If the experience of the Afghan–trained mujahids is anything to go by, the threat posed by returnees from Syria and Iraq has the potential to be far more lethal especially since the numbers involved are much higher.
While the Indonesian military played a crucial role in counter-terrorism since the late 1940s, the fall of Suharto in 1998 and democratisation led to the Police dominating this task, especially after the first Bali bombings in 2002. Lately, however, the Indonesian military has reclaimed part of this role, mainly due to the rising threat from the Islamic State.
The study analyses the nature of Southeast Asia-India defence relations, the reasons for the growth in ties and more important, the consequences of the defence relations.
Many Papuans prefer to internationalise their plight and seek a third party to settle the issue as they do not trust the Jakarta elites and Indonesians in general.
This commentary attempts to answer the question as to why the flow of jihadis is unending despite tough measures being undertaken by Jakarta, on its own or in collaboration with its regional and international partners.
Unlike ‘hard’ measures, ‘soft’ ones can succeed in softening the hearts and minds of even hard-core terrorists, especially when they are disillusioned, longing for a normal life, and want to exit from terrorism.
While the notion of Malaysia as an Islamic state appears almost unthinkable, this is exactly what has transpired since the early 1980s, posing serious challenges for the country’s internal and external politics.
Why are Southeast Asians lured to fight for the Islamic State?
If the experience of the Afghan–trained mujahids is anything to go by, the threat posed by returnees from Syria and Iraq has the potential to be far more lethal especially since the numbers involved are much higher.