This article posits that military science has been one of the most neglected subjects in Indian history in practice and in scholarship. Greater, popular scholarly focus tends to be mostly on subjects dealing with grand strategy and with it, abstract armchair theorising. While grand strategy is necessary at the political–military level, it is not sufficient as victory or defeat also depends on the capacity of the armed forces to achieve the desired results during the conduct of war.

The defence diplomacy of the United States in the midst of the current war against terror in Afghanistan is designed towards ending the US military operations without ceding total authority to the Taliban. The US-led international coalition of forces, that include NATO forces, have failed to crush the Taliban. On the other hand, Taliban have been unable to force the external forces to quit Afghanistan. The US does not want to quit without the assurance that no second 9/11 takes place.

As the first decade of the 21st century ended, India-Republic of Korea (ROK) relationship has assumed robustness in almost all dimensions – political, cultural and economic. As both countries enter the new year, a new dimension – security and strategic – that began in the preceding decade is likely to be seen in the expanding military cooperation, that began in the closing months of the preceding year. The foundation for such a relationship is already in place as both countries have identified a convergence of interests.

This paper provides conceptual and practical aspects of military diplomacy. It examines India’s recent efforts in enhancing its military diplomacy vis-àvis Chinese military diplomacy conundrum in Asia, especially in South and Southeast Asia. It points out that India’s inability to evince trust and goodwill with its neighbours has led to most of them preferring to employ military diplomacy with China as an India-specific countervailing factor. It argues that India’s military diplomacy is yet to catch up with its rising power status.