After the Taliban successfully took control of Kabul through diplomatic and intimidatory means, which included using force and striking deals with warlords and local military commanders, it has reached out to other states for recognition.1 The Taliban realizes that without international recognition it would be difficult to achieve both domestic and international legitimacy.
While the ruling elite including army in Pakistan considers CPEC a boon, many analysts view it as a Chinese game-plan to turn Pakistan into a permanent colony, a rentier-cum-client state.
This article begins with a discussion on how the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is viewed differently by different political parties as well as by the civilian and military establishments in Pakistan. The discussion then turns to Pakistan’s current economic conditions and examines whether CPEC has the potential to boost the Pakistan economy or contribute to the worsening of its economic conditions. This article also discusses how CPEC seeks to maintain a balance between geo-economic and geopolitics.
Pakistan’s efforts to deal with the COVID-19 outbreak may get severely constrained due to the refusal of the ulema and religious leaders to ensure that their followers abide by the rules of the lockdown and social distancing.
This book is a rersult of research undertaken on the subject by the scholars associated with the IDSA project on Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) - also known as Pakistan Occupied Jammu & Kashmir (PoJK) - Which includes both the so-called "Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK)" and Gilgit-Baltistan (GB), was legally a part of the erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kahmir, which acceded to India in October 1947. The authors of this book seek to provide a critical analysis of the politics of the above mentioned two regions within PoK; throw light on the genesis and evolution of various political parties and interest groups, and acquaint the readers with different pesonalities playing important role in politics therein. The main aim of the publication is to help the scholars, analysts, and policy-makers to understand the dynamics of the political systems in PoK, the complex interaction of these systems with the government in Islamabad and the responses of the local leadership to Pakistan's strateghy of keeping them under strict control in the name of representative governance over the last 70 years.
The ongoing dialogue between the US and the Taliban has generated lot of interest among strategic analysts in the region and beyond. There are indications that the Taliban are hardening their position as the US appears to be in a haste to pull off an agreement.
With the ever increasing support and swelling number of protesters, Pashteen changed the name of the organisation from the Mehsud Tahafuz Movement to Pashtun Tahafuz Movement, a Movement for the Protection of Pashtuns.
Research Assistant, IDSA, Dr Yaqoob Ul Hassan’s article on Pakistan’s diplomatic relations with the Middle East, titled ‘Pakistan’s Middle East Gamble’ was published in ‘South Asian Voices’, on June 8, 2017.
The army has quite patiently allowed Imran and Qadri to carry on with their protests and create a political condition unfavourable enough for Nawaz Sharif to approach the army for help. Thus like in 1993, Nawaz is feeling the heat even if the opposition is not united in their effort to dislodge his government.
Taliban and Al-Qaeda: The Unbreakable Relationship
After the Taliban successfully took control of Kabul through diplomatic and intimidatory means, which included using force and striking deals with warlords and local military commanders, it has reached out to other states for recognition.1 The Taliban realizes that without international recognition it would be difficult to achieve both domestic and international legitimacy.
Pakistan’s CPEC Obsession: Boon or Bane?
While the ruling elite including army in Pakistan considers CPEC a boon, many analysts view it as a Chinese game-plan to turn Pakistan into a permanent colony, a rentier-cum-client state.
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and Questions on Pakistan’s Economic Stability
This article begins with a discussion on how the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is viewed differently by different political parties as well as by the civilian and military establishments in Pakistan. The discussion then turns to Pakistan’s current economic conditions and examines whether CPEC has the potential to boost the Pakistan economy or contribute to the worsening of its economic conditions. This article also discusses how CPEC seeks to maintain a balance between geo-economic and geopolitics.
COVID-19 and Religious Fanaticism in Pakistan
Pakistan’s efforts to deal with the COVID-19 outbreak may get severely constrained due to the refusal of the ulema and religious leaders to ensure that their followers abide by the rules of the lockdown and social distancing.
Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities
US-Taliban Talks for Afghan Peace: Complexities Galore
The ongoing dialogue between the US and the Taliban has generated lot of interest among strategic analysts in the region and beyond. There are indications that the Taliban are hardening their position as the US appears to be in a haste to pull off an agreement.
Another Capitulation and another Win for the TLYP in Pakistan
The challenge that the TLYP poses to Pakistan’s internal stability is even more dangerous than the threat of terrorism.
The Pashtun Uprising in Pakistan: A Plea for Justice
With the ever increasing support and swelling number of protesters, Pashteen changed the name of the organisation from the Mehsud Tahafuz Movement to Pashtun Tahafuz Movement, a Movement for the Protection of Pashtuns.
Pakistan’s Middle East Gamble
Research Assistant, IDSA, Dr Yaqoob Ul Hassan’s article on Pakistan’s diplomatic relations with the Middle East, titled ‘Pakistan’s Middle East Gamble’ was published in ‘South Asian Voices’, on June 8, 2017.
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Déjà vu in Pakistan: Army overpowers Nawaz
The army has quite patiently allowed Imran and Qadri to carry on with their protests and create a political condition unfavourable enough for Nawaz Sharif to approach the army for help. Thus like in 1993, Nawaz is feeling the heat even if the opposition is not united in their effort to dislodge his government.