Defence Doctrine

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  • N. Jeykumaran asked: How effective is the new Joint Armed Forces Doctrine of India? What are the likely challenges ahead?

    Vivek Chadha replies: The attempt at releasing a public copy of the joint doctrine must be commended for the challenges that it possibly faced. Given the strong views of individual services, the ability to bring out a document that ably encapsulates the same and yet avoids dissonance was the very challenge that the writers unfortunately did not entirely succeed in achieving. The doctrine represents the common minimum agreement of the services on a set of common guidelines, which rarely goes beyond text book fundamentals.

    Even If It Ain’t Broke Yet, Do Fix It: Enhancing Effectiveness Through Military Change

    • Publisher: Pentagon Press
      2016

    Bringing about change in any setup, especially major shifts, is a challenges. This challenges is accentuated further in a strictly hierarchical organisation like the army, presenting an unenviable contradiction to both senior military practitioner and the governing elite, wherein, change is inevitable, yet, it is most likely to be resisted.

    • ISBN 978-81-8274-919-1,
    • Price: ₹. 795
    • E-copy available
    2016

    China’s Defence White Paper 2013: Lessons for India

    Struggling to deal with a rigid China on the intractable border issue, India would do well to digest the core assertions of the white paper, including the growing reach of the PLA, its professionalisation, keenness to protect overseas interests, modernisation of the nuclear arsenal, and growing role in foreign policy making.

    April 25, 2013

    Managing India’s Missile Aspirations

    The Agni-VI and Prahaar both signify unnecessary missile projects, which have been developed in the interests of DRDO technical and bureaucratic ambitions rather than the stated interests of India’s nuclear doctrine.

    February 10, 2013

    India’s Limited War Doctrine: The Structural Factor

    India’s Limited War Doctrine: The Structural Factor

    The aim of the monograph is to examine the structural factor behind the development of India's Limited War Doctrine. In discussing India's conventional war doctrine in its interface with the nuclear doctrine, the policy-relevant finding of this monograph is that limitation needs to govern both the conventional and nuclear realms of military application. This would be in compliance with the requirements of the nuclear age.

    2012

    Reopening the Debate on Limited War

    The commentary makes the case for reopening the Limited War debate in order to inform explicit articulation of a Limited War doctrine.

    February 29, 2012

    Japan's New Defence Guidelines: An Analysis

    During the entire post-World War II period Japan isolated itself from the ongoing power struggle. Even during the height of the Cold War when its two neighbours – the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China – went nuclear, Japan followed the three principles of ‘not possessing’, ‘not introducing’ and ‘not manufacturing’ nuclear weapons. Successive Japanese parliaments also passed resolutions putting a one per cent GDP cap on defence spending and imposed a blanket ban on arms exports and arms-related technologies.

    May 2011

    The advantages of ‘Cold Start Minor’

    Workable options short of war, as ‘Cold Start Minor’ suggests, would serve as deterrent to informed by the logic of leaving something to chance.

    December 13, 2010

    Cold Start and ‘The Sehjra Option’

    The Cold Start doctrine is an innovative exercise. While Cold Start discusses how to start the campaign, equal thinking needs to attend how to end it. On the conventional level, the learning is that the Cold Start offensives of the integrated battle groups need to be delinked from those of the strike corps. Plausible political aims cannot be visualised that make nuclear risk of launch of strike corps offensives worth running. On the nuclear front, fallout of the scenario considered is on the doctrine of ‘massive’ nuclear retaliation.

    October 2010

    Cold Start as Deterrence against Proxy War

    As long as the sub-conventional deterrence holds, the enunciation of the Cold Start doctrine actually introduces a degree of strategic stability in the region.

    November 22, 2010

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