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| Round Table Discussion on ‘China’s Policy Towards South Asia: Implications for India’ | July 16, 2019 | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Round Table |
Chair: Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, IDSA Venue: Room No. 005, Ground Floor Concept NoteThe South Asian region has been central to India’s security and foreign policy. Since independence, India’s natural pre-eminence has been subjected to contestation because of growing presence of extra-regional powers, including China, in the region. China’s presence in Tibet, bordering India, has made China an important part of India’s strategic calculus; more so, because China shares borders with many of India’s neighbours. Though India recognised China’s sovereignty over Tibet and tried to engage and befriend China, the 1962 war not only altered the India-China equation but substantially reshaped the perception of India’s neighbours towards both China and India. To some countries in the region, China gradually emerged as a reliable security partner, while India was perceived as a ‘hegemon’. Over the years, China’s approach towards South Asia has been a work in progress. At the moment, a pragmatic mode of engagement is evident between China and South Asia which throws up a challenge for India’s neighbourhood policy wherein each of India’s neighbours is eager to play the China card against India. In the past, China not only supported insurgent groups fighting against the Indian State, but also supported anti-India policies of various undemocratic regimes in neighbourhood, who faced popular opposition from constituencies seeking to bring about representative governance in these countries influenced by the successful democratic experiment in India. While following the 1988 Sino-Indian rapprochement, China advised India’s neighbours to resolve their disputes with India bilaterally, it continued to balance India and stay relevant in the region by extending military and strategic cooperation to Pakistan. China has also made multiple inroads into South Asia, often cultivating political parties, highlighting cultural affinity with South Asia, diligently spreading its soft power through Confucius Institutes and building close ties with militaries in different countries by providing defence equipment at cheaper rates. It has forged close relationships with political parties, often inviting delegations belonging to different political parties to visit China and engage the Communist Party of China. It shares close relations with the Nepal Communist Party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party and the Progressive Party of Maldives headed by former President Yameen. In Pakistan, China’s greatest support base has been the Pakistan Army, which wields real power in Pakistan. Apart from these parties which may favour China, through grants, loans and aid, it has made the ruling regimes stakeholders in its strategic calculus, while pursuing its interests in South Asia. It provides generous fellowships to students in the South Asian region to learn the language or pursue higher degrees in leading Chinese universities. It is the largest supplier of weapons to Pakistan, followed by Bangladesh. It has strategic defence and nuclear collaboration with Pakistan; it has signed a Defence Cooperation Agreement with Bangladesh and has recently supplied submarines to the Bangladesh Navy. Its supply of arms during Sri Lanka’s fight against the LTTE is often cited as being critical to its success by the Sri Lankan Army. China’s ability to provide loans on attractive terms as part of its flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) announced in 2013, has been seen as a success by many countries in the region, especially for the regimes that wish to showcase economic development for their continuation in power and are unwilling to adhere to the terms and conditions of The World Bank and the IMF. Not withstanding the fear of debts, China is able to provide an alternative politically and economically and a choice that these countries can exercise. As a result, China’s strategic entrenchment in the region has been facilitated by its involvement in building ports and infrastructure in South Asia. The deep sea port at Kyaukpyu in Myanmar, the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka and the Gwadar Port in Pakistan certainly enhance its presence in the Indian Ocean. It is continuing to eye the Sonadia Port in Bangladesh, work on which is currently shelved. The strategic underpinnings of China’s involvement in these deep sea ports are apparent. It helps China to expand its presence into the Indian Ocean ostensibly to protect its Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC), and there are several implications for India. It already controls the Hambantota Port on a 99-year lease; 91 per cent of the revenue generated by the Gwadar Port goes to the China Overseas Ports Holding Company while only 9 per cent is earned by the Gwadar Port Authority. Many in Pakistan often refer to their country as China’s colony. Its presence in Gilgit-Baltistan in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) through the CPEC project and its unrelenting effort to bring Bhutan to its side by offering to swap territory and settle the border dispute with Thimpu, are some examples of China’s attempts to make further strategic inroads into the region. This also reflects China’s strategy to control ports and to have a strategic presence around India through BRI, in the name of bringing growth and prosperity to the host country. Connectivity has emerged as an important yardstick to measure ‘influence’. China has substantial defence cooperation with the countries in the South Asia region. It has signed a defence cooperation agreement with Bangladesh in 2001 and the two countries are now strategic partners. According to a media report published in 2018, around 35 per cent of China’s arms supplies went to Pakistan between 2013 and 2017, followed by 19 per cent to Bangladesh. Dhaka procured 71 per cent of its arms from China over the five-year period, and Myanmar sourced 68 per cent of its arms during the same period. Due to India’s inability to assist in supplying arms to Nepal in 2005 because of the takeover of power by the Monarchy, and its difficulties in supplying weapons to Sri Lanka during its war with the LTTE due to opposition from Tamil Nadu, China filled the gap and supplied arms and provided military aid to Nepal and Sri Lanka. This substantially undermined India’s position in the conflicts in these two countries. Later, China provided $32.3mn as grant to the Nepal Army and built an armed police force training academy at the cost of US $350 million. Following the suicide bombings on April 21, 2019 in Colombo on Easter, China has offered Sri Lanka counter-insurgency weapons worth US$14 million. As regards Beijing’s trade with South Asia, it is heavily skewed in favour of China. Beijing enjoys a surplus in trade with all South Asian countries. However, the pattern of China’s trade does not represent a similar trend for all of South Asia. For instance, while China’s trade with countries like India and Bangladesh shows an average increase in both exports and imports (with exports significantly outweighing imports, as with all other South Asian countries), in the case of Pakistan and Afghanistan, China’s imports have declined drastically; while exports continued to rise: Chinese imports from Pakistan fell from roughly US$ 2.7 billion in 2014 to US$ 1.8 billion in 2017, while imports from Afghanistan reduced from US$ 17 million in 2014 to US$ 3 million in 2017. At the same time, Chinese exports to Pakistan and Afghanistan increased from The question is, what will all this mean for India? To what extent would it affect India’s regional primacy and its vital security interests in times to come, as India would not be able to match China’s capacity to invest? This Roundtable will broadly examine four aspects:
(Concept Note is prepared by South Asia Centre. Inputs provided by East Asia Centre) Programme
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East Asia | China's South Asia Policy | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Round Table on India – Africa Partnership in a Changing World | May 29, 2019 | 1500 hrs | Round Table |
Concept NoteAfrica is becoming significant in the global arena on issues related to security, peace, climate change and sustainable development. It is increasingly contributing to the normative framework on these issues. It has been projected that by 2050, Africa would have the largest workforce in the world and its population would surpass India and China. Africa would also be a major contributor to the global economy, both as a producer and as a consumer. African countries have been commended for finding effective plans for resolving regional problems, particularly related to ending conflicts and sustainable development. At the same time, African countries, through the African Union and also bilaterally, have formed partnerships globally with countries such as Turkey, Brazil, China, Japan, US, UK, France and India. India and Africa have a long and rich history of interaction marked by cultural, economic and political exchanges based on the principle South-South cooperation. A number of initiatives have been taken in the recent years to facilitate relations between the two sides, especially in the domain of trade and investment, skills and capacity building, energy, agriculture, health, defence and maritime cooperation. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has accorded high priority to Africa in recent years. There have been 29 high level visits at the level of President, Vice President and Prime Minister from India to Africa. India entered into a structured engagement with African countries with the launch of the first Indian Africa Forum Summit in 2008 in New Delhi. This was followed by the second India Africa Forum Summit in Addis Ababa in 2011. The third India-Africa Forum summit, held in New Delhi in October 2015 renewed the focus on strengthening the partnership with African countries. India has also undertaken significant initiatives to strengthen its development cooperation with African countries. Exim Bank of India has extended Lines of Credit to countries in Africa. India has also supported capacity building through the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme and launched initiatives such as Pan Africa e-Vidya Bharati and e-Arogya Bharati Network Project, among others. The Indian Ocean is a natural bridge connecting India with the African continent. Therefore maritime cooperation is an important aspect of the relationship. This includes maritime surveillance, anti-piracy operations and humanitarian and disaster relief. However, despite these steps, there is still room for realising the full potential of the partnership. In order to debate on these issues, and to commemorate Africa Day, the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) is organising a Round Table on the theme “India – Africa Partnership in a Changing World” at 3 pm on 29 May 2019 at the Institute. Programme
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Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Talk by Col. Dr. Ali Ahmed (Retd.) on Crisis Management in UN Peacekeeping | April 10, 2019 | 1500 hrs | Talk |
Chair: Maj. Gen Alok Deb, SM, VSM (Retd), Deputy Director General, IDSA Speaker: Col. Dr. Ali Ahmed (Retd.) Subject: Crisis Management in UN Peacekeeping Venue: Boardroom # 104, First Floor About The Speaker Ali Ahmed was a Research Fellow at IDSA between 2008 and 2012. He was part of military affairs cluster and worked on military doctrine. His monographs at IDSA were Reconciling Doctrines: The prerequisite to peace in South Asia and Limited War doctrine: The structural factor. He was earlier an infantry man, retiring from the army with twenty one years service. After leaving IDSA , he has been an assistant professor at the Nelson Mandela Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution and has been a political affairs officer in three UN peacekeeping missions. His doctorate is from JNU. He blogs Ali Writing Blogspot and tweets at [at]aliahd66. He has 900 web-publications to this credit. |
UN Peacekeeping | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Address by H.E. Mr. André Aranha Corrêa do Lago, Ambassador of Brazil | April 02, 2019 | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Talk |
Theme: India – Brazil Relations Venue:Seminar Hall- I, IDSA |
Africa, Latin America, Caribbean & UN | India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Round Table Discussion on "States of Emergence, States of Knowledge: A Comparative Sociology of International Relations in China and India" | March 08, 2019 | 1130 hrs | Round Table |
 Topic: States of Emergence, States of Knowledge: A Comparative Sociology of International Relations in China and India Speaker: Dr. Peter Marcus Kristensen, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen Compiled by Rajrajeshwari Singh 8 March 2019 Dr Peter Marcus Kristensen, Associate Professor at the University of Copenhagen initiated a discussion on the topic “States of Emergence, States of Knowledge: A Comparative Sociology of International Relations in China and India”. Kristensen’s paper is an outcome of interviews conducted with members of the academic community in China and India. Its aim is to examine the relationship between the geopolitical rise of these countries in international relations and their knowledge production in the field of international relations. The paper attempts to explore the theoretical and empirical relationship between the socio-political condition of emerging/rising powers and their attempts to theorise International Relations, which it categorises as state of emergence and state of knowledge. Kristensen highlighted the need to reject a bifurcation between Western IR and the ‘ir’ of rising powers, which is common in the sociological and historiographical literature. The scholar community in rising powers has a view that is embedded in the state of emergence in different ways. Kristensen uses four registers – constitutive, civic, infrastructural and psychological – and examines how the scholar community in India and China interacted with these registers. The constitutive register which emerges from the state of emergence is concerned with the larger epistemological order, for instance, the association between the growing global interests and stakes of the rising powers and the epistemic objectives of their IR scholarship. This register was more optimistically accepted in China. In India, a minority of scholars contended that new ‘Indian’ theories of IR should be located within the framework of global IR theory. Moreover, a significant number of Indian scholars were sceptical of India’s emerging power status. The civic register is problem oriented and serves as a conjunction of science and politics to address and solve real world problems. It has two modes, one to serve as policy advisor to the state, and the second to perform the function of a public intellectual and thereby enrich the public discourse and understanding. The principal difference between China and India in this regard is that Chinese scholars are more attuned to the role of policy advisors whereas their Indian counterparts operate more in the public mode. Infrastructural register features the condition of economic growth and expansion of resources made available for research. China has experienced immense growth in IR infrastructure, which has enabled a Chinese theoretical discourse to emerge. India’s more gradual emergence has meant that its IR infrastructure has not expanded to the extent that it has happened in China. Moreover, Indian IR remains a-theoretical and conflated with area studies. Psychological register is the sensibility or awareness of being located in a country that is perceived as an emerging power. In China, this sentiment is widespread, which has not only boosted the confidence of Chinese scholars but also their sense of wanting the world to hear their Chinese voice. There is a similar sense of confidence in India and receptivity to the views of Indian IR scholars abroad. However, Indian scholars also feel that only their contributions on India are valued, with Western IR still setting the agenda and confining Indian IR to an inferior position. Kristensen concluded by pointing out that China and India differ in the co-productive knowledge with respect to their histories. Different scholars had a different take on the state of emergence. The differences between China and India are partly explained by the more advanced rise of China. There is a stronger sense of ‘Chineseness’ within China’s scholarly discourse, something that is absent in India. The following points were raised in the ensuing discussion: S. Kalyanaraman pointed out that Indian IR neglected theory partly because of its strong critique of Western IR theory with its emphasis upon power politics and its efforts to reform the international economic and security order through nonalignment and the pursuit of peace. This situation has begun to change since the end of the Cold War with India’s turn towards greater realism and its integration into the West-led international economic and security order. Rajeesh Kumar highlighted the multiple paths that the development of Indian IR is likely to take, influenced as it is by its own traditions as well as by Western IR theory and the inspiration provided by the development of IR theory in China. Deepshika Shahi of the University of Delhi highlighted recent trends in IR theoretical development including her own work on Advaita as a global IR theory. She also pointed out that India’s diversity means the prevalence of multiple schools of IR theories. Nazir Mir highlighted the contribution of the Indian subaltern school to the IR discourse. In addition, he pointed out the influence of external factors on the development of theory in the United States in addition to the role of America’s self-perception of its role, status and interests in international affairs. Kristensen noted the importance of avoiding regional labels to IR theories such as London School, Copenhagen School, Chinese IR, Indian IR, etc. Kalyanaraman concluded the round table by referring to the continuing validity of Martin Wight’s three-way typology of realist, rationalist, and revolutionary approaches to IR as a useful framework within which to apprehend the thought processes of thinkers and scholars in non-Western countries. |
East Asia | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Interaction with Delegation from Joann Bin Jassim Command and Staff College, Qatar | February 19, 2019 | 1030 to 1300 hrs | Round Table |
Venue: Board Room # 104, First Floor Agenda for Interaction: -Overview of India- Qatar Relations |
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| Talk on ‘Restructuring India’s National Security Apparatus’ | February 15, 2019 | P. S. Raghavan | 1200 hrs | Talk |
Topic: Restructuring India’s National Security Apparatus Venue: Room No. 005 (Ground Floor) About the SpeakerAmbassador Raghavan is Chairman of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), which advises India’s National Security Council on security and strategic issues of immediate and long-term relevance. In his diplomatic career (1979-2016), he was Ambassador of India to Russia, Czech Republic and Ireland and had other diplomatic positions in USSR, UK, Poland, South Africa and Vietnam. He was Joint Secretary in the Prime Minister's Office (2000-2004), dealing with foreign affairs, nuclear energy, space, defence and national security. As Secretary (2013-14) in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), he handled India’s external economic relations and oversaw Administration, Security and e-governance in MEA. He also headed the Development Partnership Administration, which coordinates India’s economic partnership programs in developing countries. As Chairman NSAB, he engages with government departments and think tanks in India, US, Russia, Europe and Asia, on initiatives to promote understanding of India’s strategic perspectives. He writes widely on these issues. |
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| Discussion on Dr C. Christine Fair's Book Titled "In Their Own Words: Understanding Lashkar-e-Tayyaba" | February 14, 2019 | 1500 hrs | Round Table |
Book Title: In Their Own Words: Understanding Lashkar-e-Tayyaba Author: Dr C Christine Fair, Provost's Distinguished Associate Professor, Georgetown University Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, and ex-Visiting Fellow at IDSA Chair: Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, IDSA Venu: Board Room # 104, First Floor About the BookThis path-breaking volume reveals a little-known aspect of how Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, a jihadist terrorist group, functions in Pakistan and beyond by translating and commenting upon a range of publications produced and disseminated by Dar-ul-Andlus, the publishing wing of LeT. Only a fraction of LeT's cadres ever see battle: most of them are despatched on nation-wide 'proselytising' (dawa) missions to convert Pakistanis to their particular interpretation of Islam, in support of which LeT has developed a sophisticated propagandist literature. This canon of Islamist texts is the most popular and potent weapon in LeT's arsenal, and its scrutiny affords insights into how and who the group recruits; LeT's justification for jihad; its vision of itself in global and regional politics; the enemies LeT identifies and the allies it cultivates; and how and where it conducts its operations. Particular attention is paid to the role that LeT assigns to women by examining those writings which heap extravagant praise upon the mothers of aspirant jihadis, who bless their operations and martyrdom.It is only by understanding LeT's domestic functions as set out in these texts that one can begin to appreciate why Pakistan so fiercely supports it, de--spite mounting international pressure to disband the group. |
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| Talk on "Recent Trends in Brazilian Politics" | February 14, 2019 | 1130 hrs | Talk |
Topic: Recent Trends in Brazilian Politics Speaker: Prof. Fabio Luis Barbosa dos Santos, Adjunct Professor at the Department of International Relations, University of Sao Paulo Chair: Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, IDSA Venue: Boardroom # 104, First Floor About the SpeakerName: Fabio Luis Barbosa dos Santos E-mail: faboroso@gmail.com Academic degree: Philosophiae Doctor (PhD) in Economic History, University of São Paulo, 2011. Post-Doctorate at CNRS, Paris, France, 2017-2018. Current Position: Adjunct Professor, Department of International Relations, Federal University of São Paulo. Since 2013. Previous Academic post: Visiting Professor at the History Department at Federal University of Latin American Integration (UNILA), 2012-2013. Selected publicationsBooks
Book Chapters2017. United Republic of soybeans: Brazilians and agrobusiness in Paraguay and Bolivia. In: Secreto, Veronica; Vazelesk, Vanderlei (Org.). Agrarismos: Estudos de história e sociologia do mundo rural. Rio de Janeiro: Mauad, 2017. 2015. "Brazil´s place in Latin America and vice-versa" (O lugar do Brasil na América Latina e vice-versa). Published online with other awarded essays on a contest sponsored by the Latin American Council of Social Sciences (CLACSO) in 2015. 2014. "The brasiguayos issue and dilemmas of the Brazilian regional influence" (A questão dos brasiguaios e os dilemas da influência regional brasileira). In: Desidera Neto, W. Estrutura Socioeconômica e Políticas para a Integração da América do Sul. Brasília: IPEA. Articles in Peer Reviewed Journals (recent ones)1.“Neo-development of Underdevelopment: Brazil and the Political Economy of South American Integration under the Workers’ Party” Globalisations, 2018 2. “Where is the Cuban Revolution going? Dilemas faced by primitive socialism”. México: Contextualizaciones Latinoamericanas, v. 9, p. 1-13, 2017. 3. "Neodevelopmentalism or neoliberalism: regional integration and ideology” (Neosenvolvimentismo ou neoliberalismo: integração regional e ideologia). Revista da Sociedade Brasileira de Economia Política, v. 45, p. 43-69, 2017. Research Grants1. 2017/2018. Scholarship for Post Doctoral research "The political economy of regional integration in the Global South: Brazil, India and South Africa” as part of the project "Work in Brazil and France; The meaning of changes and the changes of meaning”, agreement Capes/Cofecub call Nº. 16/2015, process aprooved: 8063-15-0 - 2016/2020, coordinated by Aparecida Neri de Sousa e Régine Bercot. 2. 2017-2019: "The political economy of regional integration in the Global South: Brazil, India and South Africa”. Supported by Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa de São Paulo (FAPESP) 3. 2014-2016: "Neo-Developmentalism or Neoliberalism: Brazil and the meaning of South American integration". Supported by Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa de São Paulo (FAPESP) 4. 2011-2012: "Territorial conflicts and potencial litigations in South America". Research referred to the project "Socioeconomic structures and policies to the South American integration" which was undertaken by eight scholars from different institutions nation-wide, supported by the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA) in Brasilia. 5. 2006-2011: “Origens of radical thought and politics in Latin America: a comparative study of José Martí, Juan B. Justo and Ricardo Flores Magón”. PHD Research at University of São Paulo (USP). Supported by Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa de São Paulo (FAPESP) Awards1. 2015. Honorable mention in Latin American essay contest "Ruy Mauro Marini" promoted by Latin American Council of Social Sciences (CLACSO) on the subject: "Regional integration process in Latin America and the Caribbean: challenges, perspectives and horizons". 2015 2. 2011. 1st place in public contest: "Political and Socioeconomic Strucutures for Regional Integration", sponsored by IPEA. Oct 2011 |
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| Talk on South Asia’s New Strategic Geography by Prof. C. Raja Mohan | February 07, 2019 | 1030 hrs | Talk |
Topic: South Asia’s New Strategic Geography Speaker: Prof. C. Raja Mohan, Director, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore Venue: Room 005 (Ground Floor) About The Speaker |
South Asia | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||