operationalize these practices on the ground by identifying nine best practices.

The paper selects the best practices based on a literature survey on counter-insurgency theory, doctrines and manuals of the Indian, British and US military and also on the field experiences of the author in Northeast India to have a more focused study. The author affirms that insurgency is unique after having conducted work on the ground in the conflict affected states in Northeast India. But, there are certain common features of counter-insurgency that are valid across time and space as indicated by the literatures on counter-insurgency which is used as the frame of reference by the author in the paper. Based on the works on counter-insurgency which have been utilized in this paper, the author has identified nine best practices spanning across time and space for detailed study in this paper: Primacy of Political Goals; Centre of Gravity; Population; Counter-Propaganda; Resolute Leadership; Intelligence; Unity of Effort; Appropriate Force Structures; Rule of Law; and Operational Clarity. The paper offers to test the applicability of these counter-insurgency best practices to the Northeast of India. For the purpose of the paper, counter-insurgency is defined as “those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency”.

  • Primacy of political goals: It involves planning, preparation and execution of counter-insurgency within political framework. The role of the military in flushing out insurgents from certain areas is considered to be a supportive role. For instance, British, U.S. and Indian military forces have signified the importance of military. However, citing the cases of Mizoram and Assam, Dr. Goswami emphasises on the importance of political goals. In the paper, she has pointed out how the Mizo National Front (MNF) became a platform to express against the heavy response of the Indian military. It was during the strong political leadership of Pu Laldenga of MNF that the Mizo conflict was resolved in 1987 through staunch negotiations.
  • Centre of gravity-population: Insurgent groups aim to persuade the population by utilizing the strategy of coercion and intimidation to generate support for their political cause. While countering these insurgency groups, the operation of the armed forces should be carried out in a civilian landscape, not in military camps, and the counter-insurgency forces need to know that such operations are people-centric operation. For this, there are certain practical ways of gaining support of the population, namely, having day to day contacts with the population, organising collective work, identify local cells of the insurgent, prevent too much movement, and finally provide security to the population. Besides this, there is also a need to gather information on three different types of population in any insurgency-affected areas, namely, minority support base for the insurgent; a passive neutral majority; and a minority which is against the insurgency. According to this paper, insurgency groups such as United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), and MNF have all garnered support from the people. But, over the period of time, support for these groups has dwindled down. Insurgency will continue unless security is guaranteed to the population in this region.
  • Counter-propaganda: the insurgency groups intend to impose control over the population. These groups aim to win over the people by propagating their political cause, often by promising them better political empowerment, better economic status, better security etc. Such propaganda appears an easy task to the insurgency groups as they do not have to deliver any of those promised goals in the near term. However, countering such propaganda remains an arduous task for the counter-insurgency forces. For this, the strategy for counter-propaganda should be focused on exposing the weakness and false promises made by the insurgents. This strategy can only be materialized by ‘by obtaining the neutrality of the population, visible presence of counter-insurgent forces to provide security, establishing the authority of the state by providing basic needs, propaganda directed at insurgent rank and file, followed by an effective surrender policy’.
  • Resolute leadership: In order to carry out a successful operation, the involved leader must possess a clear conceptual understanding of the mission. For this, he or she should have a thoughtful understanding of the nature of the problem. The leadership should exhibit ‘resoluteness, act in an ethical manner and always keep the national priorities and goals in clear perspective’. His or her leadership qualities should also be shown at all levels, and the leader should able to synchronise with various agencies with the aim of protecting the population and instilling in them a sense of security.
  • Intelligence: This is one of the most important counter-insurgency measures. The absence of thorough and specific intelligence would only make the counter-insurgency operations ineffective. For this, the commander needs to form a sound intelligence network with the involvement of intelligent staffs possessing a ‘clear understanding of the operational environment, physical geography, the external influence, role of media and internet’. Means through which intelligence can be gathered are: lines of communication, belief systems, values, identity, culture, social norms, grievances, insurgent strength and vulnerabilities, safe havens, insurgent intelligence network, etc. Intelligence should be used to understand the root causes of the insurgency.
  • Unity of effort: There needs to be an integrated approach in counter-insurgency. This involves ‘showcasing of administrative capacities, economic resources, propaganda, military superiority and the like’. Operations in such cases should be guided by a single strategic narrative that is visible across all lines of operation. This practice involves the coordination of political, social, economic and the military aspects of the counter-insurgency. The author specifies the roles of politicians, bureaucrats, army, police, local leaders, NGOs and media. A successful unity of effort can be achieved if there is a single command and coordination centre. Furthermore, civil-military relations are also important in this context.
  • Appropriate ‘military’ force structures: It is important that the force is used to its minimum. This is because operations should aim to neutralise insurgents and not eliminate them. Also, minimum force should be used in order to reduce the fear that civilian population experiences due to the heavy presence of armed forces. The force structure should be able to respond to given context even though it is a small operation team.
  • Rule of law: The counter-insurgent forces need to act according to certain accepted rule of law. Any operation in a given region should be within the framework of a legal mandate and conduct must meet the highest legal standards. With such rules, the involved forces can avoid any disproportionate use of force. This will not breed alienation amongst the civilians. Forces have to be briefed about the rules of engagement with regard to arrests, searches, warrants, interrogation techniques, intelligence gathering by issuing a Standard Operating Procedure. Acts such as Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act of 1958 amended in 1972 are perceived by the common people as neutralising their fundamental rights granted by the Indian Constitution. It is difficult to control population under distress and the state must offer its people ‘a good deal working within the rule of law’ in order to isolate the insurgents.
  • Operational clarity: It is important to have clarity of purpose in any counter-insurgency operation. There has to be a unified command structure with only a single direction. The political aims should also be crystal clear. Further, the armed forces should clearly map the conflict zones. Involved forces must be clear about their allocated tasks, and short and long term targets. For all these, the most significant clarity is that the forces should be very clear that these operations must be people friendly ones. Challenges with reference to clarity of operations arise due to prevalence of multiple levels of decision makers in the insurgency-affected states like in the North East.

The author reemphasises in the conclusion that the aim of the insurgents is not to kill but spread parallel government to establish their own legitimacy. Hence, the aim of the counter-insurgency forces should be to root out these parallel structures of government.

Major Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the Author:

  • There are dissimilarities among insurgencies but many general practices can be applied anywhere. There has to be no uniform approach to stages of insurgency rather different approaches to conflict.
  • The success story of Sri Lanka where controlled empowerment of the security forces was utilized has to be referred.
  • Proper identification of current stakeholders in engagement of counter-insurgency has to be taken into consideration.
  • There has been a role of media and civil society but a larger involvement is required to have major impact on civilian population.
  • The aspect of winning hearts and minds with more emphasis on the physical, psychological, social and economical factors has to be utilised for defeating insurgency. Attitude within the military has to change and it has to be reiterated that they are not just for kills. Home and heart battalion has to be engaged.
  • Centre of Gravity as one of the best practices consist of both strengths and weaknesses be it physical, psychological, philosophical and ideological.
  • It is difficult to define the best practice of resolute leadership where military leadership has been tenure based.
  • There is a need to incorporate more technical intelligence and information operation in counter-insurgency measures.
  • There has to be more operational clarity in the practices and continuity has to be maintained.
  • If the mentioned features are best practices or best principles has to be reflected on again.
  • Concession is the key to strategy and the hardcore best practice has to be to wean away support and the ultimate solution has to come from political front.
  • Sealing of borders will be difficult to achieve instead the borders need to be secured.

Report prepared by Srishti Pukhrem, Research Assistant, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Terrorism & Internal Security
Estimating Self-Reliance in India's Defence Production July 20, 2012 Laxman Kumar Behera Fellows' Seminar

Chairperson: Shri Vinod Misra
Discussants : Dr Selvamurthy and Shri Amit Cowshish

This paper attempts to estimate the self-reliance index of India’s defence production. While estimating the index, it also focuses on three important issues; the approach towards self-reliance (as understood in the Indian context), data problems in estimating the index and the methodology used to arrive at the index. The paper suggests that a separate budgetary classification be made in the Defence Services Estimates to facilitate computation of self-reliance in a more objective manner. This necessitates suitable changes in the classification handbook for defence that mandates the concerned officials of the Indian Defence Accounts Department to book a particular expenditure.

Mr. Behera argued that the concept “self-sufficiency” differs from “self-reliance”, though these have alternatively been used in the Indian context. Self-sufficiency means producing everything in-house that the armed forces need, whereas self-reliance refers to “equipping the armed forces with a whole range of equipments that may come from foreign and domestic sources”. However, he argues that ‘self-sufficiency’ is not an ideal path for a country like India since India’s industrial and Research and Development (R&D) base is not yet sufficiently developed.

Mr Behera describes three phases of India’s defence industrialisation process from the perspective of the aim of self-reliance; from independence to mid-1960s, from mid-1960s to mid-1980s, and from late 1980s till present. In the first phase, self-sufficiency was an overall economic principle behind its industrial development as the leadership at that time felt that the state-led intervention was the best way to overcome the de-industrialisation of economy that was caused by two centuries of the British rule. However, despite some successes, this model had faced considerable weaknesses because of the low level of defence allocation and defence R&D, in addition to the lack of a civil industrial base which had a major impact during this phase.

In the second phase, according to the author, the events of 1960s, particularly the 1962 border war with China and the 1965 Indo-Pak war, brought a major change in India’s defence policy, and the term self-reliance replaced self-sufficiency in defence production. Not only India’s defence budget as percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased in the subsequent years but also the approach towards arms procurement policy and indigenous defence production. Moreover, unlike in the first stage of industrialisation, in the second stage of India’s defence industrialisation, more attention was paid to license-production rather then indigenous production, based on its own design and developmental efforts. However, this led to dependency on the license-based defence production, particularly on the Soviet Union. India’s aeronautics industry is such a case whose dependency continues till now. And, in the third phase, with increasingly aware of the pitfalls of the overdependence on Soviet Union, India began to change its approach to defence industrialisation, from license-based production to production based on indigenous design. In this regard, India and Russia signed in 1998 an intergovernmental agreement to jointly produce a supersonic cruise missile, BrahMos and in 2007 two more intergovernmental agreements were signed for co-development and co-production of a Multi Role Transport Aircraft and a Firth Generation Fighter Aircraft. Thus, there has been emphasis on self-reliance and co-production with higher importance on promoting the participation of Indian private sector defence production.

A 10-year self-reliance plan formulated in 1992, under the then Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister, Dr A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, defined the self-reliance in the form of an index, reflecting the percentage share of indigenous content in total procurement expenditure. Mr Behera held that this definition serves as the only methodology for estimating the self-reliance index, primarily because of the difficulty of putting together a log of information about what is critical and what is not, and updating it regularly with technological development. However, this estimation is not straightforward, primarily because of lack of consistent data in the public domain.

Mr Behera pointed out that India’s heavy dependence on arms import for defence preparedness defies the very objective of self-reliance that it has set for itself. The 1992 Abdul Kalam committee indicated that the share of indigenous contribution to total procurement expenditure would progressively increase from 1992-93 estimation of 30 per cent to 70 per cent by 2005. Although India has developed a vast defence industrial base over the years, the objective of achieving 70 per cent self-reliance has not been achieved till now. He concluded by stating that the self-reliance index has barely improved from 1992-93 estimation of 30 per cent to 36.4 per cent in 2011-12 which indicates the failure of India’s defence industrialisation process and demands serious retrospection.

Major Points of Discussion and Suggestions:

  • At present, India’s total defence R&D budget accounts for about six per cent of defence budget which in itself is less than two per cent of GDP. Compared to this, other countries, particularly the US and China spend a higher percentage of their defence budget on R&D.
  • It would be significant to look into and assess where India now stands at the global scenario on self-reliance in defence production. As the Indian economy is growing, it is looking for the indigenisation of defence production. This is important not only to meet its own defence requirements for safeguarding its vital national security interests but also to play a larger role beyond its immediate neighbourhood.
  • Although today India has reached 100 percent self-reliance in terms of deterrence, it needs to minimize the dependency on foreign countries for its defence needs by further enhancing and indigenisation of its defence production sectors.
  • India has already developed a good platform for co-production and development of defence equipment with Russia, now it should look for such joint production with other countries.
  • India’s private defence sector is very weak, and it cannot take big projects. However, it can contribute in the defence production sector by joining with public sectors. For this, capacity building of the private sector is very important if it is to undertake future defence projects.
  • The author pointed out that Kalam Committee Report has weaknesses which needed to be addressed. In this regard it was suggested that the methodology adopted by Kalam Committee and others such as Dr. Balachandran’s can be analysed in order to find out their strengths and weaknesses, and then the author can refine and adopt his own methodology for this study.
  • The conclusion part of the paper also needs to be moderated. As the kind of data required for estimating self-reliance index is not available in public domain, the author needs to state it as a limitation in the paper’s conclusion. The author also needs to mention what kind of data is required to estimate the self-reliance in India’s defence production.

Remarks by the Chairperson

Outlining the present status of self-reliance in India’s defence production, Mr Vinod Kumar Misra said that the extent of India’s arms imports hamper indigenisation of its Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs). Imports of defence raw-materials and technologies have also been a problem. In addition, it needs to sustain those imported technologies for a long time. However, self-reliance in defence production is a log term process and it will gradually take place in India. In this context, India’s new offset policy can be a significant game changer. However, for its success, it needs to identify the kind of defence technologies that it wants to manufacture and then should focus on creating capacity on those core items. Mr Misra pointed out that India’s defence production sector and R&D also suffer capability gap and the Joint Ventures with Russia and Israel for co-production and development of defence equipment can be one way of meeting this capability gap. There is also a strong case for increasing Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the defence production sector but India has to find out the ways to give a push to it. So far as policy announcement is concerned, Indian government has recently issued policy guidelines for engaging the private sector. Some progress has been made in this regard but still time will take in involving private enterprises in big projects.

Report prepared by Dr Saroj Bishoyi, Research Assistant, IDSA

Defence Economics & Industry
Special Address - US Secretary for Defence, Mr Leon E. Panetta, on 'Indo-US Defence Relations' June 06, 2012 Leon E. Panetta 1600 to 1700 hrs Speeches and Lectures

Leon E. Panetta, US Secretary for Defence

Click here for complete text of address

3rd CICIR Forum May 30, 2012 to May 31, 2012 Bilateral

Venue: China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), Beijing, China

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