India-China War

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  • China’s Wars and Strategies: Looking Back at the Korean War and the Sino-Indian War

    This article explores China’s war experiences in the Korean War and the Sino-Indian War and analyses China’s strategic decisions at the time of its national establishment. This article suggests that China pursued the strategic goal of protecting its frontiers and ensuring its territorial integrity in both wars, while executing dissimilar strategies. The article associates the modernisation of People’s Liberation Army after the Korean War with the outcome of the following war with India.

    March 2018

    Events leading to the Sino-Indian Conflict of 1962

    This monograph presents an objective account of a very crucial six-year period (1956-1962) in the histories of India and China (and Tibet) -- the countries directly involved in the conflict.

    2017

    Even If It Ain’t Broke Yet, Do Fix It: Enhancing Effectiveness Through Military Change

    • Publisher: Pentagon Press
      2016

    Bringing about change in any setup, especially major shifts, is a challenges. This challenges is accentuated further in a strictly hierarchical organisation like the army, presenting an unenviable contradiction to both senior military practitioner and the governing elite, wherein, change is inevitable, yet, it is most likely to be resisted.

    • ISBN 978-81-8274-919-1,
    • Price: ₹. 795
    • E-copy available
    2016

    1962: The War That Wasn’t, by Kunal Verma

    The title of the book is self-explanatory. And the tone and tenor thereof is an implied challenge to the conventional wisdom, and thesis, propounded in India’s China War, written by British scribe Neville Maxwell in the 1970s. According to Verma, in 1949, ‘China was not a player as far as India’s national security was concerned.’ None, except Sardar Patel, could read, or anticipate, China and its plan of action. Hence, the 1962 India–China conflict is ‘least understood’. Exactly a month before his death, however, Patel wrote a warning letter to the Indian Prime Minister, Nehru.

    April 2016

    A Siachen Resolution: Why Now?

    India should put Pakistan on parole and watch its behaviour for 20 years before even beginning to think of any concessions in Siachen or elsewhere.

    November 08, 2012

    The Two Myths of 1962

    In the ongoing debate on the 1962 War, two issues have not been adequately addressed: the myth that the Indian Army had not provided viable military options, and the reasons for the non-use of the combat potential of the Indian Air Force.

    October 31, 2012

    From the Managing Editor

    This issue of the Journal of Defence Studies is being published 50 years after China attacked India across the Himalayas. A majority of Indians and Chinese today do not have any personal memories of the war. Since the war was seen as a victory for China and a defeat for India, it naturally evokes different sentiments in the two countries. For China, it was a punitive strike to teach India a lesson, to make it accept a lower position in the hierarchy of nations and, perhaps, an opportunity to convey its strength to the world at large, and particularly to the two superpowers of the day.

    October 2012

    ‘We Over-imagined the Threat from China in 1962’ : Interview with Marshal of the Indian Air Force

    Fifty years since the 1962 war, reams have been written and multiple perspectives have come to the fore. Yet, the oral history of the time, the leaders and the politics, passed down to us by the generation of officers who saw these events unfold, has never been more valuable. Shruti Pandalai had the privilege of interviewing the highly decorated veteran officer and Marshall of the Indian Air Force (IAF), Arjan Singh, on his recollections of the war.

    October 2012

    Remembering 1962 Sino-Indian Border War: Politics of Memory

    How does India remember the 1962 border war with China? The article argues that there are two ways in which the war is recalled in the country and both of them are betrayal narratives, one blaming the Chinese alone and the second blaming the Chinese expansionism as well as the naive leadership of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. The main focus of the article will be on a critical analysis of the three primary assumptions made by the betrayal narratives: the legitimacy of Indian claims; the unexpected Chinese aggression; and the singular failure of Indian political leadership.

    October 2012

    Enduring Legacy of 1962: Cementing the Conflict of Perceptions in Sino-Indian Ties

    Fifty years since the 1962 war, India and China have moved on to become world powers with engagement and competition characterizing their relationship in keeping with the rules of realpolitik. Both sides argue that the past has been forgotten, yet the border dispute remains unresolved. Despite the rapprochement and robust economic engagement undertaken, the relationship has a constant undercurrent of tension and is often described as fragile.

    October 2012

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