Events

Niranjan Oak, Research Analyst, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), spoke on “Analysing the Nuclear Dynamics in East Asia” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 5 June 2023. The session was moderated by Dr. Rajiv Nayan, Senior Research Associate, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, the Director General of MP-IDSA, Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.), the Deputy Director General of MP-IDSA and scholars of the Institute were in attendance.

Executive Summary

Although, numerically the overall nuclear weapons trend appears to be on a downward track, there exist reverse trajectory in East Asia. At a systemic level China is trying to compete with its strategic rival, the United States, vis-à-vis the nuclear domain, both in qualitative (technological advancement and precision missiles) and quantitative terms. At a regional level, the nuclear dynamics will substantially be impacted by the US extended nuclear deterrence. Japan and South Korea remain the threshold states with active deliberation over nuclear weapons introduction in the region. In recent times, they have tried to resolve bilateral disputes in order to align their strategies against a common threat. North Korea, despite rampant provocations, would maintain its regime security by not resorting to a pre-emptive strike on its neighbours. Thus, nuclear dynamism of the region would continue to keep the pot boiling for an unforeseeable future.

Detailed Report

Dr. Rajiv Nayan began the meeting with a synoptical analysis of the nuclear dynamics in the East Asian region and emerging contemporary issues. In his introductory remark, he briefly touched upon the nuclear priorities of governments of Japan and South Korea, and their immediate implication in terms of Chinese response.

Mr. Niranjan Oak began his presentation with the G7 joint statement on Nuclear Disarmament. He further contextualised the Chinese numerical enhancement of nuclear weapons with the overall reduction in nuclear warheads from more than 70,000 in 1986 to approx. 12,500 currently. With the background of North Korean incessant cruise, ballistic and hypersonic missile tests, Mr. Oak gave a comprehensive analysis of the East Asian countries with substantive military and technological capabilities.

As per US Nuclear Posture Review 2022, China is slated to increase the number of nuclear warheads to 1000 by 2030. The estimate is based on 250 missile silos which were discovered in 2021, and are predictably to be filled with Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) missiles. In the midst, a possibility of bluff and ambiguity can also not be ignored. Mr. Oak described the wide range of ballistic, cruise, hypersonic missiles and other weapon delivery systems that China possesses, along with its ambitious modernisation plan juxtaposed with emerging technologies. Contextualising North Korean threats, Mr. Oak detailed North Korea’s military capabilities along with their pronouncements including no pre-emptive strike. Pyongyang is projected to increase its nuclear warheads by the end of this decade. It has further tried to enhance its survivability by diversifying its delivery platforms. Mr. Oak attributed the barrage of missile tests in 2022 and 2023 to potential causes such as acute food shortage impacting the economy, using tests as a bargaining chip to extract economic concessions from the west and preference to regime security.

South Korea President Yoon Suk Yeol’s interest in redeploying the nuclear weapons on its soil reflects increasing frustration with North’s aggression towards South. Mr. Oak attributed the timing to this nuclear utterance by South Korean President to increased provocation by North Korea with its missile tests, its sophistication and declining credibility of United States extended nuclear deterrence. The United States responded with forging ‘the ‘Washington Declaration’ in March 2023. The declaration includes the commitment of ROK to provide full conventional military support to the US nuclear or conventional operations. ROK further expressed its full commitment towards NPT. The United States, on the other hand, committed itself to strengthen the consultation process in nuclear planning and operations through the establishment of the Nuclear Consultative Group. These initiatives ensure that South Korea plays a supporting role in any operation with its conventional forces implying that command and control related to nuclear weapons stay completely with the US.

Mr. Oak further detailed Japan’s security dynamics in the East Asian geopolitical canvass. Japan’s National Security Strategy 2022 lists North Korean missile threats, increased defense budget of China and Taiwan’s quagmire as threats to Japanese security interests. Japan has already included counter-strike capabilities in its security strategies. Within five years, with the support of allies and partners, Japan intends to equip itself to defend its territories in case of foreign invasion. As a part of its ten years goal, Japan intends to disrupt and defeat the invasion much earlier and develop robust long range missile capabilities. Japan has begun changing its pacifist nature and adapting to deal with the changing security environment by increasing the share of ‘defense and other outlays’ spending to upto 2% of the GDP.

Chinese adventurism in Taiwan is bound to have repercussions for both Japan and the United States. In recent times China has increased its provocative activities with more missile launches, more naval activities and more central line crossing over Taiwan Strait, effectively establishing a new normal. To meet China’s challenge, Taiwan’s modest missile stockpile consists of anti-ship cruise missiles and short range ballistic missiles among others.

Mr. Oak concluded that the nuclear dynamics in the region continues to be volatile. This volatility is on account of Chinese rivalry with the United States, North Korea’s increasing missile tests, dwindling credibility of the US extended nuclear deterrence to its East Asian allies and escalating Taiwan crisis.

Dr. Rajiv Nayan commented on the advancement of hypersonic capabilities of China and North Korea at a time when most of the western world is struggling to acquire the capability. On the question of nuclearization of East Asia, he pointed out that Japan possesses enough fissile material to produce approx. 6000 nuclear warheads. He further pointed out that successive governments in Japan have refrained themselves from taking a political decision to acquire nuclear weapons. He further predicted a spiral effect as a result of Japan’s nuclear acquisition. Besides, he alluded to the dithering commitment of the United States to its East Asian allies that induces these countries to look for security in the nuclear option.   

Comment and Questions

The floor was opened for questions and comments. The Director General, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, the Deputy Director General, Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.), and scholars from the Institute contributed to the discussion. In his remarks, Ambassador Chinoy complimented the presentation for its crisp, precise and usefulness of factual information. Ambassador Chinoy further suggested the need for focussing on Japanese nuclear debate and its implications on South Korea in particular and Korean peninsula in general. The strategic duality reflected in the security alliance between the US and its two East Asian partners, on one hand, and ambition to acquire nuclear weapons both in Seoul and Tokyo on the other, should also be examined. Ambassador Chinoy commented on Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s alignment (or dis-alignment) with nuclear weapons given his ancestral connection with Hiroshima, one of the cities to be bombed by nuclear weapons. He further asked how the NPT provisions explain the transfers of certain kind of fissile material for non-military purposes. He also expressed his desire to understand the Chinese reaction to the AUKUS trilateral agreement for the transfers of nuclear submarines.

Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.) highlighted the strong abhorrence to nuclear weapons and nuclear reactors in Japan. Further, he asked about the implications of various missile and defense systems on South Asian security dynamics with special reference to the prospects of Indian Ballistic missile defense systems.

In the question and answer session, issues such as credibility of claims of defense systems and its battle effectiveness, Chinese tactical nuclear weapons, Indian ballistic missile defense system and China’s response to the AUKUS deal were taken up.

Mr. Niranjan Oak pointed out the rhetorical approach of the Chinese with respect to any security alliance or military build-up in East Asian region. He further clarified that AUKUS is not a violation of NPT as it commits the transfer of nuclear propelled submarine and not the nuclear weapon carrying submarine. He also pointed out the South Asian security dynamics in terms of the China-Pakistan nexus and India’s involvement with minilateral groupings like Quad, among others.

The report was prepared by Mr. Abhishek Verma, Research Analyst, Internal Security Centre. MP-IDSA.

Dr. Arnab Dasgupta, Research Analyst, Manohar Parrikar IDSA, spoke on “Takeaways from Prime Minister Modi’s Visits to Japan, Papua New Guinea, and Australia” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 29 May 2023. The Session was moderated by Mr. Om Prakash Das, Research Fellow at MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA, Maj Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.), Deputy Director General, MP-IDSA and scholars of the Institute were in attendance.

Executive Summary

Prime Minister Narendra Modi's high-power diplomacy at the G-7 summit is to understand the developed world's perspective on global security challenges and the challenges of the Global South to act as a viable interlocutor to address these concerns through India’s G20 Presidency. A key outcome of the Quad Leader Summit is moving beyond the security function to development concerns such as connectivity and space cooperation.  The Prime Minister’s visit to the strategically significant Pacific Island countries and Prime Minister’s announcement of a 12 Point Action Plan to address developmental challenges are of particular significance at the 3rd Forum for India- Pacific Island Cooperation Summit.

Detailed Report

Mr. Om Prakash Das, Moderator, introduced the topic. He spoke about the significance of Prime Minister Narendra Modi attending the G7 Summit.  There were high expectations from the G7 Summit taking place amid the Russia -Ukraine War.  The Prime Minister's participation in the FIPIC Summit is noteworthy and in addressing the concerns of the Global South.  The Prime Minister’s visit to Australia is significant and diaspora plays an important role in strengthening India-Australia relations.

 Dr. Arnab Dasgupta outlined the structure of his presentation by posing key questions. What did Prime Minister Modi achieve with these visits? What are the key diplomatic takeaways, and do they serve India’s goals? What are the major steps needed to further foreign policy objectives?

 Dr Dasgupta discussed the significance of Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Japan at the invitation of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in the G7 Hiroshima Summit.  The Prime Minister engaged G7 leaders bilaterally and multilaterally. Prime Minister Modi addressed Session 6, where he highlighted the multiple crises confronting the global community as the COVID 19 and Ukraine crises aggravated global food shortages, global health challenges arising from climate change and sustainable development.

Dr. Arnab Dasgupta highlighted the key takeaways of the G7 Summit. First, the inclusion of Global South in the G7 agenda and the call for the reform of the multilateral institutions. These institutions do not cater to the needs of the 21st Century. Dr. Dasgupta emphasised Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on the sidelines of the G7 Summit. The Prime Minister assured humanitarian aid to Ukraine and he stated that dialogue and diplomacy are the only way forward to resolve the conflicts.

 Dr. Dasgupta pointed out the key outcomes of the Quad Summit which was held on the sidelines of the Hiroshima Summit on May 20, 2023. The Quad Leaders’ Summit focused on stability and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific. Quad Leaders major initiatives are: first, the agency and   the centrality of the ASEAN, Pacific Islands Forum, and IORA will be preserved. Second, clean energy supply chain will be created for clean economic transition; third, reorientation of Quad vaccine partnership to health security partnership in order to contain the future Pandemics. Fourth, Quad infrastructure fellowship has been announced to create 1800 professionals in infrastructure field. Fifth, Quad leaders emphasized connectivity protecting the undersea cable networks.by creating a partnership for cable connectivity and resilience Sixth, an Open Radio Network is to be established in Palau, Sixth, Quad investment in emerging technologies will be done through various initiatives such as Quad joint partnership in software development and the Space Working Group.

Dr. Arnab   Dasgupta clarified about Quad expansion vs overreach debate. He cited the Foreign Secretary Vinay Mohan Kwatra as saying that the Quad Summit meeting on the sidelines of the G7 Summit in Japan and the canceling of the Summit in Australia did not undermine the Quad Summit as it does not have a formal institutional structure like NATO.  Quad exists as long as its members are willing to talk to each other as the Quad.

Dr. Arnab Dasgupta talked about the FIPIC Summit that was held on 22 -23 May 2023 in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea under the leadership of Prime Minister James Marape and Prime Minister Modi. India has deep roots in the region many of the Pacific Islands have special diaspora connections and ancestry traced back to the Indian subcontinent. Dr. Dasgupta mentioned that China's inroads into the Pacific Islands are a cause of concern.  India has good intentions, but China has the money. India’s intangible economic footprint is deeper in the region. India’s outreach is in response to the needs of Pacific Island countries. Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced the 12 Point Action Plan for infrastructure development. India’s developmental expertise is indispensable in the areas of health, IT, solar and desalination projects, and small and medium enterprises infrastructure.

 Dr. Arnab Dasgupta analysed the last leg of Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit which was to Australia. According to him, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Prime Minister of Australia, Anthony Albanese transformed India-Australia bilateral relations. Key outcomes of the visit include a comprehensive economic partnership agreement, future cooperation in the mining of the minerals, the migration and mobility agreement, and agreeing to share expertise in green and clean energy transitions. The mutual security interests of Australia and India are to secure a free and open Indo-Pacific and to address the challenges posed by China. 

Dr. Arnab Dasgupta concluded his presentation by identifying guideposts and significant inflection points with respect to foreign policy moves on Indo Pacific and the Global South, in particular Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s forthcoming visit to the US to comprehend President Biden’s approach to Indo Pacific, and his visit to France in July to ensure the continuation of Indo – French cooperation in the Indo Pacific.  The Prime Minister's  engagement with the world leaders can be understood as exercises to generate goodwill, which in turn would enable the conduct of the G20 Summit in a smooth, cordial, and fruitful manner.

Comments and Questions

Mr. Om Prakash Das invited the Director General, Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy to give his comments.

Ambassador Chinoy shared his experience as an Indian Foreign Service officer who served in all three areas- Japan, Marshall Islands, and Australia. Ambassador Chinoy stated that India’s primary focus is on the Indian Ocean region and geographical distance need not be a factor in greater interaction with Pacific Islands.

Ambassador Chinoy expressed that there is ambiguity about whether China is to be considered part of Global South or not, and that whenever Chinese leader Xi Jinping speaks of leadership of developing countries there is a pushback from many developing countries on China’s ‘debt trap diplomacy’. Thus, India is not seeking ownership of Global South. India is the voice of the Global South.

 With regard to the Quad summit that was held on the sidelines of the G7 Summit in Japan Ambassador Chinoy pointed out that it was a successful meeting. The contours of Quad have changed from 2017 to 2021. It has raised the expectations of the world. The primary focus of the Quad is preventing supply chain disruption in the Indo-Pacific and preventing economic and military threats to the region. Quad leaders are to work on infrastructure, connectivity, space, undersea cables and are not just looking at the elephant in the room. Quad is looking for creating a new environment for development.

 Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy highlighted that India’s presence in the Pacific Islands is not about matching Chinese capabilities. It is about serving India’s interests and keeping in mind the primary stakeholders, USA, China and Japan in the region. India’s presence is as a pro bono provider of public goods. Ambassador Chinoy shared his observations on India’s successful initiatives such as Information Technology Centers in Africa. Pacific Islands are difficult to visit and therefore, Singapore, which created a dedicated cadre of experts with the rank of Ambassadors who promoted Singapore’s vision abroad, is a worthy model to emulate in the Pacific Islands as well.

Dr. Dasgupta agreed with the views expressed by Ambassador Chinoy.  He further added that area specialists and language experts need to be chosen while engaging with the Pacific Island countries.

 Mr. Das invited the Deputy Director General to make his comments. Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi highlighted the G7 Summit held in Hiroshima. According to him Prime Minister Modi's visit to the Cenotaph and Peace Memorial Park had particular symbolism attached, as the Japanese were the only people hit by nuclear weapons. He also pointed out Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s emphasis on reform of the UN  Security Council.  Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi said the Prime Minister’s meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reflects India’s emergence on the world stage as a mediator or peacemaker in resolving conflicts.  He emphasised that Prime Minister Narendra Modi's outreach was warranted as Pacific Island countries are very small but significant countries. He stated that the Quad CDS meeting was scheduled but was canceled due to technical reasons.

Dr. Dasgupta responded that the nuclear memorial evokes a visceral understanding of nuclear conflict beyond a logical and intellectual understanding of nuclear security.

Dr. Rajiv Nayan, Senior Research Associate, emphasised that the Pacific Island countries are recognising the cultural capital of India. Different schools of thought, concepts, and ideas on Vishvaguru need to be debated so that they can be better utilized as cultural capital in India’s diplomatic interaction with the rest of the world.

Gp. Capt. Rajiv Kumar Narang VM, (Retd) highlighted the context of Quad investment in strategic technologies. Dr. Dasgupta responded that indigenisation of technology has limits. India's best possible option is the joint development of technology.

Dr. Anand Kumar asked the speaker how Quad interactions create reactionary responses from China. How is it possible to reconcile dilemmas of security and economic engagement with China?

Dr. Dasgupta answered by noting that the key dynamic is not to shut out China, but to figure out how cooperation can be managed.

 After the senior scholars, research analysts, and interns of the institute enriched the discussion with questions and comments, Mr. Om Prakash Das concluded the session. 

Report prepared by Dr. Velpula  Ramanujam,  Research  Analyst, South East Asia  and  Oceania Centre, MP- IDSA.

Programme [PDF]

On 8 May 2023, Dr. Prashant Kumar Singh of the East Asia Centre delivered a talk during the Monday Morning Meeting on “Analysing China's Recent Foreign Engagements in the Context of Xi Jinping's 3 Global Initiatives”. The meeting was moderated by Dr. MS Prathibha, Associate Fellow at MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, the Director General of MP-IDSA, Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Bipin Bakshi (Retd.), the Deputy Director General of MP-IDSA and scholars of the Institute were in attendance.

Executive summary

As the world emerged from the effects of COVID-19, China announced a new set of global initiatives: the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI). These initiatives have different focus areas: the GDI on developmental finance and sustainable development goals, the GSI on security, and the GCI on ‘civilizational exchange’. However, as President Xi Jinping charts a more proactive diplomacy, there are concerns about the nature of China’s intentions in pursuing these initiatives. The talk by Dr. Singh analyses the promises and pitfalls the three global initiatives hold within, and what they mean for China’s neighbourhood and the world. It warns of China’s intentions to revise the world order in its favour, and encourages a reconsideration of India’s policy towards Chinese order-building and its contention for the leadership of the Global South. 

Detailed report

In her opening remarks, Dr. Prathibha introduced the topic by highlighting the flurry of diplomatic visits conducted by China’s Foreign Minister Qin Gang in the wake of the decisions taken during the 20th Central Party Congress. The centrepiece of these initiatives are the three Global Initiatives, which include the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI). With this introduction, the Dr. Prathibha turned over the floor to Dr. Singh for his lecture.

The speaker began by pointing out that the topic under discussion would focus more broadly on the thought patterns of the Chinese policymaking elite rather than bilateral or multilateral relations. He identified certain developments as evidence of these patterns, as China gradually metamorphoses from a low-profile power to an incipient superpower seeking to achieve its goals in the international arena. China’s alternative diplomacy has been attracting attention from interested parties who are wary of US power and has also managed to gain acceptance from countries in the West. For instance, the AIIB and the SCO are particularly relevant in this context for their continued success in becoming alternative multilateral institutions. These initiatives are accompanied by a consistent push to redefine the global order on China’s terms.

In an effort to pursue these objectives, President Xi Jinping and other high-ranking leaders such as Wang Yi, have articulated the need to promote ‘Chinese wisdom’ on the international stage, a concept which purports to advance ‘Chinese solutions’ to global problems. ‘Chinese wisdom’ is the driving force behind the overarching frame that is articulated as ‘A Community with a Shared Future for Mankind’, and motivates the GDI, GSI and GCI. Dr. Singh argued that these initiatives are taking a comprehensive and holistic view of a new international order premised on the indivisibility of “foreign” and “domestic” in terms of development, and security and also in terms of co-existence of diverse social and political systems.

The Global Developmental Initiative (GDI), introduced in September 2021 at the 76th United Nations General Assembly meeting, is envisaged by China as an implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). Under the GDI, there are six objectives, eight focus areas and several deliverables. Thus far, the progress of the GDI has been mostly good, with nearly US$ 4 billion in investment in the Global Development and South-South Cooperation Funds, training and capacity-building programmes, and the membership of around 70 countries in the Group of Friends set up for the initiatives. However, the speaker pointed out that the GDI remained a state-led initiative to bolster the flagging Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), almost certainly devised to rid the latter of its negative image.  He also noted the issues with the GDI, with no tangible timelines, no clarity on funding sources and no tangible large-scale projects in the offing. Many recipient countries, which have benefited from the BRI, too, may not appreciate the change in focus as the big-ticket projects touted by the BRI are replaced by development finance, a more subtle form of economic assistance. As well, the international community is liable to be concerned, as the strategic communication surrounding the GDI touts China’s old lines of ‘development being the master key to every conflict’, conveniently ignoring the other political and geopolitical aspects of conflicts, strong opposition to human rights and liberal democracies and the linkage between the GDI and the Global Security Initiative.

Next, Dr. Singh focused on the GSI, introduced at the Boao Forum on Global Security in April 2022. The GSI has six key concepts, which are derived from China’s traditional diplomatic priorities, such as respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty. Flowing from these six priorities are 20 priority areas, ranging from nuclear security to regional institution building and peacekeeping, which are to be given attention through a host of platforms and mechanisms. The GSI, Dr. Singh argued, primarily serves as a projection of China’s views on security issues and issues that matter to the world. He highlighted China’s activities in the Horn of Africa, South Pacific and the Middle East as signals of a proactive policy, which may in turn herald China’s ‘peace activism at the global stage’, inserting itself into future conflicts as a mediator.  

Finally, the speaker discussed the GCI, the newest and the latest of the three initiatives. Introduced by General Secretary Xi at the World Political Parties Conference on the side-lines of the 20th CPC in March 2023, the GCI primarily revolves around the ‘Four Advocatings’: diversity of humanity and its political systems, the centrality of humanity, the privileging of inheritance and innovation, and people-to-people exchange. Initial reception, according to the speaker, was touted by the Chinese analysts as ‘good’. However, the initiative is yet to gain traction globally as there are only low-key pronouncements in the media and few scattered commentaries.

Dr. Singh argued that despite its best efforts, China has not succeeded in forging a common identity that could be shared with many countries. Chinese culture is a common civilizational identity in a few countries, therefore the difficulty of ensuring that its views would find a large audience remains to be seen. There is also popular resistance in many countries against the BRI, and there are also concerns about China’s irredentism, self-contradictory promotion of ethno-nationalistic policies overseas, and financial troubles regarding the BRI that are posing a challenge for Chinese diplomacy to navigate.

In summary, the speaker noted that Chinese diplomacy might be widely seen as an alternative to the US, but it is still going to experience its own share of successes and failures. He pointed to the need for other countries not only to shift and recalibrate their policies towards the new assertive China, but also to pay attention to its narratives. In the speaker’s view, global initiatives are often a form of strategic communication which signal intent and direction, thus pointing to the importance of understanding the role played by the phrasing used to delineate them.

Comments and questions

Dr. Prathibha opened the floor for comments and questions, which were led by the Director General, Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy. Ambassador Chinoy observed that China’s hostility towards the outside world represents a form of siege mentality which it has been unable to shake for millennia, and that the US has made significant blunders in hindsight by treating China as a country that could be rehabilitated to look like the US. The best example of this is the rules-based order, which China condemns as a Western imposition even as it profits from it. He also noted that China’s opinion in this regard matches India’s, the only difference being that India has been unable to design the alternative institutions that China has been able to carve out of the international order. Amb. Chinoy also noted that Chinese diplomacy now needs to be taken seriously. He also noted that the GDI is a vehicle designed to gain traction through its linkage with the SDGs, and the GSI brings into question the Western concept of ‘absolute security’. He then characterised the GCI, a challenge to the US-led Summit of Democracies, as most worthy of wariness, as it simultaneously justifies Chinese narratives and weakens the liberal order at the same time.

The Deputy Director-General, Maj.Gen. Bipin Bakshi, noted the need for a wary assessment of China’s new foreign policy, where it “plays peacemaker while stepping on its neighbours’ toes”. He pointed in particular to the Solomon Islands’ Security Agreement with China as an example of such a policy.

Commodore Anurag Bisen asked about how Indian policymakers should view the global initiatives, and how to square them with India’s own aspirations for leadership of the Global South. Dr. Singh answered by highlighting the tough choices face by India, as its aspirations, though similar to the ones articulated by China, must nevertheless remain its own; he advocated the continuation of current policy, where areas of commonality are worked on bilaterally, without a broader endorsement of Chinese policies.

The chair asked whether South Asia, especially disputes between India and Pakistan, might be covered by the GSI. Dr. Singh answered in the negative, but added that reinterpretation of the central principles of the GSI might make it so in the future.

The Report has been prepared by Dr. Arnab Dasgupta, Research Analyst, East Asia Centre.