Counter Insurgency

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  • Compressing Politics in Counterinsurgency (COIN): Implications for COIN Theory from India’s Northeast

    Counterinsurgency (COIN) has long been recognised as a political phenomenon, but current theoretical understandings of politics in COIN reflect ideal types, overlooking the depth and complexity of the politics of insurgency and COIN. Drawing from India’s experience in its northeastern region, this article argues that COIN theory overlooks the political agency and multiplicity of actors, as well as overlooking the fundamentally political scope of interactions that take place between them.

    September 2017

    Marriages of Insurgent Convenience along the Indo-Myanmar Border: A Continuing Challenge

    Marriages of Insurgent Convenience along the Indo-Myanmar Border: A Continuing Challenge

    While decades of counterinsurgency operations and peace processes have taken the sting out of the region’s major insurgencies, collaboration between groups continues to pose security challenges, particularly in the exploitable border areas adjacent to the upper Sagaing Region of Northwest Myanmar.

    August 10, 2017

    Insurgency, Drugs and Small Arms in Myanmar

    The many links between drugs, small arms and insurgency have been widely discussed and addressed by scholars. The literature in particular has convincingly shown how several insurgent groups in Myanmar have used the drug business to finance and sustain their violent movements. Funds generated from drug production and circulation help the insurgent groups to procure arms, and are widely believed to be supporting the protracted nature of these movements.

    January 2017

    Culture, Context and Capability: American and Indian Counterinsurgency Approaches

    This monograph is an attempt to examine American and Indian counterinsurgency experiences through the lens of historical context, organizational culture, and military capability.

    2016

    The Draft Maharashtra Protection of Internal Security Act 2016: A Review

    While the need for re-evaluating internal security holistically is undeniable, it may be appropriate to deal with this matter in the national context.

    September 07, 2016

    Even If It Ain’t Broke Yet, Do Fix It: Enhancing Effectiveness Through Military Change

    • Publisher: Pentagon Press
      2016

    Bringing about change in any setup, especially major shifts, is a challenges. This challenges is accentuated further in a strictly hierarchical organisation like the army, presenting an unenviable contradiction to both senior military practitioner and the governing elite, wherein, change is inevitable, yet, it is most likely to be resisted.

    • ISBN 978-81-8274-919-1,
    • Price: ₹. 795
    • E-copy available
    2016

    Operation Golden Bird: Revisiting Counter-Insurgency on the India-Myanmar Border

    Operation Golden Bird, conducted along the Indo-Myanmar border in the North-Eastern state of Mizoram under the aegis of 57 Mountain Division (57 Mtn Div) in April–May 1995, has often been portrayed as a joint operation between the armed forces of India and Myanmar. In reality, however, this operation was planned and executed by the Indian Army alone, with troops ex 57 Mtn Div and those under operational control of Headquarters Inspector General, Assam Rifles (North) or HQ IGAR(N). The Mizoram police was excluded from the operation, at least in the initial stages.

    July 2016

    Karbi Insurgency in Assam: The Way Forward

    Karbi Insurgency in Assam: The Way Forward

    Over the years, endless corruption, mismanagement of funds, and failure to devolve power to the people has completely jeopardised the unique Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council (KAAC), leading to the rise of Karbi insurgency.

    June 20, 2016

    Indian Army’s Approach to Counter Insurgency Operations: A Perspective on Human Rights

    Indian Army’s Approach to Counter Insurgency Operations: A Perspective on Human Rights

    The Indian Army has undertaken sub-conventional operations, especially counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism for over 60 years. During this period, there has been an evolutionary shift in its approach to such operations.

    Fit for Command: Leadership Attributes for PSO–COIN Operations

    Peace support operations (PSO)–counter-insurgency (COIN) operations are different and often significantly more complex than conventional operations. Such a complexity places greater demand on military leaders both at the tactical and operational levels. The diversity of tasks and threats, primacy of politics and the decentralized nature of PSO–COIN operations have serious implications for both junior and senior leaders.

    April 2015

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