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| Title | Date | Author | Time | Event | Body | Research Area | Topics | File attachments | Image |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Developments in Russia in the Post-election Period: Implications for India | March 22, 2012 | Dmitri Kosyrev | 1400 hrs | Other |
Venue: Board Room, IDSA About Dmitri KozyrevKosyrev, Dmitri, born April 28 1955. Graduate – Moscow University (Asia & Africa Institute), cum laude, 1978, Chinese history. 1976-1977 – special course in the Nanyang University (Singapore). Languages: English, Chinese, French. Current position: Deputy Director of Analytical Directorate, since January 2007. Political Columnist (Asian problems), RIA Novosti, since November 2001. Chief of International Problems Section, 2002-2006. Writes columns in various Russia media and talks on the Russian and foreign TV on Asian matters. Acclaimed writer, mainly of spy thrillers: Pet Monkey of the House of Tang (2006), Pet Hawk of the House of Abbas (2007), Pet Hawk of the House of Maniakh (2010). Previous positions: Director of the trading companies (1995-1997), import of textiles from Asia. Simultaneously numerous publications on Asia in the Russian media. Editor-in-Chief, Russian Trade Connections – a Hong Kong bulletin on Russia (1993-1995), at the same time Deputy Director of the Image Alpha PR company, Hong Kong, Moscow branch (writing of advertising texts, including bank reports). Diplomatic Columnist, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 1992-1993. PR representative, the Delovye Luidi (monthly business magazine, French-Russian), writer of advertising texts (1991-1992). Regional correspondent for South East Asia, Manila - the Pravda (1988 – 1991). Correspondent of the Foreign News Section, the Pravda (1978-1988). Married, 2 daughters (27 & 21), wife Mrs. Irina Kosyreva – director of a transport company. Foreign Policy Association, member since 1991, member of the Board, Vice-President 2002-2006. Nusantara Association (Malay Studies), member since 1996. Wine writer, expert on wines & food, regular wine trips, features & columns in the Russian specialised wine publications, including the White & Red Magazine, the Style Monitoring and the Enotheca. Hobbies: music, cooking |
Eurasia & West Asia | |||
| China and India's Look East Policy | March 21, 2012 | Baladas Ghoshal | 1100 hrs | Other |
Venue: Room 105, IDSA Biodata: Prof Baladas GhoshalBaladas Ghoshal, currently Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi and Visiting Professor, Academy of Third World Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia, is a former Professor of Southeast Asia and South-West Pacific Studies and Chairman of the Centre for South and Southeast Asian Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Professor Ghoshal is a doyen of Indonesian studies in India. He was a Visiting Professor of International Relations first at the International Christian University , Tokyo and then at Nagoya City University , Professor Ghoshal has taught at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (1990-91) National University of Malaysia (1998-1999), University of Malaya (2000) and the Universiti Utara Malaysia (2002-2003). He has held Senior Fulbright Fellowships at the Cornell and Rutgers Universities (1983-84); Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies , Singapore (1985-86); Ford-ACDIS Fellow at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and the Centre for Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong (Sept.-Oct.2003). |
South East Asia and Oceania | |||
| China and the Current Crises in the Sudans | March 06, 2012 | Daniel Large | Round Table |
Chair: Ruchita Beri Mr. Daniel Large, Research Associate with the South African Institute of International Affairs, gave a presentation on ‘China and the Current Crises in the Sudans’. He opened his presentation with a background of the current situation in Sudan and South Sudan and observed that there is a pattern of multiple inter-locking of crises in the two Sudans. He describes China’s relations with the two nations as an ‘intriguing work in progress’. A year ago, China’s relations were restricted to Khartoum but ever since, its relations with South Sudan have been growing. Since January 2011, there has been a qualitative acceleration of Chinese engagement in South Sudan and the numbers of Chinese businesses have grown exponentially. This has led to a scramble for businesses which range from SMEs to independent and private entrepreneurs. China’s aid programme, through humanitarian and development assistance to South Sudan, is being rolled out in its ten provinces. Its political relation with South Sudan has moved from a state of war to a pragmatic friendship, with enhanced government and inter-party interactions. Though some areas of tension remain, the relations have significantly improved. However, one key bottleneck for long-term Chinese investment in these countries is the lack of finances. Throwing some light on China’s engagement with South Sudan, Mr. Large argued that China began its relations even before South Sudan seceded away from Sudan. According to some observers, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) was ‘sneaking in’ to initiate relations with Juba in the mid-2000s. In July 2007, South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir visited China and elaborated his country’s position on its relations with Sudan and the geographical distribution of his nation’s oil resources. A year later in September 2008, China opened it’s Consulate in South Sudan. Mr. Large concluded his presentation by stating that security is the main concern for China in the Sudans given the fact that in late January 2012, Chinese workers were kidnapped by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (North). Chinese presence in the two countries has also raised issues of its responsibility to protect the civilians, the practicality in mobilizing aid for the countries and if it is worth at all to be engaged in the countries given such fragile security environment. China’s relation with the two countries is characterized by what Mr. Large calls, ‘sober realism’. In the likelihood of a change of Chinese leadership, there could be a departure from the current stand of a favourable relationship with Sudan. Under the Chinese initiative of ensuring security and development, there is great hope for development in South Sudan, while in Sudan the agricultural renaissance is touted to replace the former oil economy. But given the pattern of intensifying insecurities in South Sudan, Mr Large contended that it remains doubtful if these programmes can be realized. In the discussion that ensued, some more issues related to China’s wider engagement with the African continent were brought to the fore. Given China’s growing power status and its medium- and long-term interests in Africa, there is an increasing deployment of the People’s Liberation Army (Navy) on the shores off the African coast. China has also been gradually developing its operational capacities in Sudan to protect its national interests. Relations between China and Sudan have been deepening, but this pragmatic relationship is based on mistrust. However, the South Sudanese have not been as welcoming of China and the latter are concerned about corruption in Salva Kiir’s government. Sudan and South Sudan are inextricably dependent on one another and their relationship is based on good neighbourliness. However, it is extremely hard for China to balance and therefore it is ‘uncomfortably stuck’ between the two. As a result, it is continually trying to navigate through unchartered waters. It was concluded that despite all the challenges, there has been a pronounced improvement in China’s relationship with South Sudan both in tangible (development aid) and non-tangible (reception of South Sudanese government officials in China) terms. Given China’s engagement in the country, it hopes for a more established, viable South Sudanese government that is capable of better governance. Report prepared by Keerthi Sampath Kumar, Research Assistant, IDSA |
Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN | ||||
| Negotiating conflict in deeply divided societies: The merits of complex and hybrid consociational power sharing systems based on the case studies from South Asia and Eastern Europe | March 19, 2012 | Radu Cariumaru | Other |
Speaker: Radu Carciumaru, Senior Lecturer, South Asia Institute, University of Heidleberg Mr. Radu Carciumaru delivered a talk on the topic ‘Negotiating conflict in deeply divided societies: The merits of complex and hybrid consociational power sharing systems based on the case studies from South Asia and Eastern Europe’ on 19 March, 2012. Here, the author categorically explained these variables such as negotiation, conflict, ethnic conflict, deeply divided society, etc. He defined conflict as a situation in which two or more actors are involved, mostly in a deeply divided society. And, ethnic conflict is an outcome of such conflicts. Taking the ideas of Horowitz, he also explained the concept of ethnic group and ethnic identity which are based on colour, language and religion depending on the tribe, race, nationalities or castes. To the author, the ethnic groups are constructed over a period of time but are often found to be deconstructed. In order to explain his framework, Mr. Radu took up the case studies of India, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia (including Kosovo and Vojvodina) and Moldova. While talking about power sharing, the author picked up the consociational power sharing model. This model involves the domestic actors including the ones from the centre and state. Moreover, four broad principles were outlined. These include grand coalition cabinets, proportional representation, minority/mutual veto powers, and segment autonomy. In this context, India as an institutionalised state has been cited as an example for the consociational arrangement. Furthermore, the scholar discussed positional and principal negotiations. Taking ideas from the works of Fisher and Ury, Mr. Radu talked about separating people from the problem; focus on interests and not positions; generating a variety of possibilities before any actions; and finally a criteria by insisting that the result should be based on some objective standard. While discussing the interests, the scholar was of the view that specific identity should be well protected. Also, specific cultures, rights and opportunities should be safeguarded too. And, people involved should be encouraged to participate in decision making process in order to instil a sense of belonging. Alongside this, Mr. Radu also highlighted the concept of communicative negotiation. According to him, this is more applicable to the identity-based conflicts that cannot be depended on principled negotiation. Here, the participants are the communicators and the main goal is to reach an understanding based on respect. It also requires a mutual respect and also a need to recognise the differences. Most importantly, one should invent options to ensure mutual respect. Mr Radu also focussed on the consociational power sharing model which comprises of elite cooperation, an empirical model and a normative model. He highlighted two conditions for this model, namely, structure-oriented conditions and actor-oriented conditions. While the first set of conditions talk of non-majority segment, equal-sized segments, small population, socio-economic equality, overarching loyalty and geographical concentration of segments, the second revolves around dominant elite, external pressure, accommodating traditions and absence of special rights of claim. Further, the scholar stressed on the composite model for conflict-regulation in plural societies. For this, he described segmental autonomy as symmetrical and asymmetrical autonomy. Explaining this, Mr. Radu mentioned that Article 3 of the Indian Constitution has enabled the state to react more flexibly to the separatist demands by providing incentives for the self determination movements to struggle for a ‘homeland’ within the Indian Union. The aforementioned Kashmir conflict is one such instance, and comes under Article 370 of the Constitution. Similarly, Mizoram comes under Article 371. While Article 30 pertains to linguistic minorities, there are also Articles 25 and 26 and the 8 schedules. Coming to the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the scholar talked about the Dayton Peace Agreement which ended the conflict. Moreover, the direct intervention by the international community as a mechanism to coordinate law and policy-making, judicial review and arbitration was also touched upon by Mr. Radu. In the case of Macedonia, joint committees and implementation bodies including ad hoc bodies sponsored by various international organizations are believed to be involved in power sharing systems. According to the scholar, no extensive international involvement was seen in the case of Moldova but the conflict was solved bilaterally. Apart from this, Mr. Radu stressed on the types of parliamentary representation, veto tights and also the proportionality in administration. The presentation was followed by discussion on the subject and a few questions were asked. One of them was over how the Kashmir issue needs to be resolved. In response to this, the scholar talked about the Indian freedom struggle which focussed on uniting people and on avoiding making enemies. Some of the opinions were that people always talked about cultures but often failed to understand ethnicities. It was also pointed out during the discussion that the problems are manifold and dealing with them is in a divided world is difficult. To do this, there is a need for an economic development. Some questions were over the concept of elite strategy and how the speaker defined the elites. The speaker stated that elites were primarily political in nature such as the politicians, in all sectors, be it local, state or national level. |
Terrorism & Internal Security | ||||
| Current Situation in West Asia and India’s Dilemma | February 22, 2012 | Round Table |
DG Dr. Arvind Gupta India’s interests are interspersed with all these developments. These have entangled India’s policy so much so that responding and dealing with them within set parameters has become difficult. The interconnectedness of these issues makes it difficult for India to accept any side or position. Moreover, the recent bomb blast in New Delhi targeting Israeli embassy personnel has added further to the existing dilemma as to how India should articulate its stance on the West Asia imbroglio. With this background, the participants of the roundtable sought to answer the following research questions:
Ambassador S.K. Bhutani In the case of the Gulf, a military solution to stop Iran from becoming a nuclear power is not a feasible one. This is the same case with the Western solution of strangling the Iranian economy. Within Iran, there is a fragmentation of the elite. The leadership is divided, wherein the Ayatollah [Khamenei] and President Ahmedinejad are at loggerheads. The West’s aim is to use the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the P5+1 in order to pass a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution against Iran. India should not get involved in this debate because the Iranian interest will be taken care of by China and Russia. It is not the principles, but our interests that should matter. Therefore, the question arises: What are India’s interests? Iran is beneficial to us for three important reasons: oil and gas, access to Afghanistan, and access to the Caspian Sea. The Afghanistan advantage fits into the large perspective for India, that is, in order to break the two fronts that we face in terms of conflict—Pakistan and China. India should not be a partner to other powers in containing Iran; rather our role should be to double our relationship with the latter. We should develop a constructive relationship with Iran and protect our country’s strategic interests. We should also work harder to develop relations with the Gulf States, especially those states that are not in favour of India developing relations with Iran by citing our purpose as being to maintain relations with both sides. However, its internal developments and politics makes it difficult to predict the direction Iran might take. What do we do with the non-Gulf Arab states? Syria is a difficult case in point. Here, India should take a constructive humanitarian view and offer to send a non-official medical mission to both sides, or, at least, make such announcements. This will take the immediate pressure off from the Indian government and give them time to think up a response. In Egypt, the signs are positive and there are fewer contradictions to be resolved. The statement from the Muslim Brotherhood of 21 February, assuring the US that the peace treaty with Israel will be maintained if aid continues, and positive feedback from the US Senators’ visit to Egypt, all point in this direction. Egypt faces a lot of internal strife between the Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood along with unemployment, dip in tourism, and capital flight, etc. This, therefore, presents India with an opportunity to go in. During the protests at Tahrir Square, one of the demonstrators’ demands called for Egypt to adopt the Indian model. Hence, we need a non-official level study to probe this further, which should include the intelligentsia—academic institutions and/or the press. Moreover, we should not choose sides but try to live with all of them. Ambassador Ishrat Azziz Moreover, the GCC, led by Saudi Arabia, have expressed desire to develop strategic relations with India. The problem, however, is that developing strategic relations with the GCC will put us in a bind vis-à-vis dealing with Iran. The tension between GCC and Iran will affect Indian relations with either of them. For India, two countries that matter above others—amongst those who possess nuclear arsenals, share common border with it, and are beset with internal problems—are Pakistan and China. Hence, Iran possessing nuclear weapons does not affect us directly, as it is our neighbour’s neighbour. Rather, our immediate concern should be regarding our policy and stand on the issue, and what we should do to substantially prevent Iran’s nuclear programme. Moreover, we have to formulate policy for both the long- and the short term, especially for the latter, as it is difficult to meet contingencies that India faces now with regard to this region. Voting in the UNSC should be avoided as much as possible. However, neutrality in certain situations is not an option as our image as an emerging power demands that take a strong, positive stand. And this is our dilemma. There will, eventually, be pressure on India. But we should not be seen to be taking sides because of, for instance, the influence/interest of the USA, Israel, and the West. We can justify the Syrian vote because the Arab League is the conscience keeper of the Arab world. However, regarding Iran, we should stand firm in stating that the IAEA should be the agency that should deal with such matters. If an anti-Iran resolution or a resolution perceived by Iran as against it comes up for vote in the UNSC, India must abstain and avoid taking sides. If it is proved that Iran has enriched to higher percentages other than for peaceful purposes, then India might have to take a stance. Discussion from participantsOne of the discussants, Dr G. Balachandran, said that, firstly, the military option against Iran is not ruled out yet. Secondly, there is going to be no diplomatic solution to this issue at all. The only solution during the negotiations is, one, suspension of enrichment and, two, to assure IAEA that there are no hidden facilities in Iran. The question is: if Iran possesses a nuclear bomb, will it do to Israel what Pakistan is doing to India, that is, use the possession of a nuclear bomb for doing anything in a non-nuclear way. In this case, Israel has to weigh the option of military solution or not. The belief that is going around is that in case the Iranian government does not change its position, then Israel will choose a military solution. Then India, as a bystander, has to make arrangements to procure oil and gas from other sources if the Gulf region goes for war, apart from evacuation arrangements for its nationals working in the region. Cdr. S.S. Parmar said that the Shia-Sunni divide is a factor and a strategic problem in this region that India has to take into consideration. Ms Ruchita Beri emphasised that we cannot ignore that Iran is an emerging regional leader in the light of the decline of US power in the region. Dr. Meena S. Roy said that Iran is a burning issue wherein the world is divided as to how to deal with it—it is also a ‘catch-22’ situation for India. India cannot afford to distance itself from Iran because of Afghanistan, though the argument points to the fact that the USA is more important than Iran. If we are looking at a symptomatic treatment of the problem, then the US position becomes important. However, as part of this region, we cannot afford to distance ourselves from Iran. How India deals with Iran is a real question for the fact that India tries to balance its relations with Israel, USA, and the other regional actors, particularly China and Russia, who are clear about their positions. Russia and China support Iran by seeking non-intervention. In terms of military intervention in Iran, within the USA there are divided opinions. A long-term study, as pointed out by Ambassador Bhutani, on the Caspian region should also be pursued as it is China’s next target. For India, it is possible to get into this sector. At the same time, we should explore options of cooperating with China in this region, and not just competing with it. Dr. Roy also stressed that work needs to be done on internal dynamics within Iran. However, she said that change within Iran is not likely to come soon under current the circumstances when there is increasing pressure from external forces to isolate Iran. People within Iran will resist any kind of pressure and thus such a situation is likely to strengthen the current regime. Mr. Samuel Rajiv felt that there is space for a constructive role for India in the resolution of the Iranian issue, along with other regional groupings like GCC and countries like Turkey. Currently, powers that are intervening in the Iranian nuclear debate are the Western ones. Gp. Capt. Krishnappa suggested that India should weigh the option or assess the cost of voting for or against, or abstaining when the UNSC vote comes on Iran. Dr. Kalyanaraman inquired about the advantages we can derive from India leaning towards the GCC and Saudi Arabia with particular reference to Afghanistan and its transition. Ms. Shebonti Ray Dadwal asked if there was much pressure from Saudi Arabia or from any of the GCC countries vis-à-vis India to cut-off relations with Iran. Also, what is the need for adopting an ‘either-or’ policy? India’s relations with Iran are strategic, apart from being related to oil, and with the GCC the relations are largely economic in nature. So, she suggested, India should deal with them from these perspectives. In terms of our energy needs, we need not depend on Iran for energy per se. Yet, going by past experience, Ms Dadwal cautioned that India should learn its lessons from the 2005 resolution wherein relations between Iran and India soured. The implications need to be studied. As for the spare capacity of Saudi oil, one needs to bear in mind that its spare capacity is only 2 million barrels a day if oil from Iran is cut off. Moreover, till the present global economic crisis comes to an end, a military solution to Iran is not a likely option. The common agreement amongst the participants at the roundtable was that relations with Iran must not be abandoned by taking sides. India’s stand should, instead, be guided by its national interests. Moreover, as Ambassador Bhutani cautioned, India’s response to the current situation cannot be merely guided by the past. According to him, we have to clearly understand motives behind certain occurrences, especially in terms of the recent bombings in New Delhi; it can be a person(s) or group(s) whose motive is to disrupt India’s relations not just with Israel but also with Iran. Ambassador Bhutani pointed out that India should pursue a constructive role wherever possible; where not, it should step aside. Ambassador Azziz said that if ever clear evidence of the compliance of any country’s/party’s involvement in the recent bombings in India is brought forth, then India should follow the due course of law. Moreover, he said that if India takes an anti-Iran stance at the UNSC without adequate justification, then it can spell trouble. The discussants emphasised that thorough research on Iran should be carried to get adequate information and data so as to form an informed picture of the evolving situation. |
Eurasia & West Asia | |||||
| In Pursuit of a Shield:US, Missile Defence and the Iran Imperative | April 20, 2012 | S. Samuel C. Rajiv | Fellows' Seminar |
Chairman: Professor Satish Kumar The paper dealt with US efforts to counter Iran’s missile ‘threat’ and ensure security of its allies like Israel and Turkey and safeguard its interests and the regional repercussions of such measures. The paper began by discussing the Iran threat as flagged in key US policy documents including the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), 2006 National Military Strategy to Combat WMD and the February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) Review and the solution articulated (missile defence) to deal/hedge against such a threat. Pertinent among these measures being erected in consort with allies like the NATO and GCC countries at sea as well as on land across the Bush and the Obama administration were examined. The next section examined Iran’s missile inventory and its developing capabilities. The pursuit of such ‘defensive’ measures has led to complications in US-Russia arms control efforts, uncertainties in Iran’s relations with its neighbours like Turkey and has generated regional strategic tensions (NATO-Russia) as well. Russian contentions that the real focus of such measures is to constrain its strategic capabilities despite US officials insisting that it was directed against Iran were pointed out. NATO’s November 2010 Lisbon Summit explicitly avoided naming Iran as the intended target of Obama’s Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) at the instance of Turkey, which agreed to host a X-band radar at Kurecik 700 kms from the Iranian border in September 2011 on the condition that data would not be shared with Israel. The strong US-Israel missile defence cooperation was noted, with Arrow Block 4 version tested in February 2012. It was pointed out that the Arrow – first inducted into the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) in 2000 – was the first operational theatre missile defence system in the world. The paper noted that there was the distinct possibility of Obama’s PAA being extended to the Gulf region, with senior US policy makers expressing such a desire publicly in recent times. The UAE became the first international partner to buy the THAAD missiles from the US in December 2011. The paper ended by flagging possible implications for Indian security given that these efforts relate to developments in what Indian policy makers have called its ‘proximate neighbourhood’. Among these included greater regional strategic uncertainties coupled with rising military expenditures, energy security complications as a result of a possible incident at sea, and possible deterrence complications given that American BMD systems provides the justification for both Russia and China to continue their nuclear modernization efforts. Prof. Kumar noted that the issues examined in the paper have a fundamental bearing on regional and global security. He added that the ‘reset’ in US-Russia relations has been affected by the US missile defence policy with regard to Iran. Dr. Ghosh began his comments by noting that the paper was ‘well-crafted’ but with certain loopholes which can be plugged to make it better. His comments dealt with the BMD architecture, Russia-US imbroglio and Iran’s capabilities. He wanted the author to examine some of the US programmes that had been mothballed as well as programmes like the Hypersonic Glide Kill Vehicle, which could be the future of BMD. Dr. Ghosh reminded the audience that Obama’s PAA was in many ways similar to the 1996 document Capstone Requirements Document (CRD) specifying NMD operational requirements which was scrapped because the capabilities could not mature. Dr. Ghosh noted that the Bush-era system did not cover Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, and parts of Romania. He also noted that the US had rejected the Russian suggestion to host US radars at Gabaladarya, Azerbaijan directly overlooking Iran instead of in Poland and Czech Republic. On Russian contentions specifically, Dr. Ghosh stated that they were a bit overblown given that Russia could potentially overwhelm US interceptors by sheer numbers at its disposal. He concluded his remarks by noting that an Iranian ICBM capability ‘was still some distance away’. Cdr. Singh commended the effort to bring out a coherent paper by the author despite not having a military background. He gave a geo-strategic context to the issue in the light of declining Russian influence over ‘buffer’ states after the break-up of the Soviet Union, and the genuine apprehensions of countries like Poland and Georgia over the resurgent Russia. He pointed to intra-NATO divisions over the issue, which are being played up by Russia. In his opinion, the technological basis of the US system was sound. He however termed the ‘threat’ from Iran as ‘over-stated’ given that Iranian IRBM capabilities have prominent North Korean/Chinese links and an Iranian ICBM capability was far away. Iranian cruise missile capabilities though are potent and are being still further developed. Cdr. Singh pointed out that Iranian threats to close the Straits of Hormuz were real, even though it could be for a limited period. He stated that as a concept, BMD was a ‘brilliant, strategic idea’ equivalent to a ‘strategic tent’ rather than a ‘strategic fortress’. Internal Discussant Cdr. S.S. Parmar noted that in the event of clashes, it will not involve missile defences per se but conventional capabilities. He also noted that Iran could swarm US ships with shore-based batteries making defences against short-range missiles ineffective. Cdr. Parmar pointed to the importance of maps and tables to more clearly convey information. The other Discussant Kapil Dharaj Patil pointed out that Iranian perceptions of the US missile defence system was absent in the paper. He added that it was important to note the ‘threat construction’ by US and NATO vis-à-vis Iran’s capabilities. DG, IDSA Dr. Arvind Gupta noted that though the paper is an important update, it could do with more analysis. He pointed out that implications for Indian security if any have to be more clearly brought out and the author’s own assessment of the US efforts has to be included in the concluding section. The paper could also benefit by incorporating maps/tables. Chinese reactions to the issue could also be pointed out. On issues like budgetary pressures being faced by the Obama administration that the paper flags, a more focussed effort can be made to go into the pertinent details. Other points of discussion that were flagged from the floor included regional responses to US BMD efforts, specifically from countries like Saudi Arabia and the GCC, assessment of Iranian capabilities or lack of it, and the efficacy of the BMD systems being pursued by the US, among others. Report prepared by Shri Kiran Jai Prakash, Research Intern, Nuclear and Arms Control Centre, and Sam Rajiv. |
Eurasia & West Asia | ||||
| The Growing Chinese Maritime Influence: Implications for Regional Security | April 13, 2012 | Sarabjeet Singh Parmar | Fellows' Seminar |
Chairperson: Vice Admiral P S Das (Retd) In order to understand the strategy adopted by China in spreading its maritime influence and implications for regional security, the tenets espoused by Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett have been studied in this paper. The two great strategists differed from each other; whereas Mahan emphasised establishing Command of Sea, Corbett focused more on denial of command of sea. Mahan advocated the Big Battle theory (requiring big Ships and Weapons); but Corbett believed in advance indicators before big battles will occur. Whilst Mahan looked at the sea as means to an end, Corbett looked at a skilful combination of maritime and continental strategies. On comparing the two strategists it was observed that the Chinese maritime thought process was heavily influenced by Mahan, but there are also shades of Corbett’s ideas. China, in order to gain power, has consolidated the strategies of Mahan and Corbett in the present era and its strategy is now based on three conjoined aspects—economics, diplomacy and military expansion. The importance of maritime strategy for China emerges in three ways: first, breakaway from the coastal defence syndrome; second, consolidation in the immediate area in the face of the Soviet threat and the presence of the US in Japan; and thirdly, break away from the immediate area and enter into the outer areas. Comparisons were drawn between China’s wish to absorb Taiwan and the US annexation of Hawaii Islands and expansion in US maritime influence post the world wars, as these aspects hold important geostrategic indicators for China. It was brought out that in order to expand its influence China must first gain the advantage of sea denial tactics through Submarines and Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBM), second, gain sea control through establishment of working control and control in dispute, third, China’s naval operations outside the first and second island chains would fall more into the category of presence and trade protection and finally, the strategy of overseas bases which is followed by China in a subtle way in Myanmar, Maldives, Sri Lanka, eastern coast of Africa, etc. Conclusion:
Suggestions for the Paper:
Report Prepared by Soumya Tiwari, Research Intern, Centre for Military Affairs |
Military Affairs | ||||
| Understanding Africa’s position on UN Security Council Reforms | April 13, 2012 | Ruchita Beri | Fellows' Seminar |
Chairperson: Lt Gen Satish Nambiar (Retd) Reform and democratisation of the United Nations, particularly the Security Council, has been the focus of global attention in recent years. However, progress on UNSC reforms has proven to be quite elusive, mainly due to multiple and competing proposals by various groups like G-4, Uniting for Consensus, L-69 and S-5. Separately, within the UN process, through the Africa Group the African countries have tried to project their common position for permanent representation from the African continent at the Security Council. In this context, Ms. Ruchita Beri analysed the African position on UNSC reforms and provided some historical and political context necessary to situate the Africa’s debate over Security Council reforms. She argued that the continent’s inflexibility and failure to reach a compromise on the common position while negotiating with other like-minded groups is the single most significant roadblock in the African countries’ plans to acquire permanent position on the high table. Further, while India’s quest for African support for its UNSC candidature may have been one of the factors fuelling India’s engagement of African countries in recent years, doubts remain on India and Africa convergence at the negotiations on UNSC reforms in future. Highlighting the anachronistic structure of the UNSC, Ms. Beri mentioned that there has been an engaging debate on the need for UNSC reforms since the end of the Cold War. Many countries, especially from the developing world, have expressed their dissatisfaction with the unrepresentative character of the UNSC and presented various formulae and proposals addressing three issues:
However, the new permanent membership has proven to be the most contentious issue in the debate on Security Council reforms. Among different groups formed across the world to put forward the cases for permanent membership to the Security Council, the Africa group remains the only geographical group to have reached a common position when, after considerable deliberations, the African countries agreed to a common position on the UNSC reforms called the Ezulwini Consensus (2005). Further, the Sirte Summit of the African Union in July 2005 set up a follow up mechanism on the reform process and mandated to negotiate with other regions of the world and stakeholders to attain Africa’s aspiration with reference to the UNSC. However, there was a lot of criticism of the African common position:
On their part, the G-4 and the Africa group opened negotiations in London in 2005 in order to reach a consensus as they would be unable to muster the required support independently. Nevertheless, negotiations revealed fissures in the unity of the Africa group and the leading African countries failed to convince other member states that it was practically impossible for Africa to attain a permanent representation at the UNSC without support from other players. Several factors influenced these events:
On India-Africa convergence, Ms. Beri mentioned that in recent years, India has been engaging African countries in a big way, at bilateral, regional as well as pan-African levels. The need for a new paradigm encompassing diverse areas such as political, economic, science and technology, human resource development, social, cultural and strategic was highlighted during the India-Africa Summit held in April 2008. Also, India’s increasing engagement of Africa coupled with its involvement in UN peacekeeping in Africa can be viewed as a strategy to win support of the African countries for its candidature to the UNSC. In turn, on various occasions, individually or as part of a regional grouping, African countries have gone on record to support India’s candidature to the reformed UNSC. In conclusion, she opined that currently it seems the Africa group cannot agree on suitable candidates to fill the permanent seats allocated to the region. It is also doubtful whether other groups will negotiate with African countries without identification of the possible African candidates. At the same time, without African support it is inconceivable that any proposal or reform package could succeed in the General Assembly. Therefore, at the moment, Africa seems to be holding the key to further progress on the UNSC reforms debate. Major Points from Discussion and Suggestions to the Author:
Report prepared by Babjee Pothuraju, Research Assistant, IDSA. |
Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN | ||||
| Threat of Islamist Terrorism in Southeast Asia-2012 | March 01, 2012 | Bilveer Singh | 1100 hrs | Other |
Venue: Room No. 005, IDSA Dr Bilveer Singh, a Singapore citizen, currently teaches at the Dept of Political Science, National University of Singapore and is an Adjunct Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. He specialises on regional security issues with his latest books being The Talibanization of Southeast (2007); The Geopolitics of Papua (2008); indonesia Under the Shadow of an Islamic State (2011) and The Challenge of Terrorism and Suicide Bombings in Indonesia (2012). |
South East Asia and Oceania | |||
| Private Sector Participation in Defence Production: Issues of Industrial Licensing and FDI | February 28, 2012 | 1000 hrs | Round Table |
Venue: Room No 005, IDSA Concept Note
It is more than decade now since the Government of India in a major policy initiative liberalised the defence industry in 2001, by allowing 100 per cent participation by the private sector with foreign direct investment (FDI) permissible up to 26 per cent, both subject to licensing and security clearance. The initiative was taken to harness the expertise of the private sector, and facilitate its participation through infusion of foreign capital and technology for enhancing self-reliance in India’s defence production. By October 2011, the DIPP has given 200 Letters of Intent/Industrial Licenses (LoI/IL) to various private entities, with proposed investment totaling Rs. 11,773 crore and employment opportunities for 38,579 people. And by November 2011, a cumulative FDI of Rs 17.68 crore ($3.72 million) has flown into Indian defence industry. The above developments notwithstanding, there are certain grey areas in both industrial licensing and FDI policy, which need further improvement to facilitate private sector’s participation in defence industry in a more meaningful manner. As regards industrial license, the first major issue that intrigues the domestic private industry is the definition of defence items. Unlike some other countries and international arms control organisations, which define defence item through a comprehensive list (e.g., the Munitions List of the Wassenaar Arrangement), in India there is no such list to give clarity of what constitute a defence product. The lack of clarity becomes an issue when industry is required to provide the ‘item code’ and ‘item description’ while filling up the application form for industrial license. As per the current practice, the industry is required to provide the ‘item code’ from the National Industrial Classification (NIC) Code list of 1987, which has only one code ( 359.4: ‘manufacture of arms and armaments’) for entire defence manufacturing. The NIC code does not tell about what constitutes arms and armaments and if dual-use items are also covered by it. It also does not tell about if parts and components that go into arms and ammunition but may or may not have dual-use application, fall under this head. The issue with ‘item description’ is more nuanced. There is not a single dedicated list on which the Industry can rely on to describe the defence nature of its production. Rather, they have to depend on at least three different lists, depending on which list best describes their production. Apart from NIC list (which is most generic among the three), two others are Indian Trade Classification (Harmonised System) ITC (HS) Code, as maintained by the Director General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) of Ministry of Commerce for the purpose of India’s external trade; and the ‘Product List’ as articulated in the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD’s) Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP), for discharge of offset obligations by the foreign vendors. The DGFT list, gives some broad sub-details of the items which can be covered under the defence industry. For instance, under the broad HS Code 93 (arms and ammunition; parts and accessories thereof), there are 16 sub-categories. The MoD list similarly provides some broad details of items in 27 categories under three broad headings: Defence Products, Products for Internal Security, and Civil Aerospace Products. Although more elaborate in comparison to NIC list, the lists of DGFT and MoD are still not defence specific. They cater to items of defence, dual-use and even commercially off-the-shelf in nature. For instance, under HS Code 88 (aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof) there are sub-categories such as ‘gliders’, ‘balloons’, and ‘under carriages and parts thereof’, which are commercially available products or at best dual-use items. But a company producing any of the above items is at freedom to apply for a defence license and once it gets becomes a part of the defence industry, even though the item in question may not be defence in nature. Given the above lack of clarity, the Indian defence industry in the private sector comprises of companies having a defence industrial license. Even this loosely defined industry is not free from other issues. It is noteworthy that as per the guidelines of the DIPP, defence falls under the ‘Manufacturing’ sector. So the companies in manufacturing business can apply for license and get it (subject to approval) and be formally part of the defence industry. However this is not the case for companies in the services sector (such as engineering, design and software, etc) which do not come under the purview of ‘Manufacturing’, and hence do not require a license for their services. Consequently they are not formally part of the defence industry, even though their services have direct application in defence products. The only way companies in the services sector become, in a way, part of the defence industry is by becoming Indian Offset Partner (IOP) – an Indian company partnering with a foreign company for discharge of latter’s offset obligation. However the path toward becoming IOP is not very clear in the existing policy framework. It is because the term ‘Indian’ in IOP in the context of a company in the services sector is interpreted differently from the one in the manufacturing sector. The difference is because of the foreign equity that is allowed in these two sectors. For defence manufacturing, FDI is allowed upto 26 per cent where as it is upto 100 per cent in case of services sector. In other words, in defence manufacturing sector a company will be called an Indian company only when it owns minimum 74 per cent of total equity share of that company. For the services sector, the equivalent minimum equity share (with the Indian shareholder) is 51 per cent to be called an Indian company. However it is believed that the Defence Offset Facilitation Agency (DOFA) – the single window agency under the Department of Defence Production of MoD responsible for facilitating offsets in defence contracts – does not buy this argument and insists that companies in the services sector must have minimum 74 per cent domestic equity share so as to participate as an IOP. Apart from the above ambiguity caused by the FDI policy, the way foreign investment in a company in India is calculated also creates confusion in the industry. As per the current guidelines issued by the DIPP, foreign investment in an Indian company is calculated by taking into account both the direct and indirect investments (the direct investment is the one that comes directly from a foreign source where as the indirect investment is one that comes through another company in India having a foreign equity). The tricky part is that technically and as per DIPP rules, if an indirect investment comes from a company in Indian in which the foreign partner has a minority share, the said investment is not considered as foreign investment. As an illustration, if a company X in India with a foreign equity holding of 49 per cent invests 70 per cent in the equity of another company Y (which is ‘owned and controlled’ by resident Indians), the resultant foreign equity share in Y (49%*70=34.3) is not technically considered foreign investment. The said rules notwithstanding, the MoD has a different view, which is based on actual equity owned by the foreign partner. In the above illustration, the MoD views 34.3 per cent equity share in Y as foreign investment. At least on one case, the MoD has prevailed over the DIPP’ stipulated technical rules, giving a message that when it comes to defence industry, it is the actual foreign holding that matters rather than the technical calculation as suggested by the DIPP. However given the different approach adopted by two ministries of the government, it is ideal to clarify once and for all which approach is correct. Keeping the above in view, the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) is organising a round table discussion. Senior officials from the MoD, DIPP, armed forces, industry representatives, and consultancy firms are invited to discuss and debate the following issues.
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Defence Economics & Industry |