How have commentators perceived India’s defeat in the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962? What were its underlying reasons? Can the entire blame be cast on China for its surprise attack? Or, were India’s thoughtless actions also responsible? After touching on these questions, this article describes the defence reforms undertaken by India after the border conflict in 1962 in the light of the shortcomings and deficiencies highlighted.

Episodes in the modern military history of a nation need to assist in deriving lessons. At the same time, due to reasons such as fading public memory, local discourse in the area of conflict, non-availability of archival data, poor recording of history, and over-securitisation leads to the creation of myths. This article discusses tactics of victory employed by the Chinese in the 1962 Sino-Indian War. It then assesses the need to sustain capacity for mobility in the Himalayas. It also highlights the fact that local perceptions have not been understood at the national level.

Excepting in a war-like situation when there is threat to national security, unity and integrity, parliamentarians neither have the time nor the inclination to discuss issues that do not have a direct bearing on their constituency or on electoral politics. Besides considering the sensitive and professional nature of the subject, parliamentarians tend to leave the foreign policy issues to the professional diplomats and the foreign policy establishment. But there have been exceptions to the rule in most democratic countries, including India.

When will states bargain while fighting and when will they evade intrawar negotiations? This article addresses this question with respect to the 1962 Sino-Indian War and provides insight into the question of why talks did not occur for the duration of the war. To do so, I analyse Chinese and Indian strategic thinking regarding the prospects of talks in the lead up and throughout the short war, with information gathered through archival work at the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives, interviews with former Indian political and military leaders as well as scholars and secondary sources.

In spring 1962, small numbers of lightly armed Indian troops proactively established presence in the disputed border areas between Chinese Tibet and India, despite intense sabre-rattling in Beijing. What was originally intended as a ‘game of chess and a battle of wits’ in late 1961, eventually ended in war in October 1962. This article discusses the long-term and short-term factors that can help explain why the Government of India opted for the ‘Forward Policy’ in late 1961.

Tibet has always been the core issue in Sino-Indian relations. Even during the 1962 conflict, Chinese leaders, including Mao, acknowledged that the conflict was not about the boundary or territory but about Tibet. The revolt in Tibet leading to the flight of the Dalai Lama to India in 1959 came as a rude shock to the Indian leadership. After the 1962 conflict, the issue of Tibet went on the back burner. The revival of negotiations in 1981 brought the issue back into focus.

China’s cruel repression of the revolt which broke out on 10 March 1959 in Lhasa provoked sharp reactions in India. The mood of agitation that captured the country found expression in the form of a flood of articles, editorials and vivid political caricatures in national newspapers, noted for creating a powerful case in support of the Tibetans and forcefully condemning the Chinese for their imperialistic adventures in Tibet.