The overall strategy of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim led by Thuingaleng Muivah and Isak Chisi Swu-NSCN (IM) presents a mixed picture, viewed through the prism of seven dimensions of organization and leadership, mobilization strategy, time, support, terrain, technology, and the issue of legitimacy. While the NSCN (IM)'s mobilization strategy, internal support base and legitimacy have been dented in recent years because of fratricidal killings and increasing criminalization of its activities, the outfit has benefited from the dimensions of time, terrain, technology and external support upon the “extended” duration of the conflict. Therefore, it is likely to sustain itself through its complex hierarchy-based organizational structure, affiliated networks with sympathetic social groups and other smaller insurgent actors in the region, illegal parallel government-like structures in areas already under its control, besides external support. In this context, the article suggests certain policy responses to the continuing challenges posed by the NSCN (IM)'s insurgency.
Unravelling Insurgent Groups' Strategy: The Case of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim in India
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The overall strategy of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim led by Thuingaleng Muivah and Isak Chisi Swu-NSCN (IM) presents a mixed picture, viewed through the prism of seven dimensions of organization and leadership, mobilization strategy, time, support, terrain, technology, and the issue of legitimacy. While the NSCN (IM)'s mobilization strategy, internal support base and legitimacy have been dented in recent years because of fratricidal killings and increasing criminalization of its activities, the outfit has benefited from the dimensions of time, terrain, technology and external support upon the “extended” duration of the conflict. Therefore, it is likely to sustain itself through its complex hierarchy-based organizational structure, affiliated networks with sympathetic social groups and other smaller insurgent actors in the region, illegal parallel government-like structures in areas already under its control, besides external support. In this context, the article suggests certain policy responses to the continuing challenges posed by the NSCN (IM)'s insurgency.
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