There are logical reasons for India to suitably intercede with both its neighours to facilitate an agreement on the border. A mediatory role by India may not be unwelcome by Bangladesh and Myanmar as both have friendly relations.

It all appears that the Indian army this time got clear orders to hold the ground and undo what the previous UPA government did – dismantled huts, bunkers and observation posts in exchange of PLA moving back from the Indian territory.

The response from the Indian side during the recent border incident was much more robust. However, it is important to examine the likely motives that drive the Chinese to raise the ante before the high-level visits to India.

The principal opposition of the Chinese on the McMahon line is that it is illegal and a mere product of British imperialistic designs on China. Such assessments completely disregard the fact that the McMahon line is entwined with the Tibet issue – the lynchpin of China’s territorial sovereignty and party legitimacy

The reasons for abstention go far beyond the immediate issue at hand and are enveloped in deep Chinese strategic interests. The Chinese leadership is adamant that there can be no dilution of the concept of the principle of non-violation of the territorial integrity of nation states in the international system.

Soft border is neither an option nor a means to resolve the India-China border dispute. In Chinese conceptualization where borders are innately strategic frontiers, the idea of soft border is a misnomer. India should keep a distinction between the notions of soft border and boundary resolution.

China has created a furor by announcing the creation of an Air Defence identification Zone (ADIZ) over the Senkakau/Diayou islands in East China Sea. There is now little doubt that China is displaying a muscular foreign policy and most countries in Asia would be wary of a hard response because of the growing dependence of their economies on China.

The new architecture admittedly is a rehash of previously signed (1993, 1996, 2005 and 2012) de-escalatory measures. Most of the Clauses outline mechanisms for exchanging information, consultations about military activities and enhancing communications between border personnel and headquarters.