Events

Ms. Sneha M, Research Analyst, Manohar Parrikar IDSA (MP-IDSA), made a presentation on “Understanding Nepal’s Coalition Shift: Implications for Domestic Governance and India’s Interests” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 6 May 2024. The session was moderated by Dr. Ashok Behuria, Senior Fellow, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA and scholars of the Institute attended the meeting.

Executive Summary

Dr. Ashok Behuria, in his opening remarks, provided a brief and insightful overview of Nepal’s political landscape, highlighting the frequent changes in the administration and the challenges leading to the failure of the previous coalition governments. He discussed Nepal’s two electoral methods - First Past the Post (FPTP) and Proportional Representation (PR) system. After giving a short overview of the 2022 Parliamentary Elections, he noted that no government has ever lasted in power for a full term, which indicates the instability in the Nepalese political system. He drew attention to the diversity in Nepal with almost 135 spoken languages and high representation level of Members of Parliament (MPs), with one MP representing a population of only one lakh. He further highlighted that with the increase in bilateral engagements between China and Nepal, there are concerns regarding China’s growing influence in the region.

Detailed Report

Ms. Sneha M. commenced her presentation with a comprehensive overview of Nepal’s tumultuous political history, marred by divisions in the successive governments. She traced Nepal’s trajectory towards democracy from the time of Absolute Monarchy in 1846 to the adoption of a new constitution in 2015, highlighting significant events such as the Partyless Panchayat system in 1960 and emergence of multiparty democracy in 1990. She highlighted the challenges posed by the emergence of the Maoist insurgency in 1996 which was largely driven by grievances related to poverty, inequality and corruption, and the subsequent transition to a Federal Democratic Republic in 2006-2008.

While giving an overview of the 2022 Parliamentary Elections, Ms. Sneha noted that the Nepali Congress (NC) emerged as the single largest party. Due to differences among leaders for the post of Prime Minister, Pushpa Kamal Dahal, popularly known as “Prachanda”, of the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist Centre (CPN-MC) broke the coalition and joined hands with the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) resulting in him becoming the Prime Minister. However, the coalition collapsed within two months, causing further instability in the country. Ms. Sneha pointed out the political shift in March 2024, when Prachanda formed a new coalition with “CPN-UML”, Rashtriya Swatantra Party (RSP) and Janata Samajwadi Party (JSP) after terminating the alliance with the Nepali Congress. She also noted that a country with such a small population of almost 3 crores, has 109 registered political parties due to the ease of securing just 3 per cent of the total vote share to achieve a PR seat  and become a national party.

Throwing light on the instability in the government alliances, she assessed some key factors which led to the fall of the coalition including clash of opinions between Prime Minister Dahal and NC Finance Minister, Prakash Sharan Mahat, personal interests of leaders, and external pressures. She emphasised how the coalition dynamics have been impacted by Nepal’s complex electoral system and the proliferation of political parties. She also analysed the implications on domestic governance, citing Nepal’s GDP growth having an average of about 4.2 per cent since 2008 which falls short of 7 per cent to qualify as an emerging economy. She elaborated on the escalation of the trade deficit from 14 per cent to over 50 per cent of the GDP since 2008. As a result, she observed that a significant number of young people have been departing the country in search of better opportunities abroad, citing the limited job prospects within Nepal.

Assessing implications for India, Ms. Sneha acknowledged the robust ties between the two countries across economic, security, cultural and strategic domains. India has always engaged with Nepal over mutual interest irrespective of the party in power. She emphasised that China would any day prefer a left party rule in Nepal for its own political benefits. Highlighting recent developments, she emphasised that Nepal's balance is shifting towards China, which is evident in the increased bilateral exchanges and investments.

Furthermore, she stated that the inclination of the current administration towards China is unlikely to impact the bilateral relationship between Kathmandu and New Delhi given that India is still the largest trade partner of Nepal, comprising two-third of Nepal’s merchandise trade and about one-third of trade in services. India is also the largest source of foreign investments in Nepal. However, she analysed that India might lose smooth cooperation with Nepal and experience delays in implementation of projects that India has invested in and funded, in the near future.

Questions and Comments

Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, commended Ms. Sneha for her comprehensive and engaging presentation. He pointed out the significance of the India-Nepal relationship and emphasised on adopting a strategy of aligning with Nepal on issues of mutual interests. Amb. Chinoy stated that allowing local dynamics to shape Nepal’s domestic politics is a better approach for India.  However, he recognised the importance of closely observing regional developments and responding appropriately, as porous borders might be exploited by adversaries to undermine India’s security landscape.

Scholars raised pertinent points such as Nepal's decision to print NPR 100 currency incorporating disputed territories and how it impacts Indo-Nepal relations, the relevance of anti-Indian sentiments propagated by political parties, the role of culture in International Relations. Additionally, concerns related to Nepal’s reconciliation with India’s Agniveer Scheme and the recruitment of Nepalese in the Gorkha regiment were also raised. Commenting on the same, Amb. Chinoy stated that there are enough Indian Gorkhas who could be recruited to continue the legacy of the Gorkha regiment.

Ms. Sneha M. responded to the comments made by the Director General and the questions raised by MP-IDSA scholars.

The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) is organising a lecture by H. E. Dr Philipp Ackermann, Ambassador of the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany under the Eminent Persons’ Lecture Series from 1000-1100 hours on 22 May 2024 in Room 005, Ground Floor.

The topic of the lecture will be “Challenges in Europe and Indo-German Partnership”.

The lecture will be chaired by Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA.

The MP-IDSA Fellow’s Seminar presentation by Dr. Abhishek Mishra, Associate Fellow, MP-IDSA, on “Evolution of African Maritime Security: Imperatives, Governance and Challenges” was held on 29 February 2024. It was chaired by Vice Admiral Satish Kumar Namdeo Ghormade, PVSM, AVSM, NM (Retd.), former Vice Chief of Naval Staff. The External Discussants for the paper were Commander Abhijit Singh, Head, Maritime Policy Initiative, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), and Dr. Pooja Bhatt, Consultant, Ministry of External Affairs and Researcher on Maritime Security and Governance. The Internal Discussants were Ms. Ruchita Beri, Consultant, Africa, Latin America, Caribbean, & UN (ALACUN) Centre, MP-IDSA, and Cmde. Abhay K. Singh, Research Fellow & Coordinator, Southeast Asia and Oceania Centre, MP-IDSA.

Executive Summary

The development of a maritime security agenda for African countries has been relatively new, despite the continent being completely surrounded by water. Following the emergence of the scourge of piracy off the coast of Somalia, African countries and international actors started to pay due attention to ensuring maritime security. Although armed robbery at sea has sensitised the countries of Africa and the international community to the threats in the African maritime domain (AMD), an overemphasis on piracy and armed robbery has skewed perceptions about the African maritime landscape. The challenges today are much broader, and the resultant strategies employed by African countries go beyond tackling piracy. Thus, in the present time, African maritime strategies tend to focus on the common interests of wealth creation and sustainable governance.

Detailed Report

Dr. Mishra’s research explored the potential of the "blue economy" or "blue growth" approach in mitigating maritime crime in African waters. He also examined the evolution of maritime security within the African context over the past two decades.

Previously neglected, Dr. Mishra argued that Africa's colonial past fostered a "sea blindness," hindering a focus on maritime security. He emphasised the ambiguity of the term "maritime security," highlighting the varying interpretations by Till (2018) with hard and soft security distinctions, Bueger's (2015) constructivist approach with the Maritime Security Matrix, and Siebels' (2020) "Tale of Two Regions'' incorporating positive and negative definitions.

He further underscored the criticality of Africa's maritime sector. Firstly, 38 out of 54 African territories are island nations or coastal states. Secondly, Africa boasts a vast coastline exceeding 26,000 nautical miles. Finally, the number and capabilities of actors threatening the African Maritime Domain (AMD) are continuously rising. These factors necessitate a commensurate response at national, regional, and continental levels.

Moreover, while explaining the threats and vulnerabilities of the African Maritime Domain (AMD), he categorised them into three main areas. Governance issues encompass illicit fishing, marine pollution, illegal oil bunkering, and crude oil theft. Security concerns include armed robbery, piracy, and trafficking in weapons, drugs, and wildlife. Finally, humanitarian assistance needs encompass Search and Rescue (SAR), Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR), and out-of-area emergencies.

He then highlighted the Stable Seas Maritime Security Index, which ranks nations based on nine criteria relevant to Africa, including global cooperation, legality, maritime safety, coastal well-being, the blue economy, fishing practices, piracy, illegal trade, and mixed migration via sea.

However, Dr. Mishra acknowledged the ongoing debate surrounding maritime security (MS) in Africa. He said that scholars grapple with a unified definition within the African context. Since 2005, the African Union (AU), Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and the African Union Commission (AUC) have actively discussed the African Maritime Domain (AMD) primarily in relation to piracy. The initial discourse revealed diverse interests and a complex web of African-international relationships. Notably, African RECs have collaborated with the United Nations, International Maritime Organization, and other nations.

He further emphasised Africa's pre-existing engagement in maritime governance. By 2000, 37 African nations were already members of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the continent had a maritime transit charter established in 1993. Additionally, African countries ratified key agreements like the 1974 SOLAS Convention (safety of life at sea) and the 2004 ISPS Code (security of ships and port facilities).

The 2000 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) provided the foundation for the first pan-African initiatives to bolster SAR capabilities. Between 2007 and 2011, five Maritime Rescue Coordination Centers (MRCCs) and twenty-six sub-centers were established in strategic locations like Mombasa, Cape Town, Lagos, Monrovia, and Rabat.

Dr. Mishra also highlighted the significance of informal gatherings and conferences fostering maritime cooperation since 2005. These include the IMO-sponsored Sea Power for Africa Symposium (SPAS), the U.S. Naval Command's East Africa and Southwest Indian Ocean Maritime Security Conference (EASWIO), and the Indian Navy's Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), alongside regional meetings in Sana'a, Muscat, and Dar es Salaam. The establishment of the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) in January 2009 marked a further step towards regional cooperation.

Moreover, Dr. Mishra made a distinction between the Yaoundé Code of Conduct (YCoC) and the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC). Adopted in January 2009, the DCoC focuses on piracy and armed robbery suppression in the Western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden. Its core objective is to facilitate international cooperation through information sharing, training nitiatives, national legislation updates, and counter-piracy measures. The DCoC+, established through the 2017 Jeddah Amendment, addresses additional threats like illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and human trafficking.

On the other hand, the YCoC, ratified in 2013 by 25 West and Central African nations, targets a broader range of illicit maritime activities in the Gulf of Guinea, including piracy, armed robbery, and IUU fishing. Information sharing is a central pillar, achieved through two regional centers: (i) Regional Centre for Maritime Security in Central Africa (CRESMAC) under the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and (ii) the West Africa Regional Maritime Security Centre (CRESMAO) under the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Dr. Mishra highlighted key differences. The DCoC, designed from the outset to combat piracy on the high seas, actively seeks international assistance. Conversely, the YCoC prioritizes preserving signatory sovereignty. Additionally, the YCoC incorporates measures absent from the DCoC, such as seizing assets linked to illicit activities, mitigating IUU fishing, and addressing pollution prevention (a broader maritime concern beyond traditional security). Finally, the YCoC uses the term "signatories," while the DCoC uses "participants."

He moved on to explain Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIM 2050) as a unified effort to revitalize the maritime sector for the continent's development. AIM 2050 aims to leverage Africa's waterways and oceans for the benefit of its maritime industries. Additionally, the African Union (AU) is fostering a maritime security community tailored to Africa's unique needs, experiences, and practices.

He discussed the Lomé Charter, formally known as the African Charter on Maritime Security, Safety, and Development in Africa, signed in October 2016. It builds upon the AIM 2050 Strategy by transitioning maritime security in Africa from a "soft law" approach (non-binding guidelines) to a "hard law" approach with a legally binding treaty. This shift is in contrast to earlier instruments like the DCoC or AIM 2050. Notably, while 25 nations signed the Lomé Charter, only Benin, Senegal, and Togo have ratified it thus far.

In addition to that, he emphasised the AU's focus on promoting sustainable utilization of Africa's ocean resources. He terms the Blue Economy (BE) as the "new frontier for Africa's renaissance," highlighting its significance. The 2018 Sustainable Blue Economy Conference in Nairobi, Kenya, served as a key platform to discuss the applicability of the Blue Economy concept in Africa.

In conclusion, Dr. Abhishek acknowledged the mixed success of various community-based and government-led Blue Economy initiatives in Africa. He argued that social equity and ecological sustainability haven't received the same level of attention as economic benefits. He emphasized that people are the foundation of any successful Blue Economy endeavour. For Africa's Blue Economy development to thrive, it must prioritise social fairness, environmental preservation, and a robust institutional governance framework.

This was followed by Comments from the External Discussants.

Comments and Questions

Following Dr. Mishra’s presentation, the discussion shifted, with Cdr. Abhijit Singh emphasizing the value of the "sea blindness" concept in academic and policy circles. He linked national security postures to global commons management, highlighting how a state's sea blindness or sea consciousness can impact its ability to address global maritime challenges. He argued that fragmented perspectives and challenges to coordination among African nations hinder effective action. He identified poverty and poor governance (extending to maritime domains) as key issues. He also mentioned CRESMAC and CRESMAO as maritime information centers focused on West and Central Africa. He made the case that we have to identify the challenges facing Africa's marine sector and provide a targeted set of solutions. He stated that the lack of an Indian policy perspective in the study is the sole area of concern. Lastly, he said it is essential to assess each of the instruments mentioned above closely.

Dr. Pooja Bhatt then offered insights on Africa's evolving maritime approach. She noted a shift from the basic needs (food, security, and resources) to complex issues like trade, the security of traditional and non-traditional rights, and the intricate legal and technical aspects of addressing these challenges. Moreover, she emphasised the importance of definitions in maritime security. Clear definitions help identify stakeholders and goals, facilitating collaboration. However, excessive focus on definitions can hinder progress. She commended the AU's approach as a valuable model for regional cooperation on maritime security. Dr. Bhatt concluded by urging India to take a leadership role in establishing a dedicated maritime security office within the United Nations, advocating a collective vision from the Global South on maritime security.

This was followed by Comments from the Internal Discussants.

Ms. Ruchita Beri highlighted the historical perception of land as a place to reside and the sea as a passage. This perspective shapes how power and security are traditionally viewed, often neglecting the maritime domain. She pointed to the Berlin Conference's impact on Africa, where colonial powers focused on land wealth and used the seas for resource extraction, neglecting maritime security concerns. She went on to point out the various narratives developed in maritime security, shaped by African think tanks and academics. She urged Dr. Mishra to delve into questions pertaining to the root causes of the conduct of the African nations and the persistence of the problems in the region.

Cmde. Abhay Kumar Singh cautioned against a singular view of African maritime security. He identified two key schools of thought within Africa and argued that security is not solely about laws and standards. Power, strategy, and wealth are crucial elements for effective maritime security, and Africa's challenges in these areas contribute to its maritime insecurity. He asked Dr. Mishra to elaborate on a postmodernist viewpoint, focusing on the rationale for the existence of this information and the reasons behind the state of affairs.

This was followed by Comments from the Floor.

Director General, Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy stated that the whole issue is being explored without delving into the essential question of what it is about Africa's economic growth that genuinely shapes its marine environment. There is undoubtedly substantial economic hardship that exists in the littoral regions, which extends to the marine environment and vice versa. Furthermore, as an Indian researcher studying the topic, he asked Dr. Mishra to consider the Marine Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) and expand on what specific aspect of the G20 proclamation seems to have been tailored specifically for today's theme.

When the house was opened for questions, a question regarding Africa’s opposition to Western-led security formations was raised. The panelists responded by highlighting China's growing role in African security, noting the 2023 China-Africa Security Forum as a point of geopolitical interest to India.

Vice Admiral Satishkumar Namdeo Ghormade concluded the discussion by emphasising the strategic significance of Africa's resources and location. He attributed the continent's vulnerability to a lack of technology, defensive forces, and the multitude of challenges it faces.

The Report was prepared by Ms. Anusha Khurana, Intern, ALACUN Centre, MP-IDSA.

Mr. Mohanasakthivel J., Research Analyst, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) made a presentation on “Ethiopia’s Maritime Aspirations and Regional Implications” at the Monday Morning Meeting held on 29 April 2024. The session was moderated by Dr. Abhishek Mishra, Associate Fellow, MP-IDSA. Ambassador Sujan R. Chinoy, Director General, MP-IDSA and the scholars of MP-IDSA attended and enriched the discussions.

Executive Summary

Tensions in the already volatile Horn of Africa have increased as a result of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Somaliland signed on 1st January 2024 that grants landlocked Ethiopia access to the Red Sea. Any international recognition of Somaliland is interpreted by Somalia as an affront to its sovereignty, because Somalia considers the autonomous region of Somaliland as an integral part of its territory. Consequently, Somalia rejected the Agreement and demanded that it be terminated. This declaration comes at a critical moment when attacks against commercial shipping by Houthi rebels in the Red Sea have increased, which has subsequently caused a severe reduction in marine traffic and commerce in the region. The Agreement is expected to impact Somalia's bilateral relations with Ethiopia and neighbouring Somaliland, but also the Horn of Africa region as a whole. Regional organisations such as the African Union, Arab League, and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have expressed concerns about the Agreement and the possibility of escalating tensions and regional instability. 

Detailed Report

In his introductory remarks, Dr. Abhishek Mishra underlined that the Horn of Africa is on the verge of rising geopolitical tensions and realignment with a number of deals like the Ethiopia and Somaliland deal and the Somalia and Turkiye Agreement taking shape. Mr. Mohanasakthivel J. commenced his presentation by mentioning Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s  address to the Ethiopian Parliament in October 2023 on Ethiopia's marine access. 

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed proclaimed that the Red Sea was Ethiopia's "natural boundary" and that its people could not live in a "geographic prison." He underlined the existential issues linked with access to the Red Sea region, which is becoming increasingly volatile and unpredictable, attracting more actors from far and near due to its strategic economic and political importance. Thus, the Speaker highlighted that being landlocked poses a risk to Ethiopia, as it relies on other littoral states for marine access, protecting its interests, and defending against any national security danger emanating from the Red Sea. Within a week after PM Ahmed’s speech, the Ethiopian Ministry of Peace issued an outline statement, declaring that Ethiopia will take all necessary steps to safeguard port access. Ethiopia's Prime Minister agreed with protecting port access peacefully but cautioned that force may be used if required. 

Subsequently, on 1 January 2024, Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), giving Addis Ababa direct access to the Gulf of Aden. This strategic Agreement cleared the way for Ethiopia to construct commercial and military sites along the coastline. Under this arrangement, Somaliland has leased to Ethiopia 20 kilometres of its coastal land for 50 years. Ethiopia has agreed to provide Somaliland an interest in one of its profitable state-owned firms, Ethiopian Airlines. It is also considering recognition of Somaliland as an independent state. However, neighbouring coastal governments of Somalia, Djibouti, and Eritrea, have raised concerns regarding the Agreement. 

The Speaker highlighted the history of Ethiopia's maritime quest by mentioning that since Eritrea's 1993 secession from Ethiopia, the latter has remained landlocked, thereby putting an end to the Ethiopian Navy which was started in 1950’s. At first, Ethiopia was compelled to transfer its maritime resources to ports in Yemen. However, Ethiopia's naval presence was completely disbanded by the mid-1990s due to its eventual ejection from Yemen and failure to uphold its leasing Agreement in Djibouti. 

Ethiopia remains reliant on the stability of its coastal neighbours due to a lack of its direct access to the sea. Since then, it has attempted a variety of methods to secure access to the ocean. It entered into an Agreement with Djibouti in 2002. As a result, over 95 per cent of its import-export traffic now passes through Djibouti's port via the Addis-Djibouti corridor. Ethiopia also purchased a 19 per cent share in Somaliland's Berbera Port in 2018 as a means of diversifying its maritime access points.

Mr. Mohanasakthivel J. emphasised on the importance of ports for Ethiopia, stating that Ethiopia's trade is strongly dependent on access to ports for international commerce. This is owing to the bordering countries' insufficient capacity to absorb Ethiopian goods. Despite having several potential ports, logistical obstacles prevent their use. In his overview of potential ports for Ethiopia, he mentioned the Ports of Sudan, Djibouti, and Tadjourah, Eritrea's Massawa and Assab, Somaliland's Berbera, Somalia's Mogadishu and Kismayo, and Kenya's Mombasa and Lamu. 

Ethiopia relies on the Port of Djibouti for 95 per cent of its foreign trade, with the Ports of Berbera and Sudan accounting for the remaining 5 per cent. Ethiopia's principal economic channel has been the Red Sea port of Djibouti, giving Djibouti a virtual monopoly on Ethiopian trade. However, Djibouti costs Ethiopia over a billion dollars in port fees each year. This is a large sum considering that over one-fifth out of Ethiopia’s 120 million population relies on food aid. 

With respect to Somalia, the Speaker noted that the arrangement will have an impact on the dynamics of the country's relations with its two neighbours – Ethiopia and Somaliland, with whom it has a history of intra-regional disputes and conflicts. The Somali Government asserts that Somaliland is an autonomous state within Somalia, and that only the Somali Government has the authority to lease its land to foreign forces. 

Somalia considers the Agreement to be an infringement of its sovereignty, and in reaction it has expelled the Ethiopian Ambassador and recalled its Ambassador from Ethiopia.  The Somali Administration also insists that there is no intention of negotiation with Ethiopia and has threatened serious escalation if Ethiopia proceeds with the Agreement. However, a clash between Ethiopia and Somalia seems unlikely. 

While discussing regional dynamics, the Speaker mentioned that Egypt has been critical of the transaction as an obvious infringement of Somalia's sovereignty. President Sisi emphasised that Egypt stands shoulder to shoulder with Somalia and has urged Ethiopia to seek benefits from seaports in Somalia and Djibouti through transitional measures rather than attempting to control another country's territory. Egypt's objection to Ethiopia's deal with Somaliland is partly affected by its ongoing dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile River.

Furthermore, if this Agreement is implemented, Djibouti will experience a decrease in commercial transit as well as a loss of Ethiopian annual fees, as revenues from ports and foreign military bases are Djibouti's principal source of income. Djibouti's port handles more than 95 percent of Ethiopia's trade, contributing to about 75 per cent to its GDP. Djibouti is dissatisfied with the fact that Somaliland has become Ethiopia's preferred maritime and commercial partner. 

With regard to Eritrea, the Speaker mentioned that no other country felt the threat as much as the Eritreans did as both countries have a history of hostility. In 1998, both the countries went to war, which ended in 2000 with the signing of the Algiers Agreement. Nevertheless, tensions developed, as Ethiopia refused to abide by the Agreement, which required Ethiopia to cede territory to Eritrea.

Between 2002 to 2018, both countries were in a state of no conflict or peace. Eventually, Abiy Ahmed and Isaias Afwerki met in 2018, this signified the end of the state of war, resuming diplomatic ties, trade, and travel between the two states. However, cooperation deteriorated as unsolved issues and antagonism persisted. 

Ethiopia's loss of the Red Sea coast to Eritrea fuels fear of encirclement by Arab powers as the Arab League members, including Egypt, Djibouti, and Sudan, control key ports. Potential Arab attacks from the Red Sea ports have seemed to heighten Ethiopia's security concerns. Moreover, Ethiopia has been consistently denied an observer status by the Council of Arab and African Littoral States of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Since all the coastal countries have denied Ethiopia access to sea, the Speaker noted that the littoral states must develop a regional mechanism for the Red Sea rather than relying on their Arab neighbours, who may exploit the current rift. Although the Maritime Treaty may include certain concessions in favour of Ethiopia, the littoral states are unlikely to be interested in providing a naval base other than Somaliland.

It is worth noting that Ethiopia is the security guarantee for Somaliland, although it is yet to recognise Somaliland since the Agreement was signed. Formal recognition could strengthen the UAE's relationship with Somaliland, potentially leading to increased investments and development projects in the region. Recognition by Ethiopia, Kenya, and the UAE may persuade other countries to consider Somaliland as a state. 

Lastly, the Speaker stated that there is no possibility of war in the near future because Ethiopia had lost many of its officers during the Tigray Battle. The country’s military is thinly scattered and faces numerous obstacles, particularly in the Amhara and Oromia areas. Its economy is still struggling to recover from a civil war in the northern Tigray region that ended in 2022.  Moreover, it is facing a severe foreign-currency shortage.

Questions and Comments

Amb. Sujan R. Chinoy, congratulated Mr. Mohanasakthivel J. for providing a detailed picture of regional dynamics in the Horn of Africa, focusing on Ethiopia's maritime ambitions. He stated that, in theory, landlocked countries have the right to reach the sea under Article 126, Clause 10. However, this must be negotiated and transit states must be confident in their own security. As a result, the issue boils down to negotiating with neighbouring countries. Amb. Chinoy inquired about India's stance on the port, considering that the Agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland has significant complications. 

Dr. Deepika Saraswat, observed that the UAE plays an important role in the changing dynamics of the region.

Cmde. Abhay Singh explained the intricacies of the UNCLOS with respect to the status of the landlocked states and transit rights. In addition to that he further explained that Djibouti’s economic reliance on Ethiopia is 75% of its GDP.

Dr. Abhishek Mishra inquired about the international response to the port arrangement. He further enquired about the position of Somalia and the Arab Council on the Agreement. He also inquired how the citizens of both Somalia and Somaliland have reacted to the port arrangement. 

Mr. Mohanasakhtivel J. provided insightful answers to the questions and comments raised by the Director General and the MP-IDSA scholars.

The report was prepared by Ms. Anusha Khurana, Intern, ALACUN Centre, MP-IDSA.