The title of the book is self-explanatory. And the tone and tenor thereof is an implied challenge to the conventional wisdom, and thesis, propounded in India’s China War, written by British scribe Neville Maxwell in the 1970s. According to Verma, in 1949, ‘China was not a player as far as India’s national security was concerned.’ None, except Sardar Patel, could read, or anticipate, China and its plan of action. Hence, the 1962 India–China conflict is ‘least understood’. Exactly a month before his death, however, Patel wrote a warning letter to the Indian Prime Minister, Nehru.

This issue of the Journal of Defence Studies is being published 50 years after China attacked India across the Himalayas. A majority of Indians and Chinese today do not have any personal memories of the war. Since the war was seen as a victory for China and a defeat for India, it naturally evokes different sentiments in the two countries. For China, it was a punitive strike to teach India a lesson, to make it accept a lower position in the hierarchy of nations and, perhaps, an opportunity to convey its strength to the world at large, and particularly to the two superpowers of the day.

Fifty years since the 1962 war, reams have been written and multiple perspectives have come to the fore. Yet, the oral history of the time, the leaders and the politics, passed down to us by the generation of officers who saw these events unfold, has never been more valuable. Shruti Pandalai had the privilege of interviewing the highly decorated veteran officer and Marshall of the Indian Air Force (IAF), Arjan Singh, on his recollections of the war.

How does India remember the 1962 border war with China? The article argues that there are two ways in which the war is recalled in the country and both of them are betrayal narratives, one blaming the Chinese alone and the second blaming the Chinese expansionism as well as the naive leadership of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. The main focus of the article will be on a critical analysis of the three primary assumptions made by the betrayal narratives: the legitimacy of Indian claims; the unexpected Chinese aggression; and the singular failure of Indian political leadership.

Fifty years since the 1962 war, India and China have moved on to become world powers with engagement and competition characterizing their relationship in keeping with the rules of realpolitik. Both sides argue that the past has been forgotten, yet the border dispute remains unresolved. Despite the rapprochement and robust economic engagement undertaken, the relationship has a constant undercurrent of tension and is often described as fragile.