Events

Chairperson: Shri G K Pillai
Discussants: Maj Gen Dhruv Katoch and Shri Sanjoy Hazarika

Dr. Namrata Goswami’s paper defines insurgencies as irregular warfare which engages in non-frontal attacks against the adversary with small groups of fighters and which is marked by the absence of fixed battlefields. Insurgencies, therefore, involve a complex mix of political legitimisation, support base, emotional category, symbolic gestures and historical narratives buttressed by the elements of time and space. Escalation of violence, as defined in Dr. Goswami’s paper, implies increases in the level of conflict over a period of time and de-escalation signifies decreases in the level of conflict over a period of time.

The paper, however, analyses the escalation and de-escalation process in insurgencies with regard to the National Socialist Council of Nagalim Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and its political front, the Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF) of Manipur. While the first two insurgency movements have witnessed stages of escalation and de-escalation of violence spreading across decades, the PLA offers an intriguing example of an insurgent group that continues to remain hostile to peace negotiations.

The paper further offers an analysis of the factors leading to the escalation of violence taking into account the three cases mentioned above. Political motivation plays a vital role through which the insurgents garner support from the people for their violent activities. Hence, political mobilisation is the first vital step in any armed movement in order to acquire critical mass and to create space for conflict escalation. In case of NSCN-IM, political objective of Naga territorial unification and sovereignty based on the historical narrative of Naga independent status before the British occupation plays a vital role. The ULFA also utilises the politics of Assamese exploitation at the hands of New Delhi in order to vindicate its demand for a separate Assamese homeland.

The availability of arms is one of the important factors leading to the escalation of violence level in an insurgency. The easy availability of arms in Northeast India enables the NSCN-IM, the ULFA and the PLA to sustain their armed movements. Of the United Nation’s estimated 640 million illegal arms in the world, 40 million small arms are in India alone, with Manipur accounting 32 percent of small arms.

State response plays an important role in deciding the escalation or de-escalation of violence in an insurgency. For example, the state of India responded with massive use of force in response to the insurgent groups in Northeast at their initial stage. As a consequence, militant groups escalated their violence which resulted in non-combatant deaths.

Popular support base is one of the important factors which help escalating the violence level of an insurgency. The local support for the insurgent groups of the Northeast of India mentioned above depends on their ability to reflect the grievances of the people in the affected areas like alienation and deprivation, political marginalisation, etc. Similarly, the insurgent groups use violence as a tool to get support from their target population. For example, ULFA is known for its violence tactics of killing non-Assamese Hindi-speaking people.

Legitimacy of a particular insurgency movement escalates the violence level. Insurgents use various methods to enjoy legitimacy from a targeted population. These groups engage in violence in order to provoke the regular army to escalate its use of force, thereby creating enormous hardship for the local population. Disproportionate counter-measures by the state forces only provide these groups an opportunity to act as the security provider for the people.

External support also helps escalating the violence level in a conflict. In the case of Northeast of India, it shares a 4500 Kilometer highly porous border with China, Bhutan, Myanmar and Bangladesh. Both the NSCN-IM and ULFA have/had their training camps in Myanmar and Bangladesh. Moreover, both the armed groups had strong connections with the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) of Myanmar. There are lots of instances on how these groups used the bordering countries as their safe heavens.

Time and space are important factors for the escalation of violence. Time enables irregular groups to wage a protracted war aiming to gradually reduce the political and psychological will of the stronger power. Taking advantage of the strategic dimension of time, the NSCN-IM has established constituencies for the purposes of recruitment and resource generation. Similarly, ULFA has taken advantage of time to generate resources for their fight, recruit new cadres, establish base areas, create support networks amongst the local population and spread their ideas.

The geography and terrain of a particular place is critical for the continuation of insurgent movements. Without supportive terrain, lightly armed, highly mobile insurgents stand little chance to offset the technological superiority of the stronger power.

The organisational structure of an insurgent group plays a very vital role in the escalation of conflict level. A cohesive organization with a strong leadership helps an insurgent group act better. For example the NSCN-IM has a highly centralized political structure known as Government of the People’s Republic of Nagaland (GPRN). Similarly, both the PLA and the ULFA are highly centralized outfits with radical sense of loyalty. Intra-group conflicts or factionalism with on a group escalates the violence level. This happens because the rival factions adopt an escalated violence means in order to establish social and political dominance. The leadership differences between Muivah and Khaplang in 1988 and the escalated violence level can be a case in point.

De-escalation in violence, according to Dr. Goswami, is dependant upon the state response to insurgencies, political motivation, and absence of popular support, lack of legitimacy and loss of external support. De-escalation can occur also when the insurgent group identifies an opportunity to resolve the conflict in a positive sum manner if it believes that the state is willing to concede to most of its demands.

State response to the insurgency movements plays an important role in de-escalating the violence level. The state of India’s response to the insurgency movements can be located with in three conceptual parameters. The proportionate use of force has been the key determining factor of a responsive state in the post 1970s. The significance of proportionality of means and non-combatant immunity are absolutely critical for the Indian state’s response to the insurgencies in the Northeast. Because, since ULFA, NSCN-IM and PLA project a certain degree of society support, the disproportionate use of force by the Indian state can be counter-productive.

Use of dialogue and negotiation is one of the important responses of the state of India in bringing down the violence level in the Northeast. The ongoing peace talks between the Government of India and the ULFA and NSCN-IM can be a case in point. Similarly, the grant of greater autonomy and the statehood to some of the areas where the insurgent groups are active can bring down the conflict level.

Lack of legitimacy of an insurgent group may bring down the conflict level. The NSCN-IM is under constant pressure from the civil societies to bring down the violence level. For example, in 2007 the Naga Hoho (Apex Council) in a strongly worded statement demanded that all Naga factions abstain from violence and give peace a chance. Similarly, in recent years ULFA’s claim of legitimate representation of Assamese aspiration for political sovereignty has also come under deep critical scrutiny since the outfit is seen as non-transparent and run by a handful of men and women.

Lack of external support is a major factor in de-escalating the violence level of an insurgency movement. Nearly 30 under-ground ULFA camps were destroyed in Bhutan in 2003 which forced the ULFA to shift its base to Bangladesh. After the crackdown on the militant outfits in Bangladesh by Sheikh Hasina Government in 2009 many of the ULFA leaders were arrested and handed over to India.

Dr. Goswami’s paper concludes that when the insurgent groups are fighting for the establishment of separate independent statehood, violent responses by the state is counter-productive and leads to a vicious cycle of violence and counter-violence. The paper finds three key variables with regard to escalation and de-escalation i.e. popular support, loss of legitimacy and state response.

Major points of Discussion and Suggestions

• There is a need to understand the background of all insurgency movements. There is also a need to study various insurgent groups in the northeast separately.
• There has been abrogation of the constitutional norms by the political party in power in Assam. Hence, ULFA is a created problem.
• The deployment of Security Forces as a state response has to be changed. There is a need to find out the sources of funding for these groups since the local funding for them is not sufficient for them to sustain.
• The time factor has always been with the Government. The time has come not to see the insurgency as simply a military problem. There is a need to take governance issues into consideration.
• The role of political parties in escalating the violence level should have been discussed.
• There has been a shift of Insurgents activities i.e. from legitimate demands to criminal activities.
• It is difficult to decide as when is the perfect situation for conflict resolution.
• There is a need to address the governance issues because more people have died in governance failure than because of insurgencies.
• Insurgencies in Northeast will be difficult to resolve since there are many stakeholders. It can only be controlled to a point.
• Giving statehood to Nagaland was an end of the bargaining power of state of India

Report prepared by Dr. Anshuman Behera, Research Assistant, Internal Security Centre, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis.

Chair: Ambassador (Retd) Ishrat Aziz
External Discussants: Professor Gulshan Dietl, Professor Qamar Agha
Internal Discussants: Dr Shebonti Ray Dadwal, Dr Meena Singh Roy

Dr Pradhan’s paper addresses India’s relations with Saudi Arabia, arguing that India must look beyond oil and trade in order to engage Saudi Arabia in a strategic partnership. This study also explores Indian interests in cultivating strategic ties with Saudi Arabia and explores the obstacles to building a partnership of this nature. In the past, India’s relations with Saudi Arabia have been impacted by the Cold War, regional political dynamics and divergent interests of both countries. India’s relations with Israel, the Kashmir issue and Indian support for Arab nationalist regimes in Egypt, Iraq and Syria are other aspects that have created misunderstandings between the two countries. The author sees a shift in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy following the September 11, 2011 attacks as since then, it has been marked by an attempt to look beyond its traditional allies and to build closer relations with other countries, especially with major Asian powers such as India.

An important characteristic of the India-Saudi Arabia relationship is the dominance of trade and business. Saudi Arabia ranks as India’s fourth largest trading partner with a bilateral trade amounting to US$ 25.6 billion in 2010-11, dominated by crude oil imports. Joint ventures and investments form an important part of commercial relations. The Indian labour force in the Kingdom and Saudi Arabia’s petroleum reserves have constituted the most important part of the bilateral relationship.

Official visits by leaders of both countries have built on the existing partnership. The Delhi Declaration signed in 2006 aimed to strengthen ties in areas of energy, trade, science and technology, education, health, and political cooperation on regional and international issues. The 2010 Riyadh Declaration furthered on this agreement and focuses on enhancing cooperation on counterterrorism, money laundering, narcotics, arms and human trafficking, and defence and economic cooperation.

In forging strategic ties with Saudi Arabia, the author points out several advantages:

1. Saudi Arabia’s growing regional profile: Saudi Arabia has been an important regional player in the Gulf and West Asia region owing to its huge petroleum reserves, the presence of the two holy mosques, and its growing military power among other factors. It has substantial influence on the regional politics, especially on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and has cultivated ties with major powers such as the US, Russia, China and the EU. Saudi Arabia has also emerged as an influential player in the ongoing Arab Spring. This increasing profile of the country is a call for India to engage further with Saudi Arabia in areas beyond bilateral trade an energy supply.
2. Saudi Arabia as a gateway to the Arab and Islamic world: Saudi Arabia enjoys considerable clout in the Arab and Islamic worlds owing to the presence of the two holy mosques in Mecca and Medina. It also enjoys influence in organisations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). The author notes that strengthening ties with Saudi Arabia will provide a unique platform for India to promote its interest and to enable greater access to other countries in the region.
3. Defence cooperation: Although India and Saudi Arabia have not signed a defence cooperation agreement, both countries have conducted joint military exercises and are exploring enhanced military cooperation that includes training to Saudi Arabian forces on tackling terrorism in the mountainous areas bordering Yemen.
4. India’s stakes in the security of the Gulf region: India sees the Gulf region as falling within its security parameter and has shown readiness to contribute to the security and stability of the region through sharing its own experiences in the areas of counter-terrorism, maritime security and military training.
5. Cooperation against terrorism: Although both countries have been victims of terrorism in the past, Saudi Arabia has faced questions over its alleged funding of religious extremists and the spread of the Sunni Wahhabi brand of Islam. India has indicated its concern on this issue. Following the 9/11 attacks, Saudi Arabia has taken steps to check the flow of money and disrupting terrorist networks. It has condemned extremism and has been preaching moderation including through religious leaders. Strengthening India’s relations with Saudi Arabia will allow new avenues for India to manage relations within its own neighbourhood and also contribute to the security of the Gulf region.
6. Fighting piracy: Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and surrounding regions remains a threat to Sea Lines of Communication and thus to the security of the transshipment of goods. Deepening the Indian Navy’s cooperation with its Saudi counterpart will contribute significantly to the fight against piracy.
7. Energy security: India ranks as the fourth largest oil consuming country in the world after the US, China and Japan. Securing long term energy supplies has been a dominant objective for India in the Gulf region. Saudi Arabia is currently the largest supplier of crude oil to India. With particular reference to the ‘Strategic Petroleum Reserve’, India needs to move beyond mere commodity trade and engage with Saudi Arabia through energy interdependence.
8. Soft power diplomacy: The author notes that the approximately two million strong Indian diaspora in Saudi Arabia have acted as a medium through which the Saudis have shaped their perception of India and its people. The Delhi Declaration of 2006 has aimed to promote exchange of faculty, students and delegations, and encourage direct scientific and educational communications between institutions. India has also recently pledged to assist Saudi Arabia in setting up an ICT Centre of Excellence, as well as institutions of higher learning. India needs to build on portraying itself as a major education hub in Asia that can provide quality education.

In building his study, the author looks at both sides of the coin. Saudi Arabia’s perceptions of India have undergone changes following the end of the Cold War and the emergence of India as a stable democracy. Its shift in focus to major Asian countries following 9/11 has aimed at broadening its engagement particularly with India, China and Japan. The author notes that Saudi Arabia’s ‘Look East’ policy would give it the two distinct advantages of exploring new markets for oil and trade, and diversifying its diplomatic engagement with the world. However, Saudi Arabia does harbor certain concerns with respect to India’s engagements in the West Asian region, particularly with reference to India’s defence cooperation with Iran, and the supply of arms to India from Israel. These two concerns also pose challenges to furthering India’s interests in the region.

The Pakistan factor has also been an important element of the India-Saudi Arabia relationship. The author observes that India’s undue emphasis on the religious factor (that it attributed to close Saudi-Pakistani ties) made it view Saudi Arabia as a ‘lost cause’ for a long period of time. In spite of this, India’s deepening engagements with Saudi Arabia over the recent past has resulted in building a stronger bilateral relationship. The author also points out that Pakistan’s influence over Saudi Arabia in hindering a stronger Indo-Saudi relationship will have more diminished impact than in the past.

The study concludes by saying that it is imperative for both countries to move beyond ‘buyer-seller relations’. The recent high level visits and agreements are an indication of deepened trust building that will be essential for a long term strategic partnership. The author emphasises the need for both countries to engage with mutual cooperation in multiple fronts of engagement, with India taking the lead in engaging with Saudi Arabia, especially in this opportune time when India is looking west and Saudi Arabia is looking east. This will help translate the existing economic ties into a strong strategic partnership.

Major Points of Discussion and Suggestions to the author:

• There is a need to explore the use of the term ‘strategic partnership’ to define India-Saudi Arabia relations as they currently exist. A number of panelists disagreed on the assumption that such a partnership already exists between the two countries. Also, it was observed that this may not be the right time to deepen ties with countries in the region, taking into account the unforeseen consequences of the ongoing Arab Spring.
• A discussant suggested deeper exploration of the benefits of a strengthened strategic partnership for both India and Saudi Arabia and the impacts of this on regional actors in India’s neighbourhood, such as China and Pakistan; the balancing acts that both countries have to manage (for the Saudis, between India and Pakistan, and for the Indians, between Saudi Arabia and Iran).
• It was suggested that the study also explore the problems relating to succession in the Kingdom. King Abdullah has played a fine balancing act between the Islamists and the liberals in the country and it is uncertain if another future ruler will be able to do the same.
• It was noted that India must strive to engage with countries in the region in such a manner that developments such as the Arab Spring do not impact the fundamental basis of its relations with those countries. People-to-people relations need to be consolidated so that bilateral relations are not overly influenced by regime changes.
• The discussion also focused on Saudi Arabia’s strong military and religious ties with Pakistan, and its varied and continuing engagement with the Taliban in Afghanistan. One of the panelists stressed the significance of self-interests in the forging of bilateral relations. In the context of India-Saudi Arabia relations, both sides have much to gain from economic and defence cooperation.
• Panelists affirmed that despite recent shifts, the bilateral relationship would remain dominated by economic factors, with energy trade being the most important element of this.

Report prepared by Princy Marin George, Research Assistant, West Asia and Africa Cluster, IDSA

In his presentation, Prof. Ganguly discussed why a Sino-Indian conflict is more likely than a Sino-American conflict drawing on the literature on rivalries. He developed his key arguments in four stages: a discussion on theories of power transition; their applicability to the intensifying Sino-Indian rivalry; dealing with potential objections to the predictions of the theory; and suggesting possible policy recommendations.

At the outset, Prof. Ganguly notes the conventional concerns over a US-China rivalry which will increase instability and tension in Asia and may even lead to war. With China’s increasing economic heft, aggressive growth of sea power and focus on augmenting its naval capabilities, it is possible that at a point the interests of the two powers may clash. There is a possibility that the US might be drawn into a Sino-Taiwanese conflict or a clash in the South China Sea. While there is already a lot of academic and policy-oriented focus on the possibility of a US-China rivalry, Prof. Ganguly located a more likely source of instability in Asia: the Sino-Indian rivalry.

The extant and growing tensions within this rivalry matter because the two states have long held competing self-images, they are likely to vie for a dominant role in Asia and because China sees India as the most likely competitor for great power status in Asia. Theories on power transition suggest that there is a high propensity of conflict between aspiring and dominant great powers. The speaker, citing Rapkin and Thompson (2006), highlighted three features pertaining to the context in which great powers have historically emerged;

• First, all aspiring powers felt the necessity to take on another powerful state in the global order.
• Second, most great powers emerge from greatly troubled neighbourhood; and
• Last, they start out as being the predominant power within the neighbourhood.

Prof. Ganguly extended Rapkin/Thompson analysis of explaining the conditions under which great powers are likely to emerge to examine how an extant rivalry between two rising regional powers can led to a militarized conflict. He argues that a modification of the Rapkin/Thompson argument about the conditions conducive to the emergence of a great power actually leads to a prediction of a potential conflict between the PRC and India. This rivalry, already accentuated by significant power transition as the PRC steadily outstrips its principal regional rival, India, could culminate in a major war. Long before the PRC comes into direct conflict with the US, it is far more likely to cross swords with India. As India’s economic clout, military prowess and diplomatic status increase, the PRC will be tempted to curb its rival’s rise. Given the existence of an extant and seemingly intractable territorial dispute, the likelihood of such a conflict, though not imminent, seems wholly plausible. The speaker backed up his assertions by finding support for Rapkin and Thompson’s three propositions:

1. The ongoing border dispute, China’s expansionist tendencies as witnessed in the case of Arunachal Pradesh, border incursions, and growing militarization of the region suggest that the process to militarily take on the competitor of the aspiring great power could be underway.

2. The PRC has penetrated Myanmar and virtually colonized Mandalay. It has transferred nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology to Pakistan. There is increased competition in the Indian Ocean over sea lanes critical to both India and China. The PRC has also adopted an intransigent stance on the Kashmir issue. There is, therefore, ample evidence to prove that the rivalry operates in a tough neighbourhood.

3. Moreover, China is easily the predominant power in the neighbourhood, thus, confirming the third proposition.

On the view that a Sino-Indian conflict is unlikely because of, firstly, growing economic interdependence, and secondly, presence of nuclear weapons, Prof. Ganguly noted that:

• Economic interdependence is not a panacea. It is not a guarantee for peace. Moreover, India-China trade relationship is asymmetrical.
• Sino-Indian cooperation in global forums are fleeting moments of convergence of interest and not a strategy.
• Mutual possession of nuclear arsenals does not obviate the prospects of limited war. It is possible that Chinese probes and Indian military reactions might precipitate a conflict.

Thus, going by the literature on rivalries, PRC may well be looking for an opportunity to discipline what it deems to be an upstart power in its neighborhood to demonstrate its clout as a great power.

Given the analysis that the intensification of the Sino-Indian rivalry could well prove to be the likely source of a militarized conflict, in conclusion Prof. Ganguly outlined some policy options/strategies for India to forestall the conflict;

• India could simply concede ground to PRC and make significant territorial concessions. This option has the potential to prevent immediate conflict but it may embolden the PRC to seek further concessions.
• A second strategy would be to align with the United States.
• Third, India could embark on a strategy of internal balancing. Indeed, India has started following this strategy in a rather haphazard fashion.
• A fourth, and most likely path that India might pursue involves elements of the first three, involving, intermittent concessions to China, growing alignment with Japan, naval cooperation with the US and steady expansion of its own internal military capabilities.

Report prepared by Bhavna Tripathy, Research Intern at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.