Line Of Control (LOC)

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  • India-Pakistan LoC Ceasefire Decision: A Thaw in Sight?

    Even as the India-Pakistan ceasefire decision on the LoC is in effect, India has affirmed that there would not be any let-up in its counter-terrorism efforts.

    March 12, 2021

    The Cartographic Route to Deeper Strategic Partnerships

    Considering that the US, Japan, Australia and India are committed to working for a free, open and rules-based Indo-Pacific, it is time for India’s strategic partners to review their cartographic positions on India’s borders.

    July 03, 2020

    Severing Gilgit Baltistan’s Kashmir link

    Subsuming Gilgit Baltistan as a province may propel a paradigmatic shift and redrawing of Kashmir strategy across both sides of the Line of Control.

    April 19, 2017

    Cross LOC Strike and India’s Reputation for Resolve

    India needs to factor in the critical issue of reputation for resolve in future crisis situations in order to build its credibility and enhance its deterrence potential.

    October 21, 2016

    Renu Bala asked: What is the scope of cross-LoC trade and the role of the government in facilitating it?

    Priyanka Singh replies: The cross-Line of Control (LoC) trade between the two sides of Jammu and Kashmir started in October 2008 as a result of an understanding reached between India and Pakistan under the Composite Dialogue process. After hectic deliberations, trade was allowed on the Poonch- Rawalakote and the Uri-Muzaffarabad sector. A bus service meanwhile had been underway on both the routes since 2005. The cross-LoC trade is undertaken on a mutually agreed limited list of 21 items.

    Ayan Asked: Why India is averse to UNMOGIP? Does it give Pakistan a moral high ground on the LoC issue?

    Vivek Chadha replies: The UNMOGIP was established after the cessation of hostilities in 1949. It was mandated to monitor the ceasefire between India and Pakistan. However, the mission lost its relevance after the 1972 Shimla Agreement, wherein both India and Pakistan agreed to resolve their differences bilaterally. Pakistan has since gone back on this Agreement and has time and again referred to the UN resolution of 1948 and 1949. It has also attempted to internationalise the Kashmir issue at every possible bilateral and multilateral forum. Pakistan’s reference to UNMOGIP, therefore, should be seen in this context.

    The recent incidents on the LoC are related to Pakistan's strategy to push in terrorists to create disturbance inside J&K. Its actions on the LoC are a direct attempt at inciting violence, despite no instance of provocation from India. Therefore, India reserves the right to take suitable military measures to ensure both the territorial integrity of the country and safety of its people. This reality is well recognised internationally and Pakistan is clearly seen as the perpetrator of terrorism. In this context, India's handling of the issue has led to its recognition as a mature power vis-à-vis Pakistan, which is seen as the jehadi factory not only against India but all liberal societies in the world.

    Pak Army Continuing Proxy War in Kashmir

    Though the Pakistan army denies its involvement in raising violence levels along the LoC, the international boundary and in the hinterland, it is understood well that without the active support of the army and the ISI, no serious attempt can be made by the terrorists to infiltrate.

    October 23, 2013

    Ambush on the LoC: Rethinking the Response

    There have reportedly been 57 ceasefire violations of the LoC this year, which, according to the MoD, are 80 per cent more than the same period last year, and the number of infiltration attempts have doubled.

    August 12, 2013

    Abhinav Upadhyay asked: In the backdrop of recent skirmishes along the LoC, how can India create strong disincentives for such hostile actions by Pakistan?

    Vivek Chadha replies: India faces a challenging environment on the LoC. It is important to understand it, before looking at the means of neutralising or at least minimising the threat. First, there is near parity in force levels. Therefore, any talk of doing a US kind of operation has its challenges. Second, India faces a dual threat of infiltration by terrorists and LoC violations by regulars. This forces the army to deploy for both contingencies. This is not the ideal way of deploying in the area, as the method attempts to do both the tasks well, which is not possible. On the other hand, Pakistan does not face similar threats from India. Third, the geography of the area makes manning the LoC very difficult, especially during bad weather. Fourth, the LoC does not run in a straight line. Its curvaceous nature leads to creation of avenues for easy infiltration. Fifth, Pakistan continuously attempts to maintain instability on the LoC, as it is a convenient sub-conventional advantage it has.

    In view of these circumstances, the following can be done to create disincentives for Pakistan. First, there should be a declaratory policy of measured response to any violation of ceasefire on the LoC. This will create caution against misadventures. Second, the retaliatory action should be punitive and a lesson for future. Third, a clear escalation ladder should be war-gamed to ensure that actions remain within it. Fourth, the threat of border actions, infiltration and raids must be as probable for Pakistan as it is for India to keep opposing forces unstable. Fifth, our forces should be equipped and maintained with the best technology and weapons to create an edge on the LoC.